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EUROPEAN FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE IN TURKEY: A VERY SMALL WORLD

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PREFACE

This working paper derives from the findings of a Marie Curie research conducted by Dr. Claire Visier, who spent two years at the European Institute of Istanbul Bilgi University. Dr. Visier's projects, with the acronym of EUTUR, scrutinized the ways in which the European-funded projects in Turkey were designed and implemented. The Working Paper is composed of three parts. In the first part, Dr. Visier talks about her theoretical and methodological concerns. In the second and third parts, she concentrate on the results. Through the work, Dr. Visier successfully reveals strengths and weaknesses of the EU-funded projects with regard to their impact on the enlargement process. She finds out that financial assistance functions rather well in Turkey despite the slowing down of the negotiations. However, it turns out that there is a limited impact of the projects on the social actors.

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EUROPEAN FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE IN TURKEY: A VERY SMALL WORLD

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This research has been completed thanks to a European Grant (Marie Curie Fellowship), which gave me the opportunity to spend two years in Turkey, hosted by the Istanbul Bilgi University's European Institute. My project, EUTUR, was about European-funded projects in Turkey, from design to implementation. This working paper is about some of the main results of the research. In the first part I give some information concerning my theoretical framework and the methodology of my work. Then, the second and third parts concentrate on the results. First, I try to assess the role played by the EU Financial Assistance within the EU-Turkey enlargement framework. Then, I try to assess how financial assistance interferes with Turkish governance.

State of the Art & Theoretical Framework

From a critical review of the literature about enlargement policy, Europeanisation and international transfer, I have tried to develop another perspective in order to work on the EU enlargement policy towards Turkey. Concerning the enlargement and the pre-accession policy,¹ scholars have first analyzed it as an external policy of a specific power, the EU. Focusing on the role played by the states, and on the conditionality, they analyzed the effects of what they consider to be a coercive process on the transformation of the country (Sedelmeir and Schemmelfennig, 2005). The external incentive model has been a key model to understand the enlargement process through the framework of negotiation with the Eastern and Central European Countries. But with the slowing down of negotiations in the case of Turkey, recent studies have highlighted that negotiation and conditionality are not sufficient to grasp the entire picture of the current pre-accession process (Börzel & Soyaltin, 2012). Focusing on the external transformative power of the EU, and entrapped in the narrative of conditionality, the model fails to take into account the logic and structure of the pre-accession policy.

I propose looking through another reality of the pre-accession policy: the pre-accession financial assistance. Financial assistance is understudied compared to negotiation framework and Turkish sectorial reforms in EU-related issues. There is research about specific projects or specific issues (Zihnioglu, 2013; Ketola, 2013; Bahçecik, 2014; Visier, 2015), but nothing about any of the financial assistance system and its mechanism of governance. I also propose to “normalize” the study of the EU external policy and to look at the pre-accession policy as public policy.

1 For a short critical review of the literature, see Visier, 2015.

Since the 1990s, scholars have normalized the studies of the EU public policy² showing the result of a co-construction that involved multiple interactions of various actors (Hassenteufel & Surel, 2000). Focusing on the European field and looking at the different actors at stake in the policy and the uses (Jacquot & Woll, 2010) they make of the policy, I highlight the transformation of the pre-accession policy and the role played by the financial assistance within the policy.

With the deceleration of the negotiation process in Turkey, the question of the transformative power of the EU has declined in the literature, and the studies started to focus more on the domestic process of Europeanization. The emphasis on the role played by internal actors has led to a renewal of the studies about pre-accession (among others Avci, & Carkoglu, 2013). But the expanding concept of “Europeanization” (Radaelli, 2004) has not really been redefined. Beyond the tension between “Europeanization” (as a socio-political and normative model) and “EU-ization” (as a formal alignment in the EU *acquis* and structure) (Diez, Agnantopoulos & Kaliber, 2005) analyses are largely related to a pre-existing normative model of paradigms, rules and procedures. The very rich approach of International policy transfer studies (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000), which do not only focus on the European variable, have allowed a theoretical renewal (Saurugger & Dumoulin, 2010). However I consider the approach to be at risk of a top-down approach and a reification of the “models” which are transferred (Delpeuch, 2013). My aim is first to go beyond the vision of transfer as a one-dimensional and linear process, with a starting point (transmitter) and an ending point (receiver). I propose the transfer be looked at through a perspective of international circulation. The Connected History approach (Werner & Zimmermann, 2006; Bertrand, 2011) and the sociology of translation (Akrich, Callon & Latour, 2006) are very helpful to switch from a transfer perspective to one about circulation. I would also like to place some distance from the idea of a “model” which is considered to be built and consolidated prior to transfer. The impact of the transfer is then analyzed in terms of a slight distortion from the model. I suggest considering the process of transfer itself as a part of the model. Far from the narrative of the policies, there is a need to look at the transfers not through a perspective of what there should be (narratives’ objectives), but rather what sort of social practices they produce and how they are produced by social practice (sociological approach).

I propose looking at the pre-accession assistance through a perspective of public policy instruments (Salamon, 2002). Policy tools are the techniques that are used to implement a public policy, the «engine room». In the financial assistance, the techniques used to implement the financial assistance are part of the “model” the European Union wants to transfer (governance by project; conferral management of the EU funds). However, I have shown, in previous research on projects about Civil Society, the important impact of the policy tools themselves on the content of the project and on the model (Visier, 2015). Indeed, “Public action instruments are not inert things that are simply available for socio-political usage. They come with their own specific power of action. When being used, they tend to produce original and sometimes unexpected effects” (Lascoumes, Le Galès, 2004, 13).

Fieldwork

EU Financial assistance to candidate countries is provided through various tools, such as participation of candidate countries in EU programs and Agencies, direct support (projects are direct-

² Comparativists argued that the characteristics of European policymaking are more effectively studied by comparing it to other political systems rather than treating it as a unique case.

ly programmed and granted by the European Commission), coordination with international financial institutions (World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development), or a decentralized system.³ I have focused on this last system, which channels more than 80%⁴ of IPA funds. Two characteristics of this system were of primary interest for me: a) Financial assistance to candidate countries is a mirror of the EU's own financial instruments, and b) The financial assistance is part of the European "model".

- a) Financial assistance to candidate countries is a mirror of the EU's own financial instruments: The purpose of financial assistance to candidate countries, at least when it was set up, was to prepare candidate countries for the program and use the EU funds like member states do. Three out of five components of IPA reflects the three biggest European financial funds (European Regional Development Funds, European Social Funds, and Common Agriculture Policy).⁵ The financial assistance is also a projection of the EU financial management. The decentralized system aims at providing a legal and administrative framework for the transfer of responsibilities for the implementation of the EU-funded programs from the European Commission to the candidate countries. It involves the transfer of project management responsibility (i.e. tendering, contracting and payment) to the authorities in the candidate countries under the supervision of the European Commission.
- b) The financial assistance is part of the European "model": Through the financial framework, IPA is a projection of the ideal of Governance by Project. The decentralized system aims at promoting the idea of governance: a process of interaction and decision-making among different actors involved in a collective problem. The programming process of IPA's decentralized system involves a process of to-ing and fro-ing between the European Commission and different Turkish ministries. Through *ex ante* controls, the European Delegation checks the compliance of the proposals and rules on their acceptability. This way of proceeding reveals the pervasiveness of the participatory and deliberative ideal of European governance. Institutional expertise is not accorded any form of monopoly, and instead requires to be open to the existing state of affairs of the candidate country in order to try to draw up a joint assessment and define concrete objectives as part of an interactive partnership approach, whilst at the same time affirming EU strong political will (adoption of the *acquis communautaire*). More than the content or output of the projects, I have focused on the programming process and then implementing process of this decentralized system.

Methodology

European Policy of Enlargement and Financial Assistance: In order to better understand the interrelation between European projects and enlargement policy, I have first compiled official documents (including European Commission's communications and conclusions of the European

3 The IPA's name of «Decentralised Implementation System», DIS, has been changed to IPA 2, but the logic remains the same.

4 I haven't found the exact percentage of funds channeled through the DIS system, and interviewees in the EU Delegation in Ankara have just given me approximate rates.

5 IPA consists of five components. Component 1: Transition Assistance and Institution Building; Component 2: Cross Border Co-operation; Component 3: Regional Development; Component 4: Human Resource Development; Component 5: Rural Development.

Council, since 1997) related to enlargement and enlargement methodology. The pre-assistance financial instrument functioning is very complex. To better understand how it works, I have compiled official documents (regulations, manuals of implementation, annual and multiannual reports) and external documents (evaluations, policy expertise) related to procedures of programming, management and monitoring of the projects.

Quantitative research: One aim of my project was to conduct a quantitative survey about EU funded projects in Turkey. The data bank includes all the programmed projects since 2002, and the contracts awarded (related to the implemented projects) since 2002. It focuses on the fields of the projects (and contracts), the stakeholders involved in the projects, the number and amount of contracts, the beneficiaries of the contracts, the contracting institutions, the implementing actors (awarded actors and short-listed actors when available), the date of programming and implementation of the project.

The data collection was much more complex and took longer than I had expected. It was first due to my lack of experience in quantitative research. I started too early to collect numerical data. But as my qualitative research was progressing, it turned out that the indicators that I had built in order to encode the data were not sufficient. I had to start again a new encoding.

The data collection was also delayed due to some specificity of the data. There is no traceability of the EU projects from their design and programming to their implementation. Identification numbers and titles changed during the process. At a first stage, it was not possible to make a link between the programmed projects since 2007 and the awarded contracts related to each specific project. So I decided to take all the contracts awarded since 2002 (3400 contracts) into account. There are different data banks about IPA contracts, (Europeaid, CFCU, and Turkish Accredited Ministries: Environment, Transport, Industry, Labour and Agriculture). Data banks do not contain exactly the same information (for example, Europeaid includes EC direct funding, but does not provide the name of the Turkish bodies that benefit from the contracts). In order to merge all the information included in both programming fiches and contracts, I had to find the link between contracts and projects one by one.

So the collection has been very long and complex, but quite heuristic. I have realized that even the European Commission does not have a systematic and general view about the financial assistance implementation process. Nor does the European Commission have a systematic and general view about the actors that are funded in order to implement the projects.

Qualitative research: The quantitative collection has been completed by a more qualitative one. This qualitative approach has been essential to understand, beyond the regulations, how the financial assistance is really implemented. It has also allowed me to target specific sectors. I conducted 65 semi-structured interviews with people involved in the structures that officially design the projects (European delegation, Turkish Ministry of European Affairs, sectorial Ministries, Turkish Ministry of Environment and Urbanisation, Turkish Ministry of Labour and Social Security, Turkish Ministry of Science, Industry and Technology), or those that play a nonofficial role in the programming process (like international Organizations, embassies of the EU members states, Turkish consulting companies). I have also met people involved in the management of projects: members of administrations or other organizations that benefit from projects and are responsible for their implementation (EU projects Unit in the Turkish Ministry of European Affairs, and the Turkish Ministry of Justice, local Governors, local Chamber of Industry, local Chamber of Commerce, local municipality, regional development agency, foundations, associations, universities, think tanks). Some experts from the EU member states who work within the Turkish administration (Civil Aviation, Public Health institution of Turkey, Ministry of Forest and Water, Turkish

Electricity Transmission Corporation) have also been interviewed. Independent experts and consultants who have been appointed in order to implement projects have also been met. I have also participated as an observer in two 2-day events towards civil society organizations, organized by one NGO (SGTM, *Sesli Festival*) and one EU-funded organization (*Sivil Düşün, Sivil Düşler*).

The interviewing process has not been very easy. Most of the time, I needed to be introduced to get new interviews. Furthermore, in a context of political turmoil it was not so easy to find people who agreed to be interviewed. But some interviewees agreed to meet me twice. This was a very good opportunity to go into deep detail of their practices. Some of the interviewees have worked in different positions within the EU financial assistance framework. It has allowed me to get some information about organizations which I otherwise had no opportunity to access (such as CFCU or big consultancy firms).

RESULT 1: EU FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE & ENLARGEMENT FRAMEWORK: A DISCONNECTION

My first objective is to assess the role played by the EU Financial Assistance within the EU-Turkey enlargement framework. In this part, I focus on the programming process and I show the disconnection between the Financial Assistance and Enlargement framework and the autonomy of Financial Assistance. Whereas in the early days of assistance to East European countries, allocation of the EU assistance funds was rather “demand-driven”, over time they have become more “accession driven” or “*acquis*-driven”. That means that funds can only be spent in areas which were previously defined by the EU as compliant with the EU accession strategy. This logic has been reinforced by the evolution of the entire enlargement policy since 2006, with the decrease of the European Commission’s power in favour of the EU Member states. Negotiations (with benchmarks as a new tool for opening chapters) have become the main frame of the process. In this new framework, the logic of the pre-accession policy is no longer to assist the country in its accession process but rather to evaluate it through its degree of compliance with the *acquis communautaire*. The role given to financial assistance has also evolved. It is no longer conceived as a positive reward of the conditionality but more as a tool that helps candidate countries to fulfill the pre-set criteria to go forward in the enlargement process. This change is reflected in IPA’s regulation. In 2006, the IPA I Regulation assessed, “*The Community shall assist the countries listed in Annexes I and II in their progressive alignment with the standards and policies of the European Union, including where appropriate the *acquis communautaire*, with a view to membership*”⁶. In 2014, the IPA II Regulation stated: “*The Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance for the period from 2014 to 2020 shall support the beneficiaries listed in Annex I in adopting and implementing the political, institutional, legal, administrative, social and economic reforms required by those beneficiaries in order to comply with the Union’s values and to progressively align to the Union’s rules, standards, policies and practices, with a view to Union membership.*”⁷ However, this evolution in the policy narratives has not really affected the reality in the field of financial assistance. There is no

6 Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Council Regulation (EC) No, 1085/2006 establishing an Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), COM/2012/0329 final - 2012/0159 (COD) .

7 Regulation (EU) No 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing an Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II).

link, either, between financial assistance and negotiation or between financial assistance and enlargement priorities.

No link between financial assistance and negotiations

Data analysis does not reveal any systematic correlation between the implementation of projects and opening of a chapter. Implementation of projects has not systematically paved the way to opening a chapter. On the contrary, opening a chapter has not triggered an increase of the programming projects under this chapter. Such an evolution could have attested to a willingness to carry out new projects in order to strengthen negotiations.

The contraction of chapters that remain openable has not been followed by a shift/reorientation of the programming. No project about competition policy (chapter 8) has been programmed since 2009; one concerning public procurement (Chapter 5) was scheduled in 2009 but was not especially designed for Turkey (multi-country program). No project linked to the pre-set benchmark on Labour and Social Policy (Chapter 19) was programmed until 2013.

On the other hand, vetoed chapters have not lead to the suspension of the financial assistance in the related fields. Ten out of the eighteen vetoed chapters were subject to programming after they had been vetoed (1,11,13,14,15,22,23,24,26,29). Judiciary and Fundamental Rights are ranked at the first position in the number of programmed projects related to Transition Assistance and Capacity Building (Component 1.) Components 3 and 5 of IPA include the fields related to the vetoed chapters of Transport, Regional Policy and Agriculture, but have not been impacted by the vetoes.

Data also reveal autonomy between EU member states' position toward Turkey's accession and their involvement in EU financial assistance. Table 1 shows that Germany, France and Austria, which are the more reluctant to Turkish accession, are largely involved in Twinning programs. Nonetheless, twinning is seen as a very intrusive instrument because it requires long periods of stay within the Turkish administration of EU member states' civil servants.

Table 1.
EU Member States Involved in Implemented Twinning, 2002-2014

	Leader Partner	Junior Partner	Total		Leader Partner	Junior Partner	Total
Germany	39	10	49	Finland	3	1	4
Netherlands	15	7	22	Lithuania	0	4	4
UK	14	7	21	Sweden	0	4	4
Italy	14	3	17	Slovakia	2	1	3
France	12	4	16	Poland	1	1	2
Spain	12	4	16	Romania	0	2	2
Austria	6	4	10	Bulgaria	0	1	1
Hungary	2	5	7	Estonia	0	1	1
Greece	1	5	6	Portugal	0	1	1
Denmark	4	0	4	TOTAL			125

The interviews have highlighted that bilateral political crises may affect financial assistance but with a short term effect: *“I arrived in 2007, during Sarkozy’s time. I was almost sent back to France after he put his veto! Turks (the deputy director) asked to stop the twinning. During the meetings I was asked why I was here, why this twinning had been given to France. Fortunately, we had been selected on technical criteria. It was the EU delegation who rescued me, confirming that I was European, not French”* (interview, RTA, Twinning). In 2012, France lost two twinning projects that were almost finalized with the Ministry of Justice because of the bill about penalization of denial of Armenian genocide. But one year later, France was contacted again by the same ministry.

Understanding the non-link between negotiations and financial assistance: a structural mismatch


The first explanation of this non-link is the structural mismatch between the two frameworks of negotiations and of financial assistance. Negotiations are held by the EU member states. Vetoes or opening of chapters are not necessarily linked to the degree of alignment in the field. Aside from the eight vetoed chapters related to the Cyprus issue (which can be considered as directly related to the *Acquis communautaire*), some vetoes are related to very specific and broad interpretation of the *Acquis* and some others are clearly not related to the *Acquis*. I was informed that very heated discussions took place within the EU Council of Ministers in 2009 concerning judiciary and fundamental rights in Turkey. Cyprus considered that respect of human rights in Turkey must not only be related to Turkish territory but also include North Cyprus. That is the reason why Cyprus blocked Chapter 23 about Justice. Cyprus also blocked Chapter 26, Education and Culture, considering its link to the non-recognition of Cyprus by Turkey, and the Turkish veto to Cyprus participation in the Education Policy Committee of the OECD. In 2007, France blocked five chapters related to full accession issues without any consideration of Turkish alignment in these fields. On the other hand, the opening of a chapter is not necessarily linked to a degree of compliance with the EU *Acquis*. For example, in 2009, the European Commission’s annual report on Turkey pointed out many deficiencies under the Environment chapter. The chapter was opened despite it. In charge of the EU presidency, Sweden wanted to push forward the enlargement with Turkey, and argue a very positive general atmosphere in Turkey towards enlargement and important internal reforms. More than the degree of compliance, the process of opening chapters is linked to windows of opportunity (a short time period during which an otherwise unattainable opportunity exists), which are very labile.

On the contrary, financial assistance is related to an administrative process that is all the longer and more rigid because it deals with financial issues and requires lots of control procedures. This is even further extended by the specificity of the decentralized system with non-member countries. The programming process of IPA’s decentralized system involves a process of to-ing and fro-ing between the European Commission and different Turkish ministries. The Turkish Ministry of EU affairs is responsible for general coordination of pre-accession assistance and also for the programming and monitoring of Components 1 and 2. The Ministries of Environment & Urbanisation, Transport, and Science, Industry & Technology are responsible for the three operational programs (Environment, Transport and Competitiveness) under Component 3, Regional Development. The Ministry of Labour & Social Security is in charge of the programming process of Component 4, Human Resources Development, and the Ministry of Food, Agriculture & Livestock of Component 5, Rural Development. These ministries are supposed to manage the programming process by informing and involving all the stakeholders in the process

of collecting ideas or projects. They must also ensure the coherence of the programming by checking compliance of proposal with framework documents, select and hierarchize ideas of projects proposed by other sectorial ministries and public bodies. Through *ex ante* controls, the European Delegation also checks the compliance of the proposals, rules on their acceptability and, when necessary, sends them back to the Turkish authorities for further development. This way of proceeding reveals the pervasiveness of the participatory and deliberative ideal of European governance. Institutional expertise is not accorded any form of monopoly, and instead is required to be open to the existing state of affairs of the candidate country in order to try to draw up a joint assessment and define concrete objectives as part of an interactive partnership approach, whilst at the same time affirming strong EU political will (adoption of the Community *acquis*). However, this frame involves many actors and controls. In theory, it lasts from one-and-a-half to three years from the first design to the implementation of a project. There are many examples of programmed projects that were already outdated when they were about to start. The administrative timing does not match with that of the negotiations.

Chart 1.
IPA Programming Process

Source: EUTUR



It is also important to notice that financial assistance is run by the European Commission, which does not necessarily have the same view about enlargement as the EU member states.

Understanding the non-link between negotiations and financial assistance: two different worlds

The second explanation of the non-link between financial assistance and negotiations is that the two frameworks are related to two very different worlds. As an example, within the Turkish Ministry of EU affairs, the directorate of financial cooperation is not located in the same building as the ones related to accession policy. At the working level, civil servants working for the financial cooperation do not have any idea of what is done in the other directorates: *“I prefer to be here, I don’t know what sort of job they are doing; they should not be busy”* (Ministry of EU affairs, DG financial cooperation, junior expert).

Within the sectorial ministries, interviewees never mentioned negotiations. When I asked them about that, they gave me a personal general comment but did not seem to have a specific professional interest in them. This finding was confirmed by people in charge of the institutional cooperation within the member states’ embassies. *“In the sectorial ministries, they don’t care about negotiations”*. (French Embassy, Institutional Cooperation Unit). The assessment was the same at the project’s implementation level. *«In my sector, [Turks] don’t think about the chapter issue because they have concrete objectives and concrete challenges”* (Technical Assistance Expert). *“At my working level, [Turks] don’t feel concerned by the Acquis, but there is a very big industrial challenge”* (RTA, Twinning project). Therefore, interviewees are not aware of the negotiation’s benchmarks: some of them do not even know the number of the chapter related to their field or whether it was open for negotiation. Experts from member countries told me that their Turkish colleagues only speak in an informal way (*“during coffee break”*) about enlargement, their disappointment or their discouragement. Apart from the conjectural times of crises, financial assistance is not subject to politicization, in a sense of re-characterization of social activities that put into question their differentiation (Lagroye, 2003). A local fieldwork in Konya in June 2015, just before general elections, has confirmed this. The actors I met from the Development Agency, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Chamber of Industry were very proud of Konya being high-ranked in awarded Grants. They never linked EU financial assistance to a discourse about the enlargement or even about the EU. They told me that their Presidents or Directors never argue about the content of European projects.

No real connection between IPA & enlargement priorities

Official evaluation of IPA has pointed out, as one of the main criticisms, that enlargement priorities do not get the highest percentage of EU financial assistance. Table 2, from the European Commission Annual Financial Report⁸, shows that for 2013, priorities related to enlargement only get 22.99% of the budgeted allocations per priority axis in Turkey.

8 European Commission, Background document Accompanying, 2013 Annual Report on Financial Assistance for Enlargement (IPA, PHARE, CARDS, Turkey Pre-Accession Instrument, Transition Facility) SWD(2014) 287 final, 30.9.2014, p. 109

Table 2.

Financial Budgeted Allocations Per Priority for Turkey. Year 2013 (%)

Source: 2014, EC Annual Financial Report

Priority axis	% of total IPA allocation
Justice & Home Affairs	7.40
Energy	4.17
Climate Change	2.15
Social Development	7.94
Agriculture & Rural development	1.33
TOTAL	22.99%

Even if it is not obvious what exactly the enlargement priorities are, one can consider that political criteria have been the top priority of Turkey's enlargement, especially Rule of Law (reform of judiciary, fight against corruption, fight against organized crime, and public administration reform) and Fundamental Rights. Table 3, about implemented contracts, also sheds light on the gap between the percentage of financial amount related to Rule of Law or Fundamental Rights and the one related to environmental issues for example.

Table 3.

Amount of Implemented Contracts (Service, Work, Grant, Twinning, Direct Grant) (%)

Source: EUTUR

	% of total amount of implemented contracts
Rule of law*	11.15%
Fundamental Rights	7.63%
Environment	34.58%

* A very large definition of Rule of law has been taken into account, including all the forms of public administration reforms.

**No connection between financial assistance and enlargement priorities:
the structural effect of the financial tool**

The lack of link between financial assistance and enlargement priorities can be explained by the structural effect of the financial policy tool. More than a neutral technical tool used to meet pre-accession goals (narrative), the financial tool has its own logic, which impacts the content of the assistance. As it is presented in Table 4, specific programs (environment, transport, competitiveness, and human resources) have been developed under the different components of IPA, and funds have been provided for these specific programs. By so doing, the financial assistance framework has also empowered some Turkish administrations that play a key role in the system.

Table 4.

IPA Allocated Budget

Source: EC Financial Report, 2013

	Allocated budget (2007-2013), M. euros	Programming Responsibility	Contracting Institutions
1. Transition Assistance and Institution Building 2. Cross-border cooperation	1.688 (35.52%)	Ministry of EU affairs	CFCU
3. Regional Development: Transport	585 (12%)	Ministry of Transport	Ministry of Transport Since 2012
3. Regional Development: Environment	682 (14%)	Ministry of Environment and Urbanization	Ministry of Environment Since 2012
3. Regional Development: Competitiveness	468 (9.85%)	Ministry of Science, Industry and Technology	Ministry of Science, Industry & Technology Since 2012
4. Human Resources Development	474 (9.97%)	Ministry of Labor & Social Security	Ministry of Labour and Social Security, since 2012
5. Rural Development	854 (17.97%)	Ministry of Agriculture	42 Local TKDK, since 2012

The five Turkish ministries that play a key role in the financial assistance framework are in the top ten list of IPA beneficiaries (with the Ministry of Environment in a very high position), as shown in Table 5.

Table 5.
Top List of Turkish IPA Beneficiaries (2002-2014)

source: EUTUR

Organisation Name	Amount of awarded contracts (out of total)	Number of awarded contracts (out of total)
Ministry of Environnement & Urbanisation	27.9%	20.1%
Ministry of Transport	21.9%	3.4%
Ministry of Interior	8.9%	11.3%
Ministry of Education	5.7%	3.7%
ISKUR	4.7%	1.8%
Ministry of Justice	3.2%	4.7%
Ministry of Food, Agriculture & Livestock	3.2%	10.3%
Ministry of Labour & Social Security	2.9%	3.4%
Ministry of EU Affairs	2.3%	6.9%
Ministry of Science, Industry & Technology	2.0%	3.2%
	86.5%	68.8%

These five ministries are more aware of EU assistance. They have developed more capacities. They are also under the pressure of the programming. Regardless of the link of their field with priorities axis, these administrations attract more EU funds. In a nutshell, the structure of the financial tool has largely impacted the flow of the assistance.

No connection between financial assistance and enlargement priorities:

The contradiction between various logics

The strategic approach of enlargement in favor of the definition of a few enlargement priorities is based on a top-down logic. Priorities axes are designed at the top of the enlargement framework and should be then reflected in financial assistance programming. This process has been even more centralized since the transformation of the enlargement policy: priorities axes have been decreased in order to ensure a better and easier measure of compliance. Partnership for Accession (designed by the European Commission) and National Plan for Accession (designed by the authorities of Candidate countries) have been put aside due to their large scale⁹. Preference has been given to benchmarks (designed by European Commission and/or Council of Ministers and/or European Council) or very limited enlargement priorities. With the slowing down of negotiations, the top-down logic is much more difficult to carry out. Turkish public administration is more reluctant to put sensitive issues on the agenda and there is no more impetus to do so.

⁹ The too numerous priorities have been criticized by the European Auditor Court, *The European Commission's management of pre-accession assistance to Turkey*, Special Report No 16/2009

The Ministry of Interior, which is linked to enlargement priorities, is well ranked in the list of beneficiaries (table 5). But one must note that the Department of Associations has not benefited from (and has not asked for) a project about Civil Society (which is considered to be an enlargement priority), whereas two-thirds of the contracts are related to border management and migration issues. This observation leads to a question: what exactly are the enlargement priorities? If some of them are recurrent (political criteria, such as rule of law or fundamental freedoms), the others vary from one document to another and from one year to another. This vagueness allows the permanence of contradictory goals of narratives on one hand and policy tool on the other. Thus, financial planning documents list operational programs (like environment or transport) as enlargement priorities to be financed. This means that financial planning documents do not reflect priorities that have been designed in another framework; they do not precede or direct financial assistance. On the contrary, they legitimize and secure practices and organizational routines of the policy tool itself (Mosse, 2005). The blur concerning the definition of enlargement priorities also benefits the European side. For example border management has become a very important field of financial assistance.

The top-down logic is in total contradiction with the ideal model of “governance by project”, which is based on its appropriateness. The model assumes that a “beneficiary” is keener to implement a project when s/he comes up with the idea of the project. It is a bottom-up logic: of course the idea of the project must be linked to the Acquis, but it is not necessarily related to “enlargement priorities”. Notwithstanding the slowing down of negotiations and the removal of EU issues from the top of the political agenda, my fieldwork has confirmed the decisive importance of appropriateness. Whatever their political orientations or their opinion about the enlargement, when they find EU-funded projects interesting or useful, people have used it as real tool in order to make things change in their field. On the other hand, when a project is seen as extraneous, or when it is not directly related to the working level’s stakes, it is more likely to be neglected. People working with Turkish beneficiaries have also insisted on the positive effect of the recurrence of projects. From one project to another, design and content of the project is improved and beneficiaries sometimes accept touching upon more sensitive issues.

The reform of IPA and the implementation of IPA 2 will not resolve these various contradictions. “*The most important novelty of IPA 2 is its strategic focus*” (European Neighborhood policy & enlargement negotiations DG, Web site). In doing so, the aim is to escape from the former logic of preparing candidate countries to use EU structural funds, and to focus on the linkage between financial assistance and progress towards enlargement. To do so components have been replaced by pre-defined sectors, which “*cover areas closely linked to the enlargement strategy*”. The top-down process of setting enlargement priorities first, and then converting them into projects has been reinforced, but without clarifying the various contradictions I have pointed out. And the structures of the old financial framework (such as Turkish sectorial key institutions and specific operational programs) have not been removed.

No connection between financial assistance and enlargement priorities:

The weakness of the administration devoted to EU affairs

The weakness of the Turkish administration devoted to EU affairs reinforced the non-connection between financial assistance and enlargement frameworks. Despite the deceleration of negotiations, EU issues were still on the political agenda until 2011. This is attested by the reinforcement of the Turkish administration devoted to EU affairs. Many young experts were recruited in 2010 in order to strengthen EU administration within sectorial ministries; the General Secretariat of

EU affairs became in 2011 a full Ministry. In spite of this reinforcement, the administration devoted to EU affairs remains not very powerful.

Within the ministries, EU units are mainly composed of young civil servants with a high turnover (Sevim, 2013). This sociological composition indicates that the units are not highly ranked in the administrative hierarchy. Furthermore, it is not so easy for these people to promote the EU financial assistance and to push for specific projects. Because they do not have enough links with their counterparts in the different departments of the Ministries, they sometimes do not even have a very vague idea of projects. They are not the actual source of the proposals. When an idea for a project emerges, their work is more to make it match the EU requirements. However, this weakness could also have some positive effects. All the chiefs of unit I have met stressed the importance of working with young people in order to train them more easily for “European ways of doing”, which they consider to be “different”. Thus, high turnover of civil servants could generate a spreading of new ways of doing within the Turkish administration.

Legally speaking, the Ministry of EU Affairs has also been empowered. The former Secretariat General of EU affairs, which was under the authority of the Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, became a full ministry in 2011. But this autonomy does not mean the power of influence. The new ministry, responsible for the all financial assistance processes, remains weak compared to other sectorial ministries, in particular the ones of sovereignty (such as Ministry of Interior or Ministry of Justice). It does not have a strong resource to impose specific priorities or even to enhance the coherence of the financial assistance programming, for example. It is just a “letter box” an interviewee told me, meaning that the ministry does not have any capacity to select and prioritize projects. Of course, the slowdown of the whole process at the political level has reinforced its weakness. Its specific administrative identity (both in terms of sociology and ideology of the civil servants), might also have contributed to this weakness.

On the contrary, the weakness of Turkish EU administration reinforces the power of the EU delegation. It plays a key role not only in promoting the EU financial assistance but also in finalizing annual programs, putting aside non-compliant projects, but above all, trying to provide coherence within the enlargement frame.


FINDINGS

From a quantitative point of view, the Financial assistance is going well. The budget devoted to Turkey is still high for the second period of IPA (Table 6). Beyond the budget, the number of calls for proposal/tenders opened since 2002 (Chart 7) highlights an activity that was not really affected by the slowing down of the negotiations.

Table 6.
Budget of the Financial Assistance in Million Euros
Source, EC website

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total 2007- 2013	IPA for Turkey (% out of total candidate countries allocation)
IPA I	497.2	538.7	566.4	653.7	779.9	856.3	903.0	4795.2	48.2%
	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018- 2020			Total 2014- 2020	IPA for Turkey (%out of total candidate countries allocation)
IPA II Indicative Allocation	620.4	626.4	630.8	636.4	1.940			4453.9	53.29%

Chart 2.
Number of Calls for Proposal / Tenders Opened by Year
Source EUTUR



The small decrease between 2012 and 2013 is not due to the political enlargement issue but to the setting up of new Turkish accredited institutions. Table 8 also shows that Turkish absorption rates are good compared to those of other candidate countries (or even member state countries).

Table 7.
2013 Absorption Rate of 2007-2013 IPA Funds (%)

	Turkey	Average of all candidate countries
C1	57.09	53.06
C2	45	29.26
C3	36	
C4	33.1	35.12
C5	19	18

The financial tool has been well integrated, and institutions are now getting ready for the next stage of decentralisation, which will be the end of *ex-ante* control. In that sense, and if one considers the financial assistance as a tool to prepare the candidate country to act as one of the EU member state countries, there is a real process of Europeanization that is still going on. The autonomy of the financial assistance from the enlargement issue might be a reason for its success. One could be afflicted by this reality, considering the fact that the non-politicization of the financial assistance blurred the normative impact of the EU. But one must keep in mind that EU is not only norms, but also procedures.

RESULT II: FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AND TURKISH GOVERNANCE


In this part, I will focus on EU financial assistance's impact on Turkish governance. **I will try to assess how financial assistance interferes with Turkish governance.** To do so, I will focus neither on the content of the projects (or their objectives) nor on groups targeted by the projects. I will highlight who the actors involved as beneficiaries or as implementing organisations are and how they interfere with each other.

The decentralized system aims at providing a legal and administrative framework for the transfer of responsibilities for the implementation of the EU-funded programs from the European Commission to the candidate countries. It involves the transfer of project management responsibility (i.e. tendering, contracting and payment) to the authorities in the candidate countries under the supervision of the European Commission.

In order to do that, and because the Turkish legislation doesn't comply with the EU norms (concerning public procurement, for example), special institutions have been set up. A Central Finance and Contracts Unit (CFCU) has been established to handle tendering, contracting and payments on behalf of Ministries and agencies; it is also responsible for financial monitoring of the implementing projects. The Ministry of Environment & Urbanisation, Ministry of Transport, and Ministry of Science, Industry & Technology have been accredited in 2012 to handle tendering, contracting and payment for projects related to Components 3 and 4. Local administrations of Ministry of Food, Agriculture & Livestock were also accredited in 2013 for the management of Component 5.

Beside these institutions, the “Beneficiaries” of the projects and the implementing actors also played a key role in financial assistance. “Beneficiaries”, as they are called in IPA regulation, do not refer to persons or groups targeted by the project but to the public bodies that are responsible for the implementation of a project. As such, they are supposed to play a key role in the design of the project. They also play a role in the selection of the actors who will implement the projects. Most of the times, implementing actors are selected through a process of tendering/call of proposal, but they can also be directly chosen (Direct Grant) where it can be proved that they are the only organizations capable of carrying the projects out (for example, International Organizations or Euro-groups). Implementing actors also play a key role as intermediaries between beneficiaries and targeted people. They are also the ones who embed projects through their implementation.

Chart 3.
Number of Calls for Proposal / Tenders Opened by Year
Source EUTUR



Beneficiaries of Projects: reinforcement of the Turkish centralisation

Table 8.
Beneficiaries of Contracts 2002-2014 (Service, Work, Grant, Direct Grant, Twinning*)
Types of Organisations
Source EUTUR

	Ministries or State Secretaries	Governmental Boards, Agencies, Companies	Other State Bodies	Local Governments	Non-State Organisations
10 & more contracts	12	0	0	0	0
Between 5 & 9 contracts	3	4	0	0	0
Between 2 & 4 contracts	6	5	7	7	3
1 contract	3	12	3	0	10
TOTAL 78	24	21	10	10	13

* Supply contracts are not included in the analysis, because it has not been possible to find out all the names of the beneficiaries of the Supply contracts. As supply contracts often go with other types of contracts, I consider that this lack of data does not impact the overall picture.

Table 9 sheds light on the overrepresentation of central administration as beneficiary bodies, both in terms of the number of organisations that have benefited from contracts and in terms of the number of contracts they get. Moving away from the ministries, the curve goes down. Table 8, which is about the top ten list of beneficiary organisations, shows that ISKUR (Turkish Labour Agency) is the only non-central administration in the list.

It is interesting to detail the list of the non-state organisations that have benefited from a contract. Five out of the 13 beneficiaries are TOBB (Unions of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey) and local branches of TOBB (plus one cooperative), five are professional organisations (three confederations of trade unions, TESK –Confederation of Turkish Tradesmen and Craftmen- and ITKIB -İstanbul *Textile* and Apparel Exporters' Associations-). The last two (TACSO, SGTm) are what I could call European GONGOs: they are ad-hoc organisations, which have been created in order to assist the European delegation in the civil society field, and which are totally dependent on the European financial support. Apart from SGTm (which then turned into a Turkish NGO), there is no other Turkish civil society organisation that is a beneficiary (but five others have been indirect beneficiaries through a Direct Grant and have played a key role in the definition of the project that they have implemented).

Centralisation is, of course, a characteristic of the Turkish Governance. In this case, however, the Turkish specificity is reinforced by the financial assistance tool. Table 8 shows that key actors of financial assistance are all ranked in the top ten list of beneficiaries. Those ministries have developed specific capacities. Other organisations do not have strong and sufficient capacities. After all, benefiting from a contract does not provide any additional support. Interviews re-


veal that being responsible for a project is very difficult for civil society organisations; they seem to be very reluctant to do so. Key institutions of the financial framework are more aware of the EU assistance. They are also under the pressure of the programming process. There is a monopolisation of the «governance by project» by the Turkish central administration and the key actors of the financial framework. This challenges the idea of “appropriateness”: projects are not necessarily designed and implemented at the more appropriate level (the Civil Society issue is a very good example of this discrepancy).

The implementing actors: slightly rooted in the Turkish society

There are different types of contracts, and thus different types of actors involved in the implementation of projects. Works (building physical infrastructure) and Supply (delivering physical goods) are contracted with private companies. Services (performing a specific task requiring human capital, such as study or technical assistance) or Grants (giving money to a person or organisation for a particular purpose) can be contracted with private, public or third sector organisations.

I will not focus on Twinning and Direct Grant contracts, because they are not awarded through tender/call of proposals. Therefore, they involve specific types of actors (civil servants from EU member states for Twinning and, most of the time, International or Regional Organisations for Direct Grants). Chart 1 shows that the number of actors involved in different types of contracts are not proportional to the distribution of the financial amount.

Chart 4.
IPA Distribution by Type of Contracts (2002-2014)
Source EUTUR



The picture displays a strong contrast concerning the effects of financial assistance. On one hand, for Grant, Work and Supply contracts, the EU financial assistance includes a wide range of Turkish actors. But because of their low exposure to IPA governance, the process of social learning is marginal. On the other hand, for Service contracts, the EU financial assistance has triggered a rise of an enlargement-oriented sector. This sector is mainly composed of consulting firms and it involves few Turkish actors. Even though they are few and less rooted in Turkish Society, these actors play a key role in the governance of financial assistance.

Grant, Work and Supply contracts: a wide range of Turkish actors but with a low exposure to European governance


A considerable number of organisations have been awarded Grant contracts, including a very high number of Turkish actors (2555 organisations). Even if the actors that have been awarded Supply and Work contracts are much less numerous (257 and 79 respectively), the percentage of the Turkish actors is also high.

Chart 5.


Nationality of Awarded Organisations (%)

Source EUTUR

WORK CONTRACT




SUPPLY CONTRACT



Map 1 highlights a good coverage of Turkey in terms of territorial implantation of actors who have obtained Grant contracts.


Source EUTUR



NB: Data concerning grants give the territorial location of the projects and not the territorial location of the granted actors that have implemented the projects. But as the grants are generally given to actors that act locally, the data I obtain can be considered to be reflective of the territorial location of the actors.

Chart 6 shows the large diversity of organisations that have been awarded Grant contracts.


Chart 6.



Most of the grant-receiving organisations are both private and public, and represent the economy oriented sector as well as the third sector or local governments. It is also important to note that since 2002, evolution in the diversity of the actors and type of actors cannot be noticed.

Map 2 is a breakdown of the numbers of contracts by the territorial location of the companies that have earned supply. There is also a good territorial implantation of the companies that have obtained Supply contracts.

Map 2.
Supply: Territorial Location of Turkish Awarded Companies (in Number of Contracts)
Source EUTUR




Map 3.
Work: Territorial Location of Turkish Awarded Companies (in Number of Contracts)
 Source EUTUR



However, further research reveals that the awarded construction companies are not the most well known ones (neither the well-established older ones nor the newcomers that are close to the AKP). Nevertheless, the diversity of the awarded organisations (Grant, Work and Supply) goes together with a low exposure to IPA governance. Chart 3 shows that a very high percentage of organisations (even higher for Grants) have only received one contract.

Chart 7.
Rate of Contract Earned by Organisation (%)
 Source EUTUR



This means that the experience of the “EU ways of doing” has remained low. Research has shown that repetition of experience and long-term exposure is fundamental for social learning (Checkel, 2001). But, in this case, the experience of EU-funded projects remains superficial. There is no exception to this limited exposure. The chart shows that the number of organisations that had more than five contracts is very low. Further analysis reveals that these very few organisations do not concentrate a high percentage of contracts (both in terms of number of contracts and in terms of financial amount). There is no phenomenon of monopolisation (or even of concentration) of projects by a few organisations.

Service contracts: poorly rooted organisation


The picture is quite different in the case of the 365 organisations that have obtained Service Contracts. The percentage of Turkish organisations that are part of the awarded consortiums is significantly lower than those in other types of contracts. When it comes to the leader of consortiums, the percentage is even lower. It is also important to notice that this total also involves some subsidiaries of global companies.

Chart 8.


Service Contracts: Nationality of Awarded Organisation

Source EUTUR

SERVICE CONTRACTS



SERVICE CONTRACT LEADER



Map 4 shows a complete territorial concentration of the organisations that have obtained contracts.

Map 4.

Service Contract: Territorial Localisation of Turkish Awarded Organisations (in Number of Contracts)

Source EUTUR



Regarding the types of organisations that have been awarded Service contracts, Table 11 reveals an overrepresentation of consulting firms.

Table 11.

Service: Turkish Organisations Awarded
(2002-2014)

Source EUTUR


	Team + Leader	Leader
Consulting firm	95	12
Sectorial firm	3	3
Governmental organisation	1	1
Other	2 Foundations 4 Associations 3 Universities 1 Professional Chamber	1 Association 1 University
Total	109	18

Most of these consulting firms were established before the 2000s, but it is clear that some of them have focused on European financial assistance since they were established. The small number of non-private firms can easily be explained by the structure of the instrument. The number of service contracts and the references needed in order to be funded through this instrument (such as previous management of projects with significant budgets) make it very difficult for non-private companies to obtain it.

The rise of a consultancy field devoted to EU affairs is not specific to Turkey or to candidate countries. Many studies have described the same phenomena within the European Union system (Robert, 2010). So, it is also possible in this case to speak about a process of Europeanization. But this process does not mean the involvement of a wide range of Turkish actors in the EU governance. Nor does it mean that, through this involvement, a potential redefinition of ways of doing, interests and identities that could bring a deep social change in Turkey (Risse, Börzel, 2000) is taking place. The Europeanization process is more related to the emerging EU-oriented, narrow, specific, professional field of expertise, which is rather isolated from the Turkish society.

Like the case of Grants, Supply and Work contracts mentioned above, Chart 5 highlights a high percentage of organisations that have only obtained one contract. But this percentage is smaller than those of the other contracts. The companies that are awarded the most contracts primarily include the global consultancy firms that have opened a subsidiary in Turkey.

Chart 9.
Rate of Service Contracts Earned by Organisations
Source EUTUR



Further analysis reveals a difference from the other types of contract. The small numbers of organisations that have obtained more than five contracts make up a large proportion (30.4%) of the overall service contracts market. This phenomenon of concentration is even higher for some components of IPA, since sectorial ministries have been accredited for the management (tendering, contracting and payment) of the projects. This is particularly the case for the Ministry of Environment & Urbanisation and the Ministry of Industry. Within the newly accred-

ited sectorial ministries, interviews have highlighted a lack of autonomy of the units in charge of the management of contracts (they are not even structured as independent DGs). These administrations might be much more open to external pressures than the CFCU.

Even if Service contracts are less numerous than Grant and Supply contracts, even if the number of awarded organisations is also lower, the power of consulting firms involved in several Service contracts is quite important. Like the international organisations, the EU member state administrations and a few Turkish civil society organisations, the consulting firms have the power to influence the design of the projects. The ministries are “opened” to external expertise in order to help them (and sometime to replace them) in designing the projects, because of their lack of capacities. Unlike the member state administrations, international organisations or civil society organisations, the consulting firms are considered to be more neutral (or less intrusive). A second source of power is their multi-positionality. They do not only implement projects. Like other types of organisations which provide expertise, they play a key role in the regulating activities of the European Union (Majone, 1996). For example, some of them provide the European Commission with evaluations about financial assistance policy or instruments. They also play a key role in the capacity building of Turkish administrations. Thanks to their multi-positionality, they know all aspects and all sides of the European financial assistance very well and can take advantage of it.

Conclusion

Financial assistance is functioning well in Turkey despite the slowing down of the negotiations. There has been a large diffusion of the financial assistance but it remains weak in terms of its impact on Turkish social actors involved in it. The financial assistance framework, above all, has empowered some specific Turkish central administrations and a few expertise bodies on the one hand, and the European delegation in Ankara on the other hand. This delegation is the second largest in the world (with a staff of 150 persons). Besides 20 expatriate staff, it includes highly specialized and competent local staff. Some of them have been working for the delegation for a long time. Some others come from or leave for other organisations and remain involved in the EU financial assistance or enlargement issues. These trajectories have designed the boundary of a small world. In addition, the European Delegation has daily intense interactions with Turkish national administrations, and also experts coming from private companies, international organisations and Turkish CSO. These trajectories and these interactions are reminiscent of the Brussels governance of “technocratic cronyism” (Majone 1996). However, in Turkey, this specific governance takes place in a political system which is not the one of the European Union...

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