



## **Conference and Workshop: European Union but How?**

**(Social Democratic-Leftist Perspectives on Europe) 31.05 - 01.06.2013**

**31st May 2013, Friday**

**Istanbul Bilgi University, Santral Campus**

**Organizers: FES, European Institute, SODEV, TÜSES, and KÜYEREL**

Time: 10.00 – 12.30

Location: E1-301 - Conference Hall

### **Program**

10.00 – 10.15 Opening Speech: Dr. Nils Schmid

Deputy Prime Minister of Baden Württemberg and leader of the Social Democratic Party of Germany in Baden-Württemberg

10.15 – 12.30 Opening Panel: The Dream of a New Europe?

Moderator: Ayhan Cingi

Discussants: Dr. Ernst Hillebrand (Germany), Dr. Glenn Gottfried (GB)

Prof. Dr. Zoltan Pogatsa (Hungary), Nikos Kaskavelis (Greece)

Prof. Dr. Ayhan Kaya (Turkey)

12.30 – 13.30 Lunch Break

I. Workshop: A Europe for Pluralism and Human Rights

Moderator : Dr. Esra Arsan

Location : E1-302

II. Workshop: A Social and Solidarist Europe

Moderator : Belma Akçura

Location : E1-303A

III. Workshop: A Europe for Peace and Solidarity

Moderator : Bekir Ağırdir

Location : E1-304

13.30 – 14.30 Lunch

13.30 – 14.30 Workshop (Continued)

14.30 – 14.45 Coffee Break

14.45 – 15.45 Workshop (Continued)

15.45 – 16.00 Coffee Break

16.00 – 17.00 Workshop (Continued)

17.30 – 19.00

Moderators, minute takers and organizers working together to revise the results. (Not open to public)

1st June 2013 Saturday

10.00 – 12.30 Sharing of workshop results and Forum discussions.

Moderator: Hüseyin Çakır

# Conference Presentations and Transcriptions

**Moderator: Aydın Cingi**

I will speak in Turkish based on an agreement we have reached. As you know, the European Union in fact is a major accomplishment and a major performance of human history. For the first time, a group of countries came together for the European Union around an axis of common values and they left behind past conflicts. Human rights and the principle of law was the main focus of this union which is important. Here we will be discussing the possibility of a new Europe. I will take you back to the 31st of May 2003, which is tomorrow 10 years ago. Jürgen Habermas, a leading thinker Jacques Derrida, they published papers in 2003. One was published in Frankfurt *Meine Zeitung*, the other in *Liberacion* newspaper in France plus Umberto Eco published in *Repubblica* Adolf Ushk in another newspaper and Fernando Savater published in *El Pais* so they all published papers in these periodicals. Four months before that on the 31st of January in 2003, eight countries of the EU led by the UK and Spain had announced that they were not supporting the policy of the US in Iraq and they reacted. Their aim was to have the EU conduct an autonomous foreign policy, which would be based on shared values. Because they believed that the best thing about Europe was its culture and shared values. Since then the EU has indeed been trying to come up with a shared foreign policy although we can discuss whether or not it has been fully accomplished. But going back to the issues discussed by Dr. Nils Schmid discussions currently do not really revolve around those shared values but rather around finance. Today we will mainly talk about values about pluralism, solidarity, and a human-driven society basically. After this session, we will be holding workshops actually three of them and then tomorrow we will bring together the findings of those workshops and we will come up with a joint opinion text. Now let me briefly introduce the speakers to you. On my right, Dr. Glenn Gottfried graduated from California University in 2001 with a degree in political science and his masters is from Sheffield University in the area of political science and international relations and he specialized in research methods. Currently, he works in the Institute for Public Policy Research and he continues his research in this institution. Dr. Ayhan Kaya, he is a member of faculty here at Bilgi University. He is from Marmara University. He has bachelors and masters degrees in International Relations. His PhD is from Warwick University and he currently teaches at Bilgi University and is the director of the EU Institute here and he also heads the Jean Monnet Department and he is also a Professor at Malmo University. On my left, we have Nicos Kaskavelis. He specializes in management, policies, and labor law in EU relations. He has masters degrees. He works as a lawyer in Greece. He is a former PASOK member but currently he is a member of the newly established social democrat

party. And at the same time, he works for Forward Greece which is a Nongovernmental Organization. Dr. Hillebrandt works in Berlin within Friedrich Ebert. He is the director of the International Politics Analysis Department. We cooperate with them actually. Prior to that, he was head of the Eastern and Central European Section of Friedrich Ebert. He worked in Paris, London and Santiago de Chile. And we also have Professor Doctor Zoltan Pogatsa. He specializes on Development, Social Policies and European Integration. He works in Hungary. He is a member of Faculty at the Western Hungary University in the Department of Economics. The floor will now firstly go to Dr. Glenn Gottfried please.

I think we will need one or two minutes for preparation of the slides. So we will rather be practical and begin with Dr. Kaya. Thank you, as usual I forgot to make some comments I should have at the beginning. As the speaker said, in the latter part of his speech, the objective of this meeting is to talk about the new and different types of European Union. However, we would do so from the perspective of social democrats. I should have brought that up, shouldn't I? We should make that point very clear. A second point: the speakers are asked to speak for an average of 15 minutes, please. I do not want to interfere in your presentations but may I ask you to please keep your presentations to 15 minutes. This would make sure that we get enough time to take some questions and we will also give you the opportunity to reply to the questions. At this point, I would like to give the floor to Dr. Gottfried for his presentation.

### **Ayhan Kaya**

On behalf of Istanbul Bilgi University, I would like to say welcome to all of you. I will try to be economical in my use of my time limits so I will read my text to you. My aim in this presentation is to look at the 20th and 21st centuries, looking at the economic and political crises in Europe and to come up with a general assessment of those crises and to look at the discourse and ideologies produced by governments during crises and what the left or social democracy did. Actually, there is an assumption that the left was able to overcome the economic crises in Europe. Likewise, the current crisis can also be solved based on values of human society, welfare, justice, employment and rights. So, in other words, my assumption here is that socioeconomic and political problems are not really cultural or religious. But rather, because that is what neoliberal understanding says. Rather we can take these crises and problems out of religion and culture axes. Since 1970s, structural problems have not been solved by neoliberal states. Neoliberal is not fully legitimate anymore but it still continues with its presence. But the neoliberal government has not really done a good homework so a populist, conservative right and in fact a racist axis is what revolves around neoliberal governments

now. Especially in EU countries, an extreme right and racist wave has been widespread now. I think the main reason behind this is the fact that neoliberal governments have not done a good homework. So I think, we should conduct an accurate analysis here. We shouldn't focus on symptoms but rather on root causes. But this is not sustainable, because there are separations, and tensions, and incidents like the slaughter in Norway. So I will try to focus on those and lastly I will focus on the following. Perhaps today the most important function of the left is to end the quote and quote civilization, religion, and cultural-based discourse. So, perhaps the left can today serve to create alliances in an attempt to render politics tool to combine rather than bring apart. The Great Depression in the 1920s and 1930s, created differences in the discourses of Europe. So, vis a vis, left parties in the UK and Germany for example, right-wing parties were able to win elections and populist and extreme right-wing parties either came to power or were stopped from coming to power so the Depression definitely had an impact on that. In Germany, for example social democrats in 1920s were giving messages that revolved around agriculture and villagers. In Sweden, the social democrats who shared the same roots with the ones in Germany rather chose a large societal alliance to overcome the Great Depression. And they included the rural strata of the society into this alliance. So political choices were different after the Great Depression. In Germany, the political choices after the Great Depression took us to Nazism whereas in Sweden the choices of again Social Democrats were different and it created an entirely different tradition. After the Second World War, Social Democrats had to make choices. After the Second World War, there was a lot of destruction. And there were some social movements and they had to decide whether they were supposed to go with the waves or resist the social movements. We can look at England. In social sciences, citizenship and social classes paper was written by Marshall. According to Marshall, after the Second World War, the UK tried to heal itself looking at Keynesian economic policies and tried to offer free of charge education and health services. And it tried to heal itself through social rights. 1950s and 1960s were years in Europe where social rights were made widespread and governments were sort of trying to get the approval and consent of their own citizens. During those decades, economic growth was accelerated. Hannah Arendt, and other social scientists were talking about an end of ideologies. So there was some optimism in the 1950s and 1960s. And as known, in 1973 after the Arab-Israeli War, in 1974 the big global oil crisis erupted so that optimism came to an end. In 1970s, the global oil crisis, unemployment, inflation, low growth rates and the end of the welfare state were all main themes. And gradually the state became minimum. So the state started moving away from the realm of economy just as welfare distribution. These were not the main concepts anymore. Rather people started talking about prudentialism, individualism and privatization. After the fall of the Soviet Union, in 1980s and 1990s then we saw a wave of more nationalistic, ethnic-based, local

and religious movements through globalization. And this caused the legitimacy of nation states to be questioned. Beginning of 1970s, Jurgen Habermas was talking about a legitimacy crisis. Actually for the most part, such a legitimacy crisis still continues today. Post-modern waves, globalization, the consumption ideology, and multiple modernities have been popular terms. But there is a lot of questioning ideological and class-based questioning of such concepts of course. The European Union was actually established with an economic aim in mind. But at the same time, it found itself in a circle of conservatism, racism, nationalism, and xenophobia. Starting in 1970s, Islamophobia and xenophobia came to the forefront. After the oil crisis in 1973, OPEC countries diminished their exports of oil to the West and they tried to punish Western countries, thinking that they had supported Israel during the War. But at the same time, some Western societies looked at the Middle East and the Muslim countries and they held them responsible for the crisis and the oil crisis that they had experienced. And they channeled that resentment towards Islamic communities and the Muslim communities in their own countries creating xenophobia. All of these adversities in time deepened all these problems. On the one hand, the Cold War had ended. So the syndrome of a foreign enemy had come to an end at the same time. So governments in order to maintain their own power had to create new enemies. So they sort of created the concept of the enemy within us, thus focusing on immigrants in their own countries. At the same time, Muslims and immigrants started experiencing more unemployment and they were seen as the root of violence and tension. For example, in 1991 we will remember that the then Chancellor of Germany Helmut Kohl and his government looked at unemployment in Eastern Germany and his government said that it was mainly Turks, who had caused this unemployment in Germany as a result of which xenophobia again started to rise. And similar discourses, I am not going into its details but in Holland, in France and in a number of other European countries similar discourses were experienced at the same time, you will remember. But as a result of this, I should say that incidents such as the massacre in Norway are being observed today. I personally believe that that incident in Norway was a turning point, and such a discourse based on Islamophobia or the internal enemy syndrome based on otherness is a major problem and it has now become self-destructive for Europe so it cannot be sustained. Islamophobia is becoming more widespread. Social life is becoming more conservative and the conflict of civilizations or alliance of civilizations are popular themes so the tolerance discourse is becoming more popular. So at the same time, when we look at the Turkey-EU relations, Turkey has always underlined a role of bringing different civilizations together or acting as a bridge but we should have a different perspective into this thesis of alliance of civilizations. Looking at the same concept from an anthropological viewpoint, we have to remember the Bosnia Herzegovina war in 1990s, so Samuel Huntington came up with a follow-up that it is not possible for Muslims and

Christians to co-exist. I would argue that such a perspective is very reductionist and simplistic. It is not really that different from the thesis of conflict of civilizations. The assumption here is that as you interact with other cultures and civilizations, you try to make sure you do not lose your own identity. But it is a holistic cultural notion so I would argue that both concepts both the concept of conflict of civilizations and the alliance of civilizations are based on a holistic understanding of culture as a notion. Within the last 10 or 15 years, the concept of civilization has been reduced to culture and religion we have to remember. In Norbert Elias and in the Ziya Gökalp also, in the 19th and 20th centuries, civilization and culture comparisons were being held. They were seen different. But today's civilization is synonymous with culture which is synonymous with religion. So this has now brought us into a debt and which causes us a number of crises today. In this last section of my speech, I will focus on social democracy mainly. Towards the end of the 1980s, under the concept of a new world order, we have observed that a liberal capitalist understanding is becoming more widespread and deeply rooted in the world. Because of the fact that the Cold War ended, ideological conflicts, total nuclear war threat or armament, the need for armament are not major threats today. So these have been removed from the agenda. We would rather have other items on the agenda such as the concept of national security for example. The security discourse of the Cold War era has now been confined into nations and societies. So this concept now revolves around a possible threat against a public order in a given country or society. So this is a general belief that societies are under a certain threat as a result of which there is a fear that is born towards the other in a given society. And this concept of national security is used as a tool to manage or to administer societies. In France, in Germany, in Ireland, in Austria, this concept of securitization if you will is being used as an instrument. And inevitably, when we look at the discourses of Sarkozy, Merkel, Cameron, what we see is a theme of multiculturalism bashing. So this mainly threatened by some criticisms mainly coming from the right but partly from the left as well. So, all in all I think we can elaborate as follows: Today it is possible to come up with different definitions of Europe: On the one hand, based on I have seen there is a conservative Europe and at the same time there is a liberal and social democrat type of Europe. As we define the conservative Europe, we mainly look at Christianity, singularity, tradition, history, homogeneity, physical geographies, cultural unions and national borders. And within this definition, there is no place for what is different such as Turkey or Islam. But looking at social democrats and the kind of definition they have developed, what we see is plurality, cultural differences, a shared future, democracy, human rights, secularism, and a political geography. So on the one hand, there is a singularity-based thought of Europe, idea of Europe. Whereas there is another understanding of Europe which is based on interculturalism. Actually, Europe was reborn after the Great Depression in the 1920s and 1930s. Then, the European Union

was established after the Second World War. And after the oil crisis, in 1970s it became even stronger so Europe was able to overcome these crises. So, instead of the interests of the nation states the interest of the union was on the foreground up until the year 2000. Since then, things have changed because right political formations have been mainly bringing about a nationalistic and populist type of discourse and they sort of stopped the interests of the Union from being brought to the foreground. In the 2008 crisis, probably because of these reasons, the European Union was not able to take fast decisions, which caused the crisis to deepen further. So today, when you look at the EU experience, the EU experience is actually all in all an experience of being reborn after crises. So after and after, it is still the second largest economic entity in the world we should remember.

And lastly, a Europe which is not afraid of differences, which does not see singularity as a virtue and which does not see differences as a threat and such an understanding of social democracy is what we need even more today. This is not only needed for the modern Western democracies today but also for the kind of democracy that Turkey needs. Today, we have more conservatism, more racism, more nationalism and xenophobia. So, vis a vis such a phenomena, we need a better social democracy which has been able to renew itself. And this is also needed for the European Union. So, a kind of conservatism which is based on past references rather we should base the new understanding of the EU on political, secular, and cross-national codes, which I believe will help the European Union get out of the crisis. I thank you all for your patience.

### **Ernst Hillebrand**

Thank you very much for giving me the floor and thank you for all of us for being here and listening. I will focus as the other speakers about the perspective of what can be the design or the direction of a more progressive vision for Europe and it is nice to speak immediately after Nicos. Because I think we will disagree on many points of what he has been saying. So it gives a bit of an impression of how broad the discussion can be as well for our own camp not to talk about the public opinion or political opinion in Europe as a whole. But, first of all I want to make one point. I think the discussion about the future of Europe is not a right or left political issue in reality. It is an issue much more about the elites against many of the ordinary citizens. I think that is the real divide that you can see today. Just as an example, take the United Kingdom that Gottfried has been talking about. You have the city of London, the financial business sector that is totally in favor of keeping the United Kingdom in the European Union. You have all the political parties, the leadership of the conservatives which represent the money and the power in this country that is clearly in favor large in a majority to keep the country in the European Union. You have the Labor Party that is in favor of keeping the country



in European Union. And you have the LibDems as a political force to keep the country in the European Union. You have the academic elites that want to keep the country in the Union. So it is rather a question of the elites against many of the ordinary citizens who feel that they are disempowered politically and socially within the institutions of the European Union. And that is a similar picture for many other countries. Perhaps not that clear as in the United Kingdom but a similar picture in many other countries so we have to understand that that it is a question of the function of elites and the power and the money of elites that have been behind the European integration since its beginning. And against ordinary citizens who feel that they lose some of the political empowerment that has been constructed in the democratic nation state of the 20th century that they will lose this little bit of political empowerment and social and economic protection enshrined in the nation state that politicians can be held accountable by the democratic road and that they will lose that with the European integration. That the real question how we can convince people that they will not lose out the pluses of European integration concerning their political empowerment, their social welfare, and their economic prosperity. That is the real question.

Of course we all would agree that what Nils has been saying at the end we all wish that a Europe may rise again. Everybody wants that. Nobody wants a poor, or weak or a conflict-ridden Europe. The question is what the intelligent arrangement is to get that strong and prosperous Europe. And that is the whole debate should be around. For me in that sense European integration is a means not an end. For me any kind of political approach has to pass the test of utility for what in the end are the aims of Left politics. What do we want as Left? We want that people live in peace that people have a decent life that they live in prosperous economic and material conditions that we have a welfare system that protect people against the pitfalls of life, the risk of life against poverty, misery and we want to have societies where we live in individual freedom and with maximum of political empowerment so that we can really exercise our rights as sovereign people and decide about the major political orientations and institutions of our society. This is the utility test also that the European Union has to pose is it positive is it useful in that sense If not I am not interested in European integration. If it is not useful to strengthen political empowerment, if it is not useful to strengthen prosperity, if it is not useful to strengthen peace and stability in Europe of course I have no interest in that instrument as I have no interest in the traditional nation state if it fails to pass that test of political utility. We have to think any kind of political institutional arrangement from the question is it useful from a left or progressive political project. And that we have also designed a European Union that we conceive from this end and have a political union that is useful in the sense of empowering people, assuring peace and stability on the continent, assuring economic

development and growth and assuring stable social welfare systems. I think in this sense of course much of the skepticism of the population defined right now according to all of the opinion polls in Europe stem from the fact that people just do not see European Union any longer as very useful instrument in this sense. I think people feel that in social sphere European Union has been as a neoliberal project is in fact since 1980s because it has been executed by politicians and governments and bureaucratic elites that have been deeply and thoroughly inspired by the dominance of neoliberal thinking. In the social sphere, it has not been very useful to uphold social protection system that we have been creating in the post-War period. So it has not been a useful instrument to give people more social protection but I think it has been rather effective that has been destabilizing national welfare systems. In the economic performance, it is not convincing either in the last 10 years. Today the part of the OECD world with the lowest growth rates. And that is not a proof of economic performance. And of course if we compare the economic performance of the European Union to the rest of the industrialized world, it is not really impressive. I mean we did not catch up with the US. Other non-European EU member countries have had a higher growth rate, I am speaking of industrialized countries. So it is okay but it is not really a tremendous success story. In the last five or six years, the Euro has really become a problem for growth in the Eurozone. And then of course the question of political participation, if you look at the opinion polls, people feel disempowered. They have much more trust in national political systems than at the European level. They feel that they have a little say a little influence in national political democratic system. But they feel much less influential when it comes to European politics. So it is not really an instrument of empowerment for ordinary citizens but rather they see it today an instrument of disempowerment. So I think we have to take act of these facts and integrate this in our own thinking and our own concept of how we want to construct a future progressive approach to European integration. Because we all want to restrengthen Europe, we all want to make sure that the European Union again becomes a problem solver and not a problem creator in a certain sense. And all our energy should rotate around the question how we can make the European Union legitimate again in the opinion of ordinary citizens and make sure it is really a problem solver and not a problem creator. So I think our future approach to European integration should be based on two principles. One is the classical principal of subsidiarity. We should build the European integration on the principle that the thing that can be best solved regional level should be solved by regional political unit, those things that can be solved by the nation state should be solved by nation state. And only those things where we really need European integration corporation between the European nations and state should be transferred to the European level. That has always been a strong German approach to European integration but in the last 15 years I think it has been a bit reversed and we have taken a transfer of

sovereignty that goes way beyond the principle of sovereignty and transfers powers to the European Union that are not necessarily well-placed there. I think there are a lot of questions that we can still solve at the regional, local, and national level as a centralized European level. Generally speaking the 20th century has shown that centralized solutions generally are not more efficient than decentralized solutions. If not the Soviet Union would have been an extremely successful experiment. So I think decentralization has its place and subsidiarity must have a central place in our political thinking about the European integration. And then the principle, I think for each step of European integration we have to think systematically does it harm for our clientele for the people we represent politically. That is something that has not been happening in the last decades. First, European integration has become an end in itself. We wanted this bloody European Union, this deeper integration. We did not always as political force think about what does it do to the people we represent politically and economically. And I think we have to re-integrate this principle of Do not Harm. Do not harm to the national welfare system, do not harm to the economic situation of ordinary citizens when you go further in the direction of the European integration. So what I think for the time being given the fact that European populations are very skeptical at the moment that the economic contradictions of the Eurozone will grow in the coming years and not diminish that we have not solved one of the basic problems of the Eurozone in economic terms. I think we should be very cautious when we talk about deepening integration. I think we have to think hardily about reconcile democratic legitimacy of the process with the necessary efficiency of the European Institution. So I would argue that we should conceive for the time being Let's not talk about an ideal city on the hill. But let's talk about the coming years because that is where we have to decide how we want to proceed. We should think carefully, we should respect that people are skeptical towards Brussels institutions. We should take care that national parliaments play a strong role in this process because these are the institutions that are legitimate in the eyes of the ordinary citizens and that national governments do not transfer too much of a sovereignty to Brussels. This will destroy. It is not because I don't like it. I am afraid that too much of transfer of national sovereignty in the given moment in time will rather destroy the strengths and the legitimacy of the European integration process. So that is why I would plead for social democrats to be rather cautious and not be too voluntaristic in the approach for the coming years. So I leave it at that level. Thank you very much.

### **Glenn Gottfried**

Thank you. The reason I am standing here rather than talking sitting at the table is because I brought a few slides I thought might help just to make it a bit more interactive. I will try to limit my time around 10 minutes to keep the average around 15. But what I thought what I will discuss a bit today

is to go into a bit of a detail about the British context, just simply giving everything you are probably reading about in the news and seeing Britain is a reluctant partner in Europe. Right now, there is a debate whether or not to have a referendum of whether Britain should leave or not. And despite its ambivalent relationship, I think a lot of this has to do with the Left and Labor Party in particular have approached Europe through Europe's very existence. What I will talk about is just a little bit historical context in Europe and also about the current mood of the public and what they are acting against. And hopefully, by the end, I will get into some ideas for reform for bringing the people back into Europe. So Britain has always been an ambivalent partner in Europe. Its entry into Europe wasn't until 1973. 15 years after the Treaty of Rome. Even then it was challenged by a first referendum in 1975, which did pass. Britain did not join the social charter until 1997, eight years after most member states joined it. And obviously we all know about the various opt-outs that Britain has taken at least in Economic and Monetary Union as well as Schengen. In short, British leaders have always been incremental and cautious when it comes to approaching Europe. And today, although a significant proportion of hostility towards Europe is coming from the Conservative Party, it was the Conservative Party that actually brought Britain into Europe. It was in fact the Labor Party that was more hostile and split in the early years of the European community. When Europe first began in 1958, when Britain shows not to take part, labor and the trade unions saw it as a capitalist club. They thought that this would impede on socialist policies thus Britain should stay as far away from it as it possibly can. Even Hugh Gaitskell, who was the leader of the Labor Party in the 1960s said that joining Europe would be the end of a thousand years of history, which is quite a strong statement from a leftist leader. When Britain eventually did join Europe under the conservative government of Edward Heath, labor demanded a referendum on this. And eventually, in 1974 Labor won the election after it took two elections in 1974 to get a majority and Labor won partly by putting a manifesto, the promise of a referendum on the European Community. However under new negotiations, Harold Wilson managed to do this. He went to the negotiating table and managed to get some reform around the cap. And then eventually advocated a Yes vote in the 1975 referendum which did pass. By the late 1970s, when Britain was somewhat under chaos through strikes and recession and the rise of Maggie Thatcher in 1980, Labor saw itself on the outs of governance for a long time. By the mid 1980s, when Maggie Thatcher was negotiating the single European Act, Labor was very very split over whether or not it should continue to deepen its relationship with the European Union. Despite this however in 1988, Jacques Delaure single-handedly changed all this. He spoke at the Trade Union Congress in 1988 and he spoke and advocated of a different Europe not this neoliberal Europe that Margaret Thatcher was going on about, but about a social Europe, a Europe that protected rights for workers, a Europe that

protected rights for women, that health and safety regulations. What it was the social Europe would protect the very essence that Thatcherism was attempting to peel away. This is a new moment for Labor. This is when the Labor became the pro-European party of the United Kingdom. Many might argue however that this might have been more pragmatic than ideological in a sense that because Labor was not near getting into government, they foresaw the European Union as a way to protect social policies rather than more deeper ideological reasons for more commonality with the rest of the European nations. From this point on however after Labor again lost the 1992 election, the Conservative party became more and more split over the European Union which eventually many saw as harming John Major and his governments while Labor was looking for a more open relationship with the European Community. By 1997, Tony Blair rose to power. Although he was a pro-European leader, his Chancellor of the Exchequer was still a bit reluctant to deepen Britain's relationship with Europe. Some might remember the five economic tests he set forth about joining the Euro which were essentially a set of tests that Britain was unlikely to meet in terms of meeting the inflation rate and so on. So he essentially helped make the Labor Party go further into desiring more of widening Europe, adding new member states rather than deepening Britain within Europe. Now despite all this, despite Tony Blair being more pro-European than his predecessors from the Labor Party, the overall party leadership has been very very quiet on the European issue the most of a last decade. And a lot of this has to do with a given hostility that has risen within public attitudes that Europe has just something that the Labor Party did not want to discuss. And this came out a consequence for Britain. Because what happened was as pro-Europeans as the Left decided to stay out of the European argument not engaged with the public, this left a massive void for Euroskepticism to grow. So, people that stood on the right of the Conservative Party would start banging on about anti-European sentiment that Europe was going to drag down Britain, that Britain was going to lose its cultural and economic history. Labor did not counteract and engage within these conversations about it. So essentially, the anti-European media, the anti-European politicians were able to grasp the public and gain their attention rather than pro-Europeans managing to do it. Even today, as we are getting closer as it looks like a referendum is likely going to be inevitable, opposition leader Ed Miliband still won't cite what he means by reforming for Europe. He said that he desires to see an outlooking Britain which engages with Europe and engages with the rest of the world. But what he means by engages nobody knows. So this is what has come out as a consequence of the Labor Party not engaging in the European issue. Brits are grumpy about Europe. What this graph shows is over-time from the mid-1980s a graph showing whether or not people sounded that EU membership a benefit in their country and on average you can see that in Europe in most countries people thought that Europe benefited their country while in Britain only early 1990s did it

was it ever positive. So in Britain for most of its history at least when Eurobarometer was taking these polls that most Britains were seeing Europe as a negative thing. But now Britain is not alone in this. Here in this graph you can see with this depicting asking about the democratic values of the European Union whether or not my voice counts in the EU, the set of respondents in UK are overwhelmingly believing that they have no say of what happens in Brussels but this also exists to some large extent to in other countries. So despite Britain being the largest Euroskeptic country in the European Union, this is evolving in other countries. As a matter of fact, in the latest Eurobarometer Poll which I do not have a graph here unfortunately for, you could see that trust in the European Union is dropping and it is dropping at an increasing rate particularly since the 2008 crisis. But it is getting worse and worse and worse. But there is some hope for the future at least within Britain. Brits do see that closer cooperation with the European Union in certain areas particularly on global issues is important in areas such as climate change, counter terrorism, organized crime, protectionism against the rise of Asia. These are all things that Britains see that they need closer cooperation with the European Union on. However, the case still needs to be made for a closer social and economic issues particularly with migration as well. To make the case that the Left need to stand up and make the case for what they envision what Delour presented them on the social Europe aspect that they need to engage with Britain. It really seems that the only way that this is gonna possibly happen is that the Left shouldn't fear the potentiality of a referendum happening. Because when debate happens, when people are discussing Europe when the Left is actually making its case for Europe support for it goes up. And I take this example from January when David Cameron actually made his European speech stating that he promises that if the Conservatives win in 2015 that they will hold a referendum by 2017 on European membership. You can see in the months running up to this, most British were in favor of leaving the European Union. However, when Cameron made his speech when people started talking about it when pro-European business leaders came out and made the case for Europe when other pro-Europeans on the Left came out that change for the first time that more British were in favor of staying in Europe than were leaving Europe. Now this goes to prove the point that when the Left engage with the public on the European Union that the public will listen and understand that it is in their benefit to stay within the European Union. To do this, the Left needs to revive reform and my colleague Will Straw at IPPR released a great report on making the case for Britain to stay in in what areas a reform that should be looked at by the Labor Party and by the Left. First of all, he makes the case that it needs to be around substance and structures. So diplomatic energy should be focused on non-military threats including things like climate change, organized crime and terrorism, protection against the rise of Asia and irregular migration. These are the things that the people can grasp onto that people feel that close

cooperation needs to be made. Ultimately, they see the European Union acting and doing something positive.

Second of all, Europe needs to be focused around growth. As we have been stating the unemployment figures for youth around Europe is abysmal and it is only getting worse. If we do not act and show that Europe is going to be focused on growth rather than austerity that most conservative elements within Europe are taking forward right now, you are bound to lose a generation of people supporting the European Union. And one of the ways to do this is that Europe should focus on including a commission of growth that funding goes straight into industries and region areas that require such growth. This would be a way for motivation for showing that the European Union is in fact acting in the people's best interest even during times of austerity where national governments have a little flexibility.

The reform needs also focus on the democratic deficit, various ways that we have looked in to IPPR by including a single figure from the party group in the most votes in 2014 European election in parliament should be the next president of the commission and council. In other ways, by rebalancing EU's institutions away from the commission with the power initiation reciting in the Council and directly elected parliament as well as individual commissioners being accountable by their own national parliaments for work of the whole mission. So this shows that what would happen is that commission from each country would go under more or less a parliamentary meeting where parliament is able to question the commissioner on issues that are surrounding the European Union and what they in fact do in Brussels. Also there needs to be better regulation, renewed focus on improving stock and flow of regulations should undertake and with regulations being scrapped. On a simple majority council vote, national parliament should be given enhanced role on blocking legislation and identifying all legislation that could be amended or repealed. A national consultation should take place to advise list of EU legislation as citizen's votes would like to remove or significantly amend. But despite all this, the case for Europe needs to be a new one. The old arguments are no longer going to be standing with the younger generations. The idea that peace and prosperity are not going to reinvigorate young people like they did in the 1950s and in the 1960s. Unless we have a Europe focused on growth unless we have a Europe focused on emphasizing the common values that Europeans share one another then I believe that Britain should heed as a warning to other member states that this is what can happen when you disengage with the public. Although it does not look like that other member states are showing such hostility towards Europe as the British currently are if you give it too long if you have an entire lost generation of young people that see Europe not working for them that they do not recognize the values that holds that

they do not see the protection of social democracy that entails then we are in danger of losing project altogether. Thank you.



**Michael Meier**

Ladies and gentlemen, I think it is time to start. Let me welcome you on behalf of the organizers and especially on behalf of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation Turkey Office to this conference on the future of the European Union from a social democratic leftist perspective on Europe. I am very happy to welcome you to this conference and especially I am happy to welcome the guests who joined us from outside of Turkey . We have amongst us guests from Germany, from Greece, from the UK, and from Hungary. It is a privilege for me to welcome as our guest speaker delivering the opening speech, the deputy prime minister of Baden-Württemberg, one of the sixteen regions in Germany and at the same time the leader of the Social Democratic Party of Baden-Württemberg Nils Schmid who will right now give his thoughts on Europe from a Leftist Perspective. I can say that Nils is not only working and being here as his functions as the leader of the Social Democratic Party of Baden-Württemberg but he is also a member of a tiny but very important coordination group which is the coordination group on Turkey in the Social Democratic Party of Germany and I know from own experiences that Nils was also always very interested and well-informed about events in Turkey. This might have to do with his better half, which is of Turkish origin but there might be other reasons as well.

I am asked to announce that you are welcome after this event to join the working groups in the afternoon. In order to organize the working groups, you can put your names on the list which you will find outside. This is just an announcement. Now without further delay, let me give the floor to Nils Schmid. Please Nils.

**Nikos Kaskavelis**

Hello to you all. First of all I would like to thank you for your invitation to this conference in this great and historical city. It is a real pleasure form e to participate and share a few views in this really vast discussion and matter. Discussions like this are taking place widely in Europe and contribute to the formation of a new reality concerning European affairs and explore possible paths for socialist and social democrat parties in order for them to regain the place as key or dominant players. To recapture the contact with social processes that are occurring everywhere now, regaining a certain amount of trust and express a new political vision for the years to come, these gatherings help us all exchange views and information and coordinate towards a common goal in our future. Let me not forget the upcoming election next year, the European elections. My own remarks would be more of

a political context and less technical reflecting the experience that I gathered from my country, Greece and the overall discussions that take place over there together with some personal opinions concerning the topic we are approaching. This issues will just be mentioned and hopefully we will be able to elaborate during our discussion.

To start, I will have to stress that if we conduct this discussion a few years ago, it will be a totally different one a more theoretical debate concerning different approaches, theories, and opinions about the European integration process, about the social democrat identity and role. This is not the case any more. Now we are dealing with a specific situation that the shake in the very core of fundamental beliefs and system, a situation that puts into doubt formally considered as certain or secure paths. I am talking of course about the crisis that we experience. A crisis that started a debt crisis mainly concerning sovereign debt and this continuously transforming and taking different shapes with a social one, social crisis being the most threatening and dangerous of them all. So we cannot talk about the future of Europe or the related future of socialist oriented opposition reality outside the context of this present crisis, that sets an outline for the initial approach. I am saying initial because after having answered the main question of how to address this issue, we must describe a new reality through a new vision for our countries, for Europe as a whole. My approach consists of general points that give a new atmosphere or context when dealing with these affairs, European politics and of course specific oppositions concerning institutional or other forms necessary. To present you a few facts and information about what is being happening in Greece, not all that you see in the media exactly I am sure you understand that but certainly you get the general view. I can start by saying that these public debates about European policy and perspective were not so common in Greece. The public debate was very poor and so was the awareness of European affairs. This had to do with the objectives and interests of domestic political parties that held the agenda on domestic issues and all other issues were presented through that spectrum. All good arriving from the EU has been presented as a direct result of our efforts and bargaining skills. All bad heavy adjustments were imposed from the distant and faceless Brussels. The discussion was mainly an elite or academic issue, unreachable to the general public. This started to change but not completely. These observations, the media is also partly to blame are not without relevance to what we now experience in Greece. When presenting the current situation, we must face that the crisis is deep and threatening basic political and social accomplishments of the past decades. These last few months we seem as a country to stabilize our fiscal issues, our major problem for the past years. And this starts to reflect our international reputation and national credibility. But the social cost we face seems unbearable. Due to the timetable given to us by the Troika in order to achieve specific

measurable goals, we had to make profound changes and adjustments to a vast variety of domains that affected deeply and practically everything in no time.

It is true that Greece had built a not viable in the long term system with a living standard way above its natural nationally produced and owned capacity. But what has been proven during these years this wasn't a unique case as it was presented in the beginning. We all know of course that it has its specific characteristics that are unique and we can talk extensively about the Greek one later but it is now in our common knowledge that there was a systemic problem that had to do with an initial, incomplete architecture with the European institutions and mainly those concerning the Monetary Union. It is also clear now that in order to completely change a system that has been working in specific bad way for decades and this was common knowledge since there is enough European and international monitoring mechanism that following records and data more time and flexibility is needed if not the consequences in the real economy have to be paid: the social unrest the same and the social support that is needed in order for the reforms to be accepted in adopted in the long term extremely uncertain. So right now, three years after starting implementing the reforms we will talk about their political orientations that is far from being described as a socialist one. We are in a place where unemployment rate is around 27.2 percent, that is a European record. Here we have to stress the rate among young Greeks, that surpasses a rate of 60 percent. And the total recession we suffered is over 20 percent of the GDP, and will reach 25 percent probably in this year. To have an idea of what this means, we can see a comparison that renowned Bloomberg recently made, comparing the situation with the Great Depression in America and Germany in the years 1929 and 1933. The outcome of the Great Recession is well known and the cost for Europe and around the world were tragically great. The consequences of the situation are complex. What can be traced that are in the areas of focus of this conference. Some of these assumptions can describe and represent many other countries but will remain to what I know from personal day to day experience. Among other things, we witness a vast decline of the trust towards the political system in Greece and other institutions, a strong increase in the support of extremism and especially the far Right, you know the Golden Dawn party in Greece that progressively gains higher percentages on public opinion researches, and a decline in European Union support. This lack of trust towards the European Union Project is not of course a dominant or majority phenomenon. It does not affect the overall support of the importance of belonging to the Euro area. But the experience is negative. We have to keep in mind that until a few years ago, the Greek society was among the strongest supporters of the European Project according to Eurobarometer. What happened that we are now witnessing this dramatic shift: the crisis happened of course. To enter a bit more political topics, this path that we

took was not without objections. Other countries like the USA or now Japan preferred other methods reflecting partly different approaches. The European answer then dictated from the ruling majority of Conservative parties focused on budgetary discipline and austerity measures. The first obvious victim of that was the social welfare system of countries in need. This phenomenon is in fact a main issue for today and for the days to come. The European welfare system was until recently our main accomplishment and pride, the social leftists' contribution among the modern world and the competitive advantage of Europe. To step away from it is to step back from history and to step back from keeping in touch with public feeling and need. To quote a comprehensive article from a distinguished Greek MP, the conservative policies that were implemented in the US and Europe and the world through GATT and World Trade Organization since 1979 namely deregulation of markets deprived governments of resources with direct effect to the financing of the social welfare state. The result was the overborrowing from the markets in order to keep financing that need and all that led to our current situation. So a key issue that we need to discuss as social democrats concerning the EU globally is the issue of regulations. It is now time for a more comprehensive and democratic regulation for the markets. This specific issue is a fraction of the overall discussion about the major debate the battle between politics or even democracy and market economy, who has the upper hand and dictates what has to be done. Lately the common belief is that the economy took the lead and dictates almost everything. Politicians seem to play a secondary role proposing inadequate measures. So in order to express and stress our main points and even listen to this new era, we must focus on two topics: First the way to build and finance let's say through this financial transaction tax that we are preparing for so long and a new welfare state targeting to those in need designed in ways that maximize social inclusion, and secondly the way to deepen our democracy both in national and European level through new institutions that re-assure the direct involvement of citizens to the European Project and decision-making. The so-called elite-driven process that brought us here has expired. The theoretical debate about a democratic deficit in the EU is now a practical debate that has to be solved today. Otherwise, the future might lead us to undesired places and this magnificent historic experiment could experience a drastic downturn. These last few weeks, we witnessed a shift concerning the overall approach towards the remedy we are using towards prices. Many key politicians starting with Barroso few months ago and other state officials like the Italian Prime Minister or French Minister of Finance stress now the importance of a policy that focuses mostly on growth. The German Minister of Finance admitted that there is room for maneuvering now. A proof of the shift is the extension provided to several countries to administer their deficits. This conceptual shift should be our objective too.

We also witnessed efforts to address the abovementioned unemployment problem. We saw yesterday a meeting in Paris between Angela Merkel and Francois Hollande about this issue especially concerning young unemployment. This issue directly poses a threat to the very existence of EU, should be the core of our presence, as social democrats. I read another article from Mr. Hillebrandt the other day who predicted a great future for the German social democracy in SPD even for demographic reasons. That provided that it could give concrete answers to the abovementioned issues. All socialist parties should focus on that without forgetting that we face the following paradox. From the one hand, experiencing the consequences of the crisis produced by conservative parties and failed policies and from the other hand socialist parties have not been able to pass their own agenda and benefit from the situation. To conclude with propositions, our preferred answer to the crisis is to step forward and finish where we started several years ago with the formation of the EU and the Monetary Union. The answer is not less but more Europe, a democratically ruled Europe with complete institutions. For example a normal European Central Bank, a unified political authority, a European Federal Union where solidarity will not be seen as charity or generosity but as a common internal policy. We can see the example of the US for that. This is not to say of course that it does not exist today. That would be unfair but sometimes the procedures and even the attitude that is present are more important than the cold application of theoretical principles. Empathy is a term we could use. Furthermore, we want political processes that will ensure the political involvement and interference of citizens like a general election for the president of a commission for example and reassure the debate that proves that followed paths are not imposed by outside technocrats but are decided through the complex procedures of democracy. Europe cannot be described any longer by terms like creditocracy or similar ones. We need to better coordinate our fiscal and economic policies to finally complete our banking union probably in new institutions like a European Monetary Fund or a European House of Ratings, a larger European budget in order to address universal obligations and the building of a true European identity in the context of a European demos that will grow together with our own national identities. We also need to leave behind the intergovernmental or even nationalistic approaches that can be detected lately through specific behaviors and trust a supranational approach expressed from the European institutions and a well-known community method. It is only through cooperation that we will overcome the crisis and play a role in the new globalized, and highly competitive and complex world. We believe that through mutual trust and continuous exchanges of use and good practices, through transnational discussions and panels like today's, we can be optimistic and build a Europe closer to its citizens, closer to each initial concept and our vision for prosperity for everyone. Thank you very much.



## Zoltan Pogatsa

If you listen to Brussels' narratives of European integration, they usually tell you that the European Union came about because the Europeans were so shocked by the experience of the Second World War that then they were shocked into creating a political unit. That's the standard Brussels' narrative how the European integration started with the Coal and Steel Community. The only problem with this standard Brussels' narrative is that it is completely not true. That never happened. If you look at the institutions that were created after the Second World War, 1951 that was the European Coal and Steel Community. It is very difficult to call that a political institution. In fact, it was a very economic institution, based on De Gaulle style, etatist sectoralism. It is a very economic institution. I know Brussels' puts a twist on it and it says you know Monnet and Schuman were such visionaries. It was an economic institution. The next institution you find is the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which establishes Euro atom, hardly a political institution and it is actually defunct, no longer exists. 1957 also creates the European Economic Community, hardly a political institution and you have nothing else. If you look at the 1940s, and the 1950s, and the 1960s and in fact even the 1970s, you have nothing. You do not have a political institution. There are a couple of political institutions which were started, mostly by the French but they never materialized. They were never voted, never ratified. They never took of the crowd as a Scottish political scientist studying European Integration who said by the end of the 1950s, Europe looked like a Breaker's Yard where all the cars were taken for breaking up. So many political projects were crushed. It never really happened. So there is not a political institution and it never was a political institution in the 1940s and the 1950s. Yes, you did establish the General Assembly and traces of it started and European Law etc. but in a federal sense in the way that Spinelli would have wanted it it never happened and not surprisingly Spinelli and his friends are very critical in the 1950s and the 1960s of the European integration because they did not see a federal Europe. In the 1950s, there was nothing. There was eurosclerosis. In the 1970s, there was a Snake but the Snake fell apart because of for many reasons economic crisis mostly. And there was nothing until 1986. And in 1986 what comes is exactly what Glen was describing, this enormous battle of the titans, the huge fight between Jacques Delours and Margaret Thatcher. And Jacques Delours was fighting for a social Europe for a Europe of subsidiarity very importantly, a Europe of regions and a sustainable Europe. And Margaret Thatcher was fighting for a free trade association. Now that is precisely what Europe has been since the 1950s, the only thing that really materialized in the 1950s, 1960s, and the 1970s and was completed at the 1980s by the Single European Act was Margaret Thatcher's Free Trade area, the Single Internal Market, which started in 1957, with the

Treaty of Rome when Jacques Delors actually started the European Economic Community. That is the origins of the EU, 1957 and the EEC not really the European Coal and Steel Community. Actually, there is a huge tension between 1951 and 1957. It is very difficult to see it as a continuity. It is actually more of a clash between a state-led, sectoralist French style thing and a free trade single internal market. So what you have by the end of the 1980s is you have a Customs Union, you have a Single Integral Market and you have the beginnings of the Eurozone, you have the beginnings of a Currency Union. What you do not have is a political union. Now, Maastricht 1992 moves somewhat towards that. During the times of Jacques Delors, there was a certain degree of move towards social Europe towards some sort of a federalism. What I would argue that even the European Union despite its name is not really a federalist institution. Why because, the Commission does not do jurisdiction. The parliament does and the Council do. So the Council and the Parliament are the two institutions which represent the member states and the community. The Parliament has grown immensely in strength that is something you have to admit at the moment it is now much stronger than it ever was. But even at its strongest point the European Parliament can be vetoed by the Council and that is in the co-decision procedures. It is very complicated. I am sure most of you are familiar with the European decision-making procedures but the majority of European citizens are not because it is extremely complicated. In another city, I would have said it is byzantine. It is very complex and very ancient spanned and most people do not understand it. But even in the co-decision procedure, the European Council can veto the Parliament, i.e. what we have is an intergovernmental Europe, an intergovernmental Europe and not a federal Europe, not a federal political entity. Contrary to what Ernst was arguing just a moment ago, I would argue that the federal level the community level needs very strong powers. The reason why the community level needs very strong powers is because the issues that we are facing today are international issues. They are actually global issues, not even continental issues but they are global issues: things that have to do with offshoring of wealth, things that have to do with transnational finance, transnational corporations, pollution which is an international issue, the environment is an international issue, migration is an international issue. I mean almost whatever you look at, these are international issues and unless the community level gets real powers to act for real, we go on with this intergovernmental nonsense. This intergovernmental nonsense is what has led us to 20 years of stagnation. At the 1960s and the 1970s, there was eurosclerosis, Europe getting nowhere. I think since Maastricht 1992, we also had eurosclerosis. We have had nothing really interesting since Maastricht. Maastricht 1992 was the last time Europe ever did anything big. I think this Banking Union today is probably something interesting. But every other thing the Treaty of Nice and the Treaty of Lisbon and all of them, they are nothing compared in historical perspective to Maastricht.



And most of the issues that we need are actually international issues which only the community could handle with real community powers. Unless Europe is willing to become federal, we cannot handle these issues. What we have is a neoliberal Europe based mostly on a free trade area. The reason why countries like Greece or Portugal, or Italy go bust is because they de-industrialize in the 1980s in a single European market and the eurozone only exacerbates that it only makes things worse. So once you have a trade disadvantage vis-a-vis Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands and you enter a free trade area and it is not an optimal currency area for those of you who are economists and a non-optimal currency area makes things worse. That is why Greece is in such a default as Portugal. And it benefits countries like Germany and Netherlands and Belgium. So contrary to what German public opinion thinks very widely, it is not default for the majority, it is not default for the Greeks or the Portuguese. And I disagree there with Nicos who said the Greeks lived beyond their means. The Greeks did not live beyond their means if you do a regression analysis of productivity and wages in Greece, you would find that they were exactly where they should have been. Greek wages were not higher than productivity should have told them if you do a regression of European states. The problem is this is an economic setup which is a neoliberal economic setup which does not provide cohesion for periphery countries. It did not provide it for the Mediterranean, it did not provide it for my region of central and eastern Europe. We are not in convergence. The only thing which is in convergence in central and eastern Europe is the GDP figures. Wages are not in convergence, employment is not in convergence. We are a very cheap re-export zone for the German economy. That is what we are and nothing else and that is what we have remained. It is not beneficial for us to be in the European Union as it wasn't for the southern European and Mediterranean countries. I am saying big things here but I have the data to back it up so if any of you are interested I have the arguments and the calculations. But in 15 minutes, I cannot argue this. Last thing I want to say is because the European Union isn't a community, it is an intergovernmental organization for the most part, problems can only be solved at the national level. If we want to put the European Union right, we have to put the countries right first. And the problem is that our states are captured states. Most of the European Union member states with probably the exception of the Scandinavians, and probably the Germans and the Dutch, are captured states. Every other state including Great Britain, including the Mediterranean countries, including Austria, including central and eastern Europe are captured states. What do we mean by captured states? Cooperations and big business have captured the political elites of these countries. As many of you have said before the decisions are not really made by the politicians. The decisions are made by the cooperations and the big business which finances politicians. Wherever political campaign financing is intransparent, politicians are in the hands of cooperations and big business and that includes social democrats as

well. It is not only the conservatives, it is also the social democrats. Margaret Thatcher neoliberalized the conservatives who were not neoliberal before they were traditional conservatives before Margaret Thatcher. Anthony Giddens and Tony Blair neoliberalized the social democrats. So with this whole Third Way, the social democrats had become just like the conservatives. That is Gerhard Schroder, that is Tony Blair, that is Bill Clinton and a lot of the other social democrats. They are undifferentiated from the conservatives. The only appeal they have is they have left-wing cultural projections. So what happens in Europe today is right-wing has cultural projections, religions, nation, etc. And social democrats have left-wing cultural projections, secularity, gay rights etc. They attract voters and doesn't matter who wins, cooperations rule. As if cooperations could walk into a casino and they could bet on both red and black and they win no matter where the ball falls on the wheel. That is what is happening in Europe today they captured states with political cartel parties. Why is that a problem? There is a great theoretician of these social democratic Scandinavian states. My firm belief is that if social democracy wants to find itself, it has to find itself in Scandinavia. The only place where real social democracy was preserved is in the Scandinavian welfare states, which adopted very well to their crisis in the 1990s and they are sustainable socially, they are sustainable fiscally, and they are sustainable environmentally. Now they have carried out environmental reforms of their budgets as well. There is a great theoretician of that Scandinavian model, a guy called Gosta Esping-Andersen who points out in a famous study that he wrote that unless you have middle classes in a country, you cannot have a democracy. With no middle classes, you will never have a democracy. My regional central and eastern Europe represents that. It was an extremely naive belief 20 years ago that 50 years after the Holocaust ended and 10-20 years after Stalin's gulags, you can just walk into an era, a Fukuyama type era where liberal democracies carry the day and everybody becomes a democracy. It does not work that way. If you do not have middle classes, you are not going to have a functioning democracy. Not surprisingly, most of central and eastern Europe has lost their democracies in the last 20 years, because we haven't had middle classes. How do you get middle classes? The market does not give you middle classes. Only the state can give you middle classes. Why? Because you need an educated population and you need a population who is materially independent. If you do not have a population that is materially independent and educated enough to understand public discourse, you will not have a democracy and special interests will sweep away the public investment. Public budgets and public money will be sucked away by corporations, big business, large entrepreneurs and a captured state. If you have a captured state, you will not be reforming the European integration process either because captured states rule the European Union through the European Council. Thank you very much.

# Short Biographies of the Speakers and Moderators

## Speakers

### **Dr. Nils Schmid**

Was born in Trier in 1973. As a social democrat, he is part of the assembly in Baden-Württemberg, one of Germany's federal states which is run by a coalition of the Greens and the Social Democrats. At the same time he is the Minister of Economics and Finance of Baden-Württemberg. As a lawyer he did his PhD at the University of Tübingen. He entered the Social Democratic Party in 1991 and from 2009 onwards, he runs the social democratic government of Baden-Württemberg.

### **Dr. Ernst Hillebrand**

Is the administrator of the department for international policy analysis at Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) in Berlin. Previously, he was the head of the departments for Middle and Eastern Europe (2010-2012) at FES and head of the representation abroad in Paris (2007-2010). From 2005 to 2007 he was responsible for the country representation in London and Santiago de Chile (2001-2004). He was the head of the cultural department at FES between 1999 and 2001. He did his PhD at the Ludwig-Maximilian University in Munich. He still teaches at the University of Munich as well as Bonn. His working fields are international relations security and social democracy in Europe. Concerning these fields, several publications can be found.

### **Dr. Glenn Gottfried**

In 2001, Gottfried graduated from comparative politics at the University of California. He received a Master's degree at Sheffield University in political sciences and international relations where he conducted research on methods. In 2009, he received a PhD. He is an expert in analyzing statistics on social sciences. One of his latest researches was about the future free democratic order agreement in European Union and the UK as well its politicization. The international publications of Gottfried can be found in magazines. Currently, he works for The Institute for Public Policy Research and continues with his research.

### **Nikos Kaskavelis**

Kaskavelis graduated from European Affairs, administration, politics and employment law and is still working as a lawyer in Greece. Being active in the civil society, Kaskavelis works on a new project called *Greece Forward*, which is supported by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Previously, he was a member of PASOK and afterwards Kaskavelis worked at the Ministry of Labor as well as at the Ministry of Health. Currently, he is a member of the newly established social democratic party.

### **Prof. Dr. Zoltan Pogatsa**

Zoltan Pogatsa is a political economist who works internationally on improvement, social politics, European integration politics and economics. Furthermore, he is engaged with Central Europe and the Balkans. Pogatsa is employed at the Economics Faculty of Western Hungarian University and is responsible for the international economics and PhD programs. Besides, Pogatsa conducts research at the academy for Hungarian sciences. He has been teaching at several Universities in the Czech Republic, Austria, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Ireland and Italy.

### **Prof. Dr. Ayhan Kaya**

Prof. Kaya was born in 1968 in Erzurum and he studied International Relations at the Marmara University. He received his PhD at the University of Warwick and has been teaching at Istanbul Bilgi University. While still being the head of the European institute, Kaya is also chair of the Jean Monnet lectures and works as a professor at Malmö University. In the past, he was part of the managing board at TÜSES, a member of the Turkish-German Summer Academy and at the same time a member of the Turkish Association for Political Sciences. Ayhan Kaya's international publications and books can be found in many journals. His recent books are *Europeanization and Tolerance in Turkey* (London, Palgrave, 2013) and *Islam, Migration and Integration* (London, Palgrave, 2012)

## **Moderators**

### **Aydın Cıngı**

Was born in Istanbul in 1944 and graduated from the Federal Technical University of Zürich. His thesis was about different party systems within the former European Community. He conducted a statistical analysis and received his degree from the European research Institute at the Geneva University. In the federal state of Baden-Württemberg he worked as an engineer for the waterworks, as an insurance mathematician for Providentia Vida, as an industrial risk manager at a reinsurance company, as a research expert for the chamber of commerce in Istanbul and lastly as the general director of RCM research consultancy. Next to his books "2005 Yılında Sosyal Demokrasi", "Avrupa İnsanı", "Gezipduru" and "Sora Sora Sosyal Demokrasi" there are also many articles and research documents which are published in domestic and foreign journals and newspapers. Between 2005 and 2009, Aydın Cıngı was the head of SODEV. He is currently the Chief Editor of the Journals of "Sosyal Demokrat" and "Reflections Turkey".

## **Esra Arsan**

Was born in 1966 in Istanbul and studied at the Marmara University in the Department of Journalism where she graduated in 1987 although she already started with her professional career in 1985. Between 1984 and 1994 she worked as a correspondent for the newspapers Hürriyet and Milliyet. In 1994 she went to the USA and received a certificate from the Central University of Florida in the field of American Studies. When she returned to Turkey she worked as a free press consultant and journalist for several institutions and organizations. In 1998, she started her academic career at Bilgi University and worked as an assistant within the communications faculty. In 1999 received a master's degree from the Marmara University Cinema and TV department for her documentary thesis called "Bir gazetecinin Ölümü: Metin Göktepe". Receiving a full year scholarship from Reuters, she spent an academic year at the Green College of Oxford University and prepared a project called "Medyada 'ötekinin' temsili: İslamcılar ve Kürtler". In 2006, she received her PhD degree for her thesis called "EU Journalism and the Construction of European Public Space: Hungry and Greece". Assoc. Prof. Dr. Esra Arsan teaches journalism at the Institute for social sciences at Bilgi University. Her recent books are "AB ve Gazetecilik" and "Medya Gözcüsü".

## **Bekir Ağırđır**

Was born in Çal/ Denizli in 1956. He graduated in 1979 from the public administration faculty at the Middle East Technic University. From 1979 to 1980 he was responsible for data processing at the CHP. From 1980 to 1984 he worked first as a sales manager BİLSAN Bilgisayar Malzemeleri A.Ş. and later on he assisted the head of the company. From 1984 to 1986 he worked for METEKSAN LTD. ŞTİ as sales coordinator. From 1986 to 1996 he was general manager at PİRİNTAŞ Bilgisayar Malzemeleri ve Basım San. A.Ş., from 1996 to 1999 he assisted the general manager at ATILIM Kağıt ve Defter Sanayi A.Ş., from 1999 to 2003 he was general manager and a member of the management board at PMB Akıllı Kart ve Bilgi Teknolojileri A.Ş., from 2003 to 2005 he worked first as a coordinator and then he became the manager at TARİH VAKFI. He is currently the head of the KONDA Research Company. Being the founder of the Democratic Republic Organization, Bekir Ağırđır works actively with various NGOs. At the same time he is a board member of TÜSES (Türkiye Sosyal Ekonomik Siyasi Araştırmalar Vakfı) and TESEV (Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı).

## **Hüseyin Çakır**

was born in 1956. Between 1975 and 1982, he worked for TEKEL. In 1982 he had to resign from his position. He is a member of the Turkish Communist Party (TKP). While TKP worked together with the Turkish Workers' Party party, he was directing the publications and became a member of the board of the party. In 1995 he and his friends founded Küyerel Think Tank. Between 1987 and 2001 he wrote in different journals. He wrote many articles and political analyses for daily newspapers. His research entitled "Initiatives for Unity in the Left and Socialist Union Party" is soon to be published. Lastly, he is the director of the press at KÜYEREL.