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The rise of European Populist
movements & problems with
post-modern immigration policies

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**The rise of European Populist
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Preface

As I started to research this topic, I became drawn into the issue of immigration and soon found myself completely immersed in it, reading whatever I could get my hands on. Soon I realized that the report that my work would produce would be far longer than intended, and I decided to restructure it into a starting piece for my thesis next year. Thus it is directed towards outlining the situation and asking key questions rather than giving elaborate answers. I look forward to get back into this topic for a more thorough report in a few months.

1. Introduction

In the wake of this accelerated South-North migration, new reactionist movements have appeared all over Europe. These movements, their base, their interaction with the political establishment and their role in the securitization of migration, within the context of globalisation, are the objects of study in this paper.

First, I will attempt to outline the movements themselves, to go on with the local and global political and sociological environment in which they operate.

2. The Rise of Populist parties

The early 70s and onwards have seen a new type of political parties commonly referred to as far- or extreme-right. This labelling can be misleading since it includes a wide spectrum of actors, from Social Liberals like The Pim Fortuyn List, clear racists like the British National Party¹ and welfare state proponents like National Socialists. Half-hearted² attempts at trans-national cooperation has not been sustained,³ and the official website of the trans-national nationalist organ EuroNat has “latest news” from June 2006. Though populists probably sympathizes with each other across borders, some like Fortuyn vehemently denied any common ground with other groups.⁴

How extreme they really are can also be debated, since the demands raised are mostly limited to tougher restrictions on immigration or a complete stop to it, in most cases parties do not state openly that they want to expel legally residing foreigners en masse. More importantly, labelling these groups as ‘extreme’ is an easy way for mainstream politicians to ignore the questions that their emergence raises.⁵

Instead the term used here will be ‘populist’: what these parties have in common is anti-elitism, that they claim uniqueness from being close to the people contra the alienating power in the central government.⁶ This may also help explain their higher support in rural areas⁷ as a

¹ Lloyd, John “The Closing of the European Gates? The New Populist Parties of Europe” in Spencer, Sarah (ed) – *The Politics of Migration: Managing Opportunity, Conflict and Change*, The Political Quarterly, Blackwell Publishing, Malden, Mass. 2003, pp 88-90.

² Mahony, Honor “Plans for European far-right group intensify” euobserver, 2007-01-08, <http://euobserver.com/9/23196> (2009-06-03)

³ Mahony, Honor “MEPs welcome fall of far-right group” euobserver, 2007-11-14. <http://euobserver.com/9/25148> (2009-06-03)

⁴ Lang, Kirsty “At Home with Professor Pim” BBC News, 2002-05-04, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/1966979.stm (2009-06-03)

⁵ Especially true for the Belgian Vlaams Belang, whose secessionist demands may have a destabilizing effect. Official party website, <http://www.vlaamsbelang.org/56/> (2009-06-03)

⁶ Lloyd in Spencer, p 89.

symptom of an urban focus – justified by the high rate of urbanization – by mainstream politicians.

They also have in common a simple platform and focus on just a handful issues.⁸ This makes it easier for people with limited political knowledge to grasp the party's content – and also thus gets them closer to the 'people' – but it also makes them unprepared for the complex situation of being elected representatives dealing with politicians with far broader agendas.

3. Is Populism a response to a cultural threat or a counterweight against mainstream politics?

Meny states that the proliferation of institutions of power since the 1960s that put more checks on what elected governments can do creates the perception of an indifference to popular demand.⁹ The European Union is the nadir of such remote and unfamiliar power structures. Accordingly, an opposition to the EU is common among Populist Parties.

Another trend that became visible as the radical flare of 1968 wore off is the 'mainstreaming' – or homogenisation – of the political sphere. Hansen argues specifically that this de-radicalisation created vacuums that populist parties fit well into; they appear to be the only credible voice left for change. Case in point being the French Front National emerging as the former radical leftist parties were either marginalized or moving towards the centre.¹⁰

Though perceiving their culture as a static whole to be protected from foreign influence, supporters of Populist movements still often appreciate elements of a creolized¹¹ culture, most typically and heavily from U.S. consumerist culture and media, but also from cultures they view as undesired, such as the adoption of Döner Kebap, or even Pizza, into the northern European diet. But the cultural intrusion that goes on unopposed is able to influence European societies a lot more than Turkish or Italian immigrants and their foods, which through U.S. cultural hegemony helped spreading a feeling of 'an enemy within' in the aftermath of 9/11, severely increasing xenophobia¹² and giving populists a boost.

⁷ Woods, James, Moore, Robert. and Noonan, James "Characteristics of Extreme Right Groups: A Log-Linear Analysis" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois, Apr 15, 2004. http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p82594_index.html (2009-06-03)

⁸ Lloyd in Spencer, p 89.

⁹ Lloyd in Spencer, p 90.

¹⁰ Hansen, Randall "Migration to Europe since 1945: Its History and its Lessons" in Spencer, pp 29-30.

¹¹ Hannerz, Ulf – *Cultural Complexity: Studies in the Social Organization of Meaning*, Columbia University Press, 1991, p 265.

¹² Lloyd in Spencer, p 95.

While religious resurgence among immigrants often can be explained as a reaction to a perceived structural threat – of assimilation or exclusion – from the host community, the same might be true for nationalist resurgence and hostility towards immigrants. Economic globalisation often puts the lower social stratas under strain, creating a structural threat that is perceived to be foreign. Immigration is connected to capitalist greed. Lloyd notes that Le Pen in the French presidential election 2002 attacked capitalism so fiercely that he at times sounded like a communist.¹³ That said, many supporters of populist parties are economic winners in the current order,¹⁴ and immigrants as a cultural threat is emphasized in populist rhetoric, though it is hard to tell to what extent this is the source of their support.

4. Connecting alienation from the ruling classes with hostility towards immigrants – Policy Gaps

Another important theory to understand why is the theory of policy gaps. Few developed countries have immigration policies that are perfectly implemented.¹⁵ As noted earlier, a modern government acts in cooperation with other institutions that it does not have direct control over. Often have acts from the judicial branches been more accommodating to migrants than politicians.¹⁶ But then again politicians in office have usually been more accommodating than the public. Mostly because they are sensitive to the market demand of labour, but also in some cases because they feel morally obliged to support lesser fortunate migrants.¹⁷

Maybe the most expensive policy gap is U.S. policy regarding its southern border. The militarization of the U.S.-Mexican border – like immigration restrictions in Europe – led to seasonal migrants staying in the U.S. and sometimes bringing their families, since they knew that if they would return to Mexico, coming back would now be much harder. Instead of decreasing ‘illegal’ immigrants in the U.S., all billions of dollar spent stopped ‘illegals’ from returning south, and the total number in the states increased.¹⁸

¹³ Lloyd in Spencer, p 90.

¹⁴ Hentges, Gudrun & Meyer, Malte ”Changes in the Work Environment and Germany’s Extreme Right” in Flecker, Jörg (ed) – *Changing Working Life and the Appeal of the Extreme Right*, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Burlington, 2007, p 198.

¹⁵ Cornelius, Wayne A. & Tsuda, Takyuki ”Controlling Immigration: The Limits of Government Intervention” in Cornelius et al (eds) – *Controlling Immigration: a Global Perspective* (2nd ed), Stanford University Press, 2004, pp 4-7.

¹⁶ Geddes, Andrew ”Migration and the Welfare State in Europe” in Spencer, p 155.

¹⁷ Joppke, Christian commentary to Calavita, Kitty ”Italy: Economic Realities, Political Fictions, and Policy Failures” in Cornelius et al, p 384.

¹⁸ Kaya, Ayhan – *Islam, Migration and Integration: the Age of Securitization*, Palgrave Mcmillan, London, 2009, pp 11-2.

5. *How do mainstream Parties react to Populist Parties?*

In France, the attempt to marginalize the FN has been by moving in their direction, hoping to win over some nationalist, or anti-immigration voters, but in doing so they only conceded the argument, the FN retained their electorate.¹⁹

The Swedish Parliamentary parties have responded by ignoring their populist challenger, which is largely standard policy towards non-parliamentarian parties.²⁰ This has made the populists look victimized, and they have exploited the situation by questioning the democratic validity of that position. Though they are not likely to get into the EU-parliament this June, recent polls predict their entry into the Swedish parliament next election in 2010.²¹

Kymlicka argues that a more successful way seems to be quietly pro-immigration;²² to make sure that the economy gets what it needs in terms of migrant labour, but not talk about it. This entails a balancing act not to create another perceived policy gap. If constituents feel that their politicians are easier on immigration than they initially thought, they are likely to cast their votes where they can be sure to find anti-immigration policies, as has been the case in Italy.²³

6. *The French immigration model vs. the German immigration model – differences among populist movements?*

Recent research by Kaya contrasts the findings of Brubaker from the early 1990s. Kaya observes that the last 15 years have seen a change in French immigration, where they have moved from integrationist to 'assimilationist'.²⁴ But as he notes, this difference is in the perception of the migrants. While Kaya exclusively focuses on Muslim migrants of Turkish origin, Brubakers study focuses on the states themselves.²⁵ For other migrants to France, it is

¹⁹ Hansen in Spencer, p 30.

²⁰ On the auspice of political stability, non-parliamentarian parties (parties that got less than 4% of the national vote in the last election) are not welcome to official debates and receive less state-funding. Swedish Election Authority "Elections in Sweden: The Way It's Done" http://www.val.se/pdf/electionsinsweden_webb.pdf (2009-05-25)

²¹ "Sverigedemokraterna har valupptakt" SVT, 2009-05-02, http://svt.se/2.22620/1.1541745/sverigedemokraterna_har_valupptakt?lid=senasteNytt_275214&lpos=rubrik_1541745 (2009-06-03)

²² Kymlicka, Will "Immigration, Citizenship, Multiculturalism: Exploring the Links" in Spencer, pp 205-6.

²³ Joppke in Cornelius et al, p 384.

²⁴ Kaya, 2009, pp 2-3.

²⁵ Brubaker, Rogers – *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, Harvard University Press, 1992, p 168.

rather than not being accepted as French, not being fully assimilated, that causes discontent as shown in riots by second generation North-African immigrants starting in 2005.²⁶

A reason for the different approaches taken by the two countries could be their respective histories of consolidation. Germany was created by skilled political manoeuvring from several independent, German-speaking, but culturally and religiously different, states who joined the Empire on their own accord without being defeated.²⁷ France on the other hand was unified by force from Paris, and then saw the gradual but unforgiving ‘Francization’ which involved the destruction of several languages like Breton and Occitan.²⁸ Assimilation has been a trait of the French state, and ‘cultural stasis’ a trait of the German state, since long before modern migration.

7. Is Populism driving the Securitization of Migration?

A neo-liberal trend has been for the state to withdraw from the social sphere. Dean argues that this has also led to the emergence of Populist movements.²⁹ However, a social sphere free from state intervention may allow true plurality of thought to flourish, not just nationalism. Neither is it inherent that it would necessarily lead to a surge in immigration hostile sentiment. Rather than the vacuum created in its wake, a more important result is the general shrinking of the state. The state, which natural tendency to proliferate itself responds by expanding in the path of least resistance; the law enforcement agencies and the defence forces.

An easy target for expansion of the security apparatus then becomes immigration, partly since it is a natural phenomenon that will not disappear in the foreseeable future, making it long-term strategy of governmentality. Furthermore, since many migrants are not eligible to vote, and those who are often vote in smaller numbers than ‘native’ citizens³⁰ they are thus incapable of showing stark disapproval in the ballot box.

In Germany, multiculturalism itself works as a kind of governmentality by dividing society into communities based on culture rather than interest groups based on politics. The

²⁶ Common, David “France riots: Understanding the Violence” CBC News, 2009-11-28, http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/paris_riots/ (2009-06-03)

²⁷ Crankshaw, Edward – Bismarck, The Viking Press, New York, 1981, pp 294-296.

²⁸ Ager, Dennis E. – *Identity, Insecurity and Image: France and Language*, Multilingual Matters, Bristol, 1999, pp 15, 18 & 35-6.

²⁹ Dean, Mitchell – *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*, Sage Publications, London, 1999, p 153.

³⁰ Though some minority groups have higher turnouts than the majority, overall minorities do vote in fewer numbers. Messina, Anthony M. – *The logics and politics of post-WWII migration to Western Europe*, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p 199.

legal framework leads people to form apolitical groups, rather than political movements.³¹

But multiculturalism, though it may help prevent a unified opposition to government, leads to a multitude of new sources of discontent that can inspire radical anti-systemic views. That has helped the German racist National Democratic Party to gain support,³² in spite of government attempts to ban them altogether.³³

Kaya argues that securitization of migration is a way to “externalize the structural failures produced by the socio-political structure.”³⁴ Simply, to blame the failure of the welfare state on outsiders. This is an easy way out, and as such attractive also for mainstream politicians. Securing borders and preventing illegal immigration have little to do with security. It only gives the government the *appearance* of protecting their constituents.³⁵

However, the harshest examples of securitization of migration are found when Populists directly influence government. In Italy, Lega Nord and the ex-fascist Alleanza Nazionale managed to pass the Bossi-Fini Law³⁶ that requires fingerprint collection from all non-EU newcomers and automatically repels residence permits if an immigrant would become unemployed.³⁷ This in spite of the Italian economy’s great need for immigration. Geddes claims that many of these informal jobs, but also low-paid regular jobs, that before were occupied by southern Italians, are now being filled by immigrants because the southern Italians often choose to stay on state welfare or with their extended family, not because employers favour cheaper foreign labour.³⁸

Italy has a tradition of a large informal sector,³⁹ some estimates it at 20% of the country’s economy.⁴⁰ This makes Italy an attractive destination for illegal immigrants, and the impossible situation to control this flow contributes to the support for Italian populists and the securitization of migration. But it does not stop Italian Catholic communities – rarely known for progressive or anti-systemic activism – to be an important pro-immigration lobby. They

³¹ Kaya, Ayhan – *Sicher in Kreuzberg: Constructing Diasporas; Turkish Hip-Hop Youth in Berlin*, Transaction Publishers, Bielefeld, 2001, pp 112-5.

³² Ewing, Jack & Boston, William “Suddenly, Germany's Far Right Isn't So Far Out” Business Week, 2005-02-28, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_09/b3922085_mz054.htm (2009-06-03)

³³ Hooper, John “German court rejects attempt to ban neo-Nazi party” The Guardian, 2003-03-19, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/mar/19/thefarright.germany> (2009-06-03)

³⁴ Kaya, 2009, p 8.

³⁵ Kaya, 2009, p 10.

³⁶ Named after Umberto Bossi and Gianfranco Fini, respective party’s leader.

³⁷ Joppke in Cornelius et al, pp 381-2.

³⁸ Geddes in Spencer, p 160.

³⁹ Parati, Graziella – *Migration Italy: The Art of Talking Back in a Destination Culture*, University of Toronto Press, 2005, p 165.

⁴⁰ Christensen, David “Leaving the Back Door Open” in *Georgetown Immigration Law Journal* 11, no. 3:1, 1997, p 7.

stress that the immigrants are not only important as sources of labour, but that they as humans need and deserve respect.⁴¹

8. *The Swedish model; post Cold War restructuring, and securitization of migration?*

Sweden has seen enormous cuts in defence with the end of the Cold War. In the 80s, the Swedish Army could mobilize around 850 000 men, some in 6 hours!⁴² This is roughly 10% of the total population, compared with the U.S. Army amounting to just above 0.5% of the population in the early 90s.⁴³ In 2008 the number could be as low as 10 000 soldiers.⁴⁴ Still securitization of migration has been relatively mild and populist parties have been slow coming compared to Norway and Denmark.

Maybe the difference lies in the strong legacy of the Social Democratic party, having ruled the country for the majority of terms during the last century.⁴⁵ Far from being immune to it Swedish politics as “the most rocky soil of neo-liberalism”⁴⁶ have still been more resilient against neo-liberalism than its neighbours.⁴⁷ The ‘radical cultural renewal’ that Dean argues follows,⁴⁸ have then been slower and subsequently the Sweden Democrats reached political significance far later than populists in other European countries. Though anti-migration sentiments exist, grassroots anti-racist movements are as strong, or maybe even stronger.⁴⁹

⁴¹ Calavita in Cornelius et al, pp 363-4.

⁴² Ekdahl, Mats ”Sverige var ett av världens mest militäriserade länder” Newsmill, 2009-01-30, <http://www.newsmill.se/artikel/2009/01/30/ss> (2009-06-03)

⁴³ PBS, a transcript from a broadcast with Jim Lehrer, 2004-01-13, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/jan-june04/army_1-13.html (2009-06-03) Note: the source states that the U.S. army currently has 1 200 000 men, and that it is had one third less than during the first Gulf War. That would make the army $(1\ 200\ 000/3)+1\ 200\ 000 = 1\ 600\ 000$ which out of a population between at close to 300 million would give a percentage of slightly more than 0.5%.

⁴⁴ ”Sweden ill-equipped to defend itself” The Local – Sweden’s news in English, 2008-11-07, <http://www.thelocal.se/15520/20081107/> (2009-06-03)

⁴⁵ Samuelsson, Kurt – *From great power to welfare state: 300 years of Swedish social development*, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1968.

⁴⁶ Hort, Sven ”After equality? Normative innovations from Lindbeck to Svegfors – towards a dynamic conservatism?” in Kildahl, Nanna & Kuhnle, Stein (eds) – *Normative Foundations of the Welfare state: the Nordic Experience*, Routledge, New York, 2005, p 154.

⁴⁷ Skogerbø, Eli. & Storsul, Tanja ”Telepolitikk – fra trendsetting til tilpasning” in Claes, Dag H. & Tranøy, Bent S. – *Utenfor, Annerledes og Suveren? Norge under EØS-avtalen*, Fagbokforlaget, Bergen, 1999, p 200.

⁴⁸ Dean, p 163.

⁴⁹ Malmsten, Jenny ”Den föreningsdrivna antirasismen i Sverige” Doctoral Thesis, Linköping University, Department of Social and Welfare Studies, 2008, <http://www.immi.se/imer/> & <http://www.ep.liu.se/abstract.xsql?dbid=10395>

9. *Immigration – an economic advantage or disadvantage?*

The debate on a national level can often be simplified to whether the pressure from *idle* immigrants will destroy the welfare state or the labour of *motivated* immigrants will save it from its demographic crisis.

In the 90s, perception that welfare services act as a ‘pull’ factor for migration lead the British government to introduce policies excluding immigrants from some services. However, the number of asylum seekers continued to rise,⁵⁰ which may disprove the ‘pull’ of welfare. On the other hand, it is unlikely that all migrants have accurate up-to-date information about such policy changes. Nevertheless, current policies often exacerbate the economic weight of immigrants: asylum seekers are denied access to the job market and therefore *forced* to live on welfare.⁵¹ This cost the U.K. alone almost £1 billion of taxpayer’s money in 2002.⁵²

Nowhere is the need for immigrant labour as acute as in Japan where to avoid an annual drop in GDP at 6.7% needs to import 640 000 labourers every year.⁵³ In sharp contrast to this need, Japan has one of the world’s most restrictive migration policies. Unskilled immigrants are categorically denied residence, and though there are no limits to how many times one can renew a residence permit, it is virtually impossible to gain citizenship, even for those Japanese 2nd or 3rd generation immigrants ‘return-migrating’,⁵⁴ from South America.⁵⁵

However, the current levels of immigration are way too low to be able to either make or brake the welfare states.⁵⁶ In fact, 10% of the worlds population were migrating in 1913, compared with a proportion of around 3% today.⁵⁷ The difference is attributed to increased border control and restrictions of movement. “Migration does not cause change in welfare states, states cause change in migration.”⁵⁸ The debate should be how to manage migration to create the latter outcome.

⁵⁰ Geddes in Spencer, p 157.

⁵¹ Hansen in Spencer, p 33.

⁵² Ward, Lucy “Blunkett concedes asylum overspend could top £1bn” 2002-06-03, the Guardian, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2002/jun/03/asylum.politics> (2009-06-03)

⁵³ Tsuda & Cornelius “Japan: Government Policy, Immigrant Reality” in Cornelius et al, pp 446-7.

⁵⁴ Though Latino-Japanese immigrants certainly are being better care for than others, actively being helped to find jobs and housing.

⁵⁵ Tsuda & Cornelius in Cornelius et al, p 448.

⁵⁶ Geddes in Spencer, pp 150-1.

⁵⁷ Eriksen, Thomas H. – *Globalization: The Key Concepts*, Berg. New York, 2007, pp 93-4.

⁵⁸ Geddes in Spencer, p 162.

10. Discussion – Options and Possibilities

Why is migration control even needed? When it involves smaller number of people and a somewhat equal exchange between destinations, it is not, as 'internal' EU policies show. Except for Ireland and some micro-states,⁵⁹ all European countries have a net migration rate between + - 3.⁶⁰ However, when the flow is one-sided, problems of finding housing and employment may occur, acutely so in the wake of war, famine or natural disaster. Though the de-securitization of migration would be a welcome development, institutions to control migration are needed, if for nothing else so for humanitarian reasons.

When policy is formulated with the goal to salvage the welfare state, a very important factor to keep in mind is a potential 'brain-drain' effect. One must be careful with encouraging the skilled migration that Hansen and others favour,⁶¹ if large-scale unskilled migration in the long run should be avoided. Unwatched greed for human capital may remove those very persons desperately needed for domestic development and reduction of poverty in LEDCs.⁶² Though poverty does not necessarily create emigrants,⁶³ it is certainly one of the most important push-factors for unskilled labourers, and with birth rates remaining high and life prospects low, we would likely face a continued – and maybe even escalating – stream of 'unwanted' migrants.

As the 2008 IOM report argues that efforts to 'internationalize' one's own workforce and make them ready for employment abroad must be seen as complementary to welcoming immigrant labour,⁶⁴ so must the integration of 'unwanted' migrants be seen as complementary to development and the empowering of such communities before its people are 'pushed' to migrate by factors beyond their control.

While the argument that it is the poor European nationals who suffer economically – and businessmen and companies who benefit – from immigration may be morally justified, if we consider that internal migration involves a much larger number of people,⁶⁵ and even cross-border migration occurs in much larger numbers between developing countries than into

⁵⁹ From highest to lowest net migration rate: San Marino, Luxembourg, Monaco, Andorra and Liechtenstein.

⁶⁰ CIA World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2112rank.html> (2009-06-03)

⁶¹ Hansen in Spencer, p 34.

⁶² International Organization for Migration (IOM) - World Migration Report 2008: Managing Labour Mobility in the Evolving Global Economy, No 4, 2008, p 397.

<http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/cache/offonce/pid/1674?entryId=20275> (2009-06-03)

⁶³ Faist, Thomas – *The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2000, pp 23-4.

⁶⁴ IOM, p 395.

⁶⁵ IOM, p 173.

developed countries,⁶⁶ the morality of that claim becomes dubious. For MEDC's to close their borders to that small part that manages to make it so far is selfish, not to say chauvinist. If migrants are a problem, they are not solely the responsibility of the global south.

In scholarly debate, focus is being shifted from a strict relationship between sending and receiving states, rather the concept of a trans-national social space is viewed as more useful.⁶⁷ For a more comprehensive approach to migration control, the IOM report concludes that bi-lateral cooperation is a good and flexible way to control migration with migrants rights in focus.⁶⁸ Though Spanish-Moroccan co-operation has neither been able to control migration nor reducing the plight of migrants, many of whom die while attempting to make the risky journey, it must be noted that Morocco is a migration hub that attracts Africans from all over the continent. If Morocco (and its neighbours) would have the resources to control and *accommodate* migration along all its borders, the pressure on Gibraltar would be lessened, and the model of bi-lateral border control would have a fairer chance to work.

Of course, to be able to control the vast miles of border on the continent would probably require enormous amounts of capital and state power, and if not even the richest and most densely populated countries in the world can do this successfully, it is unrealistic to expect Mauritania or Mali to be able to do it. Even if these resources were available, it would be ludicrous to spend it trying to make each state an open-air prison. In a sense, each cent spent on migration control is a cent not spent on development, social services and/or jobs that could have persuaded the migrant from uprooting him/herself.

In addition to having more rational and realistic immigration policies that aims at maximum economic benefit and to make this connection between migration and economic prosperity clear to the public, governments must also have a longer term goal of increasing prospects in LEDC's, lessen the global disparities between north and south and making sure all states can properly function and protect their citizens. This mindset is starting to gain ground, with an inter-continental meeting in Burkina Faso on how to create jobs in source states to prevent emigration.⁶⁹

But difficulties are likely to proliferate: As the recent IOM-report points out, climate change is likely to create a large number of migrants;⁷⁰ controlling migration in the wake of

⁶⁶ Faist, p 4.

⁶⁷ Faist, pp 12-3.

⁶⁸ IOM, p 396.

⁶⁹ Kaya, 2009, p 13.

⁷⁰ IOM, pp 398-400.

large-scale natural disasters will have to be a comprehensive mission that will require effective use of state-power among both sending and receiving countries.

11. Concluding remarks

While maybe not credible political powers in democracies, the rise in popularity and influence of Populist, or far right, parties are symptoms of failed immigration & integration policies. They are symptoms of societies struggling to accept their new roles as countries of immigration – forced upon them by their wealth and low birth rates.

Societies have two main options, either adapt to the new situation, or try to ‘reverse’ it by lessening north-south disparities in economy and demographics, but the sensible road probably lies in between. Though bi-national approaches like that between Italy and Albania or Spain and Morocco is a good step, bi-regional co-operation in both development and migration control is needed to be more effective.

Scholars like Kymlicka can argue that “...the whole idea of ‘national citizenship’ is increasingly obsolete.”⁷¹ Though I would agree, and maybe even argue that its only purpose ever has been that of governmentality, policy makers must take into account that most of their electorate is not as progressive. Nationality as a factor of social cohesion and controllability is old in Europe, and it now has a life of its own. A satisfactory compromise between the ‘nation’ and the need for immigration must be reached if the obstacles to integration that the alienation, xenophobia and racism of post-modern populists should be avoided. You cannot reach this kind of compromise through ignoring or emulating them.

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⁷¹ Kymlicka in Spencer, p 195.

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