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**“What will be the European Union’s Next Move towards Pre-
sumed Polarisation and Intolerance in Turkish Society?”**

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AN ANALYSIS OF POLARISATION IN A RELATIONSHIP WITH GEZI RESISTANCE

Introduction

Gezi Resistance started on 27th of May 2013 and its de facto presence lasted until around 18th of July 2013. It is interpreted to be an attempt towards further democratisation of Turkish society. Millions joined the events that sparked in Istanbul Gezi Park and quickly spread to other cities. Researches show that Gezi Resistance did not have any leader, leading group, or any leading ideology. However, speeches of politicians and bureaucrats exacerbated the angry crowd rather than settling down. They insisted on labelling protesters on the park as extremists, terrorists or looters that are against the wellbeing of the Turkish society. Reasons of why they acted this way could be explained by the aim to show whole Gezi resistance as something marginal rather than a rightful movement. Therefore, their polarising language could be confused by a naturally developed polarisation. Since, this tone of politicians and authorities never changed and Gezi, which started as a collective movement, turned into a process of awakening, even if the ruling party was re-elected. Gezi triggered a process of questioning of the basic building blocks of the daily politics like political authorities, capital holders, media and education. This could be seen as the first observable signs of the birth of a different discourse, which takes its roots from ‘questioning’ and ‘distrust’ to authorities (both politicians and capital holders).

Not only are its effects on the society, its effects on Turkish international relations also important. There is a clear threshold of change of EU’s approach to Turkey after Gezi events. Good relations suddenly clouded by a knife edge approach of the EU to its relations with Turkey. This period triggered many voices against Turkey's membership vs. the voices of the EU bureaucracy to not to abandon Turkey and to stick to rational mind and conduct even closer dialogue. EU read Gezi correctly, however it is refrained from applying unified actions other than condemnations. The reasons triggered Gezi Resistance did not disappear after the events, deaths, casualties or damage. Therefore there is still room for further events, or bigger deficit in democracy. EU’s actions could range from condemns through solid sanctions that could affect Turkey’s future with the EU in both positive and constrained ways. Most importantly, current EU bureaucrats will still be on their desks to vote for Turkish membership and they will be remembering this whole process of Gezi.

Gezi Resistance

The events took spark from the construction project called ‘Project Pedestrian Taksim’, which is designed basically to empty the area from highway traffic, and re-build Topçu Barracks again as a mixture of cultural centre, shopping mall and residence¹. On 27 May 2013 construction in Gezi Park started. Then it is realised that this was not only a construction but also the demolition of trees in the park. This was a small protest until it spread quickly when the police started to use excessive violence and tear gas against passive/peaceful protesters. The pictures and videos were circulated throughout social media via Twitter and Facebook. This gathered thousands of people to raise their objections to this demolition and also police violence. Gezi watch took support from many different portions of the society¹. Considering the

¹ For further information about Gezi Resistance including its history please see my report on SlideShare:

fact that Gezi was a widespread major event happened not only in Istanbul but throughout Turkey, it is difficult to analyse who is protesting what. However major tendencies that push people to join the protest could be listed as follows with the help of researches:

- Protesting against AK Party(Ruling party) or R.T. Erdoğan (Prime Minister)²
- Protesting against police violence
- Against the policies for turning some areas into residences and shopping malls without any public coverage.
- Against the media that turns a blind eye to these ground-breaking events
- To support the people under police violence.
- For reasons related to freedom (either lack of or gaining freedom)

Polarisation Caused Gezi-or-Gezi Caused Polarisation?

Researches indicate that protesters are not representative of the Turkish population. This fact then became one of the points used to describe what happened in Gezi with ‘polarization’ of the Turkish society. On the other hand, researches also support the fact that a high majority of the protesters did not have any ideological affinity³. People did not express themselves with any ideology. Majority of them gave their vote to parties other than AKP in the last elections and this was the only political stand Gezi protesters share together. However, as also shown later, ideology’s role in voting to a party is minor. We could infer that Gezi resistance is far from being put under any type of ideology or political party, especially when we see the exhaust of the protesters to keep political parties out of owning the resistance⁴.

Definition of polarisation is simply division of a group from a unified state to a state of more than one grouping. Sassen states that ‘the top and the bottom occupational groups will increase, whereas those in the middle group will decrease and the gap between the top and the bottom will grow’⁵. However, means of polarisation in societies are varied. O’Loughin and Friedrichs summarise these means as follows⁶: ‘Income, which happens when certain groups in the society are blocked or excluded from the labour market. Otherwise social divisions happen when antagonism between social groups changes in the number, including ethnic statuses’⁷. This happens in two societal changes. One is when an increase happens in the number of different social groups or the second is when population of any of these social group increases’⁸.

Considering these definitions, Gezi Resistance is not necessarily a result of polarisation. In order to identify polarisation in Gezi, there needs to be at least two significantly different groups generally on the basis of income level, educational level, ideology, or ethnicity. In Gezi Resistance, differentiating groups are hard to identify or the groups are vastly varied. There were either not sign of any groupings or existence of many different groups that their populations are not significant. Gezi is not owned or shared by a unique ethnic group. This also applies to socioeconomic status. Researches state that these people also don’t have any ideology or any political view. Even if they strongly tended to vote for the opposition party, majority of them are not member any of the political parties or even NGO’s. What Gezi protestors share in common is that they just joined a protest.

On top of this, polarisation, if not one of the reasons that created Gezi, could be a result or end-product of Gezi. Discourse of politicians and authorities, who were led by Prime Minister Erdoğan, show a clearly polarising tone against Gezi supporters and favour of AKP supporters. According to Bretton and Dalmazone political extremism is often a product of group polarization, and social segregation is a useful tool for producing polarization⁹. Polarisation

<http://www.slideshare.net/burcuwigiter35/gezi-resistanceseptember-2013>

gives signs when a group is politically segregated, which is not necessarily physical but also political. Sassen also says that ‘a good way to create an extremist group, or a cult of any kind, is to separate members from the rest of society. With such separation, the information and views of those outside the group can be discredited, and hence nothing will disturb the process of polarization as group members continue to talk’¹⁰. Therefore, same polarisation definitions don’t value the reasons of Gezi, but can simply be one of the results of Gezi. Discourses of Prime Minister and other ruling politicians indicate an aim to push Gezi people to margins to the level of extremism. In my opinion, they seem to trigger such political extremism to justify the police intervention. Deeper analysis on the discourse of politicians shows that Gezi protesters are shown as the ‘enemies’ of the society and AKP supporters/voters are the ‘citizens/people’ of Turkey who deserve government’s support. Discourse of the Prime Minister Erdoğan during Gezi events stresses these notions about the Gezi supporters. Analysis on discourses of different actors shows how different they read Gezi.

Discourse: Not protesters but looters:

Erdoğan used the name ‘looters’ rather than ‘protesters’ to identify people who joined Gezi¹¹. Symbolism of looters also suggests that there is nothing to protest but these people are ‘looters’, who want to harm Turkey. He also added that ‘*this police are the Turkish police and we won’t let our police to be eaten by them*’. In other words PM of Turkey gives strong support to police; shows police in Gezi as the sufferers and announce the protesters as looters, who are the enemy. They tried to marginalise the protestors to show that neither the protestors, nor the subject they are protesting are coming from the mainstream and average citizens of Turkey, which was clearly wrong. Sometimes this exhaust turned into applauding the violent actions of the police, who are generally taken as heroes among AKP and government.

Discourse: ‘Us/we’ versus ‘people/society’:

Erdoğan’s discourse about ruling and his rule is marked by two very similar notions. One is ‘... *we don’t learn this from you (people)*...’ and the other is ‘...*we know this well/better*’. These two notions are very much used by the prime minister even in most crucial sensitive issues like religion, gender or education. For example he used ‘... *we don’t learn patriotism from you*’ just after the decision to abolish 19 May National Youth Day celebrations on 20th of January 2012¹². He also added ‘*the celebrations had been done before our rule.*’ During Gezi he also used this as ‘... *we don’t learn environmentalism from you*’. This discourse is printed on his expressive style to society as creating an ‘us-the rulers’ versus ‘them-unknown enemy’. People /citizens are not part of the politics or any level of state decisions. PM Erdoğan usually stresses ‘us’ as the ‘know-man’ of the society. This tone, when combined by the acts of limiting the liberties of people, constitutes an important part of why people came to Gezi.

Discourse: Two poles of society-AKP half and the rest

Erdoğan takes the resistance as a war between AKP-half of the society versus non-AKP-half, who were already potential ‘looters’ by not giving votes to AKP¹³. He usually used the name looter to make the Gezi as different as rest of the society¹⁴. He states that he directly ordered the police by skipping the hierarchical order of duty in the state system. By doing this he not only marginalised Gezi, but also takes police closer to his own political system and his party¹⁵. However, polarisation of ‘AKP and R.T.Erdoğan supporters’ vs. ‘who don’t support AKP and Erdoğan’ was not realised since ‘the other pole’, which consisted of Erdoğan’s supporters, did not appear against the protestors. Even if many support Erdoğan and ruling AKP,

they don't take this as an ideology over 'others' or 'protesters'. %50 of people Erdoğan mentioned were the people who just voted for his party; similar to the protesters of Gezi, who just voted for another party and still don't belong to any ideology.

Difference of AKP voters versus non-AKP half of the society

According to a recent survey conducted by Konda Research Company, only a 7% of AKP voters votes because of the ideological reasons¹⁶. In fact, according to the same research, ideology factor among voting is only 4% in Turkey. There is no major differences between Gezi Protesters and so called '%50 of the population' regarding ethnic and socioeconomic status. There are three points differing between AKP voters and Gezi protesters, which are level of education (higher among protesters), age (younger among protesters), and working status (more working among protesters). Since these qualifications cannot be used to marginalise protesters, Erdoğan's speeches target an unknown 50%, who only voted for AKP and doesn't have any polarising qualifications than the rest of the country or Gezi protesters.

Discourse of protesters: Distrust and non-freedom

According to a qualitative research done by SETA (Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research) with 62 protesters at Gezi park even the opposition party voters vote not because of ideological reasons but because they see no alternatives. Same survey also supports quantitative researches of Konda and Genar companies that protesters support Gezi resistance because they think their freedoms and liberties are at stake¹⁷. Researches mentioned previously in this paper uncovered the fact that half of protestors started their protesting when they saw/heard about the police violence ongoing in the Gezi Park. Nonetheless around 15% of them started their protests just after they heard/saw PM Erdoğan's above mentioned speech¹⁸.

Discourse of protesters: Rule (Misrule) of law and Gezi

According to the above mentioned researchers, it was uncovered that majority of the protesters were mainly protesting the police violence, a rather smaller portion was protesting the original subject, which was the demolition of the Gezi Park. Again mentioned quantitative researches also shows that 49% started protests when they hear/see about the police violence and 19% when they see demolishing of the trees in the park¹⁹. Therefore protesters discourse is mainly on the basis of rights and liberties. According to the analysis report of Istanbul Bilgi University Press on Human Rights Law Studies, on August 2013, number of arrested was 3773, number of jailed was 125, injured was 8163, deaths 9(now), number of people who was badly affected by gas or other weapons was 11,155²⁰. Even 50 lawyers that protest the Gezi events were arrested²¹. According to the report, there are 13 different topics of law were violated by the police or the bureaucrats².

A Wounded democracy

According to my point of view, democracy in Turkey is losing its quality to a soft version of dictatorship. Regarding distinguishing democracy from dictatorship is rule of law is an important item. Simply speaking dictatorships do not and democracies do adhere to rule of law. Democracy is strengthened when all citizens are treated equally before the law; a problem in dictatorships is that the rule of law applies to some people but not others²².

² Violations of: Right to Life, Right to Liberty, Personal Security, Freedom from Torture and Degrading Treatment, Right of Peaceful Assembly and Association, Freedom of Opinion and Information, Right to Remedy by Competent Tribunal, Freedom from Interference with Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, Right to Own Property, Right to Desirable Work and to Join Trade Unions, Right to Free Movement in and out of the Country, Right to be Considered Innocent until Proven Guilt

There is the ‘town square test’ to identify democracies. Town square test is: Can a person go to the local town square and speak out freely without fear of arrest, imprisonment and physical harm²³. Other than this test there are many items to distinguish democracies from dictatorships like free elections and free judiciary. However to me the most relevant item to Turkey is the local-town test. Turkey clearly cannot pass the test and it changes its position to a closer position towards dictatorship from democracy. On the other hand, not only on the basis of freedoms but also the jargon and behaviours of the leader of the country also gives signs of the treatments out of the democracy border. This could also count among the factors to trigger people to ask for rule of law above the thoughts of one-man-ruling. Kirişçi for example, states in his post about the Gezi resistance that the protest is a kind of individualism that resents any intrusion into their private lives, such as those attempts by the PM Erdoğan to dictate how many children they should have or what they should and should not be allowed to drink²⁴. Limitations on liberties ban on right to express and freedom of speech, especially knowing that even a comment against PM Erdoğan’s rule will be punished is pushing society to the bulk of polarisation and creates a unique discourse that started to be spoken in Gezi.

Gezi discourse

According to my point of view both the polarising discourse of the PM Erdoğan, which also includes notions of ‘us/we/rulers’ rather than democracy, and the violations of rule of law were the triggering factors behind the Gezi resistance. Interestingly enough none of the PMs discourse or violations of rule of law stopped in Turkey and Gezi Park Resistance left its physical form and turned into a Gezi Process that created a Gezi Discourse. People, who supported Gezi continued to be sensitive to their rights. Signs of distrust to politicians, state and media increased with the disasters and shocking events came one after another like bribery operation in 17th of December 2013²⁵, Soma mine disaster²⁶, death of an Alevi citizen by the police²⁷, and many like this that people read and hear every day increased the sense of being alienated from the democratic mechanisms. This led to a discourse of being alert to any information and looking for passive protests that they can do without risking lives, because after any disaster happened in the country the protests were suppressed with even harsher police violence. Gezi resistance turned into a process of awakening by having its own discourse to show sensitivity, expression and response to misruling of law and limitations in liberties.

European Union’s Discourse: Dilemma of stay or go

European Union is an institution that Turkey wants to be a member since 1963. Turkey is a candidate country and opened negotiations by targeting a full membership. These are very well known facts, however it is important to remind that Turkey still wants to be a member to an institution that its basic value is the ‘rights’ and ‘freedoms’. Relations with the EU are important because it is the only institution that Turkey insists on membership for a long time despite the scepticism of the European countries towards Turkey. This is the only institution that Turkey needs to harmonise its internal political, judicial and social systems to become a member. Therefore, it is important to analyse how EU reads Gezi. It shows the stand of the government on either abandoning the rule of law further or to get closer to EU, which will mean holding to rule of law again.

What has been emphasised again and again in all of the previous treaties of EU and latest Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union(Treaty of Lisbon) is the values below, which are the red-lines of the EU.

This article was inserted right on top of the treaty:

‘Article 1a: The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.’²⁸

This is the treaty that Turkey will sign and article will apply to Turkey too when it becomes a member. Therefore thinking about becoming a member or taking any concrete steps towards membership without preserving and pursuing these values would be wrong. However, throughout the negotiations EU makes sure that the treaty functions well for the candidate country. Turkey has many problematic areas regarding these values especially on the issues related to rule of law.

EU’s discourse showed a 180 degree turn to negative after Gezi. Both Štefan Füle (European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy) and Catherine Ashton (High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) changed their discourses to stress these issues on and on in their every mention of Turkey. Füle builds a clear link between Gezi Resistance and the upcoming negotiation of chapter 23, which according to Füle Turkish Ministry of Judicial Affairs is urging to open. Füle builds this link by simply mentioning that Turkey needs to aspire to democratic standards and apply ‘protection of the rights of all Turkish citizens irrespective of the majority in Parliament at a given time’²⁹. Speech of Füle is backed by a very similar speech of High Representative Ashton and they together put forward the look of Turkish accession process coming closer to another deadlock regarding the political criteria³⁰.

Positive Agenda turned into a mixed picture

In the progress report of Turkey 2013, Turkey is stated to show a mixed picture. Many of the developments were positively graded by the EU. However government’s approach to Gezi resistance is the factor that makes the progress a ‘mixed picture’.

In the report, EU states that *‘The government has tended to rely exclusively on its parliamentary majority to pass laws and decisions, including on socially sensitive issues, without sufficient consultation and dialogue with stakeholders.’³¹*

Mixed picture is still going on with the developments that are not hard to guess to be in the 2014 report with a title of even-more mixed picture regarding respect for freedom of assembly in line with European standards.

Knife-Edge Relations

EU up until today conducted a balanced policy that only covers condemnation. EU is not expected to just sit and only condemn the situation in the reports or speeches. Especially, with the introduction of European External Action Service in early 2011, EU is expected to approach Turkey in a more concrete and solid way.

First of all, EU could freeze negotiations anytime. However Füle stated that the EU aims to follow this topic via Working Group on Chapter 23³². For example, when it comes to closing negotiations for the chapter 23, Twitter cannot be banned, judiciary will be peer reviewed; and massive transfers of police officers, judges and prosecutors will ideally not be as easy or secret as it is today. Secondly, for the longer-term politics Turkey is a strong strategic partner. EU is waiting for Turkey to carry Azerbaijan’s gas to Europe. Agreements signed for

the Project TANAP³. Thirdly, EU might have foreign policy crisis with Russia, Iran or Syria that Turkey, as being a strong member of NATO, could be a buffer to EU's borders with these states. Lastly, EU's current focus is very much turned into deepening of integration; suffice it to say, to a more economic growth than trouble in the borders.

This situation is like a knife-edge that Turkey's strong position has the possibility to push PM Erdoğan for a further antagonism with the EU. As Ülgen also states that 'if Erdoğan believes that a higher level of antagonism is necessary to retain power, he may remain oblivious to the harm done to Turkey's international standing'.³³ This fear is now suppressed by the thoughts of engagement projects to values like rule of law would make things better³⁴.

In order to make predictions one should bear in mind the capabilities gap of the EU. EU is not a major military actor in itself, rather a minor force that deals with humanitarian aid and peace-keeping. This makes EU refrained from bold sanctions toward third parties. Therefore, I expect EU to give higher amounts of financial aid to Turkey during the negotiations of chapter 23 to help functioning of rule of law and develop civil society. Financial aid is the key to fight with polarising tones of ruling politicians and bureaucrats, and also enhancement of a more transparent media. Therefore, I can expect negotiations of chapter 23 to open quickly in the near future and find support from Gezi supporters against a rule that undermines freedoms and rule of law.

Conclusion

Gezi Resistance is, on the contrary of what it seems, not a result of polarisation of Turkish society. People, who joined the resistance, were not marginalised groups especially in terms of ideology, ethnicity or socioeconomic status. Researches showed that protesters don't have a leader, ideology or even a well-defined political view. More than half of them joined protests after they see the police violence. Police violence and politicians' responses to this violent behaviour was not even condemning but applauding. This emphasised that there is malfunctioning of rule of law in Turkey and many rights of Turkish citizens were ignored by the very law makers and executors like bureaucrats, police force and elected rulers.

Gezi Resistance indicated how much people needed a better-functioning rule of law and a freer society. Also it also shows how large a gap Turkey is putting between its system and democracy by getting closer to a softer version of dictatorship; a system that don't allow people to shout their opinions at the town square. This created a new discourse belongs to Gezi supporters. This new Gezi discourse is an end-product of Gezi process that created a segment in the society that is awakening, questioning, and searching, but also had to deal with suppression from the state organs like police and by even PM himself. This is enough to detect signs of polarisation of this Gezi segment in the society versus political elite that is ready to hold this segment as passive as possible. However, Gezi supporters, when left alone by the government, seek higher help and rule of law mechanisms from the global institutions or institutions like EU, which Turkey has still a functioning negotiation map towards membership.

Since it is a matter of malfunctioning rule of law, EU sees the developments as disturbing, but don't take any action other than condemnation. We can expect EU to take more active role if Turkey comes at the bulk of cutting relations with the EU. PM Erdoğan, especially after his party got a victory in the last elections, developed a further self-confidence that could drag him to a higher antagonism. This makes EU-Turkish relations and Turkey's overall political policies unpredictable. Therefore, depending on the level of seriousness of the deviations of

³ <http://www.tanap.com/en/portfolio-items/a-giant-project>

rule of law and approach to dictatorship, EU might put sanctions like visa and economic bans targeting some persons, government or goods. Before that it is very likely that EU will offer aid to promote mechanisms that take Turkey back to a better democratic level. This will support the civil society for re-establishment of rule of law and freedoms, in fact the notions met by Gezi discourse.

¹ Selçuk Oktay, "Topçu Kışlası'nın tarihi anlamı," (Deutsche Welle Türkçe: 13 June 2013).

<http://www.dw.de/top%C3%A7u-k%C4%B1%C5%9Flas%C4%B1n%C4%B1n-tarih%C3%AE-anlam%C4%B1/a-16879025>

² Hakan Güldağ, "Gezi Parkı araştırmaları ne söylüyor? ."Dünya, June 17 2013.

<http://www.dunya.com/gezi-parki-arastirmalari-ne-soyluyor-152314yy.htm>

³ Research of Genar Research Company, "Gezi Parkı Profili," Genar, June 2013.

http://www.genar.com.tr/files/GEZIPARKI_PROFIL-SON.pdf

⁴ Kemal Kirişçi, "Turkey Protests: Are the Youth at Gezi Park a New Actor in Turkish Democracy?," Brookings: (June 2013). <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/06/13-turkey-protests-gezi-park-democracy-kirisçi>

⁵ Saskia Sassen, "The global city : New York, London, Tokyo," (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press,1991).

⁶ O'Loughlin and Jurgen Friedrichs, "The Concept of Polarisation in Social polarization in post-industrial metropolises, ," ed. O'Loughlin and Jurgen Friedrichs (Berlin ; New York : Walter de Gruyter, 1996), 16-18.

⁷ *Ibid*, p.16.

⁸ *Ibid*, p.17.

⁹ Albert Breton and Silvana Dalmazzone, "Information Control, Loss of Autonomy, and the Emergence of Political Extremism, in Political Extremism and Rationality," ed. Albert Breton et al (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2002), 53–55.

¹⁰ Saskia Sassen, "The global city : New York, London, Tokyo," (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press,1991).

¹¹ CNN Türk TV via TRT Haber TV, Tayyip Erdoğan's Speech in Adana, posted by [KingTubeHaberTv](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YQw6ukHnIug) (9 June 2013).

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YQw6ukHnIug>

¹² Akfikir Online Magazine, 20 January 2012, "Başbakan Erdoğan : Vatan sevgisini sizden öğrenecek değiliz,"

<http://www.akfikir.com/gundem/basbakan-erdogan-vatan-sevgisini-sizden-ogrenecek-degiliz-h6552.html>

¹³ Mustafa Küçük, "Başbakan: Yüzde 50'yi Evinde Zor Tutuyorum." Hürriyet Newspaper (4 June 2013).

<http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=23429709&tarih=2013-06-04>

R. T. Erdoğan (Prime Minister): *Now there is at least 50% of this country that we hardly keep in their houses... and we tell them 'be patient...never ever be deceived by this game'*

¹⁴ AA Haber, "Gezi Parkı'nı terk edin çağrısı ," (15 June 2013). <http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/haberler/193490--bu-manzarada-yakip-yikmak-yok> last paragraph.

R. T. Erdoğan (Prime Minister): ...look, we have Istanbul meeting. Look I am saying this very open and clear that if Taksim square is empty it is empty. In case of not empty security forces of this country knows how to evacuate it

¹⁵ Milliyet Tv, "Erdoğan 'Polise talimatı ben verdim," broadcasted by Ege Siyaset (Milliyet, 24 June 2013).

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FZsoyTUcoWU>

R. T. Erdoğan (Prime Minister): ...Where is CHP (opposition party)? ...I returned from overseas. I looked and they (placards) were still there. It was above the bearable threshold. I said to my Minister of Interior 'you will clean the Atatürk Centre of Culture in 24 hours, and then Taksim Square, and afterwards you will clean Gezi Park. They are asking who gave orders to the police-I gave the order to the police. Were we going to watch the invasion forces? Were we going to watch this to let the world to put bells to dance in joy.

¹⁶ Konda Research Company, "30 Mart Yerel Seçimler Sonrası Sandık ve Seçmen Analizi," (Konda: 16 Nisan 2013).

http://konda.com.tr/tr/raporlar/KONDA_30Mart2014_YerelSecimAnalizi.pdf

¹⁷ Coşkun Taştan, "The Gezi Park Protests in Turkey: A Qualitative Field Research," SETA (2013). Insight Turkey volume 15 no 3. <http://www.insightturkey.com/the-gezi-park-protests-in-turkey-a-qualitative-field-research/articles/1416>

¹⁸ Konda Research Company, "Gezi Parkı Araştırması, in T24 Haber," posted by everywhereaksim.net (12 June 2013).

<http://everywheretaksim.net/tr/t24-gezi-parki-direniscilerinin-yarisi-polis-siddeti-oldugu-icin-eyleme-katildi/>

¹⁹ Konda Research Company, "Konda Gezi Raporu," (Konda: Haziran 2014). http://www.konda.com.tr/tr/raporlar/KONDA_GeziRaporu2014.pdf

²⁰ Evren Özer and S. Erdem Türközü, "Gezi Parkı Eylemleri Bilgi Notu-02 Ağustos 2013," (Istanbul: Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, August 2013). <http://arsiv1.tihv.org/index.php?gezi-park-eylemleri-bilgi-notu-02-austos-2013>

²¹ Selahattin Günday and Mehmet Aktaran, "Çağlayan Adliyesi'nde çok sayıda avukat gözaltına alındı," (Hurriyet Gündem Newspaper via Dogan News Agency, 11 June 2013). <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/23481104.asp>.

²² Fathali M Mogaddam, "The psychology of dictatorship," (Washington, DC, US: American Psychological Association) p.19.

²³ A. Sharansky & R.Dermer, "The case for Democracy: The power of freedom to overcome tyranny and terror ," (New York, NY: Public Affairs,2004).

²⁴ Kemal Kirişçi, "Turkey Protests: Are the Youth at Gezi Park a New Actor in Turkish Democracy?," Brookings: (June 2013).

<http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/06/13-turkey-protests-gezi-park-democracy-kirisçi>

²⁵ Constanze Letsch, "Turkish ministers' sons arrested in corruption and bribery investigation", The Guardian, December 17, 2013

<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/turkish-ministers-sons-arrested-corruption-investigation>

²⁶ Humeyra Pamuk , " Turkish mine disaster town under lockdown as death toll rises to 301", Reuters, May 17, 2014

<http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/17/us-turkey-mine-idUSBREA4C0KO20140517>

²⁷ Constanze Letsch, “*Man shot dead at funeral as police and protesters clash in Istanbul*,” The Guardian, May 22, 2014

<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/22/cleaner-shot-riot-police-istanbul-funeral>

²⁸ Official Journal of the European Union, “*Treaty Of Lisbon Amending The Treaty On European Union And The Treaty Establishing The European Community*” (2007).

<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1399275379304&uri=CELEX:12007L>, Art 1a.

²⁹ Štefan Füle, Plenary Session of the European Parliament, “*Speech: Crucial moment in EU-Turkey relations*,” (Strasbourg: European Parliament, 12 June 2013). http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-526_en.htm

‘I call on Turkey not to give up on values of freedom and fundamental rights, and to do everything to avoid undermining the new momentum we aim at creating in our relations. Because, as the High Representative stated, Turkey, as a candidate country, needs to aspire to the highest possible democratic standards and practices, which would imply the protection of the rights of all Turkish citizens, irrespective of the majority in Parliament at a given time. Such an approach should obviously include also the young people in Taksim, in Ankara, Izmir and everywhere in Turkey.’

³⁰ Catherine Ashton, , European Parliament, “*Statement: The latest developments in Turkey*,” (Strasbourg: European Parliament 12 June 2013). http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137451.pdf

³¹ EU-Turkey Progress Report (Brussels: October 2013) pg.2. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/brochures/turkey_2013.pdf

³² Štefan Füle, “*State of EU-Turkey relations: achievements and disappointments*,” European Parliament, EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee, (Brussels: European Parliament, 10 April 2014). <http://www.avrupa.info.tr/resource-centre/news-archive/news-single-view/article/state-of-eu-turkey-relations-achievements-and-disappointments.html>

³³ Sinan Ülgen, “*Erdoğan’s Pyrrhic Victory*,” (Istanbul:Project Syndicate, April 2014)

<http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/sinan-ulgen-worries-that-turkey-s-prime-minister-will-double-down-on-domestic-polarization-to-maintain-power>

³⁴ Marietje Schaake, “*2014: Polarisation, and how the EU lost the progressives in Turkey*”, in Speech at BKB Lecture, (September 2013). <http://www.marietjeschaake.eu/2013/09/speech-at-bkb-lecture-2014-polarisation-and-how-the-eu-lost-the-progressives-in-turkey/>