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GERMANY'S TURKISH VOTERS – WHAT DO WE KNOW?

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Preface

The issues of Turkish origin voters in Germany and those entitled to vote in Turkish elections residing in Germany have been the cause for numerous anxieties in recent times. Most prominently, President Erdoğan's appeal to these voters not to vote for a number of parties in German elections due to their criticism of campaigning for Turkish elections in Germany and subsequent calls from within these parties to abolish double citizenship have provoked the image of a sizable fifth column within the German electorate, ready to act against national interests at the behest of a foreign head of state. However, the topic of Turkish-origin residents in Germany and their voting behavior has not been comprehensively studied to allow for such conclusions. Our author Thomas Krumm, political scientist at Turkish-German University, challenges this popular assumption. By tackling the statistics both of Turkish elections in Germany and Turkish voting behavior in German elections, he demonstrates that most likely, the German-Turkish population's political spectrum is split across nationality boundaries, with conservatism prevailing among Turkish passport holders and leftist sympathies dominant among those with German passports. This analysis thus deconstructs the myth of the fifth column.

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Turkish-origin voters in Germany have recently gained much attention both from Turkish as well as German politicians. In the run-up to the 2015 parliamentary elections in Turkey and even more to the April 2017 constitutional referendum, Turkish citizens residing in Germany (and beyond) were greatly courted by Turkish politicians. Especially Turkish government members were keen to campaign in western European countries with high shares of Turkish immigrants. The refusal of such appearances by local, regional and national authorities in Germany, Austria, Denmark, and the Netherlands contributed to the turmoil in international relations between Turkey and these countries in 2017. As a consequence, Turkish President Erdoğan urged Turkish-origin voters in Germany not to vote for the CDU, SPD or the Greens in the German federal elections of September 2017, which was criticized by former Foreign Minister Gabriel as an unacceptable interference. According to the president, the nearly one million Turkish-origin voters in the federal elections in Germany should teach those parties behaving disrespectful towards Turkey (“enemies of Turkey”) a necessary lesson at the ballot box.

Legally, there are separate electorates of Turkish migrants in Germany for German and for Turkish elections; the different electorates barely overlap. When Turkish migrants are nationalized by their destination countries, they usually have to give up their Turkish citizenship. The ‘*mavi kart*’ they receive instead is a work and residence permit for Turkey, but does not cover voting rights. Thus, the decision to opt for a different nationality is crucial also for separating Turkish-origin migrants into two different electorates – with some exceptions. The Turkish citizenship can be kept if applicants can prove to the Turkish authorities that there would be unreasonable disadvantages otherwise. In May 2011, about 0.5 million people had both Turkish and German citizenship, amounting to 17 percent of the three million Turkish migrants, including minors¹. Art. 12 of the German Federal Electoral Law raises some hurdles for

¹ Thomas Krumm (2016), Im Ausland wählen: Die türkischen Parlamentswahlen vom 7. Juni und 1. November 2015 in Deutschland im Vergleich, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 4/2016, pp. 753-770.

Germans abroad, probably further reducing the share of dual citizens effectively participating in elections at both ends. Since 2014, Turkish citizens abroad can cast their votes in Turkish diplomatic missions; they are then proportionally distributed onto the 85 domestic constituencies for the election of the Great National Assembly as kind of ‘top up’ votes. In a 2012 decision, the Turkish Constitutional Court had a crucial role in expanding external voting rights, calling for an amendment to the electoral law. This was realized by parliament in May 2014, shortly before the first direct presidential election in August.² In this election, turnout abroad was very low at around 8.4 %, which was also due to a cumbersome organization in which registered voters got allocated a place and date for voting.³ However, already in the parliamentary elections of 2015, the new regulation had multiplied the number of votes from abroad to 1,284,964 (44.4 % out of 2.9 million registered voters worldwide, in Germany 40.7 %) in November 2015 (www.ysk.gov.tr). Surprisingly, the party support among Turkish expatriates in Western Europe significantly deviates from the average domestic results. In the following sections, this more conservative voting pattern will be quantitatively explored for the 2015 parliamentary elections and the April 2017 constitutional referendum.⁴ The level of analysis will be the 13 diplomatic missions across Germany, in which Turkish voters could cast their votes.

Turkish Migration and Political Participation in Germany

Turkish migrating to (Western) Europe has a long history. For the referendum in April 2017, there were 1.43 m registered Turkish voters in Germany, and 1.41 m in June 2015, of which 34.16 % participated (40.77 % in November) (<https://sonuc.ysk.gov.tr/module/ssps.jsf>). Thus, Germany holds by far the largest foreign Turkish electorate. Historically, along with the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria, Germany is one of the labour recruitment states that concluded institutional arrangements for the recruitment of ‘guest workers’ in the 1960s, which in turn provided a basis for several phases (or ‘waves’) of Turkish migration to Western Europe. Although the institutionalised recruitment of Turkish workers ended with the 1973 oil

² Zeynep Şahin-Mencütek, and M. Murat Erdoğan (2015), The Implementation of Voting from Abroad: Evidence from the 2014 Turkish Presidential Election, in: *International Migration*. doi: 10.1111/imig.12229; Ersin Kalaycıoğlu (2015), Turkish Popular Presidential Elections: Deepening Legitimacy Issues and Looming Regime Change, in: *South European Society and Politics*, vol. 20, i. 2, pp. 157-179; as well as Nermin Abadan-Unat, et al. (2014), Voting behaviour of Euro-Turks and Turkey’s presidential elections of 2014. Istanbul: Boğaziçi University, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. http://www.fes-tuerkei.org/media/pdf/einzelpublikationen/Voting%20_final_english.pdf.

³ The voter registry was created based on voluntary registration of Turkish citizens in their respective consulate.

⁴ Already in the 2011 external voting at polling stations (customs offices) at border crossings and airports, the Conservative-Islamic AKP scored 61.7 %, followed by the Social Democrat-Kemalist CHP with 26.2 %. In 2007, the AKP got 56.7 % and the CHP 17.7 % of external votes in the polling stations at the borders, and in 2002, the AKP got 33 % and the CHP 23 % of border votes (www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/GenelSecimler.html).

price and economic crisis,⁵ there were further ‘waves of migration’, each with different motivations, socio-economic profiles and regions of origin and destination.

The first wave is described by Aksel⁶ as ‘national unmixing’, as a population exchange with neighbouring states and non-Muslim emigration until the 1960s. The second wave then includes labour migration to Europe and Australia until the mid-1970s followed by family reunification. The 1980s and 90s (3rd wave) are characterized by political migration (military coup in 1980 and escalating Kurdish conflict since 1984), a fourth wave includes labour migration within the MENA region from the 1980s to the mid-1990s and to the countries of the former Eastern bloc after the fall of the Iron Curtain.

A final phase since the 1990s has been characterized by a broad pattern of sporadic migration, including highly skilled workers and students to Europe, the US, Canada and Australia since the 1990s.⁷ The mass immigration to Germany took place especially in the second, but also the third wave, summarized as the migration of low-skilled workers from the rural, poor regions of central and eastern Anatolia followed by family reunification and since the 1980s political migration (especially Kurds).

Against the background of the strong AKP support from abroad, as outlined in Table 1, the governing party was also expected to perform well in 2015 in the Turkish diaspora. However, this tendency towards conservative voting behaviour stands in contrast to survey results among Turkish migrants in German federal elections, with a majority voting for centre-left parties.⁸

A recent report by the German Advisory Council on Integration and Migration (*Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration*) saw the SPD as by far the most popular party among Turkish immigrants (69.8 %, followed by B90 / Greens with 13.4 %, Left 9.6 % and CDU/CDU 6.1 %).⁹ Historically, the number of Turkish migrants entitled to vote in German elections was marginal until the

⁵ In 1961 Turkey had signed the first recruitment agreement with Germany, making the latter a ‘pioneer’. Similar agreements were concluded in 1964 with the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria, 1965 with France and 1967 with Sweden. In addition, social security agreements were concluded with the United Kingdom (1959), Switzerland (1969) and Denmark (1970), see *Ahmet Akgündüz* (2008), *Labour migration from Turkey to Western Europe, 1960-1974: A multidisciplinary analysis*, Burlington: Ashgate Publishing 2008.

⁶ *Damla Aksel* (2014), *Kins, Distant Workers, Diasporas: Constructing Turkey's Transnational Members Abroad*, in: *Turkish Studies*, vol 15, i. 2, pp. 195-219.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

⁸ *Şener Aktürk* (2010), *The Turkish Minority in German Politics: Trends, Diversification of Representation, and Policy Implications*, in: *Insight Turkey*, vol. 12, i. 1, pp. 65-80.

According to a representative survey of the AKP-friendly ‘Union of European Turkish Democrats’ (UETD), in the 2013 general election 64 percent of Turkish voters supported the SPD, the Greens and the Left each took twelve percent, and the Union parties only got seven percent, see <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/deutschtuermen-doppelte-staatsbuergerschaft-das-sind-die-fakten-a-1106363.html>

⁹ Policy Brief of the SVR-Research Field 2016-5, ‘Schwarz, rot, grün – welche Parteien bevorzugen Zuwanderer?’, <http://www.svr-migration.de/publikationen/parteipraeferenzen/>, as well as *Andreas M. Wüst* (2011), *Dauerhaft oder temporär? Zur Bedeutung des Migrationshintergrunds für Wahlbeteiligung und Parteiwahl bei der Bundestagswahl 2009*, in: *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, Special Issue 45/2011, pp. 157-178.

late 1990s.¹⁰ However, they participated in trade unions, social organizations and local Foreigner's Advisory Councils (Ausländerbeiräte). This centre-left preference is corroborated by the number of members in the Bundestag with a migration background. In 2013, the total share of MPs with a migration background increased from 20 to 37, which corresponds to 5.9 % of all MPs. The proportion of MPs with a Turkish migration background more than doubled from 5 to 11 in 2013 (SPD 5, B90/Greens 3, Left 2, CDU 1).

In 2017, the share of MPs with a migration background increased further, to 58 (8.2%) from a total of 709 parliamentarians, 14 (+3) of them have a Turkish migration background. With 13 out of its 69, the Left has the biggest share (18.8 %), followed by the Greens with 10 out of 67 (14.9 %), the SPD with 15 out of 153 (9.8 %), the AfD with 7 out of 91 (7.7 %), the FDP with 5 out of 80 (6.3 %), and finally the Union parties with 7 out of 246 (2.8 %).¹¹ Out of the 14 MPs with Turkish migration background, six are from the SPD, five from the Greens and three from the Left.¹² In other words, in the 2017 *Bundestag*, all MPs with a Turkish migration background are affiliated to centre-left parties.

The lower support for the Union parties among Turkish migrants is not surprising at first sight, given for example the 'C' in the party name and their reluctance towards dual citizenship and Turkish EU membership.¹³ On the other hand, there is also some potential for conservative German parties among Turkish migrants in Germany. Hale for instance has pointed to parallels (and differences) between the AKP as a conservative-Islamic party and conservative-Christian parties in Germany, France and Italy.¹⁴ German-Turkish forums exist in some regional branches of the Christian Democrats, which also agreed on a basic program in 2010. From 2005 to 2013, the AKP had observer status in the European Peoples Party in the European Parliament, but in 2013 was accepted as a full member of the breakaway Conservative and Reformist Group (AECR), after full membership of the EPP, (mainly at the behest of the CDU/CSU) was no longer realistic.¹⁵

In the September 2017 German federal election, Turkish-origin voters still preferred the Social Democrats. However, the support of 35 % of the approximately 500 interviewed Turkish migrants with German

¹⁰ "This number stood at 8,166 in 1986, corresponding to 0.01 %, or one in ten thousand of the Germany citizenry. Therefore, in the 1970s and 1980s Turkish immigrants channeled their political activism through labor unions, civil society, and non-parliamentary political forums where they could vote and run for elections without being a citizen." *Şener Aktürk*, *ibid.*, p. 67.

¹¹ <https://mediendienst-integration.de/artikel/german-parliament-57-mps-have-a-migration-background.html>

¹² <http://www.dw.com/de/wer-sitzt-im-neuen-bundestag/a-41079697>

¹³ <http://www.dw.com/de/bundestagswahl-wie-w%C3%A4hlen-die-deutsch%C3%BCrken/a-40221698>

¹⁴ *William Hale* (2005), *Christian Democracy and the AKP: Parallels and Contrasts*, in: *Turkish Studies*, vol 6, i. 2, pp. 293–310, as well as *William Hale* and *Ergun Özbudun* (2010), *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The case of the AKP*. Abingdon: Routledge.

¹⁵ *Thomas Krumm* (2016), *ibid.*

citizenship in a study at the Universities of Cologne and Duisburg-Essen¹⁶ is considerably lower than the reported support of almost 70 % by the SVR Policy Brief 2016. By contrast, the recent study estimates the support for the CDU/CSU in the 2017 federal election with 20 % much higher than the SVR Policy Brief did in 2016. The Greens were estimated in the 2017 federal election at 13 % and the Left at 4 %. Among citizens of Kurdish ethnicity, the Left was most popular, among Alevis the Green party. In North Rhine Westphalia, the *Allianz Deutscher Demokraten (ADD)* got 12 % of the German Turkish votes. Surprisingly, among those Turkish-origin Germans entitled to vote in the 2017 federal election, Erdoğan was seen more negatively than Ms. Merkel or her challenger Mr. Schulz.¹⁷ However, the general trend of a considerable higher support for centre-left parties among German parties seems to be still intact.

On the other side, turnout among Turkish-origin voters seemed to drop and their party support seems to become more fragmented between a range of parties – two factors that primarily affect the Social Democrats. In addition, there is a trend that Turkish-origin migrants are setting up their own parties in destination countries, such as in the Netherlands with DENK and in Germany with the ADD, promising to engage primarily with the interests of (Turkish) migrants and their descendants. The Dutch DENK was formed by two former Social Democrats in 2015 and gained three seats in the Dutch Parliament in March 2017. It was particularly successful in big cities such as Rotterdam and The Hague. The ADD was founded in 2016 in response to the Armenian Genocide resolution of the Bundestag. Both parties are criticized for their close and uncritical relations to the AKP. The ADD's campaign slogan under a picture of Erdogan was 'Friends of Turkey, give them your votes, let's make them big'.¹⁸ It campaigned only in North Rhine Westphalia, where it got 41,251 second votes (0.42 %, tenth strongest party in NRW). It was strongest in the constituencies of Duisburg II (2.4 %), Gelsenkirchen (1.6 %), Duisburg I (1.3 %), Herne-Bochum II and Essen II (0.9 %), and weakest in Muenster, Kleve, and Coesfeld-Steinfurt II (< 0.08 %).

In Cologne, for instance, among the 17,535 registered voters with Turkish migration background as of late 2016, 3096 voted for the ADD, equalling 17.65 % of this group (or 0.56 % of valid votes in Cologne).¹⁹ In NRW as a whole, the coverage rate of the ADD is supposed to be higher than this. In federal elections even a much higher vote share will be effectively 'neutralized' by the five percent threshold.

International Comparison

Having provided an overview of general developments in Germany, this section now focuses on an international comparison. Table 1 depicts the November 2015 election results in those states where the

¹⁶ Immigrant German Election Study, see Der Spiegel 10/2018, p. 49: Abgewandert.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ <http://www.dw.com/de/bundestagswahl-wie-w%C3%A4hlen-die-deuscht%C3%BCrken/a-40221698>

¹⁹ <https://www.rundschau-online.de/28493508>

AKP did best. That is the Netherlands, followed by Belgium and Austria with nearly 70 %. In Germany, it received almost 60 % of the circa 570,000 valid votes. Taking the AKP share as a whole, Denmark is still above average, with Northern Cyprus below. The pro-Kurdish HDP still has a strong performance in Norway and Denmark as well as in Macedonia. There is reason to assume that the size of an electorate has a positive effect on the vote shares of the AKP: this size in turn can be explained by the 1960s labour recruitment agreements as introduced above, and the migratory flows triggered by them.

A rank correlation between the results in Table 1 produced a negative coefficient for AKP with HDP results (-624, sig. .054). This can be read as an expression of a territorially based antagonism between the supporters of these two parties. Worth mentioning is also a strong positive coefficient of CHP with MHP vote shares (.867, sig. .001) in this sample of Table 1, which might indicate overlapping policy preferences of voters of these two opposition parties (e.g. nationalist, secular and anti-globalization positions).

Table 1: Country results Nov 1, 2015 (“Top 10 AKP”)

	Turnout %	Valid votes	AKP % / Rank	CHP % / Rank	MHP % / Rank	HDP % / Rank
Netherlands	42.83	113,111	69.66 / 1	11.65 / 6	9.07 / 4	7.90 / 10
Belgium	42.09	55,423	69.40 / 2	10.02 / 8	7.38 / 7	11.29 / 8
Austria	41.10	43,979	68.38 / 3	10.22 / 7	6.36 / 9	13.07 / 7
Germany	40.78	569,836	59.70 / 4	14.82 / 5	7.50 / 6	15.94 / 5
France	44.95	141,162	58.33 / 5	8.60 / 9	5.30 / 10	25.86 / 2
Bosnia-Herceg.	52.37	1,051	55.47 / 6	19.98 / 2	13.42 / 1	8.18 / 9
Norway	35.78	2,913	52.56 / 7	14.97 / 4	8.1 / 5	22.07 / 4
Denmark	41.39	13,518	50.05 / 8	7.24 / 10	6.83 / 8	34.55 / 1
N. Cyprus	34.18	32,208	49.33 / 9	24.07 / 1	10.09 / 3	14.9 / 6
Macedonia	51.96	1,110	42.88 / 10	17.93 / 3	11.53 / 2	25.68 / 3
Turkey (total)	85.20	47,838,711	49.49	25.31	11.90	10.76

Source: <http://www.ysk.gov.tr/> and own calculation

Sub-national Level in Germany

The 2015 parliamentary election result at the level of the 13 Turkish diplomatic missions across Germany provides further insights into territorial distribution of party support. The order of the consular districts in Table 2 was again based on the strength of the AKP vote shares. In both 2015 elections, the districts of Muenster, Essen and Dusseldorf had the highest and Berlin the lowest AKP vote shares. Main opposition party CHP was strongest in Berlin (22.6 %), nationalist MHP did best in Nuremberg (10.2 %), and pro-Kurdish HDP was best in Hanover (23 %).

Table 2: Results of Nov 1, 2015 elections in Germany

	Reg. voters	Votes cast	Turnout %	AKP % / Rank	CHP % / Rank	MHP % / Rank	HDP % / Rank
Muenster (NRW)	103,219	35,092	34.00	71.05 / 1	10.27 / 12	5.8 / 13	11.25 / 11
Essen (NRW)	115,981	52,667	45.41	67.11 / 2	9.75 / 13	8.01 / 4	12.87 / 9
Dusseldorf (NRW)	130,335	57,781	44.33	64.6 / 3	12.3 / 9	8.84 / 3	12.56 / 10
Munich (BAV)	113,112	43,998	38.90	63.35 / 4	19.14 / 3	7.54 / 5	8.0 / 13
Stuttgart (BW)	142,795	66,118	46.30	60.89 / 5	11.92 / 10	9.34 / 2	15.21 / 8
Cologne (NRW)	128,504	57,674	44.88	60.8 / 6	14.05 / 8	6.84 / 7	16.84 / 7
Karlsruhe (BW)	88,525	36,295	41.00	60.02 / 7	14.33 / 7	6.56 / 9	17.38 / 6
Mainz (RP)	56,471	22,502	39.85	59.55 / 8	11.92 / 11	6.02 / 12	20.79 / 2
Nuremberg (BAV)	64,512	25,301	39.22	54.76 / 9	21.26 / 2	10.21 / 1	11.44 / 12
Frankfurt (HES)	140,786	57,178	40.61	54.36 / 10	16.19 / 5	7.41 / 6	20.25 / 3
Hamburg (HH)	82,884	34,071	41.11	54.36 / 11	17.07 / 4	6.41 / 10	19.79 / 4
Hanover (LS)	104,869	37,795	36.04	53.91 / 12	14.79 / 6	6.61 / 8	22.98 / 1
Berlin (BER)	139,560	49,092	35.18	48.47 / 13	22.65 / 1	6.31 / 11	19.48 / 5
Total / mean	1,411,553	575,564	40.77	59.70	14.82	7.46	15.93

Source: YSK and own calculation

The largest Turkish electorate was the consular district of Stuttgart, the smallest the district of Mainz; voter turnout in November was highest in Stuttgart (46.3 %) and lowest in Berlin (35.2 %). Compared to June, in November 92,818 more votes were cast; turnout increased by 6.6 percentage points. A rank correlation with these variables did not produce any significant result. For the AKP strongholds, a territorial proximity to the Netherlands (as the European AKP stronghold) is obvious, with Muenster-Enschede and Dusseldorf-Venlo only 60 km apart, and Essen-Arnhem 100 km. In the easternmost consulate district of Berlin, the AKP got its worst result, followed by Nuremberg, Hannover, Frankfurt and Hamburg (rankings 12 to 9). The closer it comes to the Netherlands and Belgium, the more AKP votes

increased. However, such an ‘explanation’ only shifts the question of the causes of the AKP’s success to a territorial dimension. For the republican CHP this territorial picture is partially inverse. With strongholds in Nuremberg (MHP) and Hanover (HDP), the smaller parties do not show such an obvious regional pattern.

The April 2017 Constitutional Referendum

Next, we focus on the results of the April 2017 constitutional referendum in Germany. On average, 63 % voted in favour of the changes and nearly 37 % against, with an average turnout of 46.2 % out of the registered 1.43m Turkish citizens. In none of the consulates, the share of Yes votes was below 50 %. To ease interpretation, the results shown in Table 3 are ranked according to the share of Yes votes (column 5).

Table 3: Results of April 16, 2017 referendum in Germany

	Registered voters	Valid votes	Turnout %	Yes %	Yes rank	No %	No rank
Essen	116,828	75,117	64.98	75.89	1	24.11	13
Dusseldorf	131,611	71,440	54.73	69.58	2	30.42	12
Stuttgart	146,076	74,257	51.34	66.26	3	33.74	11
Mainz	56,677	26,996	48.05	64.53	4	35.47	10
Cologne	129,969	65,118	50.91	64.07	5	35.93	9
Muenster	104,882	21,526	20.78	64.01	6	35.99	8
Munich	115,208	50,833	44.52	62.69	7	37.31	7
Karlsruhe	90,773	37,171	41.44	61.60	8	38.40	6
Hanover	107,372	43,071	40.5	58.56	9	41.44	5
Frankfurt	142,854	63,183	44.84	57.79	10	42.21	4
Hamburg	83,852	40,180	48.36	57.02	11	42.98	3
Nuremberg	65,186	28,000	43.41	55.44	12	44.56	2
Berlin	138,839	56,624	41.22	50.13	13	49.87	1
Total / mean	1,430,127	653,516	46.20	63.07		36.93	

Source: YSK, as of 30.04.2017

A bivariate rank correlation (Spearman) of the November 2015 with the April 2017 constitutional referendum results did not produce any significant results for the MHP and HDP, but highly significant ones for the AKP and CHP vote shares. Spearman’s rho for Yes and AKP vote shares in June 2015 is .885, sig. 000 (N=13, two tailed), in November .790, sig. .001. For the CHP, the correlation with the Yes shares

is of course negative, and highly significant; for June 2015 it is $-.879$, sig. $.000$, and for November $-.872$, sig. $.000$. The lack of significant results for the MHP and HDP can in part be explained by their lack of regional strongholds, in part also by the split within these parties in the 2017 referendum. The MHP lost part of its internal opposition after the referendum, and conservative Kurds might have voted Yes in 2017. Furthermore, turnout and thus mobilization did work for the Yes share. In another rank correlation, the share of Yes votes at the consulate level positively correlated with turnout ($.654$, sig. $.015$). A higher turnout rate thus helps to explain a higher share of Yes votes across Germany.

Discussion

Turkish-origin migrants as voters in Germany (both in Turkish and German elections) are so far not sufficiently researched. This paper presents a first exploration of electoral results of Turkish citizens' voting behaviour in Germany. Taking into account also the voting behaviour of nationalised Turkish migrants, it is stunning that a significant split in the voting behaviour of these two electorates can be observed. Turkish citizens in Germany predominantly vote conservative, whereas nationalized Turkish migrants predominantly vote for centre-left parties in German elections. Compared to the Turkish average, both 2015 parliamentary elections and the 2017 referendum produces much more conservative results across Germany than on average in Turkey. This draws our attention for instance to the bilateral labour recruitment agreements signed in the early 1960 between Turkey and the Federal Republic of Germany (1961), the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria (1964), and France (1965). These countries top the list of AKP success in the 2015 parliamentary elections.

In the descriptive analysis of the results at consulate level within Germany, there was a clear east-west divide in AKP support, with the best results in consulates close to the Netherlands and the worst in Berlin. The strongly negative correlation of AKP with CHP and HDP vote shares indicates a territorial separation of their supporters (or 'camp' formation). In addition, a significant increase in turnout took place in November 2015 (keyword 'mobilization through polarization'). Finally, the decision for a German passport and the resulting obligation to renounce the Turkish citizenship can be interpreted as a directional decision in which conservative migrants tend to renounce German (and thus keep Turkish) citizenship,²⁰ and progressive, 'leftist' migrants tend to make this change more easily.

²⁰ In a BAMF study on naturalization, a relatively large proportion of Turkish respondents (45.8%) said they had no intentions of naturalization ("no, definitely not"); another 20.1% replied "No, probably not"; see Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (2012): *Einbürgerungsverhalten von Ausländerinnen und Ausländern in Deutschland sowie Erkenntnisse zu Optionspflichtigen* (Forschungsbericht 15), Nuremberg: BAMF, p. 193.