Immigration and the Welfare State in Denmark

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Introduction

It is claimed that immigration may put the legitimacy of the welfare states under pressure (Soroka, Banting & Johnston, 2003). The typical argument refers that cultural homogeneity is a precondition of the solidarity that is the essence of the welfare state (Miller, 1995: 90-99; Brochmann, 2003). Denmark was traditionally one of the most ethnically homogenous societies in the world, and occasionally, Danes have been described as a tribe (Gundelach, 2001) The breaking point of the homogeneous Danish society can be taken as the 1960's and 1970's when the state received labor migrants and later asylum-seekers and refugees from countries of conflict and political oppression outside Europe itself. (Westin, 2005) Politically, Denmark moved from the idea of adjustment[1] and assimilation as the way to incorporate migrants in the early 1970's to the more liberal approach of promoting integration and accepting cultural and ethnic diversity as a natural condition of the society in the 1990's. However, today some indications can be found of a return to less liberal views on immigration and multiculturalism in Denmark.

This approach shows that immigrants once were useful; they had a "utility". Then with the rise of post- industrial society they became a "burden". Not only in terms of "industrial regime"[2] but also in terms of social cohesion, immigrants became a threat for the solidarity of the welfare state- the welfare state that depends on a "shared national identity and culture."

[1] The concept of adjustment was the key term employed by the Swedish authorities to refer to the process of incorporating migrants into mainstream society and this concept was embraced by the other Nordic states in their politics vis a vis the immigrants. (Westin, 2005)

[2] Within the industrial regime, with its technological objects and sceintific methods, the grandeur is about efficiency, productivity, ensuring functionality and giving utalitarian answers to needs. This is of course the world of industrial capitalism. Here, professional expertise count as "grand". Unproductive people are "small". Progress, planning and organization are given pride of place. (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991: 252-262)

Today, what is seen in Denmark can be called "welfare state chauvinism" where it leads to a general tendency towards immigration as being the reason for an erosion of solidarity. This paper aims to elaborate theoretically the linkage between immigration and legitimacy of the welfare and the way in which Denmark uses migration rhetoric institutionally. Finally, the paper will cover Denmark's experiences of political mobilization on the issue of immigration and, try to demonstrate the connection between immigration and the declining support for the welfare state.

Immigration and Political Parties

Except for the Sami People in the far north, the Scandinavian countries have been ethnically homogeneous societies without political or intellectual traditions of xenophobia or racism. (Bjorklund, Andersen, 1994) In the 1930's however, restrictions on immigration were sometimes defended by what would today be considered overtly racist arguments. For instance, it was argued that closed borders were necessary to preserve the Nordic race and to prevent Norway becoming "one of Europe's garbage cans" (Rovde, 1997). Despite this fact, official ideology has been one of tolerance and humanism even though earlier waves of small-scale immigration have often generated some unrest among ordinary people (Sorensen, 1988). In Denmark, emergence of "guest workers" from the late 1960's did not make immigration as an issue because the number was modest. That period had nearly no unemployment, and the "guest workers" accepted the so called dirty jobs which the indigenous population left vacant. It also did not become a political issue when decisions were made in the early 1970's to stop immigration of guest workers: Although the political left and the political right were concerned with different things (competition on the labor market and social expenditures, respectively), they drew the same conclusion from different arguments. It was not until the issue was re-phrased in quite other terms when cheap immigrant labor was replaced by refugees from the mid 1980's that political polarization began to increase and political attention began to accumulate (Bjorklund, Andersen, 1994).

Table 1: Immigrants in Denmark 1870-2005

Year	Total Numbers of Inhabitants	Born in		
		Denmark	Western Countries	Non-Western Countries
1870	1,784,741	1,732,957	50,169	1615
1880	1,969,039	1,906,918	60,123	1998
1890	2,172,380	2,101,408	68,294	1606
1901	2,449,540	2,369,122	78,216	2202
1911	2,757,076	2,671,750	79,984	5342
1921	3,267,831	3,160,264	100,173	7393
1930	3,550,656	3,461,820	83,022	5814
1940	3,844,312	3,760,431	78,482	5399
1960	4,585,256	-	-	2437
1970	4,492,966	-	-	9228
1975	4,054,410	-	-	25,915
1980	5,122,065	4,987,360	90,727	43,978
1985	5,111,108	4,970,542	88,111	52,455
1990	5,135,409	4,954,300	90,182	90,927
1995	5,215,718	4,990,723	97,513	127,482
2000	5,330,020	5,033,096	109,188	187,736
2005	5,411,405	5,068,038	116,071	227,296

Source: 1870-1940 Danish Census, supplemented for 1880 with Falbe-Hansen & Scharling (1885)
1960-1975 Residence and working permissions to foreign inhabitants, Statistical Yearbook
1980-2005 Ministry of Integration's register of immigrants in Statistic Denmark
Note: There can be discrepancies between the different sources' three principally complete different types of data (The census' self-reported birthplace for all inhabitants, permissions and finally register statistics). Non-Western countries includes for the years 1870-1890 all other countries than the Scandinavian countries and Germany, for the period 1901-1975 Africa, Asia, Russia and America except USA. Compared with the modern definition used 1980-2005 Balkan is excluded and Canada included from the non-western countries. Balkan and Canada is numerical unimportant before World War 2 and the classification is caused only of data reasons (for many of the years a considerable part of Balkan was included in the Austrian-Hungarian empire and America is in the statistics only divided in USA and the "Rest of America"). It is not possible to count immigrants from Western countries for 1960-75 on the basis of residence and working permissions because citizens from the – in this relation very important - other Scandinavian countries did not need any permission. The number of permissions in 1975 did not include children below the age of 16; this is adjusted by adding 5206 children to the number of permissions. The figure 5206 is calculated on the basis of the assumption that the relative part of children in the Western and the Non-Western group are equal.

There are a growing number of immigrants and there is a change in the distribution of immigrants between Western and Non-Western countries. The immigrants before World War II were from the neighboring countries – the Scandinavian countries and Germany – but today they are mainly from Non-Western countries. The number of immigrants with a real different culture was earlier very small. The 1998 persons in1880 includes all immigrants from "Other foreign countries"; this figure is in Falbe-Hansen and Scharling (1885) specified to 459 born in UK and Ireland, 386 in Russia, 182 in the Austrian Empire, 138 in France, 127 in Switzerland and 512 outside Europe and of them 361 in America (Scharling supposed that a considerable number of them are the families of Danish emigrants to USA who returns). One of the groups mentioned is farm-workers from Poland in the first decades of the 20th century. Before World War I there was no Polish state and consequently non separate registration of people born in Poland, but in the census from 1921 there are registered 7568 people born in Poland and in 1930 a total of 5242. Another of the mentioned "big" groups are Jewish refugee from Russia in the first decade of the 20th century and one can see that the number of Jews in Denmark grew from 3476 in 1901 to 5164 in 1911 and 5947 in 1921 (Kaergard, 2006).

Dispersed empirical evidence from the 1970's indicates that intolerance and prejudices were quite widespread already by then, but it was not politically articulated (Gaasholt and Togeby, 1995). In addition, what has changed in Denmark since the 1970's is not the degree of hostility but rather the saliency of the issue. In Danish election studies, immigration was not at all mentioned as an issue by the voters until the sudden shock of asylum-seeking refugees from the mid 1980's. With 1990's the rapidly growing immigrant population and the increasing public attention to language problems, juvenile delinquency, unemployment, dependence on social security etc. put the issue permanently at the voter's agenda. According to the survey that J. Goul Andersen presents, the proportion of voters mentioning immigration as the most important issue for their party choice increased from 4% in 1987, to 8% in 1994 and ends with as explosion to 14% in the 1998 election survey when immigration was one of the most important single issues, mentioned by 35% of the respondents as among the two or three most important issues.

In Denmark, the number of asylum seekers increased from 800 in 1983 and 9300 in 1986. The civil war in ex-Yugoslavia generated a peak of nearly 14000 in Denmark in 1992. Since then the figures have been lower but because of family unifications etc., the immigration population has continued to increase. By 1997/ 1998, the proportion of first- or

second-generation immigrants was 6.6% in Denmark[3]. The proportion of immigrants from "non-European" countries (Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Turkey and ex-Yugoslavia)[4] is 3.2% in 1997 where this number was the half in 1987. Turks constitute the largest ethnic group of migrant origin in Denmark followed by Germans and Iraqis (Westin, 2005). The evidence is that Nordic migrants are the least affected while migrants of non-European origin face considerable difficulties. Obviously migrants from neighboring Nordic countries or Germany have advantages in terms of language learning and proficiency and cultural affinity but they also enjoy certain labor market and legal rights. The scholars who are working on the subject of migration in Denmark indicate that the consistently high unemployment rates for non-European groups are most likely an indication that systematic ethnic and racial discrimination is in operation. It can be suspected that this discrimination is institutional, that is to say, it is part of the formal and informal rules and regulations of companies, organizations and of the authorities. Today researchers regard this discrimination as an inherent part of social structure itself.

Table 2: Number of Immigrants from Non-Western Countries in Denmark from 2005[5]

Country	**Immigrants**	**Descendants**	**Total**
Turkey	30,923	23,936	54,859
Iraq	20,771	5,580	26,351
Lebanon	12,077	10,155	22,232
Bosnia	17,850	3,025	20,875
Pakistan	10,644	8,657	19,301
Yugoslavia	11,946	5,582	17,528
Somalia	11,224	5,728	16,952

[3] First generation immigrants are born outside Denmark by parents who are also foreigners. Second-generation immigrants are those who are born in Denmark with a father and mother born in a foreing country. In Denmark, about 80% of all who are classified as "immigrants" are first generation immigrants.

[4] The description of Yugoslavia and Turkey as "non-European" countries is of course debatable.

[5] Source: The ministry of integration's immigrant database

Note: A person is in this statistic defined as "Dane" if one of his parents is Danish citizen and born in Denmark, other persons are "immigrants" if they are born outside Denmark and "descendants" if they are born in Denmark.

Iran	11,687	2,602	14,289
Vietnam	8,657	3,997	12,654
Afghanistan	9,380	1,496	10,876
Other Non-Western	80,137	22,509	104,646
Total Non-Western	227,296	93,267	320,563

Denmark has experienced an unusually strong political mobilization on the issue of immigration and ethnic conflict since the 1980's. When the Progress Party, launched in 1972 as a populist, tax protest party, was heading towards extinction in the mid-1980's, the sudden explosion in the number of asylum-seekers in 1984 and onwards provided the party with a new rallying issue in the protest against immigration (Andersen& Bjorklund, 1990; Andersen& Bjorklund, 2002). This reversed the decline in support: The party won 4,8% in the 1987 election and 9% in the election of 1988. After years of internal strife from which the party miraculously survived, the party's former leader Pia Kjaersgaard in 1995 launched her Danish People's Party, which soon became the successor of the Progress Party. Free from ideological heritage the Danish People's Party could specialize on immigration and replace former tax protests with a strong nationalism and an almost classic Social Democratic defense for the welfare state with priority to health care, elderly care and public pensions. The two anti-immigration parties gained 9,8% in the 1998 election and 12,6% in 2001. In the 2005 election, the Danish People's Party obtained 13.3% of the votes. [6]

The principle of free immigration is mentioned in the manifesto of the Danish Progress Party which states that foreigners are welcome if they do not impose social expenditures or risk of increasing crimes on the Danes (Bjorklund&Andersen, 1999). The party explicitly states that refugees should not be integrated and only in exceptional cases be granted permanent residence. Access to Danish citizenship should be limited by quota arrangement, and be given only to people with the ability to care for themselves and with sufficient knowledge of Danish language and Danish culture, if necessary examined by an oral and written test. However Danish rules for citizenship are liberal: Seven years of legal residence more or less automatically qualify for citizenship. On the other hand, immigration

[6] Source: Statistics Denmark, Statistical Yearbook, various issues.

policy occupies only one page towards the end of Danish Progress Party's manifesto, which takes its point of departure in the classical themes of the Party since 1973: Abolition of income taxes; simplification of the "law jungle"; reduction of red tape; and individual freedom (Bjorklund& Andersen, 1999). The Danish People's Party is more extreme. Rather than individual freedom, its core idea is nationalism, preservation of national feelings and the national community. This involves a social obligation to take care of the weak, and the party dissociates itself from former neoliberalism in favor of a more positive attitude to welfare but for Danes only. The party argues strongly against multiethnicity as a threat to the national culture.

However, the political impact of anti-immigration parties in Denmark goes further. The Danish People's Party recruited many working class Social Democrats. This party, in turn, became increasingly divided over this issue. Not surprisingly, voter problems and internal strife contributed to even more media attention to immigration. As from 1998, also the Liberal party saw the potentials in mobilizing on this issue. Thus, even though increasing immigration is the underlying cause, the self-reinforcing dynamics of party competition contributes much to explaining why this issue is considered so much more important among Danish voters. In the Danish 2001 elections, 51% of the voters mentioned immigration as an important problem the politicians should handle (Andersen, 2003; Holmberg & Oscarsson 2004: 123) Whereas saliency of immigration was strongly fluctuating in the 1980's (Tonsgaard, 1989), it became a permanent issue on Danish voter' agenda from 1994 onwards. In 2001, it was the most important single issue (Andersen, 1006). After radical restrictions to immigration were adopted in 2002 by the Liberal-Conservative government and the Danish People's Party, the saliency of immigration declined, but it has remained a core issue in Danish politics.

Welfare State and Social Cohesion

Often, the mobilization of negative attitudes against foreigners is seen as an effect of economic crisis and the accumulation of social problems. In such situations, immigrants may serve as an outlet for frustrations. However in the example of Denmark, this does not appear to be the case. On the contrary, high saliency of immigration may be pictured partly as an effect of the solution of other problems. From the mid-1970 until the mid-1990, unemployment seems to be a big issue, alongside the economy. After 7 years of economic prosperity, these issues had declined into significance. Even environmental problems had

been dealt with. What remained of "unresolved" problems were, first and foremost, welfare and immigration. Regardless of the background for the mobilization, it remains a fact that the issue is strongly politicized, in a way that should provide for a thinking in terms of "us" and "them", and consequently in terms of division or even polarization that may undermine solidarity.

The most widespread argument is the cultural argument which relates welfare state solidarity to the existence of a homogenous population with a shared national identity and culture. It could be argued that in Europe, the building of the welfare state was almost a part of the nation-building process (Freeman 1986; Wolfe & Klausen 1997). As demonstrated by Alesine & Glaeser (2004: 140-48), there really is a strong correlation between racial and linguistic fractionalization and social welfare spending. Their explanation is related to the classic debates over American vs. European exceptionalizm. Among the several causes of the absence of Socialism in the US, racial and ethnic divisions have always been listed among the most important – and whereas the United States have traditionally been described as the exception (Lipset, 1996). Alesina & Glaeser rather turns the argument around: It is cultural homogeneity of European welfare states that was exceptional. With increasing immigration, these nations may become more similar to the US, and consequently, one can also expect trends towards convergence of their welfare states.

It should be underlined, however, that Alesina & Glaeser do not suggest a deterministic and unconditional hypothesis about the impact of ethnic heterogeneity. In the first place, they emphasize that the impact depends on whether ethnic divisions coincide with economic divisions so that one ethnic group benefits disproportionately from welfare. (Alesine & Glaeser 2004: 134-36; 175-81). Secondly, they underline that ethnic division gain importance, first and foremost, when they are exploited by right-wing politicians for anti-welfare purposes: "In fact, the extreme right in Europe is already using the race card to oppose welfare policies. We predict that as racial heterogeneity in Europe increases, even the more "respectable" right will move in that direction" (Alesina & Glaeser 2004: 219) Finally they point out that differences in political institutions are also very important and act to preserve considerable differences in the welfare states across the Atlantic.

Jorgen Goul Andersen, however, suggests that also the institutions of the welfare state will have a major impact. It makes a fundamental difference what comes first: Ethnic heterogeneity or institutionalized welfare. He suggests that the institutionalized welfare state

may serve to maintain solidarity with the poor, even if they are foreigners, and that right-wing parties will find it difficult to get support if they maintain an anti-welfare stance. From the literature on welfare state attitudes, the argument about "cultural homogeneity could build some plausibility already on the observation that people tend to be most supportive of transfers and services which are given to people resembling themselves. Although it is not a rule without exception (for instance, universal child benefits are not very popular in Denmark), universal benefits have typically been more popular than selective ones. Also, people are usually more suspicious of abuse among social assistance claimants than among those who receive unemployment benefits – although in Denmark since the early 1980's, few people have wanted to cut back on any of these (Andersen, 2005).

There are also studies on "deservingness" that immigrants are nearly always considered less deserving than the indigenous population (van Oorschot, 2005). Numerous studies show that nearly any sort of social and economic inequality between Danes and immigrants is strong and increasing. I believe that, this simple version of cultural homogeneity argument is not as plausible as it might seem. Once built, institutions are resistant to change. Institutions have a strong impact on perceptions, norms, and values. [7] Thus, it would seem likely that reactions to immigration may be different in different welfare states. In addition, the culture argument often implies that solidarity is mechanical, to use Durkheim's classic label. However, Durkheim's argument was exactly that with modernity follows a transition from mechanical to organic solidarity, from a solidarity based on conformity to a solidarity based on difference and mutual interdependence. Indeed, one could argue that if solidarity was mechanical we should have observed a decline in support for the welfare state already in the 1960's, before the wave of immigration.

There are of course many reasons for the development of the Danish welfare state and for the specific construction of the institutions. And it seems reasonable that the forces behind the development can have changed during the hundred years from the first beginning in the 1870s to the welfare state was fully developed in the 1970s. In the very beginning social engaged Christians and economists played a key-role (Kaergard, 2005 and 2006). The Social Democratic Party has a dominating influence on the development between 1924 and 1973 and a number of politicians could be mentioned. But also among the politicians from other parties

[7] According to Michael Foucault the modern state regulates our bodies, souls, habits, and thoughts by giving us a sense of "freedom". In the modern societies, freedom has become a fruitful resource for government. Accordingly, multicultralism enables minority cultures to represent themselves "freely"

there have been a number of social disposed people; a considerable part of the reforms have been carried through the parliament by broad coalitions of parties. Even though there are many possible explanations and many influencing persons in the history of the Danish welfare state, it seems obvious that a type of welfare state, where every inhabitant is secured a reasonable level of living independent of insurance and labor market affiliation, must be difficult to manage if the society is religious, linguistically and ethnically split up and if the solidarity between the members in the different groups are weak. It is perhaps not accidental, that there has been a number of cuts in the welfare benefits and a number of tightening of the welfare rules in the last couple of decades, where the Danish society has become more multiethnical and multireligious, and where the globalization has weakened the national connection between the inhabitants – now the inhabitants are often partly educated in another country, worked in a multinational firm and are regulated by rules decided in international organizations like the EU or WTO (Kaergard, 2006).

The debate about the problem of "cohesion" is much older in countries like USA, Canada, Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands, where considerable ethnical and religious minorities have a long history. In Canada Jane Jenson's report (Jenson, 1998), Evigail Eisenberg's survey article (Eisenberg, 2002) and a number of publications of William Kymlicka, Keith Banting, Richard Johnston and Stuart Soroka (Banting et al, Forthcoming, Banting & Kymlicka, 2004, Soroka et al, Forthcoming, Soroka et al, 2004, Banting, 2005, Kymlicka, 1989, 1995 and 1998) are interesting contributions. Jenson discusses four different definitions of cohesion (Jenson, 1998, p. 17):

- The capacity to construct a collective identity, a sense of belonging.
- A society's commitment and capacity to assure equality of opportunity by including all its citizens and reducing marginality.
- In relation to democratic practices, including patterns of participation and the legitimacy of representative institutions such as advocacy groups, political parties, unions and governments.
- Society's capacity to mediate conflicts over access to power and resources, to accept controversy without trying to shut it down.

This is analyzed in five dimensions:

- belonging/isolation
- inclusion/exclusion

- participation/non-involvement
- recognition/rejection
- legitimacy/illegitimacy

She concludes that "one of the major issues for the cohesion of modern societies is the capacity to recognize and mediate politicized diversity" (Jenson, 1998, p. 35). And therefore,

> "The real challenge for conversations about social cohesion is to identify the mechanisms and institutions needed to create a balance between social justice and social cohesion. Such mechanisms and institutions are ones that continue to value and promote equality of opportunity and fairness across all dimensions of diversity, while fostering the capacity to act together." (Jenson, 1998, p. 36)

She strongly stressed the importance of institutions:

> "A cohesive society is one in which accommodation of conflict is well managed. Social cohesion will be at risk only if differences are mobilized; becoming ground for conflicting claims, *and* management of those claims is fumbled. Thus social cohesion is fostered by conflict management of mobilized differences (or cleavages) of all sorts – cultural, linguistic and economic. - - - Institutions are central both because they are the locale for managing diversity and because their actual design will affect their capacity to contribute to cohesion." (Jenson, 1998, p. 31)

The Canadian researchers, especially William Kymlicka, are working with the rights of minorities in a liberal democracy. He stresses that human rights for individual are not enough; they need to be supplemented by rights for minorities. Culturally "neutral" policies in a society tend not to be neutral at all, but instead favour the history, language, symbols and values of the majority. How fare it is fair and necessary to go in protection of minorities depends, according to Kymlicka, on whether the minority is a "polyethnic minority", which consists of voluntary immigrates to the country, or a "national minority", like the Flemish in Belgium, the Aboriginals in Australia, and many others. William Kymlicka is aware of the argumentation that;

- multiculturalism policies emphasize diversity;
- emphasizing diversity undermines the sense of common national identity;
- welfare state depends on feeling of national solidarity

But he stresses that a multiculturalism policy need not erode cohesion. On the contrary, multiculturalism can reduce prejudice and combat stereotypes and stigmatizations that often erode feelings of solidarity across ethnic, religious and racial lines. And this is exactly what has happened in Canada. The Canadian researchers like Will Kymlicka and

Keith Banting stress that growing minorities of immigrants in Canada have not eroded the Canadian cohesion and solidaric redistribution among the inhabitant. They find in Canada a distinctly multicultural form of nationalism where multiculturalism is seen as an important part of what it means to be a "good" Canadian. As part of the Canadian society, minorities can claim multicultural rights and privileges. These researchers only found little general evidence of a necessary conflict between ethnic diversity and solidarity:

> "One of the most compelling challenges facing western democracies is how to maintain and strengthen the bonds of community in increasingly diverse societies. There is no question that there is a potential conflict between ethnic diversity and solidarity. We do not need social scientists to tell us that. There is far too much evidence of ethnical and racial intolerance on our television screens. Moreover, there is undoubtedly potential fallout for the welfare state. But we need to keep our balance. Given the limited research base available to us, we need to be careful about rushing to premature judgment. --- The cross-national evidence points in several directions. Western democracies with large foreign-born populations have not had more difficulty in sustaining and developing their welfare states than other countries. But the pace of social change does seem to matter: countries in which immigrant communities grew rapidly experienced lower rates of growth in social spending in the last three decades of the twentieth century. Yet --- the adoption of robust multiculturalism policies does not systematically exacerbate tensions and further erode welfare state. Within these broad cross-national patterns lie many distinctive national stories, and the contrasting patterns in the United States and Canada point to a range of possible balances among diversity, recognition and redistribution. Given the limited nature of our hard information in this area, there is a danger that the experiences of one country will emerge as a sort of master narrative, a story that is seen as capturing the essence of the issues in play. For many Europeans, the United States has become the quintessential multicultural country, and the key test case of the relations between immigration, ethnic diversity and redistribution." (Banting, 2005, pp. 11-12)

Others have been more convinced that there is a conflict between diversity and solidarity. A number of articles in serious, non-scientific British magazines are worth mentioning, e.g. Goodhart (2004) and Pearce (2004). In relation to the topics of this problem, Goodhart's remark on how to find the final truth in the solidarity/diversity debate is interesting:

> "Sweden and Denmark may provide a social laboratory for the solidarity/diversity trade-off in the coming years. Starting from similar positions as homogeneous countries with high levels of redistribution, they have taken rather different approaches to immigration over the past few years. Although both countries place great stress on integrating outsiders, Sweden has adopted a moderately multicultural outlook. It has also adapted its economy somewhat, reducing job protection for older native males in order to create more low-wage jobs for immigrants in the public sector. About 12 per cent of Swedes are now foreign-born and it is expected that by 2015 about 25 per cent of under-18s will be either foreign-born or the children of the foreign-born. This is a radical change and Sweden is

> adapting to it rather well (the first clips of mourning Swedes after Anna Lindh's murder were of crying immigrants expressing their sorrow in perfect Swedish). But not all Swedes are happy about it. Denmark has a more restrictive and "nativist" approach to immigration. Only 6 per cent of the population is foreign-born and native Danes enjoy superior welfare benefits to incomers. If the solidarity/diversity trade-off is a real one and current trends continue, then one would expect, in, say, 20 years' time that Sweden will have a less redistributive welfare state than Denmark; or rather that Denmark will have a more developed two-tier welfare state with higher benefits for insiders, while Sweden will have a universal but less generous system." (Goodhart, 2004, p. 4)

Goodhart himself is sceptical to the combination of a generous, pluralistic welfare state:

> "More controversially, there is also a case – as Meghnad Desai has argued – for introducing a two-tier welfare system. Purely economic migrants or certain kinds of refuges could be allowed temporary residence, the right to work (but not to vote) and be given access to only limited parts of the welfare state, while permanent migrants who make the effort to become citizens would get full access to welfare. A two-tier welfare state might reduce pressure on the asylum system and also help to deracialise citizenship – white middle-class bankers and Asian shopkeepers would have full British citizenship, while white Slovenian temporary works would not. Such a two-tier system is emerging in Denmark. (Goodhart, 2004, p. 7)"

Concluding Remarks

The pressure on the Danish borders from immigrants, refugees as well as non-refugees seems to increase steadily. This is a well-knows challenge for many European welfare states as well. However, the challenges may be even larger for countries where programs are built on the social policy principles which are dominating the Danish welfare state: Social benefits and services, which are universal and available for all residents in Denmark, are mainly tax financed and not based on previous individual contributions, and which in most cases are based on individual principles, with fairly limited obligations falling on other family members. Even though, immigrants are seen as a threat in this framework, it must be also understood that avoiding conflicts, containing or concealing them or ignoring them will not promote good policies or social cohesion. On the contrary, conflicts that have their foundations in different interests, perspectives or ambitions play an important role in generation cohesion. Social cohesion is promoted by reciprocity on a societal level, as Durkheim pointed out.

However, I would also like to add the words of Bülent Diken in this part. His words may lighten up why immigrants are seen the core problem:

> "I believe that the 'immigrant' is basically a sublimated fetish object. A fetish object, without which the populist politics of immigration, especially in countries such as Austria and Denmark, would not be able to exist. Without the immigrant as the 'other' against which 'we' define ourselves, it is impossible to sustain to clean-cut definitions of Danishness, Austrian identity, and so on. Then, obviously, the immigrant has a great function in this society. Hence I don't think that the real aim of the immigration debate is to integrate immigrant - simply because if integration takes place, that is, if the 'problem of immigrant' disappears, then the culturalist/communitarian definitions of Danishness cannot be sustained in their present form. So, in fact, it is not the case that the immigrant is parasitic on 'our identity' or 'our way of life'; it is rather, the case that what we define as 'our identity' is parasitic on the supplement called immigrant. Thus it seems to me that only through the fantasy about a consistent immigrant identity, 'we' can today conceal a much more profound reality, a much more profound source of anxiety: which is that in network capitalism, 'society' itself, be Danish or Austrian society, no longer exists. There are no longer borders for the flows of deterritorialized, global capital. If we are to sustain the illusion that borders remain, we cannot afford to 'integrate' and forget the immigrant- which is I believe, the 'dirty secret' of politics of immigration and perhaps of much research in this field." (Diken, 2002)

It can be assumed that as long as the welfare state maintains its universal character – "from all of us to all of us"- there will not be real dangers that cultural diversity will constitute a serious threat to welfare state legitimacy in Denmark. If welfare is a matter of payment from "us" to "those people" (As Bush phrased it), this will inevitably raise a number of critical questions about the deservingness of "those people" – are they like "us", do "we" have any obligation towards "them", could "they" do more by themselves? Perhaps the political show must come to an end in Denmark; the fantasy of "Danish identity", "Danish culture" and so on are becoming meaningless and desperate attempts to re-stage the "Danish society". Perhaps politics should be "re-invented" [8]as Ulrich Beck says.

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