

ALMANYA NOTLARI 28

Ocak 2025-Temmuz 2025



To Defend or Not to Defend, That Is the Question

The History and Socio-Political Implications of the
Categorization of the Extreme-Right Alternative for Germany
(AfD) As "Secured Right-Wing Extremist"

Daniel Kubiak



PREFACE

For our current issue, Dr. Daniel Kubiak from the Berlin Institute for Empirical Integration and Migration Research (BIM) at the Humboldt University of Berlin contributes a comprehensive and timely study titled "To Defend or Not to Defend, That Is the Question: The History and Socio-Political Implications of the Categorization of the Extreme-Right Alternative for Germany (AfD) as "Secured Right-Wing Extremist"". In this article, Kubiak traces the trajectory of the far-right party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) from its inception as an anti-euro movement in 2013 to its 2025 classification by the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) as a "secured right-wing extremist" organization. Drawing on historical, legal, and socio-political analysis, Kubiak examines how the AfD's ideological radicalization unfolded in parallel with societal anxieties around migration, national identity, and democratic values. The article scrutinizes the implications of the BfV's official designation—both legally and symbolically—arguing that while the classification offers institutional recognition of the AfD's threat to the constitutional order, it does not in itself disarm the political or cultural forces behind the party's popularity. Through a careful exploration of postwar German migration history, shifting party dynamics, and rising right-wing violence, Kubiak contextualizes the AfD not as an anomaly but as an expression of long-standing and mainstreamed nationalist undercurrents. The article concludes by arguing that while banning the AfD would not resolve the deeper social forces behind its rise, it would offer Germany's still-young democracy a moment of institutional clarity, revealing just how resilient it truly is in the face of anti-constitutional threats.

DR. ÖZGE ONURSAL-BEŞGÜL
MÜDÜR, AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ENSTİTÜSÜ
İSTANBUL BİLGİ ÜNİVERSİTESİ

DR. DENİZ GÜNEŞ YARDIMCI
UZMAN ARAŞTIRMACI VE DAAD OKUTMANI
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ENSTİTÜSÜ
İSTANBUL BİLGİ ÜNİVERSİTESİ

To Defend or Not to Defend, That Is the Question

The History and Socio-Political Implications of the Categorization
of the Extreme-Right Alternative for Germany (AfD) As
"Secured Right-Wing Extremist"

Daniel Kubiak

To Defend or Not to Defend, That Is the Question.

The History and Socio-Political Implications of the Categorization
of the Extreme-Right Alternative for Germany (AfD) As
"Secured Right-Wing Extremist"

Daniel Kubiak¹

Classification of the AfD as "definitely extreme-right"

The state associations of Saxony, Thuringia, Saxony-Anhalt and Brandenburg, the federal party, as well as the AfD's youth organization (the Junge Alternative - JA), and individual AfD MPs and their staff were investigated and monitored by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz - BfV) or the state constitutional protection agencies, in some cases for years, as suspected cases. The AfD had filed a lawsuit against this observation. At the highest judicial instance, the Higher Administrative Court of North Rhine-Westphalia in Münster dismissed the complaint in 2024.² It was therefore lawful to monitor the AfD for years as a suspected case. After several East German state associations had already been classified as confirmed extreme-right in recent years, the Federal Ministry of the Interior (Bundesministerium des Inneren - BMI) published the result of the investigation for the federal party on May 2, 2025. In it, the BfV concluded that the AfD is to be classified as "definitely extreme-right". To this end, the BfV has collected a large number of public quotes that are classified as racist, nationalistic, discriminatory, and therefore anti-constitutional. The decisive article of the German „Grundgesetz“ for this is Article 3, which states that all people are equal and may

¹ Daniel Kubiak is a social scientist at the Berlin Institute for Empirical Integration and Migration Research (BIM) at the Humboldt University of Berlin. Kubiak was born and raised in Berlin and has been living in rural Brandenburg for seven years. He is researching post-reunification identity, East German migration society, and the politics of remembrance. He also co-hosts the podcasts Berlin.Ost.Migrantisch and Musi*Sociology

² <https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/pressemitteilungen/DE/2024/pressemitteilung-2024-1-afd.html>

not be discriminated against based on race, class, gender, etc.³ However, the BfV can also provide evidence of anti-democratic statements and behavior by the AfD. Ultimately, it is concluded that the AfD poses a threat to the German constitution. However, this assessment by the BfV does not mean that the AfD will now be banned or automatically has to fear other legal consequences for the time being. However, it is being examined whether members of the AfD may obtain a gun license or be employed as civil servants. The examination is always carried out on a case-by-case basis, never across the board.

But what does the classification of the AfD mean for a party ban? The party, which is now the second-largest parliamentary group in the German Bundestag, is not automatically banned. Firstly, it now has the opportunity to take legal action against the classification, which it has already done. Secondly, a ban on a party must be applied for by the Bundestag, the Bundesrat, or the federal government. In the previous legislative period, a group of over 100 MPs submitted a cross-party motion, but it failed to gain a majority in the Bundestag. At present, it does not look as if there will be another initiative from members of the three aforementioned institutions and the current Federal Minister of the Interior is even warning against such a motion⁴, even though a majority of Germans have voted in favor of a ban motion in opinion polls since the publication of the BfV report.⁵

Brief history of (the radicalization of) the AfD

The "Alternative for Germany" party was founded in 2013 in a suburb of Frankfurt am Main and was originally launched as an anti-euro party. The name stems from the fact that the former Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel at the time described European financial policy, particularly the aid for Greece, as having "no alternative"⁶. While the party narrowly failed to reach the 5% threshold in the 2013 Bundestag elections, it has had a parliamentary group in the German Bundestag without interruption since 2017, making it the first party to the right of the CDU/CSU to form a parliamentary group in the German Bundestag.

³ https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gg/art_3.html

⁴ <https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/rechtsextremismus-dobrindt-warnt-vor-boesem-erwachen-bei-afd-verbotsversuch/100133614.html>

⁵ <https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2025-05/umfrage-afd-partieverbot-mehrheit>

⁶ <https://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/sprachkritik-alternativlos-ist-das-unwort-des-jahres-a-740096.html>

Throughout the party's history, a radicalization of the party can be observed on the one hand; on the other hand, it also started as a nationalist project back in 2013. On the one hand, this can be seen in the very frequent changes and resignations of its leaders. The former chairmen Bernd Lucke, Frauke Petry, and Jörg Meuthen have left the party already. All three complain in public statements that the party has become increasingly radical and extreme. This is often attributed to the so-called and now disbanded "Flügel", which represents particularly radical, nationalistic and nationalist right-wing positions. One of the most influential figures in the "Flügel" was the right-wing extremist, former Hessian history teacher and current member of parliament from Thuringia Björn Höcke, who has been convicted several times by German courts for incitement of the people and is said to be of great importance alongside the official structures in the AfD. The current federal chairpersons, Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla, have also attracted attention with radical public statements, and both also appear in the report of BfV. They are members of the German Bundestag. The „Flügel“ was disbanded in 2018, but according to observers, this in no way means that the party is any less radical and extremist; on the contrary, the party has been classified as "secured extreme right" by the respective offices for the protection of the constitution in the federal states of Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt (since 2023), Thuringia (since 2024) and Brandenburg (since 2025) and now on federal level by BfV.

The report, which comprises over 1,000 pages, has been available in full since May 14, 2025 because it was leaked by the right-wing conservative medium "Cicero" and other right-wing populist media such as "NIUS". However, even before this, it was clear that the BfV was primarily referring to public sources (speeches, political program, social media accounts) and therefore little of the party's far-right, nationalist and racist orientation was publicly known beforehand. Many social scientists and journalists, such as Matthias Quent⁷, Eva Kienholz⁸, Daniel Mullis⁹, Ann-Katrin Müller¹⁰, Michael Kraske¹¹, Arne Semsrott¹², Andreas Kemper¹³ and many more have been observing this radicalization for many years.

⁷ <https://www.piper.de/buecher/rechtsextrem-das-neue-normal-isbn-978-3-492-07317-2>

⁸ <https://www.rowohlt.de/buch/eva-kienholz-eine-kurze-geschichte-der-afd-9783498007348>

⁹ <https://www.bpb.de/shop/buecher/schriftenreihe/556942/der-aufstieg-der-rechten-in-krisenzeiten/>

¹⁰ <https://www.spiegel.de/impressum/autor-67c446b9-0001-0003-0000-000000018273>

¹¹ <https://www.chbeck.de/kraske-laabs-angriff-deutschland/product/37000396>

¹² https://www.droemer-knaur.de/buch/arne-semsrott-machtuebernahme-9783426659847?srsId=AfmBOoruErJQDj-r-D4ddf282_D_EWklrveeKIJbT47qOKwbJKpOyz2t

¹³ <https://www.edition-assemblage.de/buecher/rechte-euro-rebellion/>

There were long discussions about the timing of the publication of the report's findings because there was information that the classification was already known internally before the 2025 federal election in February, but it was only published after the federal election and before the start of the new federal government under Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt. The report documents the radicalization dynamics of the party since its inception. However, it is important to emphasize that it is by no means the case that the AfD became an extreme right-wing organization overnight. The nationalist statements disguised as "patriotic" were already recognizable in its beginnings. The nationalist and "völkisch" character of the party was already evident under Lucke, Petry, and the current honorary chairman, Alexander Gauland. Although particularly extreme individuals have been excluded from the party and/or parliamentary group in some cases, some of them (as the examples of Matthias Helfferich from North Rhine-Westphalia or Maximilian Krah from Saxony show) may well be reintegrated later as members of the parliamentary group. Höcke caused a scandal early on with racist and nationalist statements in speeches and on talk shows (e.g. the Nazi slogan "Everything for Germany"¹⁴ or a speech on the "Memorial of Shame"¹⁵ about the memorial commemorating the murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin-Mitte). Former parliamentary party leader Alexander Gauland has described the reign of terror of the German National Socialists as a "bird's-eye view of history"¹⁶ and member of the Bundestag Beatrix von Storch also attracted attention very early on with radical statements, such as that the European border police should also shoot women and children if they try to cross the border. This contradicts the common narrative that the party originally started as a bourgeois professors' party that was only slightly critical of Europe and only later showed its far-right traits. Instead, the classification as "definitely extreme right" shows a continuity within the party.

However, this also means that it was not necessary to wait for the report from the BfV, nor did it provide any new insights to classify the party as an extreme right-wing political actor from a scientific and socio-political perspective, which is why this was done in many publications even before the actual report. The reason for this was that, from an analytical

¹⁴ <https://www.lto.de/recht/hintergruende/h/bjoern-hoecke-zweites-mal-verurteilt-lg-halle-alles-fuer-deutschland-sa-parole>

¹⁵ <https://www.zentralratderjuden.de/presseerklaerungen/das-andenken-an-die-ermordeten-wird-mit-fuessen-getreten/>

¹⁶ <https://www.dw.com/de/gauland-bezeichnet-ns-zeit-als-vogelschiss-in-der-geschichte/a-44054219>

perspective, the party met all the criteria to be labeled as such. For example, the fact that Björn Höcke can be described as a fascist has even been confirmed by the courts.¹⁷ Much of what is in the report was known because, as described above, it is based on public sources. Accordingly, a discussion about an application to ban the party should not be based on the expert report, but on the general state of the party, which has been brought to light by a great deal of expertise over the past 12 years since the party's existence.

Development of the AfD in a social climate of hostility towards migration

Germany's post-war history was characterized by various social conflicts. Two German states existed from 1949 to 1990. One in the West was characterized by an economic upswing and growing prosperity and freedom for its population, combined with strong Western integration and very good relations with the USA, Great Britain, and France. The other in the East went on to become the next dictatorship and increasingly became a closed society, which from the 1970s onwards could offer its citizens neither great growth in prosperity nor individual freedom. In both German states, there was a great need for international immigration from the 1950s and especially the 1960s due to labor shortages. After the 12 million internally displaced persons from the former eastern territories of Germany had gradually become halfway integrated into society, people from Italy, Portugal, Turkey (Federal Republic of Germany - FRG) (Söylemez 2024),¹⁸ and Poland, Vietnam, and Mozambique (German Democratic Republic - GDR) (Glorius 2020)¹⁹ came to Germany. This was associated with a long discussion about whether or not Germany had become a country of immigration. For a very long time, the conflict over this discourse was conducted along the lines of two major parties. Above all, the conservative Christian CDU/CSU party family rejected the recognition of (West) Germany as an immigration country. In the 1980s and 1990s, former Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl still assumed that the so-called "guest workers" would eventually return to their home countries. Large sections of the CDU were firmly to the right in this social conflict.

¹⁷ <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bjoern-hoecke-darf-als-faschist-bezeichnet-werden-gerichtsurteil-zu-eisenach-a-1289131.html>

¹⁸ https://www.researchgate.net/publication/390034659_Bruche_und_Kontinuitaten_im_Migrationsdiskurs_Deutschland_als_postmigrantisches_Heimat

¹⁹ <https://www.springerprofessional.de/migrationsgeschichte-ostdeutschlands-i-von-der-zeit-der-ddr-bis-/18318390>

In addition, in the 1990s in particular, there was an extremely racist mood in the reunified country against people seeking protection from Romania and the former Yugoslavia, but also against "foreigners" in general. This period is later referred to as the "baseball bat years" (Bangel 2022)²⁰. Thousands of attacks are documented throughout Germany, with a focus on the new federal states. Since 1990, over 200 people have lost their lives as a result of racist and right-wing violence.²¹ The pogroms in Hoyerswerda (1991) and Rostock-Lichtenhagen (1992), as well as the deadly arson attacks in Mölln (1992) and Solingen (1993), were discussed in the media (Kubiak 2024).²² This racist violence was flanked by a federal policy that tightened asylum laws in 1993 in the hope of creating "domestic political calm". The attacks on migrants were thus responded to with anti-migration laws intended to reassure the white majority. There is a political narrative that claims that this prevented the rise of right-wing populist and far-right parties. If you take a closer look, however, you will see that, firstly, many of the migration policy attitudes of the 1990s CDU corresponded to those of today's AfD and, secondly, far-right parties continued to sit in German parliaments (the right-wing populist Republicans in Baden-Württemberg, the right-wing populist Schill-Party even formed the government in the northern city state of Hamburg with the CDU, and the far-right DVU and the far-right NPD temporarily sat in state parliaments in eastern Germany). At the same time, an extreme right-wing underground terrorist organization, the NSU, was formed, which murdered ten people in the 2000s and was supported for years by extreme right-wing structures from East and West Germany and was not stopped by the BfV (Karakayalı, Kahveci, Liebscher, Melchers 2017; NSU Watch).^{23,24}

It was not until the 2000s that the general public began to recognize that Germany was a country of immigration. This went hand in hand with the reform of citizenship law, which granted the children of immigrants the right to obtain German citizenship. During the so-called "summer of migration" in 2015/2016 with many refugees from Syria and also during the flight of many Ukrainians after the start of the Russian war of aggression in

²⁰ <https://www.bpb.de/shop/zeitschriften/apuz/rechte-gewalt-in-den-1990er-jahren-2022/515769/baseballschlaegerjahre/>

²¹ <https://www.amadeu-antonio-stiftung.de/rassismus/todesopfer-rechter-gewalt/>

²² https://antipodeonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/3.-New-Spatialities-of-the-Far-Right_Daniel-Kubiak.pdf

²³ <https://www.transcript-verlag.de/978-3-8376-3709-0/den-nsu-komplex-analysieren/>

²⁴ <https://www.verbrecherverlag.de/shop/aufklaeren-und-einmischen-der-nsu-komplex-und-der-muenchener-prozess/>

2022, there were large civil society solidarity structures in German post-migrant society to support the refugees. At the same time, the right-wing populist PEGIDA alliance in Dresden and the AfD formed relevant groups that brought a racist and, above all, anti-Muslim discourse to the general public, which has now also made strong inroads into the political center of society, as research by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, for example, shows (Zick, Küpper, Mokros 2023)²⁵. One initial spark for this was the bestseller by SPD politician and former Berlin finance senator Thilo Sarrazin, who brought this anti-Muslim racism into the public debate with racist, pseudo-scientific statements.²⁶

In this section, I want to make it clear that although the AfD is an extreme right-wing party, its political attitudes and statements were and are supported by a considerable section of Germany's dominant society. How the AfD will be dealt with now that it has been categorized also provides information about how resilient German democracy is against enemies of the constitution.

Social consequences of the classification of the AfD

I have shown in the previous sections that the AfD was never a "normal" party that captures the basic racist sentiment in large sections of the population and is now classified by state authorities as a threat to democracy. But what are the social consequences of this party?

1. Right-wing violence on the rise

According to figures from C-Rex²⁷, Germany is the European country in which the most right-wing attacks are reported. Inside Germany, there is a strong dispersion towards eastern Germany. In no other European region are so many right-wing attacks reported as in the region between Rostock, Chemnitz, Magdeburg and Frankfurt an der Oder. At the same time, there has been a massive increase in right-wing acts throughout Germany over

²⁵ <https://www.fes.de/referat-demokratie-gesellschaft-und-innovation/gegen-rechtsextremismus/mitte-studie-2023>

²⁶ <https://www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/andreas-speit-buergerliche-scharfmacher-thilo-sarrazin-war-100.html>

²⁷ <https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/publications/scientific-publications/2022/the-importance-of-being-eastern-german.html>

the past decade. After reaching a high in 2015, which was strongly linked to the activities of PEGIDA and the associated activities on social media (Sardoschau & Artis 2025)²⁸, attacks increased massively again in the 2020s.²⁹ With the violent language used by members of parliament in the Bundestag, which is reflected in the increase in calls to order³⁰, but also in the statements collected in the BfV report, violence is also returning to the streets. In our research projects^{31,32}, this is also reflected in statements from affected people who avoid certain places and, above all, try to move away from certain places with a high level of everyday racism. In this way, racism and right-wing violence even become a locational disadvantage.³³ While the political discourse of the AfD, which has now been confirmed as far-right, threatens democratic processes and thus society as a whole, many people are already feeling that right-wing and racist violence is making their everyday lives less safe. Post-migrant experiences are, therefore, usually also a social early warning system that should be taken more seriously by politicians and administrators.

2. Right-wing political discourses are adopted by the democratic parties

In the discourse on a possible ban of the AfD, the argument is also repeatedly put forward that a democratically elected party can only be put forward based on its content. This statement refers to the political competition in which everyone has the same chance of getting the vote. In the Federal Republic of Germany, a relatively stable party system had developed since 1949, in which initially a conservative (CDU/CSU), a liberal (FDP), and a social democratic (SPD) party competed with each other. A green party (Die Grünen) was added in the 1980s. In 1990, the successor party to the communist state party, a party to the left of social democracy (PDS, now the LINKE), was added and has also been represented in parliament ever since. This left-wing party was also temporarily monitored by the BfV. The observation was discontinued at some point because the suspicion of anti-constitutional behavior could not be confirmed. So while there was a lot of movement on the left side of parliament from the 1980s onwards, things remained

²⁸ <https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/316859>

²⁹ <https://verband-brg.de/rechte-rassistische-und-antisemitische-gewalt-in-deutschland-2024-jahresbilanzen-der-opferberatungsstellen/>

³⁰ <https://www.n-tv.de/politik/Zahl-der-Ordnungsrufe-im-Bundestag-nimmt-deutlich-zu-article24677835.html>

³¹ <https://www.bim.hu-berlin.de/de/projekte/raeumig>

³² <https://www.bim.hu-berlin.de/de/projekte/gesellschaftliche-raeume-der-migration-geraeumig>

³³ <https://mediendienst-integration.de/artikel/rechtsextremismus-als-standortrisiko.html>

relatively quiet on the right until the 2010s. The conservative Union parties had no real competition. This changed with the arrival of the AfD. The more right-wing of the CDU/CSU criticized Angela Merkel, the then-leader and Chancellor, for, among other things, moving the CDU too far to the center and thus also to the left. Under Angela Merkel, the CDU was in fact able to achieve election results in the high 30% in the mid-2010s, despite the four other parties, and once in 2013 even over 40%³⁴ in federal elections. That was the last election in which a party was able to achieve such a high percentage. In 2025, no party achieved more than 30%. For this reason, the CDU is pursuing a strategy of shifting to the right. The hope is to recapture the right-of-center voters, many of whom have migrated to the far-right AfD. The right-wing course is particularly evident in the Union parties' anti-immigration stance: Deportations, border controls, and new hardships in citizenship law, as well as a neoliberal economic course and right-wing culture war, are seen as solutions to "confront the AfD in terms of content". However, it is a copy of the positions. Not only the CDU/CSU parties, but also the Social Democrats and the Greens have also moved far to the right, particularly concerning migration policy. On the one hand, this is all in the hope of reducing the AfD's share of the vote, while at the same time legal problems arise because many of the populist demands from the election campaign cannot be reconciled with European law, as can be seen from the stricter border controls since May 2025.³⁵ The only party that understood a tough socio-political course in terms of content and rigorously left the migration issue out of the election campaign was the Left Party, which only managed to achieve a single-digit result, but was surprisingly able to re-enter the Bundestag with this course. At one point, the party was polling at 3%. The SPD and the CDU/CSU were rather harmed by their right-wing stance in the election and were unable to achieve the result they had hoped for. It did benefit the AfD, which doubled its result in comparison to 2021. This shows that when "substantive positioning" is associated with "substantive copying", this usually does not pay off for the democratic parties in the center. This fact has been well researched,³⁶ and contrary to the expertise, the democratic parties have now tried this in the 2025 election campaign and failed. We do not know today whether they will draw any conclusions from this for the future.

³⁴ <https://www.tagesschau.de/wahl/archiv/2013-09-22-BT-DE/index.shtml>

³⁵ <https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/zurueckweisung-grenze-rechtswidrig-100.html>

³⁶ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/commentisfree/2022/apr/13/copying-far-right-doesnt-help-mainstream-parties>

3. Emotionalization of society is increasing

All in all, we are observing an emotionalized socio-political discourse in which questions of immigration, belonging, and positioning in the political spectrum have become increasingly important. There is often talk of a polarization of society and calls for greater cohesion as a solution. However, many studies on political attitudes (Mitte-Studie³⁷ or Deutschland-Monitor³⁸) show that general approval of democracy, the constitution, and state institutions such as the constitution-protecting bodies has by no means declined or is weak. The vast majority of German society can certainly agree that it wants to live in a democratic, free, secure, and just country. How politics and society need to be shaped to achieve this is the subject of sometimes highly emotional debates that have long since moved from the media space of TV, radio and newspapers to the digital world, where a small number of actors earn money primarily from the emotionalization of fear (Özvatan & Kubiak 2024).³⁹ The Berlin social scientists Steffen Mau, Linus Westheuser, and Thomas Lux show precisely this in their book "Trigger Points". There is agreement on fundamental values, but "polarization entrepreneurs" manage to create artificial divisions in society on individual issues (Mau, Lux & Westheuser 2023).⁴⁰ Currently, right-wing and far-right talking points in particular are succeeding in creating this polarization via the detour of fear. Real issues of social inequality, dilapidated infrastructure, and inefficient administration are regularly overshadowed by a defensive discourse in relation to migration. But other socio-politically relevant issues are also coded with migration. The anti-Semitism that has been measurable for years in the middle of German society is recoded as anti-Semitism "imported" by Arab people. The increasing number of attacks and terrorist acts are primarily attributed to immigrants, although the NSU complex and the murders in Hanau and Halle were carried out by German perpetrators. Sexism and misogyny are attributed to Muslim men, although all studies show that sexual abuse and femicides mainly take place in the family environment and are spread across all social classes.

³⁷ <https://www.fes.de/referat-demokratie-gesellschaft-und-innovation/gegen-rechtsextremismus/mitte-studie-2023>

³⁸ <https://www.uni-jena.de/295658/deutschlandmonitor-2024-veroeffentlicht>

³⁹ <https://www.blaetter.de/ausgabe/2024/november/tiktok-insta-co-kampf-dem-rechten-monopol>

⁴⁰ <https://www.suhrkamp.de/buch/triggerpunkte-t-9783518029848>

Conclusion:

The existence of the AfD is a threat to the democratic institutions of the Federal Republic of Germany, which in 2024 has just celebrated the 75th anniversary of the still rather young constitution. Its existence and the associated emotionalization of politics are already making the streets less safe for people affected by racism, and its success means that almost all centrist democratic parties are copying its content instead of applying for a ban to clarify whether the party has a legal basis for its existence. Various legal reports have come to the conclusion that a ban is entirely appropriate. The independent portal "Gesellschaft für Freiheitsrechte" has now also commissioned another large-scale review.⁴¹ It is clear to all those involved that the political attitudes behind the AfD's success cannot be resolved by a ban, but at least the party would be deprived of the opportunity to turn its anti-constitutional agenda into a political majority and thus be financed to a large extent by German taxpayers' money. It cannot therefore be assumed that German society would be pacified by a ban, but it would give the young German democracy clarity as to how resilient it is, because a lot depends on the answer to this question in terms of peace and security in the Federal Republic of Germany.

⁴¹ <https://freiheitsrechte.org/ueber-die-gff/presse/pressemitteilungen-der-gesellschaft-fur-freiheitsrechte/pm-afd-gutachten-start>