IME

Identities and Modernities in Europe

Contract No: SSH-CT-2009-215949

Work Package 8

Consolidation of the case study: Turkish Case

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July 2011
Introduction

This paper aims to consolidate the findings from the Turkish WP5, WP6 and WP7 Reports in order to provide a comprehensive country report. This study is comprised of two parts. The first part will begin with a brief summary of our findings from the WP5 Report and the fieldwork conducted for the WP6 and WP7 Reports. Accordingly, we will analyse the ways in which nation, Europe and modernity were articulated by the interlocutors. The second part will provide critical reflections on the fieldwork with a comparative perspective on the WP5, WP6 and WP7 Reports. In doing so, we will also provide brief references to the WP4 Report, which provided background information on the modernization processes in the Turkish context.

We argue that in the Turkish context, the state has traditionally been the bearer of western European values in a way that has modernized the social and political structures in the country. This top-down approach of simple modernization (Giddens, 1994) contradicts the definition of modernity (modernities) provided by Eisenstadt (2000, 2003, 2005, 2006) as a continual constitution and reconstitution of multiplicity of political and cultural programmes. To that effect, we will argue that the prominent idea in the aftermath of the fall of the Ottoman Empire to align with the West and the applicability of the holistic Western model is challenged in the Turkish case vis-a-vis the emphasis on the need for a more inquisitive approach towards the substance of Westernization, Europeanization and modernization. The critical views and discourses identified at the state, non-state and private individual levels will provide a general framework as to the incongruence of the discourses, and assist us in explaining that the state is no longer the sole modernizing agent in Turkey, and that collective and individual agents are critically involved in the modernization process with respect to their depiction of the human agency and cognitive processes.

Description of Fieldwork and Methodology

The Turkish WP5 Report focused on internal and external identity construction programmes and provided a literature review as well as analysis of policy documents and information obtained from the official websites of the relevant actors. In doing so, primarily policy documents were analyzed, while an extensive literature review was conducted with regards to the peculiarities of the Westernization of education. Furthermore, the WP5 was comprised of two parts, the first part focused on the state and the actors engaged in the process of identity formation, with a particular emphasis on higher education and the European Union Mission in Ankara. Accordingly, we investigated the construction of modern Turkish citizenship from an historical perspective, and then discussed the transformation of higher education in Turkey with respect to the ways in which Turkishness and Europeanness have been reflected by the higher education machinery. The second part focused on the state and non-state sponsored promotion activities of Turkey in the European Union countries. In order to do so, discursive analyses of the speeches of various statesmen were conducted. In addition, some in-depth interviews were held with representatives of non-state actors in order to reflect their perceptions of the state’s promotion activities.

1 For further discussions on Eisenstadt’s definition of multiple modernities with particular references to the Turkish case, please see the Turkish WP4 Report.

2 For further information on the interlocutors and interview templates, please see the Turkish WP5 Report.
The Turkish WP6 Report studied the identity construction programmes of non-state, professional and collective actors in Turkey through interviews with various professional and collective actors. In doing so, first we identified the major social and political contestations and conflicts between 2000 and 2010, which had direct influence on the field of education. Briefly, these contestations ranged from the Constitutional packages passed between 2000 and 2005, the victory of the AKP government in the general elections and the e-coup of 2007 that was a reflection of the growing religious-secular divide in Turkey (Kaya, 2009). The Islamic revival and the headscarf debates as well as the ethnic revivals, particularly Kurdish revival, also constituted and were identified as other important issues of the past decade.

In view of these contestations, we identified the non-state actors as ethnic minority interests’ advocates, humanist organisations, and civil organisations with specific focus on education, higher education institutions and professional actors in the field of education. First, policy documents and official websites of the relevant non-state actors were analysed, subsequently nine interviews were conducted with loud, moderate and quiet non-state actors. The questions were prepared to investigate the following issues: a) immigration, multiculturalism and citizenship; b) liberalism and globalisation; c) history education reforms as indicators of national identity construction debates; and d) the representation of religion and secularisation in the education sector.

In line with the subject matters for the WP6 Report, the following four topics were identified as relevant subject matters for the WP7 Report interviews: a) education in one’s mother language, particularly education in Kurdish and the boycotts that occurred in September 2010; b) the Bologna Process, which aims for the Europeanization of higher education, and criticisms regarding its neoliberal motivations; c) history education in Turkish high schools and the way in which neighbouring countries, for instance Greece and Armenia and the European countries are portrayed in the textbooks; and d) the headscarf ban at Turkish Universities and the student protests.

For the WP7 Report, 20 in-depth interviews were conducted with students, professionals in the field of education (as well as adults with a vested interest, such as parents), and adults without a vested interest in the field of education, such as retirees. While we placed emphasis on diversifying the ethnic, religious and educational backgrounds of the interlocutors, participants in the field-work were predominantly of middle-class background with high levels of educational background. The data collected for both Reports were analyzed on the basis of the interlocutors’ reflections on some common denominators such as globalization, localization, Europeanization, modernity, neo-liberalism, tradition, religiosity, ethnicity and nationalism. All the interviews conducted at the fieldwork stage were analyzed through the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) method (Wodak, 2010) with specific emphasis on the concepts of nation, Europe/Europeanization and modernity.

In the light of this information, this report provides an analysis of the different forms of discourses provided by state, non-state and individual actors. However, it is important to note

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3 For further information on the interview guide, interview templates and the ethics committee’s consent form, please see the Turkish WP6 Report.
4 For the interview guide, interview templates and the ethics committee’s consent form, please see the Turkish WP7 Report.
5 Please see the Turkish WP7 Report for a brief explanation of the CDA method. See also Krzyzanowski and Oberhuber (2007) and Wodak (2002).
that the analysis provided in the WP5 report is primarily based on policy, therefore the analysis is relatively static and there is little room for interpretation in comparison to the WP6 and WP7 reports. Furthermore, it is also necessary to note that this project was proposed prior to the recent global financial crisis. This is why recent developments surrounding Europe and the European Union were not foreseen in the research design. In relation to that, it is also important to clarify that the subject matters investigated in this report, as well as the WP6 and WP7 reports, reflect contestations that are restricted to the period between 2000 and 2010. Therefore, recent developments in the national and European context are not analyzed, but they are taken into consideration when they are deemed necessary to frame certain discourses.

PART I: KEY FINDINGS

Part I of this study will provide an overview of our findings from the Turkish WP5 report as well as the WP6 and WP7 reports, which constitute the fieldwork stage of our research. Accordingly, we will analyze our findings with particular reference to the interlocutors’ opinions on the nation, Europe, and modernity in the Turkish context.

1. The Nation: Limits of Turkish Holy Trinity in citizenship and textbooks

In this section, we will concentrate on the views of the state, non-state and individual actors on the ways in which the sense of national belonging is constructed and reconstructed through the means of textbooks disseminated at the primary and secondary school levels.

1.1 State Actors

Our research on the internally oriented identity construction programs vis-à-vis the nation-building process has revealed that the Turkish higher education system as well as primary and secondary levels has their roots in the state’s construct of Turkish citizenship in the period after the establishment of the Turkish Republic. Citizenship has been a common element of our previous reports as it constitutes an important part of the nation-building process in the Turkish case. As such, varying definitions of Turkish citizenship constitute an important part of our findings in the WP5 Report, which we reemphasized in the WP6 and WP7 Reports. Turkish Citizenship Law of 1928 No. 1312 put into effect in January 1929, gave citizenship to all those residing within the boundaries of the republic on the basis of jus soli principle. However, the definition of Turkish citizenship gradually became ethno-cultural in nature, embraced by the jus sanguinis principle. Accordingly, some scholars argue that citizenship has been defined territorially (Kirişçi, 2000), while some argue that it oscillates between political and ethnicist logic (Yeğen 2004; Kadioğlu 2007). Nonetheless, the shift to the jus sanguinis principle reflects a trend towards “ethnification” of key policies.

Our research has also revealed the significance of history education in the construction of Turkish identity prior to higher education. Üstel (2004) argues that these courses, which have their roots in the Constitutional Monarchy period of the Empire, were instated to form a “common sense of belonging and a feeling of allegiance”, countering those challenging the central authority while instilling a sense of Ottoman identity (Üstel, 2004: 35-40). Furthermore, Birol Caymaz argues that in the last years of the Ottoman Empire and the early years of the Republic,
“the education system, which was more and more monopolized, modernized and nationalized by the state, was designed to set up an institutional structure where the feeling of being a part of the political community was manufactured and spread across the country” (Caymaz, 2008:195).

The 1950s marked the establishment of a multi-party system in Turkey that redefined Turkish citizenship in the framework of industriousness, studiousness, working hard and having a sense of responsibility (Yücel, 1998; Üstel, 2004; and Çayır and Gürkaynak, 2008:52). The School Program was then revised in 1968 to accommodate the growing emphasis on democracy; while it also kept the nationalistic structure. The Program was revised in 1973, and it reemphasized “upholding of Turkish nationalism”, “respect for Turkish moral values” and the like (Çayır and Gürkaynak, 2008:52-53). As previously mentioned, Üstel observes that in the 1980s the emphasis of citizenship education became “ethno-cultural” and the founding principles of Turkish citizenship were divided into two categories: the material (language and religion) and the moral (common history and culture), thereby embracing a synthesis of Turkish and Islamic elements.

In terms of higher education, Öncü (1993) notes that University reforms in Turkey can be perceived as systematic attempts to model the educational system in line with westernization. Accordingly, she argues that while there have been educational reforms in 1933, 1946 and 1981 which coincided with the changing dynamics in national politics, the driving force and the common denominator behind these reforms were the state’s attempts to legitimize these reforms on the basis of existing “Western models” and westernization.

After the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, in accordance with the new state ideology, the first major step in education was the Law on Unification of National Education No: 430, put into effect on March 3, 1924 (Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu), which abolished madrasahs and unified all educational institutions remaining within the borders of the Republic under the Ministry of National Education. In the late years of the Ottoman Empire, the Darülfünün was the only higher education institute which encompassed various faculties. In 1933, in accordance with the University Act of 1933 Law No. 2252 passed on July 31, 1933, the name of Darülfünun was changed to “Istanbul University” and it was restructured in line with the Western university model.

In the aftermath of World War II with the growing emphasis on social inclusion in Western Europe, education became enveloped in an ideology of universal mobility and opportunity, an equalizer of social distinctions and the route to individual success (Öncü, 1993:158). Furthermore, with the University Act of 1946 No. 4936 passed on June 13, 1946, the Ministry of Education granted autonomy to three higher education institutions: Istanbul University, Istanbul Technical University and Ankara University (Öncü, 1993:155).

In 1981, in accordance with Articles 130 and 131 of the Turkish Constitution and the Higher Education Law No. 2547, The Council of Higher Education (Yükseköğretim Kurulu—YÖK) was established as an autonomous body. In accordance with Article 4 of Law No. 2547, the aims of higher education revolve around Republican values of the unitary state, which

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6 Madrasah is an Arabic word, which literally means a place where both religious and secular learning/studying is done.
emphasizes individuals’ duties and responsibilities to the state via an emphasis on the significance of Turkishness.\(^7\)

In addition to the reforms identified by Öncü (1993), our WP5 Report also identified 1991, the establishment of Foundation Universities, and the 2000s, the introduction of the Bologna Process and the reformation of higher education, as the turning points in Turkish higher education. On 5 April 1991, the National Assembly accepted a new Reform Act on institutions of higher education established by foundations, which anticipated incorporating the private sector and universities in order to increase education supply to meet the demand from the growing number of high school graduates.\(^8\) The Reform Act coincided with the rising visibility of Islam in the political sphere, thereby leading to debates over the Kemalist and Islamist ideologies in the higher education system. To that effect, the headscarf issue and the access of Imam Hatip school graduates to higher education became pivotal. As the secularist-Islamist divide deepened in the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit and the AKP government, these issues became even more visible in the political and public spheres. Furthermore, in the 2000s the Bologna Process was introduced to the Turkish higher education system. Both 1991 and the 2000s constitute an important element of our Reports, and our fieldwork references both periods in the realm of the Europeanization of higher education.

1.2 Non-state Actors

The interviews we conducted for the WP6 Report on the issues of immigration and multiculturalism did not yield tangible information. For instance, while all interlocutors indicated that multiculturalism and diversity vis-a-vis the migrant and minority communities in Turkey should be incorporated into the education system, the interlocutors did not provide extensive information as to how important these issues are and how the said incorporation should take place. Accordingly, neither multiculturalism nor immigration are incorporated into the education system in terms of creating a kind of public awareness at the grassroots level. The questions related to the understanding of Turkish citizenship depicted in the curriculum, on the other hand, revealed that, as Keyman and İçduygu stated, “the conventional conception of Turkish citizenship (as a national identity and/or activity) can no longer play its unifying function, nor is it capable of translating abstract status to concrete rights (Keyman and İçduygu, 2003: 231). To that effect, the interlocutors’ views on citizenship and the type of citizen that the old and the new curriculum aim to produce were rather critical. For instance, MA, member at the Sociology and Educational Studies Unit of a foundation university, argued that the curriculum was reflective of an “exclusionist nationalist” understanding of citizenship which not only excluded identities other than Turkish and Muslim but also considered them threatening, thereby repressing them (WP6/5).

KC, faculty member at the Sociology Department of a foundation university, specifically referred to citizenship courses and textbooks and indicated that textbooks differed in their definition of Turkish citizenship, defining it over blood relation or through more pluralistic

\(^7\) For further information on the Higher Education Law No. 2547, please see the Turkish WP5 Report. Full text of the Law is available at: http://www.yok.gov.tr/

\(^8\) We should note that while foundation universities recruit less than 10% of the overall university level student population, they have managed to attract high-quality academics from public universities. For statistics on the number of Foundation Universities and numbers of students enrolled in these Universities, please see: YÖK (2007). Vakıf Üniversiteleri Raporu (Foundation University Report) YÖK: Ankara.
definitions (WP6/3). Similarly, VÖ, member the Council of Education and Morality (Talim ve Terbiye Kurulu), emphasized that some of the curricula foresee conflicting human types (WP6/4).

A close analysis of the interviews indicates that the non-state actors we interviewed mainly addressed the nationalist, ethno-centric, difference-blind and monolithic nature of the national curricula in Turkey. While some of the interlocutors referenced the revision of the curriculum in 2006 as a positive step toward integrating the notion of diversity into the education system, the interlocutors were in consensus that the national curriculum is still far from meeting the requirements of the contemporary age. This is in part due to the varying definitions of citizenship that we explored throughout the Turkish WP5 Report. As such, the way ethnic and national identity is essentialized in citizenship and history courses at the primary and secondary levels has important reflections on the higher education system as well.

Drawing upon our findings from the WP5 Report, one of the most important issues that we addressed in our WP6 Report was that contemporary history education in Turkey is formulated on the basis of Sunni-Muslim-Turkish identity. Consequently, we argued that the concepts of “us” and “the other” carry significant meanings in constructing the Turkish identity. Our WP6 interviews with non-state actors indicated that the focus on the nation-building process and the way in which Turkish identity and its focus on Turkishness and Islam has guided the content of history education is very problematic. Subsequently, the interlocutors also emphasized that history education aims to legitimize the political system and create a nation via the omission of self-criticism. Furthermore, the representation and reproduction of state ideologies vis-a-vis the emphasis on the Turkish language and flag as well as the “I am Turkish, I am Honest, I am Diligent” (Türküm, Doğruyum, Çalışkanım) discourse are considered as the institution of a meta-identity. GO, for instance, noted that the dominance of the Sunni-Muslim-Turkish identity is an exclusionist approach and argued that “Meta-identity should not be defined as being a Turk; it can be being a citizen. If the emphasis is on citizenship, then it encompasses all (WP6/2).” The majority of the interlocutors expressed their discomfort with the way that the establishment of a meta-identity based on Turkishness has lead to the difference-blind history education in Turkey.

To that effect, ÖG emphasized that history education has been “a very successful project in establishing national consciousness” via the exclusion of ethnic minorities from history textbooks (WP6/7). Exclusion of ethnic minorities is another source of concern for the interlocutors because textbooks do not embrace plural identities but rather ignore the plurality of ethnicities in Turkey. KÇ’s argument that there is also a lack of references to relations with foreign countries and contemporary dynamics complements the lack of references to ethnic minorities (WP6/3). As such, both are perceived by the interlocutors as means to depict and maintain the unitary state vis-a-vis politics of fear.

Nonetheless, as previously mentioned, the 2006 revision of the curriculum is attributed to the EU accession process by KÇ, who argued that the new curriculum is more constructive than deductive (WP6/3). However, our interlocutors also indicated that there are still no references

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10 “I am Turkish, I am Honest, I am Diligent” (Türküm, Doğruyum, Çalışkanım) is a direct quote from a march which is recited by Turkish children enrolled at primary schools.
to the notions of modernity, Europe, Europeanization and particularly Europeanization of Turkey in the textbooks. Accordingly, history education in Turkey is considered to be a means to maintain the unitary state and reemphasize the civic-republican values that dominate the understanding of Turkish citizenship. We observe that our interlocutors approached history education from a critical perspective; it is also important to note that some also alluded to the importance of relaying the contemporary dynamic in international relations. As such, some of the interlocutors emphasized the necessity to include the EU and relations with European countries to eliminate the negative discourses about European countries which are founded on Ottoman history.

Furthermore, the EU accession process and globalization have also coincided with the rise of ethnic revivals in Turkey, which has been discussed with reference to separatism. Primarily, the right to education in the mother language became an important source of debate in Turkish society and politics with the TZP Kurdi (Tevgera Ziman u Perverdehiya Kurdi, Kürt Dil ve Eğitim Hareketi, Movement for Kurdish Language and Education) initiative of the “Anadille eğitim istiyoruz” (We want education in the mother tongue) campaign, and the call for boycotts between October 20-25, 2010. As our WP6 Report indicated, the interlocutors emphasized that ethno-cultural and linguistic differences in Turkey should be accommodated in the Turkish education system. MA, for instance, noted that “these children bring a lingual and cultural richness from their own socio-cultural environment (WP6/5)” As such, the support for accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity in the field of education also reflects a criticism of the current system and a need for a rather more multicultural learning environment which incorporates different identities.

1.3 Private Individuals

Drawing upon our findings and analysis in the WP6 Report and in light of the significance of the “Sunni-Muslim-Turkish” identity discourse in the Turkish education system, for our WP7 Report we focused on the campaigns on education in Kurdish. Our findings revealed that the interlocutors approached this issue in two distinct ways: as a human rights issue and as a politicized issue which is believed to mask separatist motivations. Nonetheless, concerns over separatism persist in both approaches. Furthermore, establishing a common language of communication is also a common theme among the interlocutors. For instance, to that effect, AK noted that:

“There cannot be various languages in education. Turkey is not a federal state; there is a given language, which is the language that we communicate in (WP7/3).”

On this particular issue, there were also claims regarding Europe’s role in politicizing this issue, thereby restricting the possibility of a solution. In that regard, we argued that quite a number of people in Turkey with a EUsceptic view believe that the EU is trying to divide Turkey through publicizing minority claims (Öniş, 2004; and Kaya, 2011).

Similar to our WP5 and WP6 Reports, the concept of citizenship was reiterated in the WP7 Report. The majority of the interlocutors noted their discomfort with the way in which this issue is approached in reference to ethnicity rather than human rights, which is a reflection of the confusion in private individuals’ minds regarding the definition of Turkish citizenship and what it entails (Kirişçi 2000; Yeğen 2004; Kadioğlu 2007; and Üstel 2004).
Furthermore, the majority of the interlocutors also noted that education in the mother tongue has been reduced to debates on education in Kurdish, thereby ignoring the rights of other ethnic minorities, such as Arab, Laz and Abkhazian, thus disregarding linguistic differences in Turkey (MY (WP7/13), EI (WP7/15), CS (WP7/6) and PB (WP7/2)).

Significantly, the majority of the interlocutors indicated that they are aware of the Catalans in Spain as a similar debate in Europe. However, those who refer to Catalans also stated that they have a concern that Kurds might also further their demands for education to a separate state. Nonetheless, some interlocutors also argued that the unresolved conflict between the Turkish armed forces and the PKK is being exploited by the media. Furthermore, as MY elaborated, the approach to this issue with references to Kurdish nationalism is a result of the history education in Turkey (WP7/13). AA, who has openly identified himself as being Kurdish, noted that being a Kurd is not necessarily difficult for those living in Eastern and South eastern Turkey and that his opinions on education in the Kurdish language are correlated to his experiences in Istanbul.

In terms of education in the mother tongue, some interlocutors indicated that they question the use of English in higher education institutions, which they argued was as important as the right to education in one’s mother language. As such, some interlocutors argued that the use of English was a means to ensure employment upon graduation (ÇH (WP7/12) and UA (WP7/9)).

As was the case in the WP6 Report, history education in Turkey was the most criticized issue throughout our WP7 interviews. All the interlocutors indicated discomfort with the ways in which history education portrays neighbouring countries as well as the European countries. Most importantly, we have found that, although the interlocutors maintained their dissatisfaction with the current history textbooks as well as the negative discourses towards neighbouring countries, thus questioning the objectivity of the textbooks, the majority of the interlocutors stated that they find the system justifiable on the grounds that this is a common means of nation-state building in European countries. It is also important that the interlocutors did not tend to question this phenomenon, which is a reflection of the success of the curriculum in maintaining the nationalist discourse.

The extent of references to the Ottoman Empire and Ottoman history were frequently criticized by the interlocutors. While CY (WP7/7), AK (WP7/3) and MY (WP7/13) criticized the “infatuation” with the Ottoman Empire, they noted that this phenomenon is a result of the yearning for the Ottoman Empire’s power and the feelings of inferiority to the West. Subsequently, we also found that some interlocutors were critical of that way that Ottoman history is conceptualized with references to the internal and external “threats and enemies”, such as minorities and neighbouring countries. For instance, AK noted that the extensive focus on the Ottoman Empire is perhaps a claim to modernity vis-à-vis the Empire’s contributions to the West and argued that:

“You are taught that you are neither Western nor Eastern. You learn that everyone is against you. For example, we want to become a member of the EU, but we also talk about Muslim brotherhood (İslam Kardeşliği) (WP7/3).”

In terms of similar cases in other European countries, it is possible to note that while the majority of the interlocutors indicated that they are not informed about the system in other
European countries, they assume that such negative discourses exist in Greece and German history textbooks as well.

There is considerable support for a common solution based on the establishment of more objective relating of history in general. CH, for instance, argued that “Europe fought for centuries, but they forgot about those wars and established friendly relations. Maybe this was the aim of the EU (WP7/12).” Similarly, BY argued: “We absolutely can and should find a common solution [with other European countries]. I think EU membership can help us in this issue and we need EU membership to see a positive influence on history education (WP7/11).” We should note that this is the only issue where some interlocutors made a direct reference to the EU and its consolidative element.

2. Europe and Europeanization: Constant search for Identity

In this section we will delineate the perspectives of the state, non-state and individual actors on Europe and Europeanization with a special focus on the last decade, in which Turkey’s Europeanization process gained a particular momentum.

2.1 State Actors

As mentioned in the previous Turkish reports, Europe has been an important anchor for the democratization process of Turkey in the last decade. Particularly in the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit of 1999, EU harmonization efforts to align Turkey’s policies with that of Europe occupied the political agenda and led to various constitutional amendment packages. However, while 1999-2005 marks the rapid reformation of the Turkish legal framework, 2005 marks the loss of momentum for the said reformation process along the lines of the Copenhagen criteria. The EU anchor, which was considered to be at its strongest in the 1999-2005 period, hence being considered the “virtuous cycle” (Öniş, 2004), yielded to the “vicious cycle”, where the EU anchor weakened and the reformation process came a to a halt. This shift in “cycles” also coincided with the rise of Euroscepticism. The Euroscepticism that we observed and analyzed in the previous reports has influenced the perceptions of the state actors towards Europe and particularly the EU. In effect, the state actors’ discourses do not necessarily depend on the EU anymore, but rather on the rising significance of Turkey as a global and a regional actor. While Europe does not remain the sole anchor for reform, it still constitutes an important element in the transformation of Turkish politics.

Europe and the EU are also framed and discussed with references to globalization. As such, globalization has certainly influenced the formation of different meanings for “identity”; subsequently Turkish modernization began to reflect ‘alternative modernities’ with different political discourses of, and different future prospects for, Turkish social life (Keyman and İçduygu, 2003: 225; Göle, 2002; Kaya, 2004). Considering that the standardization efforts proposed by the Bologna Process are not just about Europe but rather about Europe’s aim to become a stronger force in the process of globalization (Blitz, 2009; and Keeling, 2006), internationalization of education, among other policies, is often perceived as a reflection of the influence of global forces on domestic policies. Accordingly, our WP5 report revealed

11 Please note that Annex I of the Turkish WP4 Report also encompassed important information regarding political parties in power prior to 2000 and their stances on Europe and Europeanization.
12 For further information on the Constitutional Packages, please see the Turkish WP5 and WP6 Reports.
that Europe and the Bologna Process play an important role in the state and non-state efforts to modernize Turkish higher education.

As we established in our WP5 Report, Turkey is still in the process of implementing the structural reforms of the Bologna Process. On this issue, our most important finding was that there have been two distinct approaches to the way in which the Bologna Process has influenced the university structure. To illustrate, Maja Stolle (2009) argues that *Europeanization* embedded in the Process triggered a wide range of mobility initiatives in Turkish universities and forced universities to professionalize the organization of student mobility. However, Özge Onursal argues that due to the rise of Euroscepticism and the stretching of the Bologna space the term *Europeanization* is now replaced by the term *internationalization*, and that the Rectors prefer to use a discourse underlining that the “Bologna process is designed to create world citizens”, thereby replacing the discourse underlining the creating of European citizens. This is in part attributable to the efforts to avoid backlash from the rising Euroscepticism. In addition, it is also important to underline that, as it is the case in the Bologna Process, Europe and the EU are ascertained in reference to global trends. Therefore, Europe and the EU are not framed separately from the international trend of cooperation in various policy fields, including education.

### 2.2 Non-state Actors

The Turkish WP6 Report revealed that the Bologna Process is an important reflection of Europeanization but also of liberalization and globalization. While most of our interlocutors for the WP6 Report were hesitant to opine on this issue, the interlocutors who have been actively involved in the Process noted that Turkey has been relatively successful in reforming the system along the lines of the Bologna Process. For instance, ÜE, director of a centre working on equal access to education and the former Rector of a prominent public university, emphasized that the way in which the Turkish higher education system was formulated along the lines of the “American model” in the 1950s deemed the Process compatible with the institutional structure of Turkish universities (WP6/1). This is related to the way that Turkish higher education was modelled in line with its Western counterparts, including both European and American education systems.

Corresponding to the arguments regarding the Europeanization versus the internationalization of higher education which were presented in the Turkish WP5 Report, the interlocutors also revealed that they have different perspectives about the way in which the Process is/should be framed. Our interviews were also reflective of this predicament: for example, VÖ argued that while the Process’s scope is currently reflective of Europeanization, “it is anticipated to be internationalization” (WP6/4). ADÖ, who considered the Process to be Europeanization, on the other hand, voiced her concerns with the “top-down approach” of the reformation process (WP6/6). ÜE, who has taken active part in the Bologna Process, indicated that the Process is indeed a process of Europeanization (WP6/1). Similarly, DK, program officer at a civil society organization specializing in social, political and economic policy issues and a columnist, observed that “the Process is in line with EU’s *raison d’être*. The most important reason was mobility. It is reasonable in terms of employment; similar qualifications are a necessity (WP6/9).” In light of our interviews, it is possible to infer that the state’s framing of the Process as internationalization is not a factor in determining the interlocutors’ views on the Bologna Process. The interlocutors’ views reveal that there are various factors that help

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13 Please see the Turkish WP5 Report for the interview template.
shape their approach to the framework of the Process which include globalization and their understanding of Europeanization.

Standardization is also an issue that was raised by the interlocutors, particularly; KÇ argued that the level of standardization required by the Process and the establishment of the language of education as English should be managed in a way to preserve localities (WP6/3). This issue is also related to the rise of the neoliberal policies of the 1980s and 1990s and their reflections in the field of education. As we noted in our WP5 Report, the foundation universities were often criticised for their neoliberal motivations vis-a-vis the involvement of the private sector in education. As such, our research in the WP5 Report indicated that the proliferation of foundation universities contributes to debates on whether education is a private or a public good. It was argued that while foundation universities have been able to integrate their graduates into the labour market, the majority of the state universities were not as successful. Foundation universities are often criticised for having a neoliberal and market-oriented approach, since their networks play an important role in employment opportunities for their graduates. The majority of our interlocutors, on the other hand, have not reflected on this issue. Nonetheless, while ED, faculty member at the Political Science and International Relations Department of a public university, criticised the commercialization of education, ÜE noted that the implementation of the “American model” and the institution of private universities, which laid the foundations for the establishment of foundation universities, constitutes “an important innovation and the EU can be guided in this issue. I believe that the EU should be informed about our experiences with foundation universities (WP6/1).”

This argument was further complemented by interlocutors’ critical views towards skill-based education at the higher education level. On this issue, ÜE stated that: “I agree with the criticisms of the process with regards to neoliberal motivations. If skill-based education is accentuated, then higher education will resemble occupational schools (WP6/1).” Similarly, KÇ, who referenced the importance of local characteristics, argued that the skills necessary for various professions change rapidly, thus it is important to equip students with a critical perspective in order to ensure that they are able to function in the contemporary world (WP6/3).

In addition to the Bologna Process, the Turkish WP6 Report also focused on equal access to education. In the framework of gender equality in access to education, GO, former chairperson of a women’s association and a member of the CHP, underlined the significance of EU Reports, hence the EU criteria, with regard to the integration of women into education and subsequently the labour market. She underlined the importance of the EU anchor in addressing the gender inequality in education (WP6/2). VÔ (WP6/4) also indicated that the EU accession process and the revisions in the curriculum to complement the EU standards have contributed to a change in mentality with regards to the approaches to problems in education, including inequality of access. However, he also noted that doubts about the EU as well as the challenges in transforming the existing institutional structure and the mentalities of the educators still restricted the revision of the education system. As such, these interlocutors were supportive of the modernization of the curriculum in line with that of the Europe vis-a-vis the internalization of Western values in education such as pluralism, diversity and equality. MA’s observation that the 2006 curriculum, which is founded on the Western understanding of an individual, cannot be internalized and implemented by the educators (WP6/5) supplements this argument.
These arguments also signify an underlying criticism of the educators and the type of individual that the education system prior to 2006 aimed to produce. While modernization of education is clearly perceived in line with the westernization of education, in these interviews we observe that there is a high correlation between westernization and Europeanization, since the benchmarks for the revised curriculum are those set by the EU member states. Furthermore, the role of the human agency is also signified in these interviews because the interlocutors indicate that the curriculum has been revised to produce rather more critical and inquisitive individuals, which is in of itself in line with our definition of human agency. In correlation with the significance of human agency, ÖG (WP6/7), assistant program officer at a civil society organization specializing in social, political and economic policy issues, noted, the way that political ideologies and preferences have penetrated the Turkish education system leading to “self-censorship”.

2.3 Private Individuals

Corresponding to our arguments regarding the ongoing implementation of the Bologna Process, our WP7 interviews indicated that among all the subject matters that we have identified, the Bologna Process is the least known/least discussed subject, which correlates with our findings in the WP6 Report. In that regard, the majority of our interlocutors have asked for clarification about the Process and what it entails. Those who have direct or indirect experiences with the Bologna Process indicated that they know of it as a standardization process initiated by the EU for the European countries, thereby excluding non-European countries. Interestingly, when asked about the Bologna Process, many interlocutors straightforwardly referred to the Erasmus student exchange program.

On the issue of the skill-based orientation vis-a-vis the market-orientated approach of the Process, it is possible to argue that those who have an educational or professional background in natural sciences (forestry, metallurgy, agriculture and the like) have analyzed skill-based education as a positive feature of the Process (UA (WP7/9), (WP7/4), (WP7/11)). These arguments were founded on the idea that skill-based education would be beneficial in terms of employment through the education of qualified experts in fields requiring applied knowledge of theories. Thus their concerns were over the establishment of a competitive and efficient labour force.

Nonetheless, some of the interlocutors criticized the ways in which this Process might hinder individuals’ outlooks on the world. These individuals were mainly in the 40-65 age brackets and with backgrounds in social studies (MY (WP7/13), (WP7/14)). This argument was based on the idea that an individual without knowledge of the world vis-a-vis the arts, culture and the like, as well as critical faculties, cannot excel in the contemporary world.

In line with the Turkish WP6 Report, the lack of autonomy of higher education institutions was also raised as a serious concern in terms of education and the establishment of quality education. As Erçetin indicates, “Private universities [in Turkey] can enjoy administrative and financial autonomy, while state universities cannot (2005: 25)”, which is also addressed in terms of the Bologna Process reforms. In that framework, and in line with the observations of the interlocutors, it is possible to argue that individuals are supportive of financially and administratively autonomous higher education institutions that are not under the authority of the central system (MY (WP7/13)).
3. Modernity: Alternative Modernities?

This section will revolve around the perspectives of the state, non-state and individual actors on modernity. The previous Turkish Reports frequently referenced Nilüfer Göle (2002 and 2006), who argues against the traditional understanding of the headscarf as a symbol handed down by generations and underlines that women who wear the headscarf are neither traditional nor modern in conventional terms. According to Göle they have been able to consolidate the traditional and the modern. Furthermore, the headscarf issue has been one of those issues that has always attracted great popular attention in Turkey, as it has become a symbolic fault line epitomizing the ongoing debate between seculars and Muslims, modernists and traditionalists, and Europeans and Eurosceptics, etc. (Göle, 2003; Toprak and Çarkoğlu, 2006; Saktanber, 2002).

3.1 State Actors

As noted in the WP4 and WP5 reports, Turkey went through a rapid modernization process after 1923 in reference to the Western model of modernity. Accordingly, the linear and teleological understanding of modernity was often underlined by the state actors. As such, the West, Europe and modernity were perceived to be synonymous with each other, hence highlighting the idea that modernity meant political and societal transformation along the Western model.

Between 2000 and 2010, the AKP government and the changes in the political agenda to include the construction of moderate Islam transformed the policies of the state. As the WP5 report extensively analyzed, the state policies began to include more cooperative projects with the Turkic countries as well as Middle-Eastern neighbours, thereby contributing to Turkey’s aspirations to become a soft power in the region. Accordingly, this has led to concerns such as the “axial shift” argument; however, as we will further investigate in this study, the state actors’ discourses have not completely abandoned the Western model, as such promotion of Turkish culture with European elements was maintained, but they were complemented by neo Ottoman undertones.

While the significance of religion in state actors’ discourses on modernity was discussed in the Turkish WP5 report, we should also reiterate the emphasis on the secular state after the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. To that effect, the debates surrounding the representation of religion in the field of education are the embodiments of the rising contestations between the religious make-up of the society and the secular tradition of the Turkish state. In other words, the debates surrounding modernization often stem from the ambiguous nature of the relationship between laïcité and religion. Therefore, the modernity discourses of the state actors are often framed in the religious-secular divide which is also debated in terms of the traditional values of the Turkish society versus the emphasis on secularism and rationality embedded in the foundations of the Turkish state.

3.2 Non-State Actors

Our previous Reports established that Turkey is a secular state by way of its Constitution however, in the last decade the headscarf became a symbolic element in non-state actors’ discourses on modernity and the role of the human agency. In our WP6 Report, we identified two debates regarding the representation of religion in education that received both the
media’s and civil societies’ attention, which were the debates surrounding the headscarf ban at universities and the proliferation of Imam Hatip school graduates’ participation in higher education. Some of our interlocutors discussed this issue with regards to politicization of the headscarf. To that effect, ÜE indicated that since this is a political issue, it cannot be solved in the short term (WP6/1) and ED similarly argued that this is a synthetic political issue and it should be viewed as women’s individual preferences (WP6/8).” On the other hand, KÇ indicated that the women wearing the headscarf should not be considered a homogeneous community and that this “movement” has been transformed to include women who are questioning the inequalities they have faced as well as those who maintain their belief in the patriarchal structure of the society (WP6/3).

While we observed different views on how to approach the headscarf issue, the relation between religion and education in general has been a source of concern for the majority of our interlocutors. Significantly, VÖ noted that the uncertain definition of laïcité and the supposed antagonism between laïcité and religion are some of the problems with regard to this issue (WP6/4). His argument references the challenging nature of the separation of religion and state in Turkey as well as the religious-secular divide, which have become sources of concern in terms of the social and political dynamics. Our interviews also revealed that while conservative and liberal interlocutors prefer to approach this issue within the human rights framework, interlocutors with left-wing and secular ideologies prefer to underline that this issue is highly politicized.

In terms of the representation of religion with regard to Imam Hatip14 schools, our interlocutors had different opinions. In that regard, we observed that the enrolment of Imam Hatip graduates in departments other than theology has become a concern for secular groups. Additionally, the interlocutors’ opinions also depend on how they perceive these schools’ role within the education system. In that regard, we argued that those who perceive these schools as occupational schools are more accommodating towards Imam Hatip schools. For example, KÇ viewed these institutions as,

“a kind of a temporary solution to the detrimental effects of modernization process... these are solutions to public demand founded by politics. Imam Hatip schools provide students with occupations without ostracizing religion (WP6/3).”

Similarly, ÖG indicated that these schools are in fact occupational schools, and that they provide a reasonable alternative for those who cannot attend universities. She further noted that the debate surrounding these schools has been politicized and taken advantage of by political actors (WP6/7). On the other hand, VÖ focused on the need for these schools on the basis of a lack of alternatives and argued for the renouncing of “religious education in civil space, and to ensure state control (WP6/4).”

In this framework, GO indicated that she has not been fond of these schools and that: “Schools are supposed to liberate and enrich people but these schools restrict women from finding their gender identity. These schools do not raise individuals (WP6/2).”

“The word imam actually refers to men because only men can be imams but we place women into these schools... These schools are also based on memorizing because they

14 For further information on the laws on Imam Hatip schools, please see the Turkish WP5 and WP6 Reports.
give student the Kur’an and expect them to memorize it... I find it senseless to raise women as religious individuals without an occupation (WP6/2).”

Our WP6 interviews indicate that some interlocutors were accommodating towards these schools as they constitute alternative educational institutions that accommodate professional and religious education, while some were in favour of the need to eliminate these institutions. However, it is significant that the majority of our interlocutors did not reference these schools with references to modernity or with reference to their counterparts. On the other hand, the interlocutors were more willing to provide their opinions on the headscarf issue and this issue was often referenced along the lines of the headscarf debate. The headscarf debate has come to overshadow the concerns/debates over Imam Hatip schools owing to the overemphasis on the headscarf debate in political and media circles. Furthermore, these schools are discussed in terms of the state’s control over education and occupational schools, therefore our interlocutors were less willing to offer their opinion on the Imam Hatip schools issue.

3.3 Private Individuals

In terms of our interviews for the WP7 Report, some interlocutors discussed the headscarf debate as a standardization effort. For instance, NK (WP7/1) contended that there are certain behavioural expectations from the public and certain behaviours are repressed for the sake of standardization (tek tipleştirme). Furthermore, it is possible to observe that while the headscarf debate as a symbol of the religious-secular divide is highly politicized, thereby leading to differences of opinion, academic works indicate that Islamic identity claims such as the headscarf are indeed reflections of modernity, the need for recognition vis-a-vis the contestation of the status-quo.

In terms of similar debates in other European countries, we observe the debates in France, which have been highly publicized in the Turkish media. A related observation was that several interlocutors expressed that they are not comfortable with the way the way in which the headscarf is being considered as a symbol for Islam in Turkey and in European countries. Accordingly, a majority of the interlocutors also noted that they are critical of the politicization of the headscarf debate. As such, Islamophobia was another issue that was associated with the headscarf debate. Moreover, one particular interlocutor stated that his views on the headscarf contradict his understanding of modernity; BB stated that:

“the headscarf is unnecessary. There are more important issues. It is visual pollution; it is not very nice to see women with the chador. It is not modern. I think is backward. This issue is being politically manipulated (WP7/8).”

Some female interlocutors indicated that this issue should also be questioned on the basis of gender equality, because the headscarf is employed as a means to identify women’s religious beliefs while men with similar beliefs cannot be identified, thus they are not denied access to education (AK (WP7/3), SO (WP7/14), UA (WP7/9)). Subsequently, we should also note that the majority of the interlocutors were also concerned with the motives behind the headscarf, since they maintained that it can be an individual’s choice or a result of family and community pressures.
PART II. NATION, EUROPE and MODERNITY

Part II of this study will identify the discourses used by state actors, non-state actors as well as private individuals which were discussed in the WP6 and WP7 Reports respectively. In doing so, we will provide comparisons between the discourses identified in different stages of our research and fieldwork.

The Nation: The need for a prospective definition of nation

As we have noted in the Turkish WP4 Report, modern Turkey is a multi-ethnic and multicultural country, housing approximately 50 different Muslim and/or non-Muslim ethnic groups: Sunni Turks, Alevi Turks, Sunni Kurds, Alevi Kurds, Circassians, Lazis, Armenians, Georgians, Jews, Greeks, Arabs, Assyrians, etc. (Andrews, 1992). Nonetheless, the Turkish state has not recognized the ethnically and culturally diverse nature of the Turkish society and ethnic groups have been subject to homogenising state policies which are among other results of the unitarian nationalist education policies and the rejection of ethno-cultural differences.15

As previously noted, in our WP6 interviews the national curriculum and citizenship play an important role in determining the interlocutors’ opinions on the Turkish education system. As such, the interlocutors argued that the type of citizen that the citizenship education aims to raise is defined in the framework of civility, patriotism and nationalism, as it anticipates reproducing nationalist, ethno-centric and difference-blind individuals. Furthermore, the interlocutors were critical of the way in which individuals/citizens produced in such a way that a good citizen is one who fulfils his/her duties to the state and satisfies the state’s expectations. Accordingly, the interlocutors’ discourses on citizenship in Turkey were critical of the exclusion of self-reflexivity of the individual from the curriculum. The lack of self-reflexivity was often attributed to the establishment of a meta-identity on the basis of Sunni-Muslim-Turkish identity, which excluded the non-Muslim, non-Turkish fractions in Turkey.

This discourse put forth in the critical perceptions of citizenship was furthered in the interlocutors’ perceptions of the relating of history and history education in Turkey. The interlocutors were in consensus that history education has been a successful means of establishing and maintaining the meta-identity while alienating non-Muslim, non-Turkish individuals from the individuals’ understanding of the Turkish nation. The identification of internal and external enemies vis-a-vis the emphasis on separatist efforts was criticized by the majority of the interlocutors, who have also indicated that the discourses on the Turkish nation and the nation-building process have overshadowed the discourses on Europe and modernity.

Interestingly, while the criticisms towards the use of history education to create a sense of belonging and unity via overemphasizing Ottoman history, embellishing Turkish history and identifying enemies/threats, a majority of the WP7 interlocutors indicated that they see this phenomenon as a common factor of nation-building for all European countries. Accordingly, we observe that there is a general lack of critical thinking and inquisitiveness. While the WP7 interviews indicated that private individuals criticize the overemphasis on the nation-building process, they often justify and legitimize this process with international references/benchmarks. Furthermore, this legitimization seems to take place with reference to European countries, particularly Greece and Germany, which means that Europe and

15 For further information on the state policies as of 1923, please see the Turkish WP4 Report.
European countries constitute a benchmark for the individuals’ understanding of the nation-building process.

In line with our findings from the interviews conducted with non-state actors, individuals’ opinions on the nation and national identity yielded that these notions are not essentialized by the interlocutors. However, while the non-state actors were more accommodating and welcoming towards ethno-cultural differences, private individuals were rather anxious about the rise of minority nationalism, particularly Kurdish nationalism. The need to maintain the unitary state was emphasized by the majority of the interlocutors who supported the right to education in the mother tongue in the human rights framework but still emphasized that this right should be managed in a way that does not lead to separatist movements in the future.

Furthermore, we observed that in terms of education in Kurdish, some of the WP6 interlocutors were in favour of using the term “bilingual education” while the WP7 interlocutors in general were in favour of using the phrase “official language”, which has been a frequent phrase used by the media and the political leaders. As such, one can argue that the individuals’ opinions have been influenced and even formed by the media coverage on this issue. Moreover, a common discourse that we observed in the WP6 and WP7 interviews is that the interlocutors in general perceive nationalism as a strategy and a tactic which aims to maintain the unitary state. Furthermore, both sets of interlocutors have been critical of fundamentalism and extreme nationalism in favour of embracing ethno-cultural diversity. However, in terms of linguistic differences the WP6 interviews were more accommodating towards linguistic differences labelling them as a “richness” of the Turkish society, while the WP7 interviews were only in favour of linguistic differences as long as they did not consider it a threat to the integrity of the Turkish society.

**Europe and Europeanization: The need for a post-civilizational Europe**

Before proceeding with our analysis, we should briefly reiterate the definitions of Europeanness which we defined in the Turkish WP4 Report. There are two alternative projects for Europe: 1) “civilizational Europe” defines Europe as a static, retrospective, holistic, essentialist and culturally prescribed entity, 2) “post-civilizational Europe” defines ‘Europe’ as a fluid, ongoing, dynamic, prospective, syncretic and nonessentialist process of becoming. The civilizational definition aims to build a culturally prescribed Europe based on Christian mythology, shared meanings and values, historical myths and memories, the Ancient Greek and/or Roman legacy, homogeneity and heterophobia. Consequently, this definition does not include any other culture or religion outside the European/Christian legacy, thus neither Turkey nor Islam has a place in this project. The post-civilizational definition, on the other hand, welcomes a political project embracing cultural and religious differences, including Islam. This definition proposes a politically dynamic Europe based on cultural diversity, dialogue, heterogeneity, and heterophilia. The advocates of a syncretic Europe promote coexistence with Turkey and Islam, and underline that the EU is, by origin, a peace and integration project. Furthermore, previous Turkish reports observed that Europe/Europeanization and the EU/EUization are two different concepts in the habitats of meaning for Turkish citizens. While Europeanization is perceived as a long-standing transformation process on the societal level *vis-a-vis* the transformation of values, “EUization”, refers to the technical and structural transformation of the political and legal systems *vis-a-vis* the implementation of the *acquis* (Kaliber, 2002). In other words, the
procedural elements of Europeanization are assigned to the EU while Europe is observed in a more identity-related manner.

In our WP6 Report, it was argued that the new curriculum of 2006 attempts to underline the notion of diversity through a religiously defined mode of civilizational discourse defining Europeanness and Turkishness as separate entities. On the other hand, we have also observed that non-state actors were in favour of the 2006 curriculum revisions due to its efforts to transform the understanding of an individual in line with the Western understanding. As such, the interlocutors emphasized the need for more inquisitive, self-reflexive and independent individuals with advanced critical faculties. In this context, it is also possible to infer that some of the interlocutors perceived this process of westernization/Europeanization of the mentality behind education as a means to confront the dogmatic nature of the Turkish national curriculum. This observation is also related to the way that the interlocutors criticized history courses and the way in which the content has not been revised to incorporate the contemporary dynamics, thus being outdated.

While the Western understanding of the individual is supported by the interlocutors, the Bologna Process is criticized for the neoliberal motivations behind it. Nonetheless, it is also important to note that criticisms of neoliberal motivations and policies are not necessarily confined to Europe or to the West but rather identified as by-products of globalization and increased economic competition and interdependence on the global scale. Accordingly, the interlocutors were critical of the skill-based aspect of the Process and perceived it as a means to “dehumanize” individuals in order to fulfil the labour oriented tendencies of global economic trends. Furthermore, this Process was criticized for its standardization and homogenization efforts which are in contradiction with the growing emphasis on multiplicity and local motives. In that sense, the use of a common language was brought up by some interlocutors in order to provide an example for standardization and the challenges it presents to locality vis-a-vis local languages. In effect, we observe that in the minds of the interlocutors the orientation towards fulfilling the requirements of the labour market vis-a-vis standardization seems to challenge the growing emphasis on diversity and locality, thereby contradicting the much accentuated notion of diversity. While this issue is surely related to Europe, globalization is surely an issue that we can infer from the interviews. Since the Bologna Process is also considered in association with globalization, we can also observe that the interlocutors have concerns over the maintenance of local elements in the face of globalization. Moreover, the fact that some interlocutors noted that the Bologna Process is or should be framed as internationalization suggests that perhaps the state’s framing of this Process as internationalization is not just about the prevention of backlash on the basis of growing Euroscepticism, but also a consequence of the perceived motivations behind the Process. In relation to that, while Europeanization was surely an important issue with regards to the reformation of Turkish higher education, non-state actors who were directly involved in this Process also indicated that this Process can also be equated with Americanization, since its point of reference is the Anglo-American model.

The lack of knowledge of the interlocutors on the Bologna Process in the WP7 interviews is also indicative of how this process has been introduced by the state and non-state actors. In that regard, we observe that this Process has been omitted or framed otherwise because of the

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16 We should note that in using the term “dehumanization”, we are particularly referring to the lack of individuality and the mechanization of individual abilities.
growing Euroscepticism\(^\text{17}\) in Turkey. Furthermore, owing to the lack of references to the influence of Europe on the Turkish education system, the American model introduced in the 1950s still constitutes an important element of individuals’ opinions towards the higher education system in Turkey. Similarly, the main discourse that we observed in the WP7 interviews is that modern education is often understood and discussed in reference to the USA. In light of this information, due to the lack of references and information on the Bologna Process, private individuals are in favour of Americanizing the education system rather than Europeanizing it. Consequently, we observe that Americanization is the preferred model of modernization in the field of education. Nonetheless, we should also note that this argument is also related to the way that non-state actors have differed in their approach to the framework of the Bologna Process. The focus on the structural aspects of Europeanization is also important and relevant for the Turks because it reiterates our argument in the WP4 Report, which argued that in the national contexts Europeanization generally means “adopting European issues into national political discourses,” “Europeanization of political parties,” “undertaking necessary socio-economic and agricultural reforms first to have a claim for EU funds and then for compatibility with the single market,” “general programs for increasing public awareness about Europe and the EU,” or referred to the reformulation of the candidates’ foreign policies and relations so that they broadly conform with the EU policies while in the Turkish context; Europeanization generally refers to the legalistic reformation and to the broad and deep reform process undertaken since the late 1990s. As such, the definition we operationalized in our previous reports is confirmed with the explicit or contingent definitions provided at the fieldwork stage.

Moreover, analyses of both sets of interviews have revealed that the civilizational definition of Europe persists in the minds of non-state and individual actors. In analyzing the interlocutors’ assumptions on Europe and Europeanization, we see that Europe is perceived to be static, holistic, essentialist, and most importantly, a culturally prescribed entity. In doing so, the interlocutors, particularly those of the WP7 Report, indicate that Turkey does not have a place in Europe and is often isolated due to its religious characteristic. In that framework, we see that private individuals perceive Turkey as an outsider to Europe on the basis that Turkey does not share the common Christian heritage of Europe. Furthermore, in the WP7 interviews Europe is perceived as an entity which politicizes domestic issues, thereby hindering the possibility of solving these problems.

It was also clear in the WP6 and WP7 interviews that the majority of the interlocutors make a distinction between Europe and the EU. For instance, the WP6 interviews mostly focused on how the EU rather than Europe has been an influential factor in the revision and the transformation of policies on education. In the WP7 interviews, there was a further differentiation between Europe and the EU, through which we referenced the growing EU scepticism. The assumed monolithic nature of Europe was often disputed by the interlocutors, particularly in terms of proposing a common solution with Europe or a possible European model to resolving problematic issues in the field of education. EUization is often unwelcome for the interlocutors as they question the sustainability and the motivations behind the EU. Nonetheless, the EU, whether criticized or commended, provided a rather tangible and uniform framework in terms of the modernization of education, while “Europe” proved to be a rather problematic term in identifying common practices. This differentiation between Europe and the EU can be considered a by-product of the EUization of the Turkish education

\(^{17}\) For factors related to the rise of Euroscepticism, please see the Turkish WP4 Report.
system on the structural level. Most importantly, this is in part a result of the top-down approach that has been carried out by the Turkish state in implementing the EU reforms in general.

The differentiation between Europe and the EU is also important in identifying the type of Euroscepticism that we have observed in the Turkish context. Euroscepticism in general terms refers to the disbelief in the European integration. Taggart (1998: 366) identifies the term as the expression of opposition, either qualified or unqualified, to the process of European integration. Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002) further identify two types of Euroscepticism: hard-Euroscepticism as a principled opposition to the EU and European integration, and soft-Euroscepticism as a concern about some policy areas or when there is a sense that national interest does not fit with the EU’s trajectory.

To that effect, in the Turkish context, soft-Euroscepticism seems to be rather more prominent, owing to the asymmetrical interdependence between the EU and Turkey and the current economic turmoil in Europe. Therefore, we do not observe hard-scepticism in our reports but rather a general contestation of certain policy areas and a concern over the conflicting interests of Turkey and the EU which stem from a) lack of information on the EU, b) lack of consensus on the definition of Europe (territorial or value-based), c) an inability to differentiate between Europe and the EU. Therefore, the type of Euroscepticism that we have identified in previous reports encompasses the idea of Euroscepticism. The top-down reformations processed in Turkey still persist vis-a-vis the EU reformation procedures, hence leading to a general backlash against and a rejection of “Europe”. Nonetheless, owing to the increased visibility and influence of non-state actors, the bottom-up approach has also become imperative in understanding the idea of Europeanization and modernity in the Turkish context.

Modernity: Individual self-reflexivity and social-political participation

In our WP4 Report, which constituted the framework for our understanding of modernity and modernization in the Turkish context, we emphasized that modernization is equated with Europeanization and westernization. Accordingly, the model of civilization promoting Euro-American hegemony in the modernity discourse was investigated in our WP6 and WP7 Reports.

As we put forth in the WP4 Report, the idea of multiple modernities in the Turkish context has been debated in Turkey through the works of Nilüfer Göle, İbrahim Kaya, Ferhat Kentel and Ayhan Kaya. In doing so, we argued that the works of Nilüfer Göle (2003 and 2009) and Kaya and Kentel (2005 and 2008) tend to provide some alternative interpretations for the rising visibility of Islamic symbols in the public space in Turkey as well as in the western European countries. Their interpretation of modernity equates modernity with social (civil) and political (civic) participation. Becoming socially and politically active for those who have a strong faith in Islam makes them modern although they do not fit into the classical definition of Western modernity. In accordance with the works of these scholars, we have also found that the majority of the discourses on modernity were found in the questions regarding the representation of religious beliefs in the Turkish education system.

As it was revealed in the literature review, the WP6 interlocutors addressed the debates revolving around the issues of religion and secularism in the field of education in the context
of modernity and modernization. As such, the WP6 interviews revealed that representation of religion in the education system is located around a fault-line dividing those who place these issues within the framework of human rights and those who place it within the framework of politicization of religious claims. Nonetheless, the primary discourse that we observe in the WP6 interviews is the importance of self-reflexivity in the representation of religious beliefs. In other words, the interlocutors emphasized that the motives behind the headscarf should be questioned to determine the role of the individual in choosing to represent religious beliefs, thereby referring to the family and community pressures on women to conform to the society’s preferences. Imam Hatip schools were discussed in a similar fashion in that while some interlocutors argued that they consolidate occupational and religious education but still maintained that individuals’ preferences in attending these schools were questioned.

In our WP7 interviews, we observed that the interlocutors’ opinions indicated their support for “modernizing” the educational system. Politicization of religious, ethnic and cultural debates was a major concern for the interlocutors. This was also the case in the WP6 report. In discussing the need to modernize the Turkish education system, the responses of the interlocutors were critical of both the current government and the opposition and in some cases it transcended into a criticism of the Turkish mindset and public opinion. Furthermore, some interlocutors’ critical approach to the practices of the state was combined with their emphasis on the need to increase their access to the decision-making process. In this framework, the interlocutors were critical of the education system as well as the active state and non-state actors, and emphasized the importance of self-reflexivity on the part of private individuals in order to transform the system.

Furthermore, we can also argue that based on the interlocutors’ implied definitions of modernity, Europe, which is frequently used as a synonym for the West, is representative of modernity. The EU, on the other hand, is often perceived as a rather political and economic entity which does not have influence on the social and cultural elements of modernization. As we discussed in regards to discourses on Europe, the EU is only referenced with regard to the structural reform on education, while Europe is referenced in cases relating to the transformation of the social and cultural elements in the Turkish context.

**Conclusion**

This report revealed the non-state actors’ and private individuals’ perceptions of nation, Europe and modernity in the Turkish context. We have found that modernization of the educational curriculum as well as the improvement of attitudes toward ethno-cultural differences is highly supported by all the interlocutors. While the interviews we held with non-state actors mostly focused on and welcomed the structural reforms that have been formulated in the framework of EU harmonization efforts, the interviews carried out with private individuals have been critical of the employment of Europe as a benchmark. We have observed that interlocutors refer to modernization and Europeanization, whether negatively or positively, as a phenomenon that occurs on the structural level vis-a-vis the policies on education. Accordingly, we see that justifications of national issues/debates with references to Europe are plenty; however, internalization of the values that accompany these transformation processes such as the mentality behind these processes, is still problematic. In other words, while there is a tendency to modernize the educational system, ethno-cultural and linguistic differences still constitute a challenge in the private individuals’ minds. The concept of the unitary state established and maintained in various levels of the Turkish education system
contradicts the notion of self-reflexivity and critical attitudes, thus restricting the role of the human agency. Consequently, as this report argued, modernization and Europeanization occur on the structural level while the reform processes are not internalized; thus they are in constant contestation with the conventional education system.

Furthermore, as far as both EU scepticism and Euroscepticism are concerned, we observed that the uniformity and standardization proposed by both entities are highly criticized by the interlocutors. In reference to multiple modernities, we see that although Europe structurally constitutes a point of reference, the interlocutors fear that standardization, particularly in the field of education, would constitute a challenge to the traditional characteristics of Turkish culture. Accordingly, this raises the question as to how the modernization of the legal and structural system in line with the EU can be consolidated with the growing scepticism towards Europe and the EU. While this phenomenon constitutes a challenge to the concept of modernization with reference to Western Europe, we observe that secularism, the fundamental political value of Western Europe, is maintained by all interlocutors. Nonetheless, secularism in the Turkish context is more than the separation of religion and the state but rather a founding value of the unitary state. The debates which perpetuate the religious-secular divide are often perceived to challenge the unity of the Turkish society. Accordingly, in the Turkish context, modernity does not necessarily rely on the conservation and propagation of European values on the societal level, while Europe constitutes an important benchmark in terms of the state structure. Subsequently, modern Turkish experience with the ongoing contestations of the traditional societal values while maintaining secularism and rationality can be discussed as an alternative form of modernity.

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Özbudun, Ergun and Serap Yazıcı (2004). Democratization Reforms in Turkey. İstanbul: TESEV.


**Annex I**

**Summary of the findings**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Europe and Europeanization</th>
<th>Modernity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>State level (WP5 Report)</strong></td>
<td>Essentializing national identity and citizenship</td>
<td>Rapid Europeanization/EUization between 1999-2005 (predominantly structural reforms)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Perpetuating the Turkish-Muslim-Sunni meta-identity</td>
<td>Loss of EU harmonization efforts (2005 onwards)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The shift of citizenship from <em>jus soli</em> principle to <em>jus sanguinis</em> principle</td>
<td>Bologna Process framed as internationalization (to prevent backlash and the rise of Euroscepticism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emphasis on Ataturk and his principles as the foundation of national education (emphasis of Republicanism and the unitary state)</td>
<td>Concerns over neoliberal motivations behind the restructuring of Turkish education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-state actors (WP6 Report)</strong></td>
<td>Criticism of exclusionist and nationalist policies</td>
<td>No consensus over the Bologna Process (internationalization versus Europeanization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Criticism of the identification of minority groups as “threatening”</td>
<td>Europeanization perceived in line with globalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>History education perceived as a project on establishing a national consciousness</td>
<td>Emphasis on the “American model” as the basis of the Turkish education system</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Emphasis on the need to emphasize cultural and linguistic differences (approach to bilingual education: human rights issue and a politicized issue)</td>
<td>Concerns over what skill-based education entails (references to the cultivation of critical faculties versus access to the labour market)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Criticism of the nationalist, ethno-centric, difference-blind and monolithic nature of the national curricula in Turkey.</td>
<td>Modernization/Europeanization seen in line with Western values (focus on pluralism, diversity and equality)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Criticism of the legitimization of the political system via the reproduction of state ideologies</td>
<td>2006 revision often referred to as Europeanization of the structure with problems with mentality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Private individuals (WP7 Report) | Emphasis on the role of human agency  
No consensus on Europeanization and what it entails |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Discomfort with the reduction of the education in mother language to education in Kurdish,  
Awareness of other European countries in selected issues (such as education in mother language and headscarf)  
Confusions on defining Turkish citizenship  
Criticism of the use of English in education (emphasis on the need to maintain education in Turkish)  
Justification of national history education with references to Europe as a common nation-building strategy  
Criticism of the infatuation with Ottoman history | Different approaches to skill-based education (social versus natural sciences)  
Emphasis on the cultivation of critical faculties  
Europeanization is seen as a “mentality”, “a way of living” and an “attitude”  
Criticism of the central education system and the top-down approach to the reformation process  
Lack of references to the EU |
| References to the headscarf debate as standardization (fearing that the headscarf will become the standard and lead to challenges to the secular individuals)  
Criticism of the headscarf as being “backwards”  
Concerns over Islamophobia in Europe over the association of Turkey with religious characteristics (particularly the wide depiction of the headscarf issue) |