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**ISLAMOPHOBIA AS A FORM OF GOVERNMENTALITY: UNBEARABLE WEIGHTINESS OF THE POLITICS OF FEAR**

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**Keywords**: Islamophobia, governmentality, Europe, poverty, securitization, stigmatization, exclusion, racism, multiculturalism

The aim of this paper is to provide a review of the contemporary literature on Islamophobia in Europe, through the lens of immigration issues, socio-economic status and civic participation of Muslim origin migrants and their descendants as well as international constraints. In addition to critically reviewing the current state of knowledge and debate about Islamophobia through the literature, the paper seeks to address the most recent data, survey findings and public discourses available about the current state of Islamophobia in Europe. In the process, some references will also be made to the current rise of Islamophobia in the United States and its differences with the European context. Describing Islamophobia as a form of *governmentality* in Foucaultian sense, I shall argue that it operates as a form of *cultural racism* in Europe, which has become apparent together with the process of *securitizing* and *stigmatizing*.
In assessing the rise of Islamophobia in Europe, one should systematically review the cycle of events, which can be specifically connected to the changing perception of migrants with Muslim background in the west: Arab-Israel war leading to the global oil crisis (1973), Iranian Revolution (1979), Palestinian intifada (1987-1990), Rushdie Affair (1989), affaire des foulard (headscarf affair) in France (1989), Gulf War I (1990), Gulf War (1991), Bosnian War (1992), the first World Trade Center bombing in the USA (1993), second Palestinian intifada (2000), Paul Scheffer’s polemical book Multicultural Drama in the Netherlands (2000), September 11, Afghanistan War (2001), the violence in northern

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1 In several European countries, labour immigration was halted in 1974 due to economic recession and electoral choices. The decision was taken as a result of the 1973 oil crisis and growing unemployment which lessened the need for foreign labour. Oil embargo by the OAPEP (Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries) followed the nationalization of Algerian oil resources, which were under French control until then. Under such circumstances, French public in general tended to associate the oil impoverishment and the economic crisis with ‘Arabs’. France went through a growing stream of anti-Arab violence between 1971 and 1973. The ‘problem of immigration’ became a pivotal issue in the public space in 1973 (Jelen, 2007: 4). Reel politic has always played an important role on the integration of Muslim origin immigrants in the European countries. On 1st August 1974, following the 1973 oil crisis, Belgium officially declared the end of any kind of immigration based on work. It is interesting though to know that days before, on 19th July 1974, Islam had been recognized in law as an official religion. It is claimed that this decision, enacted just before the planned visit of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia to Belgium, was a gesture to oil-exporting countries (Blaise and de Coorebyter, 1997; and Zemni, 2006: 245). This was meant to be the involvement of the Saudi-based Muslim World League (MWL), also known as Rabita, in financial support of the Muslim organizations in Belgium, Germany, France and the Netherlands in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The MWL group was founded in 1962 in Saudi Arabia, and is the most important and influential Wahhabi organization in the world, effectively serving as the ideological headquarters for Islamic extremists worldwide. MWL conducts its work through branch offices and affiliate organizations established in countries all over the world.
England between native British and Asian Muslim youth (2001), rise and
death of Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands (2001-2002), the Gulf War II
London terrorist bombing (2005), Paris autumn banlieue riots (2005),
Cartoon Crisis in Denmark (2006), British Cabinet Minister Jack Straw’s
speech about his wish to see women not covering their face (2006),
Lars Vilks’ drawings published in the Swedish daily Nerikes Allehanda
(2007), Swiss minaret debate (2009), nuclear debate with Iran (2010),
Thilo Sarrazin’s polemical book (2010), Stockholm bombings (2010)²,
an Imam’s beating up the students in class in Birmingham in the UK
(2011), the burning of Quran by an American Pastor in Florida (2011),
and official ban of burqa in France (2011).³ There are also some other
affairs leading to the rise of negative perceptions of Islam in the west. For
instance, the provoking intervention of the Pope Benedict XVI⁴ regarding
the ‘brutal nature’ of the Prophet Mohammad has also brought the
Muslims in the west together in protest, provoking hostile reactions from
Europeans who, for the first time, viewed Europe’s immigrant Muslims as
a unified whole (Popham, 2006).

All these events led to both questioning of the significance of Muslims’
collective presence in Europe, and radicalization of European Islamic
identity. The escalation of such events and Islamophobic discourses of
some political figures and public intellectuals has made the two worlds
apart. Muslims and the rest. Islam has certainly become politicized by
various groups with Muslim background as well as by some non-Muslims.
Those Muslims politicizing Islam have been in search of an ideology to

² Swedish authorities assumed that there was a connection between the explosions
and the Swedish artist Lars Vilks’ drawings of the prophet Muhammad as a
roundabout dog. For a detailed depiction of the story see http://edition.cnn.
com/2010/WORLD/europe/12/11/sweden.explosion/index.html?hpt=T1 (entry date
28 September 2011).

³ For a similar review of these events see Esposito (2011), Elgamri (2005); and
Vertovec and Wessendorf (2010).

⁴ During a theological lecture at the University of Regensburg (12 September
2006), in Bavaria, Pope Benedict XVI criticized the idea of jihad, and said
“Violence is incompatible with the nature of God and the nature of the soul”. He
quoted Byzantine Emperor Manuel II Palaiologos, who said, “Show me just what
Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and
inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached”. For
the speech of Pope, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/15_09_06_pope.
pdf (entry date 10 April 2011).
protect themselves against the detrimental forces of globalization such as injustice, inequality, poverty, employment, exclusion, racism and discrimination. On the other hand, some western political leaders and public intellectuals have also politicized Islam to mobilize the majorities for their own interests along with the constructed fear of an ‘enemy within’ or an ‘outside enemy’. These events and several others have, in one way or another, shaped both the ways in which Muslims have been perceived by the western public, and the ways in which Muslims have comprehended the West. This is why, immigrants of Muslim origin and their descendants have often been considered guilty until proven innocent in times of turmoil such as the recent mass murder in Norway on 22 July 2011, after which the Muslims were the first to blame. In what follows, such political and public discourses will be revealed in more detail in order to demonstrate the ways in which Islamophobia has been used as a form of governmentality.

Islamophobia: A Term Difficult to Define!
In a report submitted to the European Commission by Joselyne Cesari et al. (2006: 5), it is stated that although negative perceptions of Islam in Europe can be traced back to the Crusades in many ways, Islamophobia is rather “a modern and secular anti-Islamic discourse and practice appearing in the public sphere with the integration of Muslim immigrant communities and intensifying after 9/11”. Islamophobia is a much used

5 Islamic reference used in various acts of opposition is mostly expressive of the need to belong to a legitimate counter-hegemonic global discourse such as that of Islam, and to derive a symbolic power from that. It seems that religion is now replacing the left in the absence of a global leftist movement. Michel de Certeau (1984: 183) reminds us of the discursive similarities between religion and left: religion offering a different world, and left offering a different future – both offering solidarity. In a similar vein, Tony Evans (2010) also describes Islam as a unique global movement, dedicated to defending its followers from further cultural and spiritual encroachment. Accordingly, Islam has recently constituted a Gramscian counter-hegemonic force capable of mounting a successful challenge to the global neo-liberal order, under which particularly Muslim origin migrants and their descendants suffer (Mandaville, 2001: 153). Moreover, it should be remembered that the recent acts of violence in the name of Islam are also an indication of the solidarity among the members of the newly emerging transnational Islam, who are claimed to be engaged in religious fundamentalism.

6 The website http://www.euro-islam.info offers a very detailed map of the news and analysis on Islam in Europe and North America. The site is sponsored by GSRL Paris/CNRS Paris and Harvard University, and consists of over forty researchers.
but little understood term, which is believed to become popular after the report of Runnymede Trust’s Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia (CBMI) entitled *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All* (Runnymede, 1997). In this report it is asserted that the first usage of the term was by an American newspaper reporter in 1991. ‘Islamophobia’ was defined by the CBMI as ‘an unfounded hostility towards Islam, and therefore fear or dislike of all or most Muslims’, and further elaborated by the proposal of eight possible Islamophobic mindsets. The eight statements are: 1) Islam is seen as a monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to change. 2) Islam is seen as separate and ‘other’. It does not have values in common with other cultures, is not affected by them and does not influence them. 3) Islam is seen as inferior to the West. It is seen as barbaric, irrational, primitive and sexist. 4) Islam is seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, and supportive of terrorism, and engaged in a ‘clash of civilizations’. 5) Islam is seen as a political ideology and is used for political or military advantage. 6) Criticisms made of the West by Islam are rejected out of hand. 7) Hostility towards Islam is used to justify discriminatory practices towards Muslims and exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society. 8) Anti-Muslim hostility is seen as natural or normal.7

There is currently no legally agreed definition of Islamophobia; and social sciences have not developed a common definition, policy and action to combat it either. However, Islamophobia is discussed within the broad concepts of racism and racial discrimination, which are universally accepted by governments and international organisations. The UN8, the Council of Europe9, the Organization of Security and Cooperation

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8 For the definition of racial discrimination by the UN see the “International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination” adopted and opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965, entry into force 4 January 1969.

9 See European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI)’s general policy recommendation No 7 on national legislation to combat racism and racial discrimination, adopted on 13 December 2002. In the meantime, assuming that intolerance, discrimination and radicalization have recently seized control of the European public discourse, the Council of Europe decided to create a Group of Eminent Persons in order to prepare a report within the context of the Pan-European project Living together in 21st century Europe to be submitted to the
in Europe\textsuperscript{10}, and the European Union (EUMC; 2006), therefore base their approaches to identifying the phenomenon and its manifestations on internationally accepted standards on racism. In 2005 a Council of Europe publication ‘Islamophobia and its consequences on Young People’ referred to Islamophobia as “the fear of or prejudiced viewpoint towards Islam, Muslims and matters pertaining to them. Whether it takes the shape of daily forms of racism and discrimination or more violent forms, Islamophobia is a violation of human rights and a threat to social cohesion” (Council of Europe, 2004). In this regard, paraphrasing Edward Said, Semati also eloquently defines what Islamophobia refers to:

“Islamophobia is a cultural-ideological outlook that seeks to explain ills of the (global) social order by attributing them to Islam. It is a way of thinking that conflates histories, politics, societies and cultures of the Middle East into a single unified and negative conception of Islam. It is an ideology in which the ‘backwardness’ of the other is established through an essentialized Islam. It is, as a form of racism, an essentialist view of peoples whose culture it deems ‘different’ in an eternal, fixed, and immutable fashion. It is a way of conceptualizing (international) politics that explains political acts and political violence not in terms of geopolitical calculations, motives, and actors, but in terms of religion. Islamophobia posits ‘Islam’ as a conception of the world that is incompatible with modernity, with civilization,

Committee of Ministers prior to Istanbul Ministerial of 11 May 2011. The group consists of 9 high-ranking individuals with a specific expertise and a particular interest in the subject. Former German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer is the Chairman, and British journalist Edward Mortimer became the rapporteur responsible for preparing the draft report. The other members of the Group are Timothy Garton Ash, Emma Bonino, Martin Hirsch, Danuta Hubner, Ayse Kadioglu, Sonja Licht, Vladimir Lukin and Javier Solana Madariaga. The Group of Eminent Persons is expected to help the Council of Europe to deal with new challenges for security and stability of European citizens. For further information see the report of the Group of Eminent Persons, https://wcd.coe.int/wcd/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=GroupEminentPersons&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Site=CM&BackColorInternet=C3C3C3&BackColorIntranet=EDB021&BackColorLogged=FD383 (entry date 23 June 2011).

Islamophobia, on the one hand, creates difference (the ‘other’) and, on the other hand, erases difference (all of ‘them’ are the ‘same’)” (Semati, 2010: 266-277).

Islamophobia is actually what we call “cultural racism” (Meer and Modood, 2009; Schiffer and Wagner, 2011), the roots of which could be traced back to the writings of Arthur de Gobineau (1816-1882) who was a French nobleman. The main concern of de Gobineau (1999) was to offer an answer to the ever-fascinating question of why civilisations rise and fall. De Gobineau argued that history is composed of continuous struggle among the ‘white’, ‘yellow’ and ‘negroid’ races. He underlined the superiority of the ‘white race’. The lesson of history, according to de Gobineau (1999: 56) argued in 1853 that “all civilisations derive from the white race, that none can exist without its help, and that a society is great and brilliant only so far as it preserves the blood of the noble group that created it, provided that this group itself belongs to the most illustrious branch of our species.” He always complained about the mixture of the races (miscegenation), which, he believed, led to the crisis of civilisation. The racist thoughts in Gobineau’s works spring from his fear of ‘Oriental’ attacks towards the “Occidental” lands which would cause miscegenation and the fall of civilisations. His line of thinking resembles very well the contemporary debate regarding the alleged invasion of the West by Islam expressed by Theo van Gogh, Pim Fortuyn, Oriana Fallaci, Paul Scheffer and George Bush.

As Andrew O’Hagan (2008) has observed very well, Islamophobia is one of the big questions of our day, presenting a problem that is most often answered ‘with ignorance or with common hysteria, and almost never with fresh thinking.’ The damage this brings to bear on the European public is ‘making a monster where it shouldn’t exist, a monster made from the mania of our own fear?” (Evans, 2010: 3). Similarly, Cesari et al. (2006) argue that Islamophobia actually conceals different forms of discrimination resulting from structural inequalities:

“This phenomenon cannot simply be subsumed into the term Islamophobia. Indeed, the term can be misleading, as it presupposes the pre-eminence of religious discrimination when other forms of discrimination (such as racial or class) may be more relevant. We therefore intend to use the term Islamophobia
as a starting point for analyzing the different dimensions that define the political situation of Muslim minorities in Europe. We will not take the term for granted by assigning it only one meaning, such as anti-Islamic discourse” (Cesari et al., 2006: 8).

The ‘monster made from the mania of our own fear’ presumably derives from a glocal (global + local) context shaped by a growing feeling of insecurity making individuals more and more heteronomous in a way that essentializes communal, ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious boundaries. It is this kind feeling of insecurity, which makes individuals lean on what is cultural, religious and communal in an age of prudentialism. Nostalgia, past, ethnicity, culture and religion turn out to be a kind of lighthouse waving even the members of the majority societies back to the shore – the one point on the landscape that gives hope of direction in a time characterized by prudentialism, post-social state, insecurity, fear, loneliness, distrustfulness, and aimlessness (Stewart, 2000; Miller and Rose, 2008). This is actually the way the neo-liberal state operates through securitizing and stigmatizing those who are ethno-culturally and religiously different from the majority societies, a point which will be discussed in what follows.

Politics of Fear: Securitizing and stigmatizing Islam

Muslims are increasingly represented by the advocates of Islamophobia as members of a “precarious transnational society”, in which people only want to ‘stone women’, ‘cut throats’, ‘be suicide bombers’, ‘beat their wives’ and ‘commit honour crimes’. These prejudiced perceptions about Islam have been reinforced by the impact of the previously stated events ranging from the Iranian Revolution to the official ban on burqa in France in 2011. Recently, it has become inevitable for quite some people in the West to have the urge to defend the Western civilisation against this ‘enemy within’ that is culturally and religiously dissimilar with the ‘civilized’ western subject. Samuel Huntington interpreted the Islamic resurgence as an attempt to counter the threat of Western cultural advance. He noted that the resurgence is a broad global movement that represents an effort to find solution not in Western ideologies, but in Islam (Huntington, 1996: 110). Silvio Berlusconi, then the Italian Prime Minister, is one of those to have this urge:

11 For a detailed account of the ways in which the ‘clash of civilisations’ paradigm was revitalized in the aftermath of the September 11, see Sussex (2004).
“We are proud bearers of the supremacy of western civilisation, which has brought us democratic institutions, respect for the human, civil, religious and political rights of our citizens, openness to diversity and tolerance of everything... Europe must revive on the basis of common Christian roots” (The Guardian, London, 27 September 2001: 15).

American President George Bush’s speech regarding the ‘Axis of Evil’ (29 January 2002) was also perceived by the American public in particular as an attempt to demonize ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ and the ‘enemies of freedom’ (Asad, 2003: 7). Although Bush as well as some European leaders like Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac, repeatedly stated that the war did not represent a fight against Islam, especially the US public was highly engaged in deepening the Islam-bashing displayed very explicitly in the following speech of George Bush:

“Our military has put the terror training camps of Afghanistan out of business, yet camps still exist in at least a dozen countries. A terrorist underworld - including groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and Jaish-i-Mohammed - operates in remote jungles and deserts, and hides in the centers of large cities... First, we will shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bring terrorists to justice... While the most visible military action is in Afghanistan, America is acting elsewhere... Our second goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction. Some of these regimes have been pretty quiet since September the 11th. But we know their true nature. North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens... Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people’s hope for freedom. Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror... States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United
Similarly, Italian journalist and novelist Oriana Fallaci is another disputable figure, who generated a very contested discourse in the aftermath of September 11 *vis-à-vis* Muslims:

“... I say: Wake up, people, wake up!... You don’t understand, or don’t want to understand, that what is under way here is a reverse crusade. Do you want to understand or do you not want to understand that what is under way here is a religious war? A war that they call Jihad. A Holy War. A war that doesn’t want to conquest of our territories, perhaps, but certainly wants to conquer our souls... They will feel authorized to kill you and your children because you drink wine or beer, because you don’t wear a long beard or a chador, because you go to the theatre and cinemas, because you listen to music and sing songs... (Cited in Marranci, 2004: 108).

This right-wing stream of reactions also made echo in other parts of the western world. Dutch media presenter and politician Pim Fortuyn (2001) published a book entitled *Against Islamization of Our Culture*, in which he simply claimed Islam was a threat to Western civilisation in a way that contributes to the othering of migrant origin individuals residing in the West. Islam-bashing has become a popular sport constantly instigated by ministers, politicians, media specialists and even Prime Ministers in the European Union as well as in the other parts of the world. Today, hostile language, offensive language, racist statements, and anti-immigrant policy propositions or real measures take place every day in the news. Conversely, aggressive language and threats directed against politicians who are perceived to be at fault, for whatever reason, have spread as well. The language of hatred replaces the language of dialogue.

Islam has been demonized by various politicians and public intellectuals in a way that has radically changed its image at a global scale. Mohammad Waseem (2005: 3-5) analyzes the writings of Manfred Halpern (1962),

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Stephen Schwartz (2002), Daniel Pipes (2002), Graham Fuller (2003), and Bernard Lewis (2004), who consider Islam as equal to fascism, violence, anti-modernism, irrational, and incapable of human rights, democracy, modernity, and tolerance. He critically assesses contemporary Western orientalist thinking about Islam as (1) a discourse of essentialist difference reproducing the boundaries between the West vs. Islam; (2) a selective reading of fixed, timeless and classical religious texts rather than specific regional contexts, leading to treating Islam as a “undisciplined, medievalist and irrational force inherently disruptive of modern civilisation”; and (3) the metaphysics of terrorism, making Islamic militancy a self-propelling mechanism.

After the strikes against the United States on September 11, 2001, the “Muslim” became reified as the enemy of the state, as a regressive, violent, bloodthirsty and menacing fanatic: the typical terrorist. Corey Robin (2004) explicated very well the ways in which the Muslims and the Middle Easterners, especially Iraqis, were stigmatized by the Bush administration as ‘typical terrorists’ with reference to the anthrax scare in the wake of 9/11. Between October and November 2001, when the story broke, five people were killed by anthrax, and eighteen others were infected with it. Government officials immediately hunted for signs that the attack originated in the Middle East, particularly Iraq. This incidence was providing the Bush administration with a good excuse to go after Iraq. However, nobody could find any evidence linking the anthrax attack with the Middle East. Later it was revealed that the perpetrator of the attack was an American citizen, with likely connections to the U.S. military (Robin, 2004: 16-17). Similarly, this kind of politics of fear has also been very influential on the Muslim residents of the USA, who are considered to be guilty until proven innocent, a reversal of the classic American legal maxim (Esposito, 2011: 12). For instance, it is reported that in 2005 the FBI admitted that it had yet to identify a single al-Qaeda sleeper cell in the United States. Noone out of more than 5,000 Muslisms held in preventative detention after September 11 was found guilty of having committed a terrorist act (Esposito, 2011: 13).

The process of “othering” of migrants in public imagery is also apparent in the “statisticalization” of illegal migrants through the use of a variety of numerical technologies such as statistics, population, counts, demographic trends, economic forecasts, and the like. Statistical data on illegal migrants usually draw security forces’ attention to refugees and
asylum seekers originating from Third World countries, who often travel in those ‘boats’ and ‘trucks’ that have become indispensable scenes in our daily news media. However, there have recently been some studies that have examined and decoded some of these data, and they reveal that most of the so-called illegal migrants are not actually those ‘boat people’, or ‘truck people’ suffering inhuman conditions. Instead, the figures actually hide “ overstayers”, who go on staying in countries even after their visas expire (Walters, 2006). Interestingly enough, most of the illegal migrants in Australia are British overstayers, whilst it is the Americans in the UK, not the Africans or Asians. Frank Düvell (2006: 17) cites studies that suggest that for all the media frenzy generated by images of boats emptying desperate travellers on Italy’s islands and shores, only 10% of the irregular migrant population arrived in Italy on boats.

Statisticalization of migration has apparently given ‘illegal’ immigration visibility as a phenomenon of ‘great’ magnitude. Words such as ‘flood’, ‘invasion’ and ‘out of control’ have often been used to characterize the flow of ‘illegal’ migrants all around the world. Politicians, journalists and sometimes scholars have picked up and reported on the enumeration of ‘illegal’ migrants as a challenge to be tackled.13 A comparative study of parliamentary discourse in various Western European countries (France, the Netherlands, Austria, Italy, Spain, and UK) it was revealed that:

Refugees are (. . .) primarily seen as a financial burden, and virtually never as an opportunity for the country. They tend to be associated with illegality, if not with crime, and in many other respects are represented in negative ways. Politicians, in their parliamentary speeches, will thus on the one hand present themselves as tolerant and understanding, but more often than not their speeches will more subtly or blatantly convey the idea that refugees are not welcome in Europe. The same is true for debates about residing minority groups within the country. Except from a few notable antiracist voices, the discourse of the political elites thus confirms and reformulates the broader antiforeigner sentiments in the European Union” (Wodak and van Dijk, 2000: 10-11).

13 For the scholarly works see Lamm and Imhoff (1985); Palmer and Wayne (1985); and Fortuyn (2001).
Another important issue to be underlined with respect to the perception of migration by the public as a substantial threat is the way in which the phenomenon of migration is being discussed in international documents, basically highlighting statistics, the demographic deficit and the labour deficit of the West, rather than addressing the social, cultural and humanitarian aspects of migration. One could argue that within these kinds of exposures, migration is problematized and statisticalized through its probable impact on total fertility rates and potential support ratios against a space of demographic and social processes. Within this discursive space, the question of Europe’s security is framed not in terms of dangerous flows transgressing its borders, but as the challenge of declining fertility rates and their consequences for economic productivity and the sustainability of welfare systems.

As demonstrated above, mainly right wing politicians and public intellectuals, in their speeches, often present themselves as tolerant and understanding, but more often they subtly or blatantly convey the idea that Muslims are not welcome in Europe. The same is true for debates about residing minority groups within the country. Except from a few notable antiracist voices, the discourse of the political elites thus confirms and reformulates the broader anti-foreigner and anti-Muslim sentiments in the European Union. A similar pattern has also become apparent among the lay people in Europe as it will be elaborated in what follows with reference to various public polls held in the last decade.

**Public Surveys: Islamophobia has become the mainstream!**

Islamophobic discourse has recently become the mainstream in the west. It seems that social groups belonging to the majority nation in a given territory are more inclined to express their distress resulting from insecurity and social-economic deprivation, through the language of Islamophobia even in those cases which are not related to the actual threat of Islam. Islamophobic discourse has certainly resonated very much in the last decade. It has made the users of this discourse be heard by both local and international community, although their distress did not really result from anything related to the Muslims in general. In other words, Muslims have become the most popular scapegoats in many parts of the world to put the blame on for any troubled situation. For almost more than a decade, Muslim origin migrants and their descendants are primarily seen by the European societies as a financial burden, and virtually never as an opportunity for the country. They tend to be associated with illegality, crime, violence, drug, radicalism, fundamentalism, conflict, and in many other respects are represented in negative ways.
A PEW survey held in 2006 indicated that opinions of Muslims in almost all of the western European countries are quite negative. While one in four in the USA and the UK displayed Islamophobic sentiments, more than half of Spaniards and half of Germans said that they did not like Muslims and the figures for Poland and France were 46 percent and 38 percent for those holding unfavorable opinions of Muslims. The Survey revealed that prejudice was mainly marked among older generations and appeared to be class based. People over 50 and of low education were more likely to be prejudiced. Similarly, the Gallup Organization Survey of Population Perceptions and Attitudes held for the World Economic Forum in 2007 indicated that three-in-four US residents believe that the Muslim world is not committed to improving relations with the West. The same survey finds out that half of respondents in Italy (58 percent), Denmark (52 percent), and Spain (50 percent) agree that the Muslim world is not committed to improving relations. Israelis, on the other hand, represent a remarkable exception with almost two-thirds (64 percent) believing that the Muslim world is committed to improving relations. The picture on the other side of the coin is not very different either. Among the majority-Muslim nations surveyed, it was deciphered that majorities in every Middle Eastern country believe that the West is not committed to better relations with the Muslim World, while respondents in majority-Muslim Asian countries are about evenly split (WEF, 2008: 21).

Another poll made by the PEW Research Institute in the United States in August 2010 reveals that the favorable opinions of Islam among the American public have declined since 2005. 35 percent of the public say that Islam encourages violence more than other religions. Similarly, the British Social Attitudes Survey held in 2009 shows that 45 percent of the British do not like Muslims much, and do not really believe in free speech at all. It is uncovered that dislike of Muslims is related to the belief that Britain is too diverse, and that religious diversity is harming Britain as it was also recently vocalized by the British PM David Cameron in February

14 For the data set of the surveys on Islamophobia see http://pewresearch.org/; http://people-press.org; and for an elaborate analysis of these findings see http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/sep/18/islam.religion. One could also visit the website of the Islamophobia Watch to follow the record of racist incidences in each country: http://www.islamophobia-watch.com/islamophobia-watch/category/anti-muslim-violence (entry date 22 March 2011)
Islamophobia has also become visible in those countries, which are known to be non-religious and very secular such as Sweden. Sweden received harsh criticisms from the Swedish UN association in 2009 for failing to abide by a number of UN conventions. It was stated in the report that the hate crimes increased in Sweden as a result of Islamophobia, anti-Semitism and homophobic sentiments.\(^{17}\)

The growing distance between the life-worlds of the majority societies and their allochtonous Muslim origin minorities has also become evident. Detlef Pollack, a sociologist from Münster conducted an extensive survey in Germany, France, Denmark, Portugal and the Netherlands in late 2010. The study reveals that the German society in comparison to the French, Dutch and Danish have recently generated a more intolerant perspective towards Islam. His findings also disprove the statement of the German President Christian Wulff on 19 October 2010 saying that “Islam is part of Germany”.\(^{18}\) The findings actually reaffirm the speech of the German Minister of Interior, Hans-Peter Friedrich, announcing that “Islam may not belong in Germany”.\(^{19}\) The study also uncovers that fewer than 5 percent of Germans, compared with more than 20 percent of Danes, French and Dutch consider Islam to be a tolerant religion, according to the study. These findings are also confirmed by another survey, which the German Marshall Fund conducted in 2010. The respondents were asked in several different countries about their perception of the level of integration of Muslim immigrants and their descendants into their societies. Canadians were split evenly, with 45 percent believing Muslim immigrants were

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\(^{16}\) For the British Social Attitudes Survey see http://www.natcen.ac.uk/study/british-social-attitudes-26th-report/our-findings#hotlink5 (entry date 20 April 2011). For the speech of David Cameron dated February 2011 see http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12415597 (entry date 16 August 2011).

\(^{17}\) See “Sweden slammed for UN rights failures” (9 November 2009), available at http://www.thelocal.se/23150/20091109/ (entry date 23 April 2011). However, one should also bear in mind that since the 1960s migration issues were not politicized in Sweden, at least until the 2002 general elections, due to the fact that there has been a broad consensus on immigrant issue among the Swedish elite (Dahlström, 2004). It is not surprising to see that Tomas Hammar (1999) calls the political climate in which the Swedish immigration policy took form as “the Apolitical Tradition”.

\(^{18}\) For the President’s speech see http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11578657 (entry date 26 April 2011).

\(^{19}\) For the Interior Minister’s speech see http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/04/germany-muslim-integration-row (entry date 26 April 2011).
integrating well and 44 percent thinking they were integrating poorly. Americans were the most optimistic about Muslim integration, 45 percent of whom thought these immigrants were integrating well, while 40 percent said that they were not. A further 14 percent claimed that they did not know, probably because of comparatively low numbers of Muslim immigrants residing in the United States. Whereas in Europe, Spain and Germany were remarkably pessimistic about the integration level of Muslim origin immigrants and their descendants, where large majorities said that Muslims were integrating poorly (70 percent and 67 percent, respectively). They were followed by the Dutch (56 percent), the British (53 percent), the French (51 percent), and a plurality of Italians (49 percent) who also thought that Muslim immigrants were integrating poorly (GMF, 2010).
Table 1. Anti-Muslim statements (agreement in percent) (Source, FES, 2011).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There are too many Muslims in [country].</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>60.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims are too demanding.</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam is a religion of intolerance. [France: Islam is a religion of</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>52.3*</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tolerance.]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Muslim culture fits well into [country/Europe].</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims’ attitudes towards women contradict our values.</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>76.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many Muslims perceive terrorists as heroes. [France: question not</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>asked].</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The majority of Muslims find terrorism justifiable. [France: not</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>23.3*</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>justifiable]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A recent survey conducted by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in various EU countries reveal that in most of the countries a majority believe that Islam is a *religion of intolerance*, with agreement just below 50 percent only in Great Britain and the Netherlands (Table 1). In almost all the countries, more than half of respondents said that Muslims make *too many demands*; Portugal was the only exception with about one third. The statement that there are too many Muslims in the country is affirmed by just over one quarter in Portugal and by about one third in France. In Germany, Great Britain, Italy and the Netherlands more than 40 percent of respondents complain that there are *too many Muslims in their country*, in Hungary about 60 percent. The figures for those, who say that *Muslim culture* is compatible with their own, range from 17 percent in Poland, 19 percent in Germany to about half the population in Portugal and France. A majority of more than 70 percent of European respondents find that *Muslim attitudes towards women* are incompatible with their own values. One third of the surveyed countries think that *Muslims treat Islamist terrorists as heroes*, although somewhat fewer believe that *terrorism* finds moral support in the Muslim community (ranging from under 20 percent in Germany and the Netherlands to nearly 30 percent in Hungary). It is obvious that Europeans are largely united in their rejection of Muslims and Islam. The significantly most widespread anti-Muslim attitudes are found in Germany, Hungary, Italy and Poland, closely followed by France, Great Britain and the Netherlands. The extent of anti-Muslim attitudes is least in Portugal (FES, 2011: 60-63).

On the other side of the picture, Muslim origin migrants and their descendants are highly concerned about the ways in which they are being treated by the majority societies in the West. For instance, a survey conducted by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC, 2006) reveals that Islamophobia, discrimination, and socio-economic marginalisation have a primary role in generating disaffection and alienation among Muslim origin migrants and their

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20 Vincent Geisser (2010) argues that French Islamophobia often intermingles with ‘hijabophobia’ (rejection of the Islamic veil). He claims that there is a French republican form of Islamophobia, which is partly different from other forms of Islamophobia: According to the French republican form, “a perfect Muslim is one who has given up a part of his faith, beliefs and ‘outdated’ religious practices. A beautiful mosque is a quiet one without minaret, practically invisible, in harmony with the republican context. An emancipated Muslim woman is one who has escaped from her tribe, being freed of an “Islamic male’s” supervision” (Geisser, 2010: 45).
descendants residing in the European Union countries. Muslims feel that acceptance by society is increasingly premised on ‘assimilation’ and the assumption that they should lose their Muslim identity. This sense of exclusion is of particular relevance in the face of the challenges posed by terrorism particularly in the aftermath of 9/11, which has put them under a general suspicion of terrorism (Cesari, 2009).

One could describe a few recent events to demonstrate the ascendancy of Islamophobic perception of the western societies: the death of Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands on 6 May 2002, the Danish Cartoon crisis in 2006, the Swiss minaret debate in 2009, and the burning of Quran by an American Pastor in Florida in 2011. Pim Fortuyn was a former university professor of sociology, a political columnist, and a gay activist in the Netherlands. He was well known for his extravagant lifestyle with luxury. He was unable to find a place for himself within the established political parties, and he started his own party, List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) in 2001. He was in favour of lower taxes, less government, abortion rights and euthanasia. His views on immigration and Islam made him even more popular. He called Islam a ‘backward culture’, and he was openly stating that “there were too many immigrants in the Netherlands”. Immediately before the elections he was assassinated by an animal rights activist. This was the first political assassination in the Netherlands in 400 years. Pim Fortuyn’s Islamophobic apparently paid off for the LPF in the general elections held on 15 May 2002, and they received 17 percent of the vote and 26 seats in the Parliament (Andeweg and Irwin, 2005: 16-17).

When *Jyllands-Posten* published twelve cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad on 30 September 2006, they could not have predicted the far-reaching and devastating consequences it would have for a small country of 5.4 million people. What started as a trivial attempt to provoke debate in defence of free speech would go on to cause an unforeseen inter-cultural clash on a global scale. Some consider it Denmark’s biggest international crisis since 1945. Damaging not only the Danish economy (a loss of $1 billion in exports), the ‘cartoon crisis’ destroyed Denmark’s reputation as an open and tolerant society. Many Muslims forbid any visual depictions of the Prophet Muhammad altogether, though others allow it as long as the images are respectful (Laegaard, 2007; Kaya, 2009). Harmless by most secular standards, the cartoons in this case satirized the Prophet Mohammad – as this was their intended purpose in general. While some found the drawings mildly offensive, others experienced sheer outrage and
saw it as an attempt to humiliate them. The reactions ranged from peaceful demonstrations to violent riots, embassy and flag burnings all around the world, and even resulted in a significant number of deaths world-wide. In a country where Muslim immigrants remain fairly geographically segregated (Mouritsen, 2006: 74), the media’s influence worked as a stronger force to affect people’s perceptions about Muslims, since the contact between the groups remains limited. *Jyllands-Posten* facilitated a common stereotype that perceives all Muslims as terrorists.

Similarly, in Switzerland, a country where the contact between the majority society and Muslim origin immigrants remains very limited, the negative perception about the Muslims was explicitly articulated by the majority society through the debate on minarets. The requests by Muslim origin immigrants to erect mosques and minarets aroused significant public opposition in various European cities (Baumann, 2009; Nielsen et al., 2009; Geisser, 2010; and Allievi, 2010). The Swiss majority vote in 2009 referendum to ban the building of minarets is not a single and exceptional result. Rather, it is a dramatized culmination of Swiss politics shifting from long practised equilibrium to populist polarization and aggressive exclusion of minorities. But what was really interesting in the Minaret Referendum was that those Swiss citizens who did not have an interaction with the Muslims in their everyday life were more inclined to oppose the erection of minarets (Pfaff-Czarnecka, 2009).21 On the other hand, those interacting with the Muslims in everyday life did not either go to the poll, or expressed their indifference to the issue. The reaction of the majority of the Swiss citizens to the minaret issue was probably the reflection of their unrest originating from the global financial crisis, increasing immigration of highly skilled Germans and the domestic political problems. Public expression of ongoing structural problems by means of a kind of hate-speech against the Muslims has become a popular discourse in Switzerland as well as in the other European countries.

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21 A similar pattern has also been observed by Bevelander and Otterbeck (Forthcoming, 2011) in the Swedish context. Referring to the data provided by the *Integrationsbarometern* of the Swedish Integration Board (*Integrationsverket*) held in 2005 and 2006, they reveal that those who have “more positive attitude towards Muslims and Islam are women more than men, individuals living in large cities more than individuals living in small towns or the countryside, and the higher educated more than the lower educated” (Bevelander and Otterbeck, Forthcoming, 2011).
Another event demonstrating the growing negative perceptions of Islam and the Muslims in the west is the burning of Quran by a Pastor in Gainesville, Florida on 20 March 2011. A controversial evangelical preacher oversaw the burning of a copy of the Quran in a small church after finding the Muslim holy book “guilty” of crimes committed against humanity especially since 9/11. The burning was carried out by pastor Wayne Sapp under the supervision of pastor Terry Jones, who in September 2010 drew sweeping condemnation over his plan to ignite a pile of Qurans on the anniversary of 9/11 attacks. The event was presented as a trial of the book in which the Koran was found “guilty” and “executed.” Although the event was open to the public, less than 30 people attended. However, it has caused several different uproars in different parts of the world, especially among the Muslims in a way that has deteriorated the divide between the two worlds.

All the public surveys in Europe and the USA confirm the prevalence of negative opinions about Islam. It is likely that the negative perception of Islam in the European countries mainly springs from the Muslim origin migrants and their descendants residing in respective countries, while in the USA this negative perception is more likely to be coming out of the foreign policy challenges posed by Islam in general. The increase of negative attitudes to Muslims in Europe is confirmed by opinion polls carried out by different researchers as detailed above. In some European countries, the percentage of those interviewed who have either a “somewhat unfavourable” or a “very unfavourable” opinion of Muslims has substantially increased between 2005 and 2010 or, in specific cases, has remained at a high level, sometimes close to 50 percent. Islam is even perceived as a major threat to Europe by many Europeans because they feel that the minority is growing and that Islam is incompatible with “modern European life”. The highest levels of discrimination were found in employment and in services provided by the private sector. Other surveys portrayed above also show increasing numbers of attacks and


23 European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EU-MIDIS) held in 2009 very clearly depicts that Muslim origin individuals residing in the European space mainly complains about discrimination in the labor market. For instance, The Pew Global Attitudes Survey of 2006 found that unemployment registered as a worry (very or somewhat) for 78 percent of Muslims in Great Britain, 84 percent in France, 81 percent in Germany and 83 percent in Spain.
instances of discrimination against Muslims, as well as rallies and public gatherings with anti-Muslim messages. In what follows, I shall delineate how the Islamophobic opinions of politicians, public intellectuals and ordinary citizens are translated into policies of migration, integration, citizenship, multiculturalism, and secularism.

**Islamophobia as form of Governmentality**

As a discourse that travels between state, civil society, and citizens, that produces and organizes subjects, and that is used by subjects to govern themselves, islamophobia could also be seen to embody what Foucault formulated as a distinctive feature of modern *governmentality*. An analysis of modern ‘government’ needs to pay particular attention to the role accorded to ‘indirect’ mechanisms for aligning economic, social and personal conduct with socio-political objectives. Today, political power is exercised through a set of multiple agencies and techniques, some of which are only loosely associated with the executives and bureaucracies of the formal organs of state (Miller and Rose, 2011: 26). The state is not the source or agent of all governing power; nor does it monopolize political power; rather, the powers and rationalities governing individual subjects and the population as a whole operate through a range of formally non-political knowledges and institutions. The ensemble of legal and non-legal, pedagogical, cultural, religious, nationalist, and social discourses of Islamophobia together produce what Foucault understands as the signature of modern governmentality.

According to Foucault, modern governmental rationality is simultaneously about individualizing and totalizing: that is, about finding answers to the question of what it is for an individual, and for a society or population of individuals, to be governed or governable (Gordon, 1991: 36). Simultaneously totalizing and individualizing, gathering and distinguishing, and achieving each effect through its seeming opposite, Islamophobia emerges as one technique in an arsenal for organizing and managing large and potentially disruptive populations. As such, it is a strand of biopower, that modality of power so named by Foucault because it operates through the orchestration and regulation of life rather than the threat of death (Bröckling et al., 2011; Miller and Rose, 2008; Brown, 2006). The orchestration and regulation of life in modern societies is operationalized by the states through multiple forms of governmentality ranging from nationalism to Islamophobia, or from racism to multiculturalism.
Michel Foucault defines governmentality as the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses, and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security. In other words, governmentality refers to the practices which characterise the form of supervision a state exercises over its subjects, their wealth, misfortunes, customs, bodies, souls and habits (Foucault, 1979). It is the conduct of conduct, that is to say a form of activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of individuals or groups. The semantic linking of governing (gouverner) and modes of thought (mentalité) indicates that it is not possible to study the technologies of power without an analysis of the political rationality underpinning them. In this sense, according to Michel Foucault, modern societies can be understood only by reconstructing certain techniques of power, designed to observe, monitor, shape, discipline, or control the behaviour of individuals situated within a range of social and economic institutions such as the school, the factory, the prison, the media, and the church.

Foucault (2007) discerned three inter-related meanings of security: 1) sovereignty confirmed through the enactment of law on the population within a territory; 2) discipline consisting of techniques of individualization directed at making individual subjects docile, conformists and governable; 3) security as an abstraction of the diversity within a population that can be statistically conceived and managed through the guidance of the human sciences such as demographics, economics, and administrative sciences. The key issue here is not the increasing control of the state over its population, but the shifting emphasis in the ‘ethos’ and ‘art’ of governing. For example, following the Foucaultian perspective, one could trace the shift from the administrative state of the past shaped by the police and discipline, to one in which governmental power is dispersed through society by way of professional power at different sites such as education, health, correction systems, media, and fear (Truong and Gasper, 2011).

Contemporary states are more inclined to use multiple governmentalities to control and rule the masses. These multiple governmentalities could range from the processes of securitization of migration (Doty, 2000; Huysmans, 2006; Walters, 2006; Kaya, 2009) to the growing political discourse of tolerance (Brown, 2006), or from multiculturalism
(Povinelli, 2002) to Islamophobia. As Miller and Rose (2011: 17) put it very well, governmentalities change by entering into periods of criticism and crisis, where multiple perceptions of failure come together, and where alternatives are proposed – for the failures of one mode of governing are opportunities for the formulation of another. The ways in which multiple forms of governmentality are being performed by the states demonstrate to us that there are two sides to governmentality. Firstly, the term refers to a specific form of representation; government defines a discursive field such as prevention of migration or “combating Islamic terrorism” in which exercising power is rationalized. This occurs by the description of concepts, the specification of objects and borders, the provision of fears, arguments and justifications. In this manner, government defines a problem to be addressed and offers certain strategies for handling the problem. And secondly, Foucault uses the term government in a more general context in the ways in which it was used until the 18th century. Government was a term discussed not only in political tracts, but also in philosophical, religious, medical and pedagogic texts. This is why, Foucault defines government as conduct, or, more precisely, as “the conduct of conduct” and thus as a term which ranges from “governing the self” to “governing others”. In other words, in his history of governmentality Foucault endeavours to show how the modern sovereign state and the modern autonomous individual co-determine each other’s emergence (Foucault, 1979).

Islamophobia as a form of governmentality is being manufactured in parallel with the growing stream of ethnicization, racialization and culturalization of what is social and political in the west since the early 1990s (Brown, 2006). This stream is advocated by several politicians, public servants, bureaucracy, judiciary, police and the media in order to hold socio-economically and politically deprived migrants and their descendants responsible from their isolation, exclusion, poverty, unemployment, unschooling and any kind of failure in everyday life (Balibar, 2004: 37-38). The process of ethnicizing, racializing and culturalizing what is social and political is not only shaped by dominant political discourses with a great conservative tone, but also by the enormous demographic changes, led by the dissolution of the Eastern Block in late 1980s and early 1990s (Brubaker, 1991; and Kaya, 2009).

The year 1989 signalled the very beginning of a new epoch that resulted in massive migration flows of ethnic Germans, ethnic Hungarians,
ethnic Russians and Russian Jews from one place to another. The post-Communist era has also brought about a process of re-homogenization in western nation-states like Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands. Political instability and ethnic conflicts in the former Eastern Bloc (USSR and former Yugoslavia) on the other hand pushed some ethnic groups to immigrate to Western European countries in which they could find ethnic affinities. The mobility of millions of people has stimulated nation-states to ethnicise their migration policies in a way that approved the arrival of co-ethnic immigrants, but disapproved the status of existing immigrants with different ethno-cultural and religious background from that of majority society. Nation-states were not suitably equipped in the 1990s to absorb the spontaneous arrival of so many immigrants. This period of demographic change in Western Europe occurred in parallel with the rise of heterophobic discourses such as the ‘clash of civilisations’, ‘culture wars’, ‘religious wars’ and ‘Islamophobia’, as well as with the reinforcement of restrictive migration policies and territorial border security vis-à-vis the nationals of countries outside the European space.

“Immigrant-bashing”, or ‘Muslim-bashing” is becoming a social sport at a time when net migration is close to becoming negative in several countries, including Germany, France, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands (Table 2). There are already some concerns in the UK, Germany and the Netherlands, for instance, which reveal that these countries are likely to face a remarkable demographic problem very soon due to the decreasing fertility rate, increasing emigration and rising racism and xenophobia. For instance, the figures display that the number of people immigrating to the Netherlands increased by 9,192 from 2005 to 2006. In 2005 the number of immigrants who settled in the country was 92,297. In 2006 the number was 101,489. The increase is attributed mostly to Dutch emigrants returning home, as well as the influx of new EU citizens coming from Eastern Europe, particularly from Poland. However, in 2005, the number of people who emigrated from the Netherlands was 92,297. In 2006, the number was 132,682 - an increase of 40,385 (Statistics Netherlands). One of the reasons of the rising emigration numbers could possibly be attributed to lower housing prices and attractive mortgage taxes in neighbouring countries such as Belgium. Similarly, there is also an increase in the number of German citizens who have recently left Germany to settle in other countries. It is reported that in 2006, 155,300 German citizens

24 For a detailed account of growing global migration flows in the late 1980s and early 1990s leading to the securitization of migration see Brubaker (1991).
emigrated, the highest number of emigrants since 1954.\textsuperscript{25} This debate is likely to become heated soon as the German migration expert Klaus Bade has recently published a report indicating that Germany has experienced a net migration loss in 2008. Criticizing the recent migration phobia in Germany, he warned the public that Germany will lack three million workers by 2015 if this trend continues.\textsuperscript{26}

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|l|c|}
\hline
Country & Net migration (per 1000 people) & Country & Net migration (per 1000 people) \\
\hline
Netherlands & 2.50 & Belgium & 5.10 \\
Denmark & 2.70 & Spain & 1.30 \\
Germany & -0.20 & Czech Republic & 2.70 \\
United Kingdom & 2.90 & Finland & 2.70 \\
Italy & 5.30 & Cyprus & -4.00 \\
Austria & 2.50 & Switzerland & 8.50 \\
Sweden & 6.70 & Poland & 0.00 \\
European Union & 1.70 & Latvia & -2.10 \\
France & 1.10 & Estonia & 0.00 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Net migration in western countries (Source: Official website of the Eurostat, see \url{http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Crude_rates_of_population_change_(per_1_000_inhabitants).png&filetimestamp=20110207144942v})}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{25} The figure in 2005 was 145,000. Popular countries of destination for the German emigrants in 2006 were the following: Switzerland, 18,000 (12 percent), United States, 13,800 (9 percent) and Austria, 10,300 (7 percent). The age groups between 18 and 50 prefer to go to countries such as Switzerland, the USA and Australia, while the elderly people emigrate to the Mediterranean Riviera in Spain, or Turkey. For further detail see the official webpage of Statistisches Bundesamt, “Zahl der Woche Nr. 43 vom 30.10.2007”, available at \url{http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Presse/pm/zdw/2007/PD07__043__p002.psm1} (entry date 5 June 2008); and “Pressemitteilung Nr. 220 vom 30.05.2007”, Pressrelease, available at \url{http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Presse/pm/2007/05/PD07__220__125.psm1} (entry date 5 June 2008).

\textsuperscript{26} For more detail see “German politics influenced by immigration fears,” available at \url{http://www.presstv.ir/detail/174675.html} (entry date 10 March 2011).
Hence, the European context is different from the American context where Islam was predominantly portrayed by the Bush regime as a challenge coming from outside the ‘nation under siege’. European politics has rather used Islam as an ‘enemy within’ to be the pretext for a certain type of politics discriminating against those whose values are different from the Europeans’. The introduction of citizenship tests and integration tests in several European countries has become a phenomenal issue as both kinds of tests are explicitly designed on cultural criteria. The rationale of these tests is to restrict immigration flux of unqualified candidates. Citizenship reforms in most of the European countries have become more restrictive in the last decade due to fears about terrorism, violence, and the alleged disobedience of Muslim origin immigrants to western values.

The introduction of the ‘attitude test’ (Gesinnungstest) by the state of Baden-Württemberg in 2006 was the first step towards a more restrictive regime of citizenship towards Muslim-origin migrants and their descendants in Germany, who are asked for their views on issues like domestic violence, arranged marriages, religious freedom and terrorism.\(^{27}\) The citizenship test became a national exercise in Germany in August 2007 as the amended Nationality Act came into effect. It was stated by the Federal Ministry of the Interior that knowledge of German civic values will now be required for naturalisation. The definition of civic values includes having basic knowledge of the legal and social order and the way of life in Germany as well as competency in the national language (Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2007). The 2007 amendments mark a setback from the 2000 Citizenship Law in the sense that this new civic-based citizenship has now turned the pre-2000 blood-based restriction on citizenship into a restriction based on ‘values’. The so-called civic integration seems to be discriminatory to Muslims, who are negatively targeted as an ethnic group in Europe under the guise of liberalism (Joppke, 2007). Such tests have also recently been introduced in Austria, Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. What is polemical and controversial about the tests is not only limited to its content, but also there is a debate about who is required to take the test. For instance, the test is only required for ‘non-western’ peoples in the Dutch case.\(^{28}\) While

\(^{27}\) See http://www.integration-in-deutschland.de/ (entry date 10 August 2011).

\(^{28}\) The Dutch Ministry of Justice states that the following groups of people are exempted from taking the Basic Civic Integration Examination (Dutch Language test and Knowledge of Dutch Society test) (Section 17 (1) of the Aliens Act 2000 (Vreemdelingenwet 2000): A) persons of Australian, Belgian, Canadian, Cypriot,
the test is required for all ‘non-westerners’, the addition of some fact and analysis shows that the test is oriented particularly towards applicants of Muslim origin (Bauböck and Joppke, 2010).

These examples illustrate very well that fear can be politically fabricated and instrumentalised by ethno/religio-nationalist public intellectuals, politicians and administrators in order to legitimize some of their prospective actions in a way that leads to the *securitization and stigmatization of migration and Islam* (Doty, 2000; Bigo, 2002; Walters, 2006; Huysmans, 2006; Cesari, 2006; Kaya, 2009; and Bahnser, 2011). The process of stigmatization and securitization in the aftermath of 9/11 has prompted the states to invest more in the protection of their national borders against the ‘intrusion of immigrants and Muslims’. The states have been investing in an impressive array of policing technologies – personnel (Border Patrol agents), material structures (fences and lights), and surveillance devices (helicopters, ground sensors, TV cameras, and infrared night vision scopes) - at the borders in order to keep the so-called undocumented immigrants out of the land. Inda (2006) explicates very well in detail the ways in which the US-Mexican border has been protected with the assistance of all those high-technologies of surveillance. However, statistics indicate that there is a negative correlation between the militarization of the US-Mexican border and the volume of “illegal migration” (Sassen, 2006: 6-7). The EU is also following a similar trend through the enforcement the Border Agency, Frontex (Monar, 2006). One could not do without asking the question: if the high-tech surveillance systems do not bring about expected results, then why do the states go on investing so much money in the securitization of their borders? Is it because, securing the borders against Muslims and illegal immigrants is
basically to prosper the agents of the security sector? Perhaps, not only that! Investing in the protection of borders, governments also ensure that the masses would be mobilized along with their policies. After all, it turns out to be an efficient form of governmentality as “borders are privileged sites for the articulations of national distinctions”, and thus, of national belonging (Sahlins, 1989: 271).

Mehdi Semati (2010) also finds a correlation between the rise of the Islamophobic discourse prevailing in the West and the ongoing political crisis in the Middle East. With a special focus on the United States, he claims that the current discourse of Islam and Muslims is inextricably bound with the issues of the protection of national security and of terrorism, which tends to frame all other issues concerning the Middle East. The present day notion of terrorism, however, has a relatively short history. The origin of today’s terrorism discourse is located in the 1980s American foreign policy during the presidency of Ronald Reagan. This era has been characterized as the era of aggressive militarism and a ruthless foreign policy as a response to the perceived erosion of American power and standing in the international political arena. The preceding presidency of Jimmy Carter had entailed events and policies that contributed to a real and perceived decline in America’s credibility as a superpower due to the loss of Nicaragua, Iran and Afghanistan. The failure in American foreign policy vis-a-vis such events led to a call for a renewal of the projection of American power around the globe. A central tool of the foreign policy of the Reagan regime was ‘resurgent America’ (Prince, 1993). The idea of projecting American power in this era brought about aggressive intervention policies around the globe. Invasion of Grenada, supporting the Contra’s war in Nicaragua, and the bombing of Libya were some of these actions around the world. This aggressive jingoist militarism, which culminated in the military operation in the Persian Gulf in 1991, was part of a renewed Cold War by the Reagan administration in the New World Order to reassert American leadership after a period of perceived decline. The major thrust of foreign policy in the 1980s was formulated in response to (perceived) Soviet Union aggression. The threat of terrorism, as ‘Russia’s secret weapon,’ became a major theme in the new Cold War. American foreign policy during the Bush administration became more engaged in the war against the Axis of Evil, which mainly symbolised the so-called (perceived) “terrorist” Islamic countries (Semati, 2010: 259-260).
Hence, as Chris Allen (2007, and 2010) very eloquently revealed, Islamophobia is not really a ‘phobia’, it is rather a form of governmentality, or an ideology, “similar in theory, function and purpose to racism and other similar phenomena, that sustains and perpetuates negatively evaluated meaning about Muslims and Islam in the contemporary setting in similar ways... that inform and construct thinking about Muslims and Islam as Other” (2010: 195). The aim of Islamophobia as a form of governmentality is to make the majorities believe that Muslims and Islam pose an ‘enemy within’ in the European context, and an ‘outside enemy’ in the American context so that the unity of the nation can be protected against the national, societal, and cultural security challenges coming from inside, or outside (Doty, 2000; Huysmans, 2006; Kaya, 2009; and Allen, 2010).

Islamophobia as a form of governmentality has so far produced unintended consequences with respect to the minority – majority relations in the west. On the one hand, it has prompted Muslim origin migrants and their descendants to revitalize an essentialist discourse with regard to their dialogical relationship with the majority societies in a way that has paved the way to the reification of *honour*. On the other hand, Islamophobic form of governmentality has partly stimulated the majority societies to generate an unfavourable discourse with respect to multiculturalism and diversity in a way that has essentialized homogenization. So far, Islamophobia as a form of governmentality has proven to be wrong, because it has simply deepened social, political, cultural and religious cleavages already existing in the western societies. In what follows, these two unintended consequences of Islamophobic form of governmentality will be scrutinized.

**The Collapse of Social Cohesion (Asabiyya)**

The findings of the surveys outlined above are open to interpretation. But they do suggest that there is a growing cultural and civilizational divide between Muslims and non-Muslims residing in the west. Each survey points to similarities between both groups when it comes to politics, education, and social and economic position, as well as to the attitudes towards democracy and fundamental freedoms. However, majority suspicion of the Muslim minority in the wake of 9/11 continues, and is reinforced by the widespread and reductionist equation of Islam with extremism, terrorism, suicide bombers, stoning women, honour crimes and fundamentalism.
One should not underestimate the fact that Islamophobic tendencies may prompt at least some of the Muslim origin immigrants in the west to become more affiliated with essentialist religious ties in order to defend their ‘honour’ against the perceptions of the majority societies as well as the detrimental forces of globalization such as deindustrialization, poverty and exclusion. In an age of insecurity, deindustrialization, poverty, exclusion, discrimination and violence, Muslim origin immigrants and their descendants become more engaged in the protection of their honour, which, they believe, is the only thing left. In understanding the growing significance of honour, Akbar S. Ahmed (2003) draws our attention to the collapse of what Mohammad Ibn Khaldun (1969), an Arab historian from North Africa in the 14th Century, once called asabiyya, an Arabic word which refers to group loyalty, social cohesion or solidarity. Asabiyya binds groups together through a common language, culture and code of behaviour. Ahmed establishes a direct negative correlation between asabiyya and the revival of honour. Accordingly, the collapse of asabiyya on a global scale prompts Muslims and other deprived masses to revitalize honour.29 Ahmed (2003: 81) claims that asabiyya is collapsing for the following reasons:

“Massive urbanization, dramatic demographic changes, a population explosion, large scale migrations to the West, the gap between rich and poor, the widespread corruption and mismanagement of rulers, the rampant materialism coupled with the low premium on education, the crisis of identity, and, perhaps, most significantly new and often alien ideas and images, at once seductive and repellent, and instantly communicated from the West, ideas and images which challenge traditional values and customs.”

The collapse of asabiyya also implies for Muslims the breakdown of adl (justice), and ihsan (compassion and balance). Global disorder characterized by the lack of asabiyya, adl, and ihsan seems to trigger the essentialization of honour by Muslims. The rise of honour crimes in the Muslim context illustrates the way honour becomes instrumentalized and essentialized. Recent honour crimes among Euro-Muslims have made it very common for some of the conservative political elite and academics in the West to explain it as an indispensable element of Islam. However

29 For the discussion about the importance of honour among the Catholic origin immigrant communities see Horowitz (1983).
one should note that honour crimes are not unique to the Islamic culture: they are also visible in the Judeo-Christian world (Horowitz, 1983). Honour crimes have rather been structurally constrained. The traumatic acts of migration, exclusion, and poverty by uneducated subaltern migrant workers without work prepare a viable ground for domestic violence, honour crimes and delinquency.

Religion and ethnicity seem to offer attractive ‘solutions’ for people entangled in intertwined problems. It is not surprising for masses who have a gloomy outlook of the future, who cannot benefit from the society and who are cast aside by global capitalism to resort to honour, religion, ethnicity, language, and tradition, all of which they believe cannot be pried from their hands, and to define themselves in those terms. The Islamic reference used by Muslim origin migrants and their descendants is mostly expressive of the need to belong to a legitimate counter-hegemonic global discourse such as that of Islam, and to derive a symbolic power from that. It seems that now religion is replacing the left in the absence of a global leftist movement. Michel De Certeau (1984: 183) reminds us of the discursive similarities between religion and left: religion offering a different world, and left offering a different future – both offering solidarity. In a similar vein, Tony Evans (2010) also describes Islam as a unique global movement, dedicated to defending its followers from further cultural and spiritual encroachment. Accordingly, Islam has recently constituted a Gramscian counter-hegemonic force capable of mounting a successful challenge to the national/global neo-liberal order, under which particularly Muslim origin migrants and their descendants suffer (Mandaville, 2001: 153). Moreover, it should be remembered that the recent acts of violence in the name of Islam are also an indication of the solidarity among the members of the newly emerging transnational Islam, who are claimed to be engaged in religious fundamentalism.

Islam is perceived by Westerners as a threat to the European lifestyle. Islamic fundamentalism is depicted as the source of xenophobic, racist and violent behaviour in the West. However, reversing the point of view, the rise in religious values may be interpreted as the result of structural problems such as deindustrialization, poverty, unemployment, racism, xenophobia, isolation, constraints in political representation, and the threat of assimilation. In order to cope with these challenges, discourses on culture, identity, religion, ethnicity, traditions and the past have become the most significant existence
strategy for minorities in general, and immigrants in particular. Reconstituting the past and resorting to culture, ethnicity and religion seem to serve a dual purpose for immigrant communities: Firstly, as a way to be contemporary without criticising the existing status quo -- “glorious” past, authentic culture, ethnicity, and religion are used by diasporic subjects as a strategic instrument to resist exclusion, poverty, racism, and institutional discrimination; and subsequently, as a way to give an individual the feeling of independence from the criteria imposed by the majority society, because the past, traditions, culture, and religion symbolise values and beliefs that the diasporic subjects believe cannot be taken away from them.

Religion is an important cultural source for the formation of identity among migrants and their descendants. The significance of religion for youth lies in the fact that these young people are perceived in a prejudiced manner by the majorities. The European majority societies are inclined to use Islam as the main reference point when defining young people from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, or Turkey. For example, young adults of North or Central African origin, who are defined as Islamic by the majority of the French, Italian, or Belgian public, believe that their identities are not recognized, or misrecognized, by the majorities. As a reaction, they may generate a stronger affinity with their religion. Growing reliance on religion may also result from the ways in which their belonging and of multiple loyalties is questioned by the majority societies along with the salient issues of security and the battle against international terrorism (Frisina, 2010: 558).

An example of this process can be seen among those Turkish origin youngsters residing in Germany. A Berlin-based Turkish-German rap group in the 1990s explained the choice of Islamic Force as its name mainly on the grounds that they wanted to protest the prejudiced attitude of the German majority towards Islam, and sought to provoke them further. Interestingly, Islamic Force was a rap group of a predominantly universal discourse, as opposed to its name (Kaya, 2001). Steven Vertovec (1995) explains this expression of identity as “the cultural Islamic identity”. There are significant similarities between the young Asian Muslim migrants living in the town of Keighley in Northern England defining themselves as ‘young Muslims’, and the Turkish youth in Berlin or North African youth in France defining themselves along the lines of Islamic codes (Kaya, 2009). These examples imply that cultural identities in the diaspora emerge in the process of dialectical and dialogical relations between the majority and
the minorities. This is a process of vernacularization of Islam in diaspora whereby religion becomes more individualized in line with the changing needs of individuals who are subject to collective impacts due to the ongoing structural outsiderism. Thus, Islamic space becomes a space in which transmigrants\textsuperscript{30} search for recognition.

Islamic allegiance by those youths could also be interpreted as a quest for emancipation from the parental culture, which imprisoned religion in the authentic culture brought from home by the former generations. However, the allegiance of post-migrant youth into Islam is not limited to their parents’ country, but extends to the worldwide Muslim community, especially involving solidarity with, and interest in, various ongoing struggles such as the Palestinian cause, and conflicts in Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon (Cesari, 2003). For instance, the French banlieues are identified with the Palestinians, Iraqis, and Afghans (Roy, 2007: 3). Hence, diasporic youth, who are affiliated with Islam, rather has a political stance. This is a stance, which goes beyond the separation between religion and politics. The reality in Europe today is that young Muslims are becoming politically mobilized to support causes that have less to do with faith and more to do with communal solidarity. The manifestation of global Muslim solidarity can be described as an identity, which is based on vicarious humiliation: European Muslims develop empathy for Muslim victims elsewhere in the world and convince themselves that their own exclusion and that of their co-religionists have the same root cause: Western rejection of Islam. As Buruma and Margalit (2004) eloquently put it, this is the kind of humiliation, which can easily turn into a cult of the pure and authentic.

Similarly, North African origin French-Muslim youth have also recently adopted a religious identity. Needless to say, some young Muslims have chosen a more fundamentalist view of Islam under the influence of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) that is primarily organised in Algeria and earned a degree of legitimacy against the colonialist French state (Leveau, 1997). However, recent studies both in France and other countries show that young Muslims hold their Islamic identity only at a symbolic and political level, that most do not observe religious rites such as daily

\textsuperscript{30} The term transmigrant refers to those migrant origin individuals whose networks, activities, and patterns of life encompass both their host and home societies in what we call transnational space. For a more detailed analysis of the term transmigrants see Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton (2004).
prayers and fasting (during the month of Ramadan), and that they adopt an increasingly secular (material) worldview (Hargreaves, 1995; Tribalat, 1995; Kaya, 2001; Safran, 2003; and Kaya and Kentel, 2005). In fact, the works of Hargreaves and Tribalat mention that some young Northern Africans in France (“beur” in French) see themselves as “Muslim Atheists” (Hargreaves, 1995: 120-1; Tribalat, 1995: 96-8).31

Franco-Algerian writer Sadek Sellam argues that young Muslims see what France has done to their parents, they see the bad housing, and they see that France is not interested in helping them make a better life, and they discover radicalism. Their parents said: “we are Muslims, why not? But these kids are saying: “We are Muslims. Now what?” (Cited in Pauly, 2004: 49). The bell tolls for the French Fifth Republic. The islamophobic form of governmentality in France and elsewhere, which has become more visible through the growing assimilationist discourse, the rigid political structure that ignores differences, the inability to transfer political rights from theory to practice, the excessively centralised quality of the state, and the exaggerated power of the national government used in times of turmoil, has given rise to a social opposition which may be expected to grow in various ways.

As noted earlier that marginal groups who cannot enter the political grounds through legitimate political channels will sometimes use the language of religion, ethnicity, and sometimes of violence. For instance, the language used by Beurs in France is, in this respect, the expression of such a political search. Many Muslims can find places in the French national team, the hip-hop culture, in cinema, plastic arts and many other fields, while having absolutely no place in the political arena. This imbalance needs to be corrected. From this perspective, the events in France are actions of immigrants seeking political recognition and equality. It should not be surprising, and not be considered as a coincidence that France, the birthplace of the 1968 youth movements, is also the birthplace of immigrants’ movements, who have truly displayed their allegiance to the three pillars of the republican rhetoric underlining their quest for “liberty, equality, and fraternity.”

31 A similar debate is also made by Nacira Guénif-Souilamas (2006). She is using the notion of _Le musulman laïc_ (secular muslim) when she is revealing the ways in which young men (Beurs) and women (Beurette) of North African origin melt into the French way of life.
However, one should be also aware of the transformation of the political discourse generated by different generations of French-Muslim youth along with the rise of the islamophobic form of governmentality of the French state. It seems that there are two basic differences between the riots of 2005 Autumn and preceding ones in France: firstly, latest riots were not only limited to Paris but also reached out to all around the country, and even to the neighbouring countries like Belgium and the Netherlands where there are African origin migrants; and secondly the intensity of violence was more than that of the former ones. Nationwide rioting in France, in October and November 2005, brought to national and international attention the realities and grievances of a largely Muslim minority population that was normally kept out of sight in vast housing projects on the outskirts of major cities (HRF, 2007). For instance, between April 2005 and August 2008, the lack of safe public housing has brought about the death of 48 poor immigrants in three separate fires in makeshift municipal housing and abandoned buildings in Paris (Kaya, 2009).

The first Beur collective action which constitutes the turning point in terms of Beurs’ political visibility in France is the 1983 March for Equal Rights and against Racism (‘Marche des Beurs’). The March initiative was a reaction to the escalation of racist violence. It was partly inspired by the non-violent model of the US civil rights movement under the leadership of Martin Luther King. This choice partly reflected the individuality of the initial 40 marchers who started the march at Marseilles to finish one month later in Paris with some 100,000 marchers. Beurs’ demands were expressed in moral terms such as a quest for equality, dignity and rights, a pacifist statement on solidarity (Balibar, 2004: 32; and Khiari, 2006: 42). Ever since, Beur movement split itself between electoral politics and local social actions, in other words, between civic and civil movements. It is not clear yet which one is more peculiar for the Beurs: civic claims or civil claims? However, what is obvious is that Beur movement is radicalizing itself since early 1980s. There are lately strong indications that the recent rioters, who are the sons of 1983 demonstrators, have shifted their discourses from a pacifist Martin-Luther-King-like discourse to a more radical Malcolm-X-like discourse, which has a rather Islamic substance.32

32 This hypothesis was significantly substantiated by a field work conducted in Paris in the Summer of 2006. Although it seems that this discursive shift is rather an intellectual construct, what is important is that it has gained a very fast publicity. One could find several blogs and interventions in the internet concerning the circulation of this expanding radical discourse.
Thus, not only social mobility among the Beurs had limited effects in terms of the integration of *banlieues* synonymous with ‘Muslim youth’, it also signified the failure of the Beur political elite of the 1980s. The failure of these elite and worsening social exclusion in the *banlieues* as well as the growing Islamophobic form of governmentality of the French state paved the way to the re-islamization of Beur youth in France – a country facing increasing economic difficulties and mounting racism (Khiari, 2006). The findings of a survey conducted by Brouard and Tiberj (2005: 30) expose on the issue of re-Islamization that 42 percent of Muslim respondents say they now give more importance to religion than they did before (41 percent say equal, and 17 percent say less), and most say they are less religious than their parents. Only 2 percent of Muslim respondents say they would refuse a dinner invitation from a non-Muslim, showing there is not a closed community of Muslims hostile to the host society. For the great majority, the authors find, Islam is a private matter with little consequence on becoming part of French society.

In the mean time, the Islamic salience, which partly results from the common assumptions among the Muslims regarding their humiliation on a global scale, has a potential to transform Christianity into a constitutive element of the western national identities be it German, French, Dutch, Swiss or Danish national identity (Modood, 2007). The result in this case is an unprecedented and heavy emphasis in European liberal societies on ensuring that citizens share values, outlooks and practices, not just that they accept shared institutions and laws, and interact productively in the economy (Dobbernack and Modood, 2011: 28):

“This paradoxical re-substantialization of modern solidarity translates to general societal intolerance of ‘too much diversity’. On the ‘new right’ it may crystallize opposition to practices, which most provocatively are seen to symbolize what is alien from national culture, such as the building of minarets on Mosques; or which are seen to perpetuate segregation, such as speaking Turkish and Arabic in public schools and not sending children to public kindergarten. More mainstream political concerns of the need for a shared (civic) culture usually influence milder attempts to encourage individuals to cultural adaptation or integration.”
Moreover growing Islamophobia in the West reshapes political alliances in everyday life, too. Peter Widmann (2010) rightfully draws our attention to a newly emerging alliance in the German society. Widmann claims that Islamophobia recently offers a possibility of coming to terms with a German past that still overshadows the national self image. Anti-Muslim activists see Muslims as the main representatives of anti-Semitism in Germany and in the world. In this view “autochthonous Germans now seem to have stepped out the shadows of the past, fighting side by side with Jews against a common threat (Widmann, 2010: 7)” Based on historical amnesia after centuries of Christian persecution of Jews, the rhetoric of “Judeo-Christian culture” amalgamates with Islamophobia and becomes a new way of restoring a positive group identity of autochthonous Germans. Islamophobia as a form of governmentality has not only negatively impacted upon the Muslim origin minorities residing in the west, but also on the majority societies through restructuring social and political alliances as well as reproducing a public discourse favouring ethno-cultural and religious homogeneity, thus rejecting multiculturalism and diversity.

**Multiculturalism Withers Away: Encouraging Wright Wing Extremism**

As Will Kymlicka (2010) rightfully asserts where states feel insecure in geo-political terms, fearful of neighboring enemies, they are unlikely to treat fairly their own minorities. More specifically, states are unlikely to accord powers and resources to minorities that they view as potential collaborators with neighboring enemies. Today, this is not an issue throughout the established Western democracies with respect to authochtonous national minorities, although it remains an issue with respect to certain immigrant origin groups, particularly Muslim origin groups after September 11. As stated earlier, ethno-cultural and religious relations become securitized under these conditions. Relations between states and minorities are seen, not as a matter of normal democratic debate and negotiation, but as a matter of state security, in which the state has to limit the democratic processes of political participation, negotiation and compromise to protect itself. The state of securitization of minorities is likely to lead to the rejection of minority political mobilization by the larger society and the state. Hence, the securitization of ethno-cultural relations erodes both the democratic space to voice minority demands, and the likelihood that those demands will be accepted.
The situation with respect to immigrant groups is more complex. In the European context, the same factors that push for multiculturalism in relation to historic minorities have also generated a willingness to contemplate multiculturalism for immigrant groups (Kymlicka, 2010). However, immigrant multiculturalism has run into difficulties where it is perceived as carrying high risks with regard to the national, societal and cultural security of the majority society. Where immigrants are coupled with violence, honor crimes, drug use, drug trafficking and human trafficking, and are seen as predominantly illegal, as potential carriers of illiberal practices or movements, and as net burdens on the welfare state, then multiculturalism also poses perceived risks to the shared moral principles of the nation, and this perception can reverse the forces that support multiculturalism. Accordingly, multiculturalism bashing is also inclined to become a popular sport often revisited in times of social, political and economic turmoils. In moments of societal crisis, the critique of multiculturalism turns out to be a form of governmentality employed mostly by Christian Democratic parties to mobilize those segments of the society, who have an inclination towards the right wing extremism due to the growing feelings of anomie, insecurity and ambiguity.

33 For a similar debate in Germany in the 1990s see Heitmeyer et al. (1997). Wilhelm Heitmeyer et al. (1997) concluded that it is the Turks who are not tempted to integrate and incorporate themselves into the German society. Their main criterion in declaring the self-isolationist tendency of the Turkish-origin youths was their perceived contentment to live with Islam and Turkishness. This polemical debate around the work of Heitmeyer et al. (1997) is very parallel to the debate revolving around Thilo Sarrazin (2010)’s book, engaging the high level politicians including the Chancellor and the President of Germany.

34 One should not underestimate the destructive effects of such nationalist anti-multiculturalist rhetoric on the western societies such as Norway and the UK. For instance, the myths that Muslim immigrants are taking over Europe and that multiculturalism is harmful caused the murder of seventy-nine individuals by a right-wing extremist, Anders Behring Breivik, in Norway on 22 July 2011 (see BBC website, 23 July 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14259356, entry date on 15 August 2011). In a similar vein, British PM David Cameron had also criticized the multiculturalist rhetoric in February 2011, a few months earlier than the London riots in August 2011. In boroughs where more than half of youth centers are closing, youth unemployment is rising, and negative experience with police is repeated through the generations, many children and young adults feel that neither the state nor the community has anything to offer them. For further detail on the notorious speech of David Cameron on multiculturalism see http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12415597 (entry date 16 August 2011); and for more detail on the London Riots see http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-14436499 (entry date 16 August 2011).
Securitization and stigmatization of migration and Islam has brought about the ascendancy of a political discourse renown as *the end of multiculturalism*—a discourse, which is often revisited in the last two decades since the war in Bosnia in 1992, leading to the birth of the Huntingtonian clash of civilizations paradigm. The discourse of the end of multiculturalism is often built upon the assumption that the homogeneity of the nation is at stake, and thus it has to be restored at the expense of alienating those who are not ethno-culturally and religiously from the prescribed notion of “us”. It should be kept in mind that migration was a source of content in Western Europe during the 1960s. More recently, however, migration has been framed as a source of discontent, fear and instability for nation-states in the West. What has happened since the 1960s? Why has there been this shift in the framing of migration? The answer of such questions lies in the very heart of the changing global social-political context.

Undoubtedly, several different reasons such as deindustrialization, unemployment, poverty, exclusion, violence, supremacy of culturalism and neo-liberal political economy turning the uneducated and unqualified masses into the new ‘*wretched of the earth*’ to use Frantz Fanon’s (1965) terminology, can be enumerated to answer such critical questions. After the relative prominence of multiculturalism debates both in political and scholarly arenas, we witness today a change in the direction of debates and policies about how to accommodate cultural diversity. Diminishing belief in the possibility of a flourishing multicultural society has changed the nature of the debates about integration of migrant origin groups. Initially, the idea of multiculturalism connoted compromise, tolerance, respect, interdependence, universalism, and was expected to bring about an ‘intercultural community.’ Over time, it began to be perceived as a way of institutionalizing difference through autonomous cultural discourses and cultural archipelagos (Cesari et al., 2006). Europe and the other parts of the world including the USA have experienced increasing tensions between national majorities and ethno-religious minorities, more particularly with marginalised Muslim communities. Arthur M. Schlessinger (1991) and Robert Hughes (1993) became very vocal in criticizing the policies of multiculturalism in the USA, and claimed that US multiculturalism will result in the dissolution of the United States as long as minorities such as the Hispanics and Afro-Americans are granted the right to celebrate their ethno-cultural distinctiveness. On the other side of the Atlantic, the Dutch society was struggling with what Paul
Scheffer (2000), a social democratic figure in the Netherlands, called *Multicultural Drama* allegedly leading to the dissolution of the Dutch society.\(^{35}\)

This debate has been roaming around in Europe for a long time. It seems that the declaration of the ‘failure of multiculturalism’ has become a catchphrase of not only extreme-right wing political parties but also of centrist political parties all across the continent, although it is not clear that each attributes the same meaning to the term.\(^{36}\) Angela Merkel for the first time publicly dismissed the policy of multiculturalism as having ‘failed, failed utterly’ in October 2010, and this was followed swiftly by David Cameron’s call for a ‘more active, more muscular liberalism’ and Nicolas Sarkozy’s statement that multiculturalism is a ‘failed concept’. Geert Wilders, leader of the Freedom Party in the Netherlands, has made no apologies for arguing that Christians “should be proud that our culture is better than Islamic culture” (*Der Spiegel*, 11 September 2010). Thilo Sarrazin (2010), a politician from the Social Democratic Party who sat on the *Bundesbank* board and is the former Finance Senator for Berlin, has argued in his bestselling book that Germany is becoming ‘naturally more stupid on average’ as a result of immigration from Muslim countries. In his critic of Thilo Sarrazin’s highly polemical book *Germany Does Away With Itself* (*Deutschland schafft sich ab*, 2010), Jürgen Habermas states that German *Leitkultur* (leading culture) is recently being defined not by “German culture” but by religion: “With an arrogant appropriation of Judaism — and an incredible disregard for the fate the Jews suffered in Germany — the apologists of the *Leitkultur* now appeal to the “Judeo-Christian tradition,” which distinguishes “us” from foreigners” (Habermas, 2010).

\(^{35}\) Similarly, Koopmans et al. (2005), and Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007) suggested that immigrant multiculturalism in the Netherlands as well as in the other European countries produced adverse effects.

\(^{36}\) Multiculturalism was also criticized by several left-wing scholars with the claim that multiculturalism became a rather neo-liberal and neo-colonial form of governmentality, imprisoning ethno-cultural and religious minorities, migrants and their children in their own ghettos. For a more detailed account of the critique of multiculturalism see Rosaldo (1989); Rath (1993); Radtke (1994); Russom (1995); Koopmans et al. (2005), Sniderman and Hogendoorn (2007), and Kaya (2001, and 2009).
Referring to genetic arguments, Sarrazin claims in his book that the future of Germany is threatened by the wrong kind of immigrants, coming especially from Muslim countries. Although his arguments are based on a conventional racist rhetoric, he was highly credited by the German society securitizing the policies of citizenship (Habermas, 2010; Widmann, 2010). His racist arguments were later followed by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who denounced multicultural rhetoric, and by the Bavarian Prime Minister Horst Seehofer’s hate speech against the migrants coming from Turkey and Arab countries (Habermas, 2010). The German experience also reveals that the European form of secularism is not yet equipped to accommodate Islam, which has recently become very visible in the public space (Laitin, 2010). Interestingly, the German practice as well as other practices in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and the UK have ended up with a kind of holy alliance secular left and Christian Right against Islam (Roy, 2007: xii).

These populist outbreaks contribute to the securitization and stigmatization of migration in general and Islam in particular. In the meantime, such interventions also deflect attention from constructive solutions and policies widely thought to promote integration, including programmes for language acquisition and increased labour market access, which are already suffering because of austerity measures across all around Europe including Germany, Belgium, the UK and the Netherlands. 2007 Human Rights First Report on Islamophobia states that such an anti-Islamic political discourse blames Muslims as a group for the marginalization they feel, even while the discriminatory policies and practices that exclude them from the mainstream are reinforced (HRF, Human Rights First, 2007: 2). Furthermore, critics of the failure of at least some parts of Muslim population in Europe to fully integrate often become advocates of measures that would further isolate and stigmatize these minorities.

The debate is not only restricted to the critique of multiculturalism. Difference-blind republicanism, which is the other model of managing ethno-cultural and religious diversity, has also failed. The republican French experience is going through a tremendous failure in the last decade. Although France set out to create politically equal citizens with no regard to religion, language, race, ethnicity and gender, it no longer recognises the politics of recognition generated especially by migrants of Muslim background, ignores the cultural, religious and ethnic differences emphasised by minorities, and adopts an assimilation policy,
all of which serve to show that the Republican project and its values are under threat. These demands, voiced by migrants and minorities and left unsolved by the Republic, clearly show that the Republic at hand needs to be democratised. In other words, the real republicanism needs to be reformed along the egalitarian claims of migrant origin people who are affiliated with a true republican rhetoric underlining equality, justice and rights in all spheres of life including politics, education, labour market and culture (Kaya, 2009). Not only does it fail to provide migrants and their children with equal access opportunity to political space and labour market, but France can also not provide them with a venue where they can convert their cultural capital to economic capital upon graduation. As such, it can be said that France, much like many other western nations, discriminates against Muslim origin migrants and their descendants at work. As Michèle Tribalat (2003) put it very eloquently, what is the point in working hard for success at school if you are going to be discriminated against?37 She reports that the presence of discrimination raises the problem of coherence between republican principles and the reality of French society. One should remember that unemployment rate among the university graduates of French ethnic origin is 5 percent, and 27 percent among the North African origin university graduates.38 This ratio is much higher than it is in Germany (4 percent and 12 percent), Belgium (5 percent and 15 percent), and the Netherlands (3 percent and 12 percent) (Crul and Vermeulen, 2003).

**Conclusion**

Migration has recently been framed as a source of fear and instability for the nation-states in the West. Yet not so long ago it was rather a source of contentment and happiness. Several different reasons like de-industrialization, economic crisis, changing technology, unemployment, poverty, neo-liberal political economy, Islamophobia and cultural racism can be mentioned to explicate the reasons of such a discontent. Furthermore, one should also not underestimate the enormous

37 The data collected by the work of Kaya and Kentel (2005) affirm Tribalat’s findings concerning the discrimination faced by immigrant populations and those of foreign origin. French-Turks, when asked, address mostly the problem of discrimination in France (17 percent).

38 In order to cope with institutional racism in the labour market as well as in other spheres of life, migrant origin people tend to give traditional French first names to newborn children. Gérard Noiriel (1988: 233) indicates that this practice is rather an old practice among migrants: in a Polish community in northern France, 44 percent in 1935, 73 percent in 1945, 82 percent in 1955, and 98 percent in 1960.
demographic change caused by the dissolution of the Eastern Block either. The period starting in 1989 signifies the beginning of a new historical epoch that ushered in the massive migration flows of ethnic Germans, ethnic Hungarians, ethnic Russians and Russian Jews from one place to another. The mobilization of millions of people has stimulated the nation-states to change their migration policies in a way that encouraged the arrival of immigrants from similar ethnic backgrounds. This period of demographic change in Western Europe went in tandem with the rise of discourses like the ‘clash of civilizations’, ‘culture wars’ and Islamophobia that presented societal heterogeneity in an unfavourable light. The intensification of Islamophobia made easier by al Qaeda type violence and the radicalization of some segments of Muslim origin immigrant communities in several countries reinforced the societal unrest resulting from immigration. The result was the introduction of restrictive migration policies and increased territorial border security vis-à-vis the nationals of third countries who originated from outside the European continent.

Globalism has not only equipped migrants and minorities with certain reflexivities to come to terms with the detrimental effects of the processes of globalisation, it has also produced its own neo-liberal form of governmentality, which has transformed the modern state from investing in the idea of *welfarism* to investing in the idea of *prudentialism*. The idea of *prudentialism* requires social policy to be gradually based upon the notion of stakeholdership, and promotes the idea that individuals should be responsibilized and empowered by social policy to become a part of the club of stakeholders. Prudentialism is all about social Darwinism, which undermines the incapacity of subaltern individuals such as immigrants, who are not able to look after their certain needs due to the structural constraints creating an unequal stance for them in the spheres of education, labour market and politics. Immigrant origin individuals, mainly Muslims, respond accordingly to the demise of the *welfare state* policies, and thus to the rise of the *workfare state*. Such *workers without work* who have been structurally deprived of education, qualification and compassion have been the first losers of the processes of globalization. Unemployment, poverty, exclusion, institutional discrimination and Islamophobia have become the main reasons for the Muslim origin immigrants and their descendants to question the political and legal structure of their countries of settlement in a way that has made them hesitate to integrate into their countries of settlement. Instead they have tended to find a refuge in the comfort of certain communities of sentiments such as religious, ethnic, cultural and fellowship communities. Such
communities of sentiments provide immigrants and their children with a safe haven protecting them against uncertainty, insecurity, ambiguity, poverty, unemployment and exclusion. Hence, religiosity seems to be one of the most versatile tactics to come to terms with the existing structural problems rather than being an essentialist state of mind.

The supremacy of cultural-religious discourse in the West is likely to frame many of the social, political and economic conflicts within the range of religious differences. Many of the ills of migrants and their descendants such as poverty, exclusion, unemployment, illiteracy, lack of political participation and lack of will to integration are reduced to their Islamic background, which is stereotypically believed to be in clash with western secular norms and values. Culturalization of political, social and economic conflicts has become a popular sport in a way that reduces all sorts of structural problems to cultural and religious factors. The question is then to generate a post-culturalist, post-religious and post-civilizational approach to understand the main sources of existing conflicts in the European countries. How are we going to generate such an approach? Majority nations could start refraining themselves from contributing to the essentialization of ethno-cultural and religious borders, while the members of immigrant origin communities could try to attain the citizenship of their countries of settlement, which may serve them as a protective shield against the destabilizing forces of globalization.

Eventually, most of the public surveys conducted in the West do not see Islam itself as the basic stumbling block. They tend instead to blame extremists and some politicians who deploy religion in support of narrow agendas. Majorities appear to believe that relations with the Muslim origin minorities as well as with the Muslim origin nations can improve over time. Pessimism about dialogue in the present and the immediate future may prove compatible with cautious optimism over the long term. One should not underestimate the fact that European Muslims have become even more politically mobile after the rise of Islamophobic tendencies in the aftermath of 9/11. The growing interest and success of Muslim-origin candidates in local, general and European elections indicates that the time of crisis characterized by Islamophobia brings about its own window opportunities for the European public in general. All in all, latest incidence in Norway demonstrates that Islamophobia as a form of governmentality is not sustainable anymore. And let us not forget that the failures of one form of governmentality result in opportunities for the formulation of another.
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