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"The Turks and the Germans. How does the german domestic Integration politics influence the Perspective on Turkeys EU accession?"

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The Turks and the Germans

How do German Domestic Integration Politics influence the Perspective on Turkeys EU Accession?

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1. Introduction

Turkey's history with the modern European Community has been very intense, after its first application for accession in 1959, as the accession process turned out to be unsteadier than for any other member state.

Within a constructivist discourse[1] the European Union is defined through a common cultural and historical identity. Often opponents of Turkish accession argue that Turkey does not belong to Europe due to its cultural and religious roots. They associate Turkey with 'backwardness' and assume the religious oppression of women in Turkey to be worse than in other candidate countries (see McLaren 2007: 267).

In this context citizens of Austria and Germany the most hostile towards the country's EU candidacy even though they are seen to have the closest political ties to Turkey. McLaren argues that this 'hostility' goes back to the "high level of concentration of Turkish migrants " which contributes to overall negative feelings about the particular candidacy of Turkey. She states, "Where the number of Turkish migrants is higher, the level of opposition to this candidacy will be higher". Because of the experience those countries have made with Turkish migrants (see ibid: 268 - 269).

In my paper for the Jean Monnet Workshop I will argue, that it is rather the domestic political discourse about integration of Muslim migrants and conservative rhetorics than the experience with Turkish migrants themselves, which produce the negative stance towards Turkeys accession among Germans. It is striking that Muslim migrants in

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[1] Constructivist discourse is a discourse in EU enlargement theory. "According to constructivist institutionalism, enlargement politics will generally be shaped by ideational, cultural factors" (Schimmelfennig and Seidelmeier 2002: 513)

Germany are stigmatized as a homogeneous group, that is hardly integrable into the host community. The multicultural and islamophobic discourse as well as the governmentality[2] of othering produce stereotypes against Muslims on the domestic level, which subsequently is influencing the perception of Turkey on an international level. As well as the group of migrants, Turkey is seen as a homogeneous country, characterized by backwardness and conservative values and therefore does not belong to Europe as the 'Islam does not belong to Germany' (see ibid: 267). In the first chapter of this paper I will take a closer look to McLarens explanation for the existence of hostility against Turkish EU accession among Germans. Afterwards in chapter 2 I will outline the history of Germany's integration politics for Turkish migrants and analyse the effect of the used governmentality on the interaction of the Turkish minority and the German majority group. In Chapter 3 I will connect the outcomes of chapter 2 with the results of the Eurobarometer and show that rhetorics and governmentalities, used on the national level, also appear on international level.

Concluding I will discuss that changing the national discourse[3] of multiculturalism into a discourse of interculturalism could change the perception of Turkish migrants nationally and subsequently also change the perception of Turkey as a country in the EU admission process. I will conclude that this change would have a more positive influence on the perception of Turkey's EU accession within Germany.

2. Context

After France, Germany has the largest Muslim minority in Europe. From its population of 82,4 million people, around 3,4 million are Muslims. Out of this 3,4 million Muslims 3 million are immigrants from Turkey and/or their descendants (see Kaya 2012: 39). The Eurobarometer of 2006 shows, that only 16% of the German citizens would appreciate the Turkish EU accession, while 74 % indicate that the cultural differences between Turkey and EU member states would be an argument against Turkey's accession (see Kluth 2006: 26). As in the introduction stated, McLaren sees a correlation between the

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[2] Governmentality is defined in a Foucaultian sense as a "discourse that travels between state, civil society and citizens, that produces and organizes subjects, and that is used by subjects to govern themselves" (Kaya 2012: 211).
[3] Discourse in this paper is defined as a "systems of thoughts composed of ideas, attitudes, courses of action, beliefs and practices that systematically construct the subjects and the worlds of which they speak" (Lessa 2006: 98).

number of Turkish migrants in a country and the level of its opposition to Turkey's candidacy. Subsequently she sees the hostile results of the Eurobarometer based on the high concentration of Turkish migrants in Germany and the experiences, Germany has made with those Turkish migrants (see Mc Laren 2007: 269). She states

> "Instead of creating a climate of empathy for the country of origin of these migrants, high levels of Turkish migration have created a climate of perceived threat to in-group resources and culture that manifest itself partly as opposition to Turkey's candidacy for EU membership". (Ibid: 254)

She argues that actually such migration might provide a "source of sympathy or empathy for the Turkish candidacy" since the citizens of Germany would become more familiar with and more connected to individuals from Turkey. But most analyses

> "of the relationship between high concentrations of immigrants or minorities and hostility to those groups indicates that the former is usually associated with hostility rather than with positive feelings or behaviours". (Ibid.)

She probably refers to the contact hypothesis, which says that spatial proximity of different groups supports interactions and contact. This contact improves and deepens the knowledge those different groups have about each other, and lead subsequently to the reduction of prejudices. But spatial proximity seems not to be enough since conflict hypothesis claims that spatial proximity with social distance could lead to aversion and even to hatred or fight (see Häußermann and Siebel 2001: 73).

Thus the reason for hostility against Turkish accession would not be due to a high concentration of Turkish migrants in a country, but based on the spatial and social distances, the countries majority has to the minority. In the next chapter I will argue, that the reason for the spatial and social distances between German majority and Turkish minority is a result of the failed 'integration' policies of the German government.

3. German Integration Policies

The integration discourse in Germany is dominated by a lot of different governmentalities: from segregation and denying of being a country of immigration over the idea of 'multiculturalism', a holistic concept of culture, the rhetorics of tolerance to the governmentality of Islamophobia. All these concepts are tools used by conservative politicians and media in order to govern society and create distances between German majority and Turkish minority. In the following passages I will briefly outline the history of Turkish migrants from the 60s until today and show how German integration politics

and the rhetorics of German politicians have separated Turks from Germans spatially as well as socially.

In the 1960s Germany and Turkey signed a recruitment agreement in which course hundreds of thousands of Turkish guest workers came to Germany in order to provide a vital and cheap labour supply that boosted the country's booming post war economy. From the very beginning, the German government considered those Turkish immigrants to be guests, who would leave Germany after some time and who will return back 'home'. This assumption was mirrored in the integration politics and in the way, people from Turkey were perceived by the Germans. The guest workers were not provided with language courses and lived in segregated dormitories apart from German society. Through this spatial segregation and through 'preventing' the guest workers to learn German, an interaction between both sides was not made possible.

Contrary to expectations, those guests decided to stay and made use of their right of family reunification (Familienzusammenführung) after 1974 (Ceylan 2006: 29).[4]

The Turkish community began to grow[5] and to develop an identity of its own. The only things that did not change was the widespread attitude among many Germans that these immigrants were still only guests as well as the restrictive integration policies. In the 1980s prominent centre-right politicians such as old chancellor Helmut Kohl made a mantra out of saying that Germany was not a country of immigration (see Angelos 2011: 2). Government policies focused on the "return readiness" of guest workers, resulting in little emphasis on language training, and in offering guest workers and their families money to return to their 'home' countries. Citizenship was denied for children of immigrants being in Germany resulting in a generation of foreigners born and raised in Germany (see ibid.). These practices excluded the Turks from German society and created a picture of the 'foreign' foreigner, who does not belong to Germany and therefore is not welcomed. Furthermore it created claims like "the boat is full" and that Germany should get rid of those inconvenient guests. Still there were not a lot of spaces for interaction between both cultures.

By the beginning of 2000, 40 years after the first guest worker came, German politicians slowly began to accept that the immigrants were about to stay. Policies moved toward

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[4] I do not want to go into historical detail, since I consider the history as known by the reader

[5] not only guestworker families came, but also asylumseeker and refuguees which needed to escape in the cause of the military invention in 1980 and in the cause of the kurdish civilwar in the 90s.

integration of immigrants into the society, emphasizing German-language instruction and improving educational opportunities for children with a migration background. In 2000, Germany many children, born of foreign parents, received the German citizenship at birth[6] and thus political rights. Despite such policies that intended to make Germany a more inclusive society, much of the political rhetoric has remained far behind.

Even though officially the 'integration' of the Turkish migrants was expected, in the integration discourse the idea of a multicultural living together appeared. Multiculturalism actually means the coexisting of two or more cultures, where interaction between those cultures is not intended (Taylor 2013). There is no idea of living with each other, but next to each other. Multiculturalism functions on the base of a holistic perception of culture, which considers culture as something essential, that is naturally given and never changes and therefore is a static entity. In praxis this means that the German government tried to go on with its separation politics and did not take effort to include the migrants into the society. It furthermore gave the intention that there are two 'different' cultures coexisting, which do not have anything in common.

In order to realize such multiculturalism, German society started to 'tolerate' the Turkish community. But other than promoted, to tolerate does not mean to provide the minority with equal rights and to really accept them. From the political side it is rather communicated that if "we" give "them" freedom by tolerating their religious and cultural practices, "they" need to integrate themselves into "our" society, by learning German and accepting the "political ethic of our liberal democracy" (Taylor: 2013). By tolerating Turkish migrants, German politicians alienated "them" as the "other", with a different culture and different values, which are less valuable than "our" Western culture.

According to Forst, there must be a practice, which is judged as bad or false in order to 'tolerate' it. He considers toleration as a relation between an authority and one or more minorities. The meaning of toleration in this context emphasizes that the authority gives a qualified permission to the members of a minority group, to live according to their particular beliefs under the condition that the minority accepts the dominant position of the authority (see Forst 2010:2).

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[6] Although if that child has another citizenship as well, he or she has to relinquish it by age 23 in order to retain German citizenship. But this law also changed recently so that children, who are born in Germany can hold two citizenships.

"As long as their expression of their differences remain 'private' and within limits, and as long as these groups do not claim equal public and political status, they can be tolerated on both pragmatic and normative grounds. (Ibid.)

This means, that if German politicians talk about tolerating Turks, they actually consider their beliefs, their cultural and religious values as wrong and false and create at the same time a picture of a generous country, which putatively accepts the cultural practices of the Turkish minority. These assumptions will subsequently be adapted by the German society. It often comes to problems when those 'differences' do not stay private anymore and become visible. Especially in the context of religion the 'tolerance' of German society comes to its limits. In debates about building mosques or teachers wearing headscarves in school, conservative voices appear and "fear" that "they" may change "us". "The notion that "they" can be equal collaborators in remaking our common culture rings alarm bells in all who share this anxiety" (Taylor 2013). This anxiety is called Islamophobia and often used as a tool. By creating the feeling that the 'dangerous', 'barbaric', 'irrational', 'primitive' and 'sexist' Islam becomes stronger in Germany and will overtake the country, conservative politicians try to "mobilize the majority for their own interests". Furthermore they stigmatize the Islam as 'violent', 'aggressive', 'threatening' and supportive of terrorism (see Kaya 2012: 202-203). The CDU- politician Irmer for example stated "Islam does not mean anything else than submission" (Von Bebenburg 2012 – translated by the author). The CSU politician Stürzenberger went even further when he said, the Muslims wanted to infiltrate the western culture and take over. Which is written in the Koran, one just needs to read it. He compares the Koran with 'mein Kampf' from Hitler and the Islam with the National Socialism (see Halser 2013). Also scholars and intellectuals as the famous feminist Alice Schwarzer stigmatized Islam. According to her, "the headscarf is clearly a political symbol and a tool for oppression" (Jacobsen 2011 – translated by the Author). Thilo Sarazzin, a senior official at Germanys central bank and a member of the Social Democratic Party Germany (SPD) published a highly-controversial book in which "he accused Muslim immigrants of lowering the intelligence of German society"(Weaver: 2010) and said that "no immigrant group other than Muslims is so strongly connected with claims on the welfare state and crime." (BBC 2010). By using these rhetorics of tolerance and Islamophobia, politicians and intellectuals create a social difference between people of the Turkish minority and the German majority, which according to the conflict theory leads to aversion.

According to Taylor these kinds of misrecognition and mistrust for an ethnic minority lead to frustration within the ethnic minority and "may even generate a rejection of the mainstream and its ethnic" (Taylor 2013). The fact that some of the people with migration background are avoiding integration is most probably caused by the failed integration politics and the underlying degradation, alienation, hostility and racism as well as by the given feeling of not being welcome.

The Germans on the other hand, see the Turkish migrants as a homogeneous group, which is different, hardly integrable or even dangerous and thus causes a lot of problems. For them 'multiculti has failed' (BBC 2010). They blame the migrants themselves, instead of seeing the reason in segregational integration politics, the discourse of multiculturalism, the myth of toleration and the rhetorics of Islamophobia. Through these discourses migrants are stigmatized as "the other" and as less vulnerable than the mainstream society. Thus a hierarchy between people with migration background and those without is created.

4. European Discourse

In the previous chapter I showed how the national integration politics of Germany created a distance between the Turkish minority and the majority society in Germany. Because of the lack of contact and interaction, stigmatizing and stereotyping rhetorics on national the level as well as on the international level fall on fruitful grounds. Furthermore the integration politics create the feeling that Turks are not able to integrate into German society and that Turks and Germans are not able to live with each other, without having problems. Following the slogan "if multiculturalism does not function on national level, how should it work on international level", I would argue that these national politics are the basis for the results of the Eurobarometer, where only 16% of the Germans would appreciate the Turkish EU accession and 74% see that the culture of Turkey is too different to be an EU member country.

In this chapter, I will show that the same rhetorics, used in the national integration discourse, appear as well when it comes to the discussion[7] of EU accession of Turkey.

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[7] In this context I will focus on cultural arguments, because other then political arguments as critic on democracy-deficits and the situation of human rights, cultural arguments are more subjective.

Conservative EU-politicians and newspapers "conceive Europe to be a cultural or geographical union" (Steunenberg et. al 2011: 451). In this context they see the identity of the EU based on culture with an explicit reference to a common history and a common heritage. According to the Centre of the European Community culture is seen as an artifact of the past (see Kylstad 2010: 4). As in the national discourse on multiculturalism, a holistic concept of culture is also used in this case. Culture is proclaimed to be something fixed and not changeable. According to conservative politicians, Turkey is not considered to be sharing the historical roots that the rest of EU member states seem to have in common. It is rather seen to be a politically, culturally and historical 'other' (see ibid: 5). In this context Edmund Stoiber, a member of the German CSU, stated for example, "Europe's values must be shared values, culture, and history. Turkey's membership would breach these borders" (Saatcioglu 2012: 170). With this claim he does not only emphasize the otherness of Turkey, but also reproduces the holistic perception of culture and assumes the identity of the EU to be something fix, grown on the base of European history.

Also the Kölner Stadtanzeiger, a local newspaper in Germany, does not consider Turkey to belong to Europe and assumes the incompatibility of Turkish and in this case European culture.

> "Turkey does not belong to Europe, neither geographically, nor culturally. [...] On the one hand Christian-occidental identities in the one hand and identities and way of life shaped by the Islam on the other hand do not fit together" (ksta.de 2009 – translated by the author).

According to Steunenberg et al "ethno-culturalists" often stigmatized Turkey as backward orientated and Turks as "poor, blindly obeying authority, religious and uncultured". They often see the biggest indicator for Turkish 'otherness' in its islamic roots which would lead in the case of EU accession to a 'clash of civilization'" (Steunenberg et. al 2011: 451-452). In this context ethno-culturalists are using the rhetorics of xenophobia, the fear of the foreign (Überfremdung), and claim: if Turkey would be a member, there would come more migrants and overrunning Europe. Sarkozy stated in this context:

> "We have a problem of integration of Muslims that raises the question of Islam in Europe. To say it is not a problem is to hide from reality. If you let 100 million Turkish Muslims come in, what will come of it?' (Hakura, 13.11.2006)"

By saying so, he does not only appeal to the fear that 100 million Turks could come to Europe. He also refers to the 'problems' the national states already have with Moslems, knowing that those arguments would fall on fruitful ground. By putting an

emphasis on the religion, he profits by the national rhetorics of Islamophobia. Also Geertz Wilders, a Dutch right-wing politician and the founder and leader of the Party for Freedom, took the same line, when he said, "There is no equality between our culture and the retarded Islamic culture [...] I want the fascist Koran banned" (Traynor 2008).

Fritz Bolkestein the former Commissioner for the Internal Market of EU said "if Turkey accedes to the EU, then this means that the efforts of the German, Austrian and Polish troops that resisted the Ottoman's Turks siege of Vienna in 1683 would be in vain" (Kylstad 2010: 9). The battle in Vienna was the ending of the expansion of the Ottoman Empire into Europe. By making this statement he not only tries to maintain the common history of Europe and the common enemy in order to strengthen the European identity, forgetting that 2 and a half centuries later, during World Wars 1 and 2, those German and Polish and Austrian troops were fighting against each other. He also constructs a risk which Turkish accession and the subsequent invasion of Turks and Muslims would pose; following the slogan 'at that time we could protect us and our values, but when Turkey will be part of the EU, the Muslims will come a second time to infiltrate us'. This can also be considered to be form of Islamophobia.

This chapter showed, that not only on a national but also on an international level different rhetorics are used, which subsequently lead to hostility against Turks and Turkey's EU accession. All of these arguments are in the line with the national rhetorics in the context of the integration debate. In the next chapter I will argue, that if the national discourse of integration and the perception of the Turkish migrants would change, international argumentation in the EU would not fall on fruitful grounds anymore.

5. Culture of Interaction

As in the beginning stated, stereotypes and mistrust can be reduced by interaction, when spatial and social proximity is given. In Germany, integration politics created first a spatial distance between Turkish migrants and German majority, due to its segregation politics. And later, by proclaiming a 'multiculti' environment under the premise of tolerance, German politicians created a hierarchy between Turkish minority and

German majority, which led to social differences and distance. Both conditions can lead to aversion and hostility, which is mirrored in the results of the Eurobarometer.

In this chapter I will argue that Germany should create a new culture of interaction, which provides spatial and social proximity. Therefore new governmentalities such as interculturalism instead of multiculturalism and recognition instead of tolerance should be considered and applied by politicians.

Multiculturalism as a governmentality creates the idea that two or more different cultures are coexisting. It implies that there are existing two or more cultures, which are different on the one hand, and on the other hand assumes that these would be fix and not changeable. As already mentioned above, multiculturalism is based on a holistic perception of culture, which considers cultures to be natural and given and to grow like trees over time. According to this conception of culture, due to its different roots the Turkish community could never be part of Germany, as mirrored in the exclusion of Turkish immigrants and the non-recognition of being part of Germany.

Interculturalism on the other hand, creates the idea that two or more cultures are interacting. It is based on a 'postmodernist' concept of culture, which considers culture not as being something natural, but socially constructed (see Barth 1960: 15). According to this perception, cultural differences in general exist, but are developed over time and in different environments as well as in distinction to other groups. But those cultural differences are neither fix nor invincible. Deleuze and Guattari consider culture to be a 'Rhizome' and criticize the traditional essential holistic perception of culture (see Deleuze/ Guattari 1987: 5).

> "A rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things, interbeing, *intermezzo. The tree is filiation, but the rhizome is alliance, uniquely* alliance. The tree imposes the verb "to be," but the fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction, "and . . . and . . . and..."
> (Deleuze/ Guattari 1987: 26)

This implies that a culture is nothing fixed and a culture or a society never "is", but "becomes". According to this post modern perception of culture, cultures are formed and developed within processes of interaction and thus the Turkish community in Germany already is or can become a part of the German society. Some of the German politicians already use this perception of culture as Christian Wulff, the former president of Germany, when he stated Islam is a part of Germany. If German more politicians would use this perception of culture, they would create a more inclusive atmosphere since everything can become part of 'us'.

Furthermore interculturalism promotes intercultural interaction. Interculturalism as governmentality would thus imply to create spaces, in which the 'different' cultures could meet, communicate and build new identities and even cultures. Edward Soya or Henri Lefebvre call these spaces "third spaces". By promoting interaction, these spaces would reduce the spatial as well as the social distance and support an exchange of experience, which would strengthen mutual understanding. These third spaces would create a base for learning and common identities would be created, which would not only lead to a common 'we'-feeling but also reduce stereotypes and prejudices. Islamophobic arguments would subsequently not fall on fruitful grounds anymore, since people of different faith would get to know each other and the picture of the 'dangerous Moslem' would disappear.

On another level, multiculturalism and tolerance lead to a hierarchy, which sees the German majority superior to the Turkish minority. It creates the feeling of two coexisting cultures and the image of the 'more powerful' German society in the position to tolerate the 'inferior' beliefs and practices of the Turkish minority. By 'tolerating' these 'false' believes and cultural and religious practices, German politicians create also the idea that Turks would be different. These rhetorics have not only an influence of the 'feeling of being superior' within the majority, they also have a deep influence in the identities of the members of the Turkish community as Charles Taylor describes in his article "The politics of Recognition":

> "Our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves" (Taylor 1994: 25)

Therefore the task of the government should be to create an atmosphere of recognition in which individuals of both groups are considered to be equal. The majority therefore should not tolerate the beliefs and practices of the minority group but respect and accept it (see Forst 11). According to Taylor an atmosphere of recognition cannot be created within a multicultural society, since multicultural societies often lack (perceived) recognition of the equal worth of one group by another (see Taylor 1994: 63). When two or more cultures coexist, it often comes to the point that the majority culture is superior and imposes its will on the minority culture. Therefore he recommends interculturalism as governmentality.

Instead of creating a hostile, separated culture of communities, the government should rather create an intercultural atmosphere, with third spaces, in which the members of those different cultures can communicate and interact, in order to generate new cultures and new spaces. Therefore it is necessary that all members of a society are considered to be equal, in terms of their rights and the weight of their voices.

Interculturalism would also allow the society to "develop in ways which it wouldn't if only the native born were in charge". The interaction of different cultures will hold a lot of potentials, as the people from other cultures will contribute "new ideas, new skills, new insights, which will enrich our society" as well as transform our own culture (Taylor 2013).

If these new governmentalities will be successful on a national level, it will also influence the attitude towards the EU accession of Turkey. If the people in Germany see, that Turkish and German culture is compatible on a national level and they can easily live together, islamophobic as well as xenophobic arguments would not fall on fruitful ground. If Turks and the Islam can be part of Germany, due to a new proclaimed perception of culture, Turkey and the Islam can also be part of Europe. And if people see that an intercultural society has a lot of potentials, they would see similar potentials for the European Union.

6. Conclusion

This paper dealt with the hostility against Turkish EU accession to the European Union. In the following I will summarize the most important outcomes.

The results of the Eurobarometer, in Chapter 2 showed, that the countries that are most hostile towards Turkey's EU accession are those with a high concentration of Turkish migrants. 74% of the Germans, for example, see the reason for a rejection in Turkish membership in the cultural difference between Turkey and the European member states. While McLaren traces these results back to the experience those countries have made with Turkish migrants I see the problems more in the German integration politics.

In Chapter 3 I outlined the different governmentalities and tools used in the German integration discourse. There it became clear that German politicians create a spatial and social distance by using the governmentalities of segregation, multiculturalism, the notion of tolerance as well as Islamophobia. These spatial and social distances again create according to the contact and conflict hypothesis stereotypes, prejudices and

aversions, which can even end up in hatred or fights against the German-Turkish minority.

In Chapter 4 I connected this self-produced aversion on the national level with the hostility on the international level. There it was argued that national politics following the slogan "if multiculturalism does not function on the national level, how should it work on the international level", are the basis for the results of the Eurobarometer. Afterwards I took a look at the argumentation of the European Union level and found out that there similar rhetorics appear. Besides the emphasis of the cultural differences between Turkey and the rest of 'Europe', xenophobic and islamophobic arguments are used in order to create a fear of the possibility, Turkish Muslims could take over.

In Chapter 5 I argued, when spatial and social proximity is given, the stereotypes and mistrust can be reduced. Therefore German politicians should create a new culture of interaction, by changing governmentality from multiculturalism to interculturalism and by creating an atmosphere of recognition instead of tolerating the Turkish community. Furthermore German politics should provide third spaces for interaction of minority and majority groups in which the members of those different groups can communicate and interact, in order to generate new cultures and new spaces. This interaction also holds a lot of potentials, as the people from other cultures will contribute new ideas, new skills, new insights, which will enrich the society as well as transform the own culture.

These positive experiences on the national level will lead to a different perception of Turkish migrants, which subsequently will lead to a different attitude on the international level. The European as well as Turkish culture will no longer be seen as something fix, which can not be developed. Subsequently Islamophobia and xenophobic arguments will not fall on fruitful grounds anymore and concluding: Turkey can become a part of Europe while Islam can become a part of Germany.

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