

## CONTENTS

**Ayhan Kaya**

Director, European Institute

**Özge Onursal Beşgöl**

Vice-Director, European Institute

ERC PRIME YOUTH PROJECT **2**

HORIZON 2020 PROJECTS **6**

DAAD FELLOWSHIP **25**

CONFERENCES, ROUNDTABLES  
AND WORKSHOPS **27**

PUBLICATIONS **33**

MA PROGRAMMES ON EUROPEAN  
STUDIES **33**

FROM OUR STUDENTS **34**

SHORT NEWS **35**

İSTANBUL BİLGİ UNIVERSITY **36**

ACADEMIC PROGRAMMES **36**

Dear Friends,

We would like to welcome you all to the 13th newsletter of the European Institute of İstanbul Bilgi University. This issue contains information on the Institute's research activities, publications, conferences, workshops, graduate programs, social outreach projects and opinions of our staff and intern.

The newsletter starts with the depiction of our ongoing projects and activities carried out in 2019-2020 by the European Institute. European Research Council PRIME Youth project and the Horizon 2020 projects on migration cover the first place in the Newsletter. You can find a detailed explanation of the ERC Advanced Grant research called "PRIME Youth: Nativism, Islamophobism and Islamism in the Age of Populism" as well as some Blog entries by one of our Scientific Advisors, Prof. Mehdi Lahlou from Morocco and one of our researchers, Dr. An van Raemdonck, from Belgium. What follows the ERC project is the ongoing Horizon 2020 Projects. There are two projects as such. The first one is RESPOND, and it deals with the multilevel governance of mass migration in Europe and beyond. The second one is MATILDE, and it elaborates on the impact of migration on remote, rural and mountainous places in Europe and elsewhere.

The second part of the Newsletter is reserved for different activities, programs, publications and testimonies revolving around the European Institute. Activities of the German Studies Unit run by Dr. Deniz Güneş Yardımcı, DAAD Fachlektor, conferences, roundtables, workshops, and publications follow each other in this part. The second part continues with the testimonies of our MA students in European Studies and our interns, and ends with the news about the post-Doc researchers who started to work with us: Dr. Ayşenur Benevento, Dr. Fatma Elmas Yılmaz and Dr. Metin Koca.

On this occasion we would like to express our appreciation to the Rectorate and the Board of Trustees of İstanbul Bilgi University for their constant endorsement of the research and outreach activities of the European Institute. But most importantly, we would like to express our gratefulness to you all for your interest in the European Institute. We wish you all a pleasant New Year...



**Prof. Ayhan Kaya**  
Director, European Institute



**Dr. Özge Onursal-Beşgöl**  
Vice-Director, European Institute

**Istanbul Bilgi University  
European Institute**

Tel: +90 212 311 52 60

Web: eu.bilgi.edu.tr

E-mail: europe@bilgi.edu.tr

Editor: Aslı Aydın-Sancar

### Institute Staff

Prof. Ayhan KAYA (Director)  
Faculty Member, PhD Özge ONURSAL-BEŞGÜL (Vice Director, Dept. of International Relations)  
Dr. Metin Koca (ERC Research Fellow)  
Dr. Ayşenur BENEVENTO (ERC Research Fellow)  
Dr. Fatma YLMAZ-ELMAS (MATILDE Project, Research Fellow)  
Dr. Deniz Güneş YARDIMCI (DAAD Research Fellow, Lecturer)  
Emre GÖNEN, MA (Dept. of International Relations)  
Aslı AYDIN-SANCAR, MA (Project Manager)  
Emre GÜR, MA (CIFE Representative for Turkey)  
Didem BALATLIOĞULLARI, MA (Administrative Assistant)

### Academic Board

Prof. Dr. Nurhan YENTÜRK (Dept. Of Economics)  
Faculty Member, PhD İdil Işıl GÜL (Faculty of Law)  
Faculty Member, PhD Gresi SANJE (Dept. of Communication Design and Management)  
Faculty Member, PhD Büke BOŞNAK (Dept. Of International Relations)

### Executive Board

Prof. Dr. Aslı TUNÇ (Dept. of Media and Communication Systems)  
Prof. Dr. Cem BAŞLEVENT (Dept. of Economics)  
Faculty Member, PhD Azer KILIÇ (Dept. of Sociology)

## EUROPEAN RESEARCH COUNCIL (ERC) PRIME YOUTH PROJECT



## “Nativism Islamophobia And Islamism In The Age Of Populism: Culturalization And Religionization Of What Is Social, Economic And Political In Europe”

From: 01 January 2019 – To: 31 December 2023

*This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme grant agreement no. 785934.*

Prof. Ayhan Kaya, faculty member of İstanbul Bilgi University's International Relations Department and Director of the European Union Institute has been awarded an “Advanced Grant” by the European Research Council (ERC), one of the most prestigious research institutions of Europe, for his project entitled “Nativism, Islamophobia and Islamism in the Age of Populism: Culturalisation and Religionisation of what is Social, Economic and Political in Europe”. For the purpose of more fairly evaluating research work at different levels, ERC offers three types of grants: A “Starting Grant” for young researchers, a “Consolidator Grant” for experienced researchers, and an “Advanced Grant” for scientists who perform high-level research at a global level. Prof. Ayhan Kaya's project is the first social sciences project at a Turkish university to receive an “Advanced Grant” from ERC.

### Research Summary:

The main research question of the study is: How and why do some European citizens generate a populist and Islamophobic discourse to express their discontent

with the current social, economic and political state of their national and European contexts, while some members of migrant-origin communities with Muslim background generate an essentialist and radical form of Islamist discourse within the same societies? The main premise of this study is that various segments of the European public (radicalizing young members of both native populations and migrant-origin populations with Muslim background), who have been alienated and swept away by the flows of globalization such as deindustrialization, mobility, migration, tourism, social-economic inequalities, international trade, and robotic production, are more inclined to respectively adopt two mainstream political discourses: Islamophobia (for native populations) and Islamism (for Muslim-migrant-origin populations). Both discourses have become pivotal along with the rise of the civilizational rhetoric since the early 1990s. On the one hand, the neo-liberal age seems to be leading to the nativisation of radicalism among some groups of host populations while, on the other hand, it is leading to the islamization of radicalism among some segments of deprived migrant-origin populations. The common denominator of these groups is that they are both downwardly mobile and inclined towards radicalization. Hence, this project aims to scrutinize social, economic, political and psychological sources of the processes of radicalization among native European youth and Muslim-origin youth with migration background, who are both inclined to express their discontent through ethnicity, culture, religion, heritage, homogeneity,

authenticity, past, gender and patriarchy. The field research will comprise four migrant receiving countries: Germany, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, and two migrant sending countries: Turkey and Morocco.

**For further information of the European Research Council:** <https://erc.europa.eu/>

Since the beginning of the project in 2019, we have prepared various reports including literature reviews on radicalisation, focusing on the various approaches to the concept, and literature reviews shedding light on the dynamics of the Moroccan diaspora. Our field researchers have also prepared city narratives providing in-depth reviews on the political, economic, and socio-cultural dynamics in Cologne, Aalst, Lyon and Amsterdam after WWII.

### Literature Reviews on Radicalisation

We contributed to the existing literature on radicalisation by publishing three reports on the topic. Each of the reports emerged after noticing the lack of clarification on the definition of radicalisation and the subsequent research conducted based on subjective perspectives. In the first report, Ayhan Kaya assessed the conceptualisation of radicalization historically. Kaya's assessment shows that radicalism, extremism, terrorism, fundamentalism and violence have recently been interchangeably used by many in academia, media and politics. These terms used to be perceived and defined very differently prior to the 1990s when tremendous political, societal and demographic changes took place all around the world. Focusing on the radicalisation processes of both nativist and Islamist youngsters in Europe, Kaya scrutinises the differences between these terms by revisiting the ways they were used in the past. In doing so, Kaya reveals the neo-liberal logic of modern state actors in reducing radicalisation to terrorism and extremism.

**Available at:** <https://bpy.bilgi.edu.tr/en/publications/working-paper-12-state-art-radicalisation-islamist/>

**Dr. Aysenur Benevento's** contribution observed the topic from psychological lenses and critiqued the existing literature for lacking clear theoretical ground. Benevento investigates the psychology's foundational theories and overviews their contributions to the study of radicalisation from a psychological perspective. This review focuses on the Psychoanalytic, Cognitive, Behaviourist and Socio-Cultural schools of thought, which have different approaches to the human psyche and the processes of change. This study illustrates that theories in Psychology identify various distinct elements as contributing factors to radicalisation. Through identifying the commonalities and disparities among the four schools of thought, this review contends that these different approaches do not invalidate each other but rather provide alternative pictures of the radicalisation process.

**Available at:** <https://bpy.bilgi.edu.tr/en/publications/understanding-process-radicalisation-psychological/>

Lastly, **Dr. Ayse Tecmen** examined the strategic documents that use the term and heavily influenced European Union policies. Tecmen discusses the emergence of radicalisation and its prevention as a key pillar the EU's counter-terrorism strategy. Tracing the changes in the methods of cooperation and the proliferation of prevention strategies, Tecmen provides a review of the changes in the radicalisation discourse illustrating that the EU maintains that escalation of radicalisation to terrorism is still a main premise within this discourse. While strategies since the mid-2010s have become oriented towards identifying the “root causes” thereby partly addressing the individual socio-economic and psychological factors that provoke radicalisation, there is still an overemphasis on Salafi Islam as opposed to right-wing radicalisation.

**Available at:** <https://bpy.bilgi.edu.tr/en/publications/european-unions-articulation-of-radicalisation-dec/>

### COUNTRY REPORTS

The country report series reviews the major political, social and cultural developments in Germany, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands that are related to migration and integration. They cover significant developments such as elections, new discourses, including the rise of populism and radicalisation. In doing so, they discuss immigration laws as well as migration and integration policies in Germany while stressing the case of Muslim-origin migrants and their descendants. However, this study does not focus on the influence and reception of migration and integration policies on the migrant population. Thus, these country reports avoid making a sociological evaluation in order to refrain from reproducing stereotypes based on culture, religion, and ethnicity. In fact, they focus on the changing migration and integration policies which have also contributed to the structural discrimination of migrants.

**Country reports are available at:** <https://bpy.bilgi.edu.tr/en/publications/archive/>

### City Narratives

In this research, we argue that local aspects are as important as national and global aspects to understand the root causes of radicalisation, extremism, nationalism, populism, fundamentalism and violence. In this respect, we want to magnify the contemporary history of each city in which we conduct our interviews with both native and Muslim-origin youngsters as far as the processes of deindustrialization, unemployment, poverty, exclusion, alienation and isolation are concerned. Because we claim that radicalisation processes of both groups of youngsters in the European context are likely to result from their local forms of response to the detrimental effects of globalisation. We believe that revealing local socio-economic, political, demographic and ethno-cultural dynamics may help us better understand the current forms of youth radicalisation.

To that end, our field researchers have prepared various city narratives reflecting on the history of the cities selected for the fieldwork. More city narratives will be available at our website throughout the project.

City narrative on Cologne prepared by **Melanie Weissenberg** is available at: <https://bpy.bilgi.edu.tr/en/germany-city-narratives/>

City narrative on Aalst prepared by **Dr. An van Raemdonck** is available at: <https://bpy.bilgi.edu.tr/en/belgium-city-narratives/>

City narrative on Lyon prepared by **Max-Valentin Robert** is available at: <https://bpy.bilgi.edu.tr/en/france-city-narratives/>

City narrative on Amsterdam prepared by **Merel Zuurbier** is available at: <https://bpy.bilgi.edu.tr/en/netherlands-city-narratives/>

## LITERATURE REVIEWS ON MOROCCO

This project focuses on the effects of globalisation on Turkish-origin youth and Moroccan origin youth in Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands. In order to reflect on the home-land politics of Morocco, the history of Moroccan emigration to Europe and its diaspora politics, Lalla Amina Drhimeur has prepared 3 reports.

“The interactions between the Turkish and Moroccan State actors and governments” is available at: <https://bpy.bilgi.edu.tr/en/publications/interactions-between-turkish-and-moroccan-state-ac/>

“The State of the Art on Moroccan Emigration to Europe” is available at: <https://bpy.bilgi.edu.tr/en/publications/state-art-moroccan-emigration-europe/>

“Moroccan political system: Literature Review” is available at: <https://bpy.bilgi.edu.tr/en/publications/moroccan-political-system-literature-review/>

## COVID-19 and the School of the Future

By **Prof. Mehdi Lahlou**, University Mohammed V, Morocco



With all the measures that have been taken all around the world since December 2019, and especially since March 2020, it has become clear that Coronavirus crisis has shed more light on inequalities between rich and poor countries, and within the same country, whether rich or poor, the inequalities between the most affluent and less affluent categories of the population.

When it comes to inequalities between countries, it's clear, for example, that while European countries, North Americans, Chinese, Japanese or South Koreans can easily produce or have access to all the medicines and medical equipment their populations need, African countries as a whole, like many poor countries in Latin America and Asia, live in fear of not being able to do the same. This is all the more so since almost all of their health care systems are severely failing. In the same vein, the risks of famine in these same countries have become greater with the disjointed global transport of goods, including food products, which have also seen their prices skyrocket since the onset of the health crisis.

Within each country, the economic and social gap between the richest, the better educated, the most socially protected and the others have become deeper and deeper. It is now as deep as it is socially explosive in most countries of the South where tens of millions of people have fallen below the poverty line, and are increasingly hungry or threatened with famine. To this end, the World Food Programme estimated in early April 2020 that hunger could affect 250 million people by December 2020, up from nearly 130 million persons in 2018.

For the rest, while the global health crisis has shown that it is now possible for many production functions

to be carried out in the most advanced countries by telework and that a very large proportion of pupils and students can take their courses in the same way, in poor countries, such an option is only allowed at the margins. This is because the concerned economies are dominated mainly by informal activities, and distance education is only possible for a very small proportion of students, given the combination of many factors, including the poverty of parents who cannot equip themselves as their children with computers, the absence in large geographical areas of any internet or phone or television coverage, the size of the dwellings where many people are mostly crammed into the same room, the illiteracy of parents who cannot accompany their children to follow the distance courses they are supposed to benefit from, or the inability of the teachers to have the necessary equipment, both at home and in their schools.

In this regard, access to food, school or telework, the ability to have the best responses to coronavirus and other viruses, seems predetermined for a large part of the world's population by multifaceted inequalities, including economic, financial, educational and health inequalities, which persist between nations. However, if there is an inequality that will cause all others to continue, and which poses a threat to all humanity when it comes to a new global epidemic - and there would still be many in the future, especially given the growing environmental

problems - or as long as it is a question of combating all forms of human precariousness and access to economic and social development, it is that of access to school and the knowledge that it is associated with.

Starting the now universally accepted principle that knowledge is a common good, and that school is the standard vehicle for acquiring shared knowledge, useful to all, investment in it appears to be paramount. In this sense, it becomes an obligation for every state as well as for the international community as a whole. Schools, like the safety of people in all its forms within a nation, must be the responsibility of the public authority, one of the first tasks of which is to make it accessible to all. Education must thereby be widespread, compulsory and free. This goes without saying in most developed countries, but it is worth mentioning and repeating in all others. And if a country cannot do it on its own, it must be assisted by all others, and by relevant international organizations, such as UNESCO, UNDP and other UNICEF.

Such a school must be part of a position of participation, openness and adherence to the need to train children (and, as a result, students) in scientific rationality and the development of their creative spirit through individual and collective research. It must also consider the cultural, historical and values of each country/society that invests in it. It would also benefit from enshrining in its programmes the values and teachings of solidarity, complementarity and sharing among peoples, as well as the principles of social justice and equality between men and women.

The school of the future, that of the coming decades, is the one we build as soon as today. Those who will train or teach there will be born this year and in the next few years. But those who need to think about it are women and men, and politicians, the heads of international bodies as well as national and international NGOs already at the helm.

In this sense, this school, which is our total responsibility, can get us out of our current crises as it could make them even more dramatic if nothing is done to make it more open, more progressive and, above all, accessible to all, all over the world.

## Riots in Brussels: on Corona “lockdown tiredness” and police racial bias

By **Dr. An Van Raemdonck**, ERC AdG PRIME Youth Researcher, European Institute, Istanbul Bilgi University; and Postdoctoral Researcher at the Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam



A 19-year old resident of Anderlecht, Brussels, died on Friday night during a police chase. Adil, from Moroccan background, drove a moped together with a friend when they noticed a police patrol to enforce the mobility restrictions due to the Corona pandemic. The two youngsters fled from a police confrontation after which the patrolling officers chase them through the streets of Anderlecht and call for reinforcement from the Anti-Crime Brigade. While Adil bypasses a small van, he clashes into the second police vehicle head-on and passes away immediately.[i]

Soon after his tragic death, calls on social media were raised to stage a public protest to show indignation. Twitter users called for justice and an investigation into the events leading to Adil's death with the hashtag #JusticePourAdil. They called for a silent march on Saturday, a gathering that rapidly became dominated by acts of violence, hurling stones and destructions of cars. Dozens of youth came out on the streets, and within two days, about 100 individuals had been arrested across the district. About 30% of those arrests concern minors.[ii]

Belgian Minister of the Interior, Pieter De Crem (Christian-Democrats, CD&V), has defended the police behaviour and encourages a “zero-tolerance” policy against any group gatherings including protests, in light of the current Coronavirus mobility restrictions. He dismisses any link between the deadly incident and the ensuing riots, stating that “nobody shows understanding for what happens in those districts. [...] These youngsters are not in agreement with our norms and values, and they will be punished for it.”[iii]

Among the Brussels police personnel, some suggested to the Belgian media that “lockdown tiredness” among youngsters may have played a role in the escalation of violence in the days following Adil's death.[iv] The case is being examined, and important information on the circumstances of the event is yet unknown. Yet, many questions have been raised by civil society organisations and youth workers about the appropriateness of the police intervention and the motivations behind the riots. [v] Was this incident triggered by a desire to enforce lockdown restrictions vigorously - a policy that already is subject of debate and implemented with different levels of tolerance across Belgian municipalities?[vi] Would the patrolling officers start a chase and call for reinforcement from the Anti-Crime Brigade if they had noticed instead of Adil, a 30-year old white male or female on a moped escaping a police check? Did the young people on the street express their anger with the help of frustration due to enduring lockdown measures?

By referring to “lockdown tiredness” in an effort to understand the riots, attention is shifted to the youngsters' behaviour rather than the police actions and underlying motives. This view ignores the explicit calls for “justice” raised in social media and disregards existing studies demonstrating police bias against minority youth. A recent investigation by Amnesty International shows how racial profiling among Belgian police is widespread. The human rights organisation deplores the lack of data collection and national policy.”[vii]

The report states:

In Belgium the Minister of the Interior, the federal police and the local police have so far done very little to prevent, detect or combat ethnic profiling and to fulfil the right on non-discrimination. Instead, they have been reluctant to acknowledge that there is a cause for concern, a need for data collection, or that police officers may lack the training, processes and knowledge necessary to address any reliance on negative stereotypes about people belonging to ethnic minority groups.

Amnesty International's own research shows that half of the interviewed police officers show awareness and concern of the problem and recount details of practices considered as bias and ethnic profiling. A youth worker who was present during the Saturday events explains to the press how the minority youth present interpreted and experienced Adil's death. They told him "it could have been me, or my little brother. Something stupid happens, and next you are dead". This incident reinforced their feeling that "our lives are less worthy than another's." [viii] The youth worker concludes that this Corona policy 'accident' above all points at the larger systemic problem within society that targets and disadvantages the socially vulnerable.

The event has prompted some politicians to express their opinions. Apart from showing disagreement with the violence used by the youngsters, Flemish Minister of Brussels Benjamin Dalle (Christian Democrats, CD&V) stated that concern and consideration is required for how the crisis affects vulnerable youth. [ix] Mayor of Antwerp and leader of right populist party New Flemish Alliance (N-VA), Bart de Wever, equally called for reasonable tolerance in the implementation of lockdown measures, especially concerning socio-economically disadvantaged groups who live in small houses and have little access to parks or green zones. [x] On Twitter and Facebook, far-right party adherents refer to the event to reinforce existing stereotypes that equal minority youth with criminal and violent behaviour.

[i] <https://www.demorgen.be/nieuws/rellen-in-anderlecht-na-dood-19-jarige-beelden-tonen-hoe-relschopper-politiewapen-steelt-en-schoten-lost-43-mensen-opgepakt-b88cfed9/>; <https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/en/2020/04/12/death-of-youngster-in-police-chase-triggers-unrest/>

[ii] [https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20200412\\_04920993](https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20200412_04920993)

[iii] [https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20200412\\_04920993](https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20200412_04920993)

[iv] <https://www.hln.be/in-de-buurt/brussel/rellen-in-anderlecht-nadat-19-jarige-sterft-na-aanrijding-door-politievoertuig-jongeren-plunderen-combi-en-gaan-aan-de-haal-met-vuurwapen-a88cfed9/>

[v] <https://kifkif.be/cnt/artikel/na-de-dood-van-adil-welke-onderzoeken-zijn-er-nodig-8874?fbclid=IwAR3kZI5bFtrKy2Tel-u->

[EiZclifgg4yF4aeL8w\\_TX6z6WsBqo8RybjikXco](https://www.brussel.be/samenleving/hele-buurt-viert-op-sstraat-maar-politie-danst-mee-2020-04-12?fbclid=IwAR30yN5ZutHSwOFzQ1Z47P_eLB_1lhshEyR_-6sb7sogFW3xxwr_t5WgsvY)

[vi] One day after Adil's death, people entered the streets in support of medical personnel in Sint-Lambrechts-Woluwe, another district of Brussels. Police officers were present but did not enforce social distancing measures and tolerated the spontaneous show of support. [https://www.brussel.be/samenleving/hele-buurt-viert-op-sstraat-maar-politie-danst-mee-2020-04-12?fbclid=IwAR30yN5ZutHSwOFzQ1Z47P\\_eLB\\_1lhshEyR\\_-6sb7sogFW3xxwr\\_t5WgsvY](https://www.brussel.be/samenleving/hele-buurt-viert-op-sstraat-maar-politie-danst-mee-2020-04-12?fbclid=IwAR30yN5ZutHSwOFzQ1Z47P_eLB_1lhshEyR_-6sb7sogFW3xxwr_t5WgsvY)

[vii] <https://www.politico.eu/article/racial-ethnic-profiling-by-belgian-police-is-cause-for-concern-report/>; [https://www.amnesty-international.be/sites/default/files/bijlagen/ethnic\\_profiling\\_executive\\_summary\\_en.pdf](https://www.amnesty-international.be/sites/default/files/bijlagen/ethnic_profiling_executive_summary_en.pdf)

[viii] <https://www.brussel.be/samenleving/adil-nog-niet-gezien-door-zijn-ouders-maar-de-simplismen-zijn-daar-al-2020-04-12>

[ix] [https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20200412\\_04920993](https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20200412_04920993)

[x] <https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2020/04/13/bart-e-wever-n-va-advertentie-over-bankzitten-niet-goed-en-h/>

This blog entry is also available in Turkish at: <https://bpy.bilgi.edu.tr/en/blog/brukselde-ayaklanmalar-karantina-bikkinligi-ve-pol/>

Please follow us on Twitter [@BILGIERC](https://twitter.com/BILGIERC) to receive notifications about our new blog posts.

## HORIZON 2020 PROJECTS

### Ending Project: Horizon 2020 RESPOND: Multilevel Governance of Mass Migration in Europe and Beyond

# RESPOND



Horizon 2020  
European Union Funding  
for Research & Innovation

**From: 01 December 2017 - To: 30 November 2020**

*"This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 770564"*

#### Project Summary:

With the goal of enhancing the governance capacity and policy coherence of the EU, its member states and neighbors, RESPOND is a comprehensive study of migration governance in the wake of the 2015 Refugee Crisis. Bringing together 14 partners from 7 disciplines, the project probes policy-making processes and policy (in)coherence through comparative research in source, transit and destination countries. RESPOND analyzes migration governance across macro (transnational, national), meso (sub-national/local) and microlevels (refugees/migrants) by applying an innovative research methodology utilizing legal and policy analysis, comparative historical analysis, political claims analysis, socio-economic and cultural analysis, longitudinal survey analysis, interview based analysis, and photovoice techniques. It focuses in-depth on: (1) Border management and security, (2) International refugee protection, (3) Reception policies, (4) Integration policies, and (5) Conflicting Europeanization and externalization. We use these themes to examine multi-level governance while tackling the troubling question of the role of forced migration in precipitating increasing disorder in Europe. In contrast to much research undertaken on governance processes at a single level of analysis, RESPOND's multilevel, multi-method approach shows the co-constitutive relationship between policy and practice among actors at all three levels; it highlights the understudied role of meso-level officials; and it shines a light on the activities of non-governmental actors in the face of policy vacuums. Ultimately, RESPOND will show which migration governance policies really work and how migrants and officials are making-do in the too-frequent absence of coherent policies. Adhering to a refugee-centered approach throughout, RESPOND will bring insights to citizenship, gender and integration studies, ensure direct benefit to refugee communities and provide a basis for more effective policy development.

#### Consortium:

- 1 UPPSALA UNIVERSITET Sweden
- 2 THE GLASGOW CALEDONIAN UNIVERSITY United Kingdom
- 3 GEORG-AUGUST-UNIVERSITÄT GÖTTINGENSTIFTUNG OFFENTLICHEN RECHTS Germany
- 4 THE CHANCELLOR, MASTERS AND SCHOLARS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE United Kingdom
- 5 ISTANBUL BILGI UNIVERSITESI Turkey
- 6 SWEDISH RESEARCH INSTITUTE IN ISTANBUL Sweden
- 7 ÖZYEGIN UNIVERSITESI Turkey
- 8 UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI FIRENZE Italy
- 9 ΠΑΝΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΙΟ ΑΙΓΑΙΟΥ Greece
- 10 OESTERREICHISCHE AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN Austria
- 11 UNIWERSYTET WARSZAWSKI Poland

- 12 KOBENHAVNS UNIVERSITET Denmark
- 13 LEBANON SUPPORT Lebanon
- 14 THE HAMMURABI HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATION, Iraq

## POLICY BRIEFS

### Authors

**Prof. Ayhan Kaya**, Principal Investigator İstanbul Bilgi University

**Dr. Susan Rottmann**, Principal Investigator, Özyeğin University

**Dr. Ela Gökalp-Aras**, Principal Investigator, Swedish Research Institute in İstanbul

**Dr. Zeynep Şahin-Mencütek**, Senior Researcher, Swedish Research Institute in İstanbul

### Policy Brief 1: Border Management and Protection Policies for Syrian Refugees in Turkey



Credit: Hüseyin Aldemir (İstanbul Bilgi University)

#### Executive Summary

This Policy Brief focuses on border management and international protection policies, practices and humanitarian responses to refugee immigration between 2011 and 2018 in Turkey. This brief addresses the main challenges in terms of the focused policy areas with an emphasis on the nexus of forced and irregular migration, in particular regarding the situation of Syrians in Turkey. It also offers some policy recommendations for different stakeholders. Our research is primarily based on the fieldwork that conducted in İstanbul, İzmir, Şanlıurfa and Ankara in 2018. Turkey is different from the European Union (EU) Member States in the sense that it does not grant refugee status to non-European refugees but the "conditional-refugee" status as pending the resettlement and durable solutions of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) elsewhere, due to Turkey's geographical limitation to the 1951 Geneva Convention. This results in limits to protection under international law, a dual international protection regime as well as reduced access to rights. In addition, Syrians are provided

temporary protection, which brings additional complexities and uncertainties for the asylum policy and international protection.

Regarding border management, Turkey's initial open-door approach towards Syrian mass migration have gradually turned into reluctant approach, evolved around deterrence and return. Turkey's stance toward exits of irregular migrants, particularly in its Western costs has been utmost importance. Beside humanitarian and legal concerns, domestic politics and geopolitical considerations shape Turkey's perspective about bordering in and outside of the country. Dual protection regime and dominance of temporary mechanisms characterize the national protection regime.

Gap between legislations and actual practices are observable, generating high level of precarity and fragility for asylum seekers and holders of international/temporary protection statuses. Most worrying protection related problems include difficulty to access registrations, situation in removal centres, bans on travel and assessing asylum applications.

There are increasing concerns about the outcome of Covid-19 pandemic are already further restricting the formal and informal protection mechanisms available to asylum seekers, refugees and irregular migrants.

This policy brief is based on analysis of reports, political speeches, legal documents and interviews.

## **From Guesthood to Return: Turkey's Changing Migration Policy**

Initially, Turkish political leaders welcomed Syrians with open arms and described them as religious brothers who deserved Turkish hospitality. However, as time wore on the situation has changed dramatically. This brief was written in a period in which worrying developments took place in Turkey with regard to the state of migrants under temporary protection. Regarding the internal controls, following the election defeat of the ruling party in the local elections in Istanbul (June 2019), the Governor of Istanbul operating under the Ministry of Interior announced that Syrians under temporary protection residing in Istanbul without a valid document showing their legal residence permit, in other words, those who had originally been registered in other cities at their reception would be sent back to the cities where they were initially registered with the risk of losing their protection rights. For many years, many Syrians had found ways to migrate to Istanbul to find better opportunities with respect to jobs, education, housing and protection, despite the fact that they were originally registered in different cities, mostly in the cities bordering Syria.

Following the sharp increase of crossings from Turkey to Greece, new policy tools and agreements were also introduced regarding the external border controls, such as the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016. Briefly according to the Statement, the EU Heads of State or Government and Turkey agreed to end irregular migration flows from Turkey to the EU, ensure

improved reception conditions for refugees in Turkey and open up organised, safe and legal channels to Europe for Syrian refugees. The Statement not only aims to prevent loss of lives in the Aegean Sea, but also seeks to break down migrant smuggling networks and replace illegal migration with legal migration. The Statement also formulates regulations specifically concerning Syrians as distinct from general, irregular transit migrants. Known as the "one-to-one" formula, this article requires that for every Syrian returned to Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian should be resettled in the EU (Article 2).

Worries about the conditions of irregular migrants and migrants under temporary protection grew when Turkish state actors declared they would open the

borders for irregular migrants to head towards the European borders on 29 February 2020, the day after 34 Turkish soldiers were killed by the Syrian regime forces in Idlib, the northwest province of Syria. It was declared that Turkey's borders with Europe would be opened and Turkey stopped border controls at its EU borders. Since then, immigrants and refugees from various countries including from Syria, began to accumulate and thousands gathered at the border areas such as Edirne, Çanakkale, and İzmir, along with the land and sea borders with Greece. While they were trying to enter Europe, they faced serious humanitarian tragedies, traumas and violations. Some of them could cross the borders, but they were prevented by the border forces in the countries they reached, and faced the risk of serious push-backs and violence while also becoming the target of human smuggling networks. In addition, those who want to cross the borders irregularly became subject to loss of rights and for this reason, removal from international or temporary protection in Turkey. As of 28th March, the majority of these migrants were taken by the state actors back from the border and distributed to nine cities.

This new development once more showed how vulnerable irregular and forced migrants are to the political changes in the region.

A mounting discourse about the need for Syrians to return has replaced the initial discourses of guesthood and the Ansar spirit. The ruling elite has refrained from using a discourse of integration as they strongly believe that it is the discourse of return, which will politically pay off. It is for this reason that the Directorate General for Migration Management (DGMM) is reluctant to publicise the Integration Strategy Document (Uyum Strateji Belgesi), which has already been reported to have been prepared by the Ministry of Interior. In the midst of the growing stream of return discourses are practices to encourage so-called voluntary returns (e.g. municipal campaigns to return home, provision of transportation support, 'go and see visits'). There are growing concerns about Turkey's unilateral approach, its strategy of providing restricted protection while encouraging return, and the principles that it ignores during returns such as voluntariness, safety, and security.

In addition, the ongoing cross-border operations and the return emphasis for Syrians in Turkey got

more visible and emphasized. Regarding the return dimension, it should also be emphasized that as of 22 July 2019, Turkey unilaterally suspended the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement; however, the EU-Turkey Statement (2016) appears to still be functional, which has also significant implications on international protection. Although, the recent developments at the EU-Turkey border cities, in particular Edirne, appear as against the principles of the the Statement and in a way, its de facto suspension by Turkey, returns can still take place under the EU-Turkey Statement from Greece to Turkey. Therefore, Syrians under temporary protection have started to feel even more threatened and at the conjunction of the irregular and forced migration nexus, they have been subject to instrumentalization by Turkey and made into a bargaining chip during times of crises with the EU.

### **Protection**

Registration of asylum seekers is the first critical step for status determination and access to rights. Since the Fall 2018, Turkey's migration agency, the DGMM has taken full authority for refugee status determination (RSD) procedures by gradually eliminating the parallel procedure carried out with the UNHCR. The DGMM has been the sole responsible authority for registrations for temporary protection and verification and renewal of previous registrations. However, non-standardized practices in registration have been observable across cities. Not only access to rights but also in some cities even the access to asylum is challenging for migrants, since authorities have temporarily suspended registration for both international and temporary protection applicants and are not taking first registrations.

Turkey has a dual protection system, basically offering different treatment or access to rights by asylum seekers from European countries and non-European countries, which is legitimized by Turkey's geographical limitation regarding the 1951 Refugee Convention. The country also maintains different treatment of Syrian and non-Syrians with respect to temporary protection status. This situation leads to vast differences regarding access to rights for the beneficiaries of international and temporary protection and for those who are Syrians, non-Syrians or non-Europeans.

In general, our respondents highlighted nationality-based differences or discriminations in practice with regards to access to asylum. Non-Syrian beneficiaries or applicants of international protection appear to be more disadvantaged. Access to asylum, in particular, at the borders appears problematic for both international and temporary protection applicants. For asylum seekers, it is difficult to reach non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) to get legal assistance. The majority of the migrants, who are caught at the borders during irregular border-crossings, do not know about their rights to apply for asylum. Also, making asylum applications through law enforcement forces after being apprehended is difficult. Few IGOs and NGOs are able to officially cooperate with Turkish law-enforcement forces at the border-crossing points to provide information to migrants about an

international protection application. Beside problems that migrants face accessing information, Turkish state agencies have shortcomings in capacity, training and preparation for solely carrying out registration, identification, evaluation and appeal stages that are marked by uncertainties and inconsistencies. Problems in each stage either hinder or slow down the recognition of vulnerabilities within the asylum procedure. Access to international protection during the administrative detention and deportations or so-called "voluntary returns" from removal centres can be noted as the most challenging protection issues. In February 2018, the derogation from the principle of nonrefoulement was introduced for reasons, such as public order, security and terrorism. This widely used derogation also raises concerns about protection.

The temporary protection regime for Syrian refugees is based on temporality and uncertainty due to its design. Considering that temporary protection is not the main protection itself, but an interim measure provided in emergency situations, such as mass-migration movements, it should not be seen as an alternative to international protection. Rights and procedural safeguards attached to temporary protection are weaker than those attached to international protection. By hindering access to international protection, temporarily protected individuals face the risk of being subject to an insecure status for an indefinite period time. Therefore, there is a significant risk of protracted refugee situations where there is no available durable solution other than repatriation. This is also relevant to the fact that the status of temporary protection prevents asylum seekers from approaching the UNHCR for resettlement except in a very few emergency and vulnerable cases.

### **Methodology**

The policy brief is based on RESPOND reports comprising data from different sources in order to provide comprehensive insights regarding policies, regulations, practices and experiences of border management, reception, protection and integration in Turkey.

The discussion of politics and legal regulations is based on a document analysis of policy and legislative documents. In addition, the reports draw from 84 semi-structured interviews conducted with different meso level stakeholders in four cities, namely: Istanbul (17), Izmir (29), Sanliurfa (34), and Ankara (4). The meso level analysis is based on total 84 interviews conducted in Istanbul (17), Izmir (29), Sanliurfa (34), and Ankara (4) by members of the Turkish research team between July 2018 and November 2018. Interviews were conducted with high level state officers, including representatives from ministries, and directorates, local government bodies (municipalities, city councils), law enforcement agencies, provincial civil servants, experts from international organizations (IOM, UNHCR), representatives of international, national, local non-governmental organizations and lawyers dealing with cases about migrants.

Micro level interviews were conducted by the same research team in İstanbul (40), İzmir (43), and Şanlıurfa (20) to understand the ways in which refugees respond to the policies, regulations and practices of reception at local and national levels. 103 refugees of mostly Syrian origin, as well as some Iraqis and Afghans, were interviewed in the summer of 2018. The data was analysed on the basis of a qualitative content analysis approach which combines deductive and inductive elements. The software, Nvivo12 Pro, was used as an essential tool in the study for the processing of data.

## Policy Recommendations

**1. Working together:** Turkish migration and asylum policy require multidimensional cooperation and coordination among actors and sectors. It requires both strong state actors like the DGMM and strong civil society networks, which can bring together very different stakeholders to take part in the process.

**2. Consensus building:** Effective migration and asylum policy involve building and managing political consensus across the country. A migrant/refugee friendly public opinion should be encouraged by the political leadership of the country together with academia, civil society organizations and the media to foster a positive attitude about migrants and refugees. The national parliament could be the venue for the building of consensus among different political parties.

**3. Developing a holistic approach:** Migration and asylum policies are all interconnected. Admission is connected to integration; reception conditions are connected to long-term integration outcomes; and housing policy is connected to public opinion. This makes migration/refugee policy especially complex and it makes holistic, integrated approaches, multilevel governance, and institutional and international cooperation essential.

**4. Facilitating knowledge formation:** Turkey must be able to evaluate the policies that are implemented, and this requires benchmarks and indicators. All of the stakeholders must be able to analyse the results and communicate them back to the public. All of this requires data collection and interpretation. There should be scientific venues where a synergy can be constructed between government, civil society, and academia to exchange views and opinions on objective grounds.

**5. Improving border management and protection:** Turkey needs a more civilian border management structure and elimination of vagueness and contradictions in its legal framework are needed. At the borders, blocking the migratory flows in the neighbourhood by constructing a border wall or conducting unilateral military operations cannot be seen as an effective border management policy in the long run. In terms of internal controls, the implementation of travel permit measures should be re-formulated, as it significantly limits the exercise of freedom of movement of people who are under international or temporary protection in Turkey. In relation to return, voluntary returns should be closely monitored and the non-refoulement principle should always be respected.

The procedures and consequences of readmission agreements should be carefully analysed. Moreover, to comply with human right standards, Turkey should act more transparently and cooperatively with non-state actors in the apprehension, deportation, and voluntary return of asylum seekers.

**6. Training of border officials and law enforcement authorities:** Officials who come into contact with refugees should be aware of international and domestic laws relating to asylum-seekers and refugees. They should be trained on how to handle asylum applications, including sensitive ones, such as those based on gender-based persecution or those submitted by minors.

**7. Consistent rights-based approach in Access to asylum:** All state and non-state actors should embrace a rights-based approach. Ensuring the equal and fair access to asylum procedures and the facilitation of full access to legal aid should be among the major priorities. The disadvantages and differences between international and temporary protection should be gradually eliminated. The inconsistencies between primary and secondary law should be narrowed down in favour of eliminating restrictions, such as the domestic travel limitations of Syrians. Legislation, implementation and monitoring should be better harmonized.

*Further readings:*

1. RECEPTION POLICIES, PRACTICES & RESPONSES: TURKEY COUNTRY REPORT <https://www.respondmigration.com/wp-blog/refugee-reception-policies-practices-responses-turkey-country-report>
2. REFUGEE PROTECTION REGIMES: TURKEY COUNTRY REPORT: <https://www.respondmigration.com/wp-blog/refugee-protection-regimes-turkey-country-report>
3. BORDER MANAGEMENT AND MIGRATION CONTROLS IN TURKEY REPORT <https://www.respondmigration.com/wp-blog/border-management-migration-controls-turkey-report>
4. TURKEY - COUNTRY REPORT: LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK OF MIGRATION GOVERNANCE <https://respondmigration.com/wp-blog/2018/8/1/comparative-report-legal-and-policy-framework-of-migration-governance-pclyw-ydmzj-bzdbn-sc548-ncfcp>
5. INTEGRATION IN TURKEY REPORT (FORTHCOMING) <https://www.respondmigration.com/wp-blog>

## Policy Brief 2: Reception and Integration of Syrian Refugees in Turkey



*Credit: Hüseyin Aldemir (İstanbul Bilgi University)*

### Executive Summary

This Policy Brief focuses on reception and integration policies, practices and humanitarian responses to refugee immigration between 2011 and 2017 in Turkey. Protection under international law is limited for migrants, since Turkey does not grant refugee status to non-European refugees (instead granting “conditional refugee status” or “temporary protection status.”) This Policy Brief addresses the main challenges of reception and integration for migrants under temporary protection (mainly Syrians) in Turkey and offers some policy recommendations for different stakeholders. Our research is primarily based on interviews with stakeholders and forced migrants conducted in İstanbul, İzmir, Şanlıurfa and Ankara in 2018. Overall, Turkey’s forced migrants face a very challenging situation, as they are frequently subject to new regulations due to the country’s rapidly changing, polarized political climate; policy shifts; securitization; they are pressed into the lowest social classes, making due with sub-standard living conditions and suffer from mental and physical health conditions brought on by their journeys and on-going daily struggles. Yet, they do make a home in Turkey, finding ways to support their families, enrol their children in schools and access healthcare. They become integrated even without a coherent national policy. Most wish for greater political and social rights, the possibility of long-term, secure settlement, as well as increased societal acceptance in their communities.

Recent geopolitical developments as well as the start of the global pandemic, Covid-19, make the possibility of attaining these basic goals seem further away than ever before.

### Reception Governance

In Turkey, Syrians were first registered by the camps authorities under the surveillance of the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) in collaboration with the Directorate General of Migration Management. From the very beginning of the Syrian civil war, Turkey had a state-centric model

of reception. All Syrian nationals, Palestinian refugees, and stateless persons living in Syria are under the temporary protection regime in Turkey. Initially, Turkey established camps for the most vulnerable groups and has generally been supportive of self-settlement. The camps are now almost completely closed down. As of May 2020, only 1,7% of Syrians reside in the camps. Since the beginning of mass migration in 2011, Turkey adopted a flexible, but controllable, approach by making residence permits tied to a certain province. The reception of Syrian refugees in Turkey is mainly based on a discourse of tolerance and benevolence driven from path-dependent ethno-cultural and religious premises dating back to the Ottoman Empire of the late 19th century as well as to the establishment of the Turkish Republic in the 1920s. It is known that harsh reception policies become a tool to ensure the temporary nature of refugee stay. The Turkish camps offered power, hot water, schools, playgrounds, and job training courses to the migrants. Turkey’s camps were even praised by international media as the “perfect refugee camps”. Irrespective of the conditions within, however, 98% of refugees in Turkey have chosen self-settlement mainly in urban areas, rejecting the camp option. The Turkish case, therefore, suggests that there was a restriction of movement, isolation and a passive life inside the camps.

### Integration Governance or Non-Integration Governance?

Syrians are gradually integrating in all major areas. However, integration is far from uniform, but varies according to gender, age, life stage, social class and other factors. Among the three regions of Turkey in which we conducted research (Şanlıurfa, İzmir and İstanbul), integration seems to be slightly smoother for migrants due to shared linguistic and social ties in Şanlıurfa and slightly more challenging for migrants due to host community reception in İzmir. But, in general we observed only slight differences in service provision between the three cities.

Syrians have established formal and informal grassroots organizations for humanitarian relief, socio-religious services and empowerment via employment, particularly in the border cities and in İstanbul. They actively participate in activities organized for social cohesion by municipalities, local NGOs or faith-based actors. However, their participation often remains tokenist manner, as they are rarely able to make rights claims. Some organizations, having socio-economic capital are able to collaborate with organizations of the Syrian diaspora elsewhere. Also, some Syrian community leaders and grassroots organizations emphasize Arabic teaching, literature and art among the refugee community to maintain Syrian identity.

### Labour Market

At the heart of self-sufficiency is the ability for individuals to earn a living and provide for their families. Under temporary protection, refugees do not have the right to work without obtaining a hard-to-get work permit. Before the enactment of Law 8375 in January 2016, which allowed Syrians under

temporary protection to have work permits only under certain conditions and with certain restrictions, there were only 7,351 work permits issued to Syrians. They were mostly issued to those who started a business. The number of Syrians who received work permits in 2019 was around 65,000. This is still a low number compared to the total number of Syrians in Turkey who have no way to support themselves besides working and who are provided just a small amount of cash-transfer- the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN), known as “Kızılay cards”. In Turkey, around 1.7 million of the most vulnerable refugees receive these monthly cash-transfers of 120 Turkish liras financed by the EU in collaboration with the World Food Programme, the Turkish Red Crescent and Turkish government institutions. The cards have been distributed by Turkish authorities since 2016.

Without easy legal channels to access the labour market, the informal sector becomes the only option for most individuals to earn a living. Jobs are mostly found in the textile, construction, service and agricultural sectors. Wages for Syrians are generally reported to be only half of the minimum legal salary and some participants reported making as little as 30 TL a day. It should be mentioned of course that none of these jobs provide job security, occupational safety, or social security benefits.

## Education

With regards to education, around two thirds of Syrian children are now in school, and urgent steps are needed to ensure that the remainder enrol as soon as possible. New programmes supported by the EU and the Ministry of National Education have been implemented to smooth the transition of Syrians into Turkish schools and to improve educational outcomes of Syrians. Our research shows that there are still barriers to access and tensions in schools, among children and between children and teachers. There is a strong need for more cohesion programming and diversity education. Adult language education is also an urgent need, particularly an increased number of courses and more Turkish-language teacher training is required.

## Housing

The average size of a Syrian refugee family is just above 5 people, with an average of 2 families in each household. Housing and living costs are higher for Syrian refugees due to abuse by landlords, and they are generally higher in Istanbul than in other parts of the country, resulting in multiple families living under the same roof. A majority of Syrians navigate their way in Turkey with overwhelmed public and support services, coupled with a language barrier. Even though assistance and protection are being sporadically provided by a number of aid agencies to the refugee population settled in urban areas, urban refugees struggle to secure a minimum of social and economic rights, such as education, housing and healthcare. Many families live in abject poverty, often in unsanitary, even dangerous, housing conditions. Despite all of their difficulties, they are managing to create spaces of comfort through furniture purchases and personal

decorating choices. They generally speak positively of their neighbourhoods, and our research has shown that they are emplacing themselves vividly in their cities through newly opened restaurants, shops and cultural centres.

## Healthcare Services

Refugees face significant physical and mental health difficulties, including hypertension, diabetes and depression. Some health issues are due to the aftermath of war while others can be directly attributed to living at or below the poverty line. Legally, if they are registered under the TPS system, Syrians have access to Turkey’s public hospitals free of charge.

However, they are impacted significantly by difficulties in registration, thereby impacting access to healthcare services. Many interlocutors during the field research reported a lack of access to healthcare facilities able to provide Arabic speaking staff and doctors. They attributed this as a major concern and barrier for access of Syrians to basic services. Due to the size of big cities such as Istanbul and Izmir, local transportation is also reported to be another major barrier in terms of accessing services. Since the very beginning of the mass migration, it has not been easy for Syrian refugees to travel in the country from one city to another. Domestic travel was subject to permission (travel permit) to be granted by the local authorities. This difficulty impacts both physical and mental health. International travel is impossible and travel to Syria is subject to specific permissions given during religious festival times or for funerals and trade purposes.

## Citizenship, Belonging and Gender

Most migrants claim that they want citizenship; Syrians do not find their Temporary Protection Status to confer sufficient rights. The Turkish state has been bestowing citizenship on some migrants, seemingly on an invitational basis and according to the refugee’s educational or class qualifications. While Syrian businessmen who received citizenship are pleased as it facilitated their business transactions and travelling, some others who recently acquired citizenship felt disadvantaged as they lost access to social assistance and men are now subject to compulsory military service. More information about the requirements and process is needed. Migrants are eager to participate in the political process, but this is not possible in today’s Turkey, even the possibility of having a Syrian candidate in elections sparked heated tensions in 2018.

In general, Syrian migrants feel a strong belonging in the country due to historical, cultural links, but in local communities, tensions are at an all-time high.

Syrian women’s entry into the labour market in Turkey is low, but still creating significant changes in terms of social relations within families and the broader Syrian community. For some women, migration has led to a welcome evasion of traditional roles, while others feel more burdened by new challenges and responsibilities. Traditional family roles are under pressure, leading to divorce and a rise in domestic violence. Many men

are unable to maintain their status of being the sole breadwinner that they held in Syria, leading to family tensions.

## Methodology

The policy brief is based on RESPOND reports comprising data from different sources in order to provide comprehensive insights regarding policies, regulations, practices and experiences of border management, reception, protection and integration in Turkey. The discussion of politics and legal regulations is based on a document analysis of policy and legislative documents. In addition, the reports draw from 84 semi-structured interviews conducted with different meso level stakeholders in four cities, namely: Istanbul (17), Izmir (29), Sanliurfa (34), and Ankara (4). The meso level analysis is based on total 84 interviews conducted in Istanbul (17), Izmir (29), Sanliurfa (34), and Ankara (4) by members of the Turkish research team between July 2018 and November 2018. Interviews were conducted with high level state officers, including representatives from ministries, and directorates, local government bodies (municipalities, city councils), law enforcement agencies, provincial civil servants, experts from international organizations (IOM, UNHCR), representatives of international, national, local non-governmental organizations and lawyers dealing with cases about migrants.

Micro level interviews were conducted by the same research team in Istanbul (40), Izmir (43), and Sanliurfa (20) to understand the ways in which refugees respond to the policies, regulations and practices of reception at local and national levels. 103 refugees of mostly Syrian origin, as well as some Iraqis and Afghans, were interviewed in the summer of 2018. The data was analysed on the basis of a qualitative content analysis approach which combines deductive and inductive elements. The software, Nvivo 12 Pro, was used as an essential tool in the study for the processing of data.

## Policy Recommendations

**1. Making use of our migration knowledge to develop a sustainable migration policy:** Turkey has a long history of accommodating refugees since the 19th century of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey also has a long history of outgoing labour migration since the second half of the 20th century. It is by combining these two migration experiences – the reception of various mass migrations and the Turkish labour emigrants – that Turkey can build the intellectual foundation for its own migrant/refugee reception and integration policies.

**2. Managing public opinion:** Engaging with the public and managing public opinion is of essential importance. There is a need to build a specific migrant/refugee reception and integration policy with the main purpose of reducing tensions between what the government does and how the society may interpret the government’s actions.

**3. Engaging the media:** The role of the media is clearly an integral part of public engagement. The DGMM should work on a communication strategy to appeal to the mainstream media promoting solidarity and

human protection values, with biographies and refugee testimonials, and an explanation of how they relate to all of us.

**4. Improving reception on arrival:** Reception facilities at borders, including airports, should include all necessary assistance and the provision of basic necessities of life, including food, shelter and basic sanitary and health facilities. Even for a short stay, family unity and privacy are essential. Single men and women should be accommodated separately, and families should have the possibility to stay together in the same premises.

**5. Ensuring better accommodation:** In most instances, refugees are destitute. Many depend on the solidarity of friends or relatives who may host them temporarily. Even when they can afford rented or hotel accommodation, owing to language difficulties, hostility of landlords or racial prejudices, asylum-seekers often encounter difficulties when trying to find private accommodation. This proves even more difficult when asylum-seekers are not permitted to work or cannot find employment. The state should develop programmes of quality control to ensure that all refugee housing meets minimum quality and safety standards. The government should allow migrants to move freely between Turkish cities without the need for travel permission.

**6. Access to health services:** Most refugees suffer from health problems, including emotional or mental disorders that require prompt professional treatment. Arabic translators should be available at all state hospitals and government offices, and hospital staff should be trained regarding refugee needs. The state, IOs and I/NGOs should increase awareness about psychosocial health services among refugees, and provide greater access to services.

**7. Access to education:** Following the departure from the country of origin, children asylum-seekers suffer from the forced interruption of their education. In order to restore a semblance of normality, it is essential that children benefit from primary and secondary education of a satisfactory quality. The state should also increase childcare access and language course opportunities and incentives so that adults are better able to attend language courses.

**8. Improving employment opportunities:** It is widely accepted that dependence on the state is reduced when refugees are working. Apart from the financial aspect, the right to work is an essential element of human dignity, particularly in the case of lengthy stay pending the outcome of the asylum procedure. As is already the practice in many countries, refugees should, preferably, be granted permission to work when the length of the asylum procedure exceeds a certain period or where the “package” of support offered to asylum-seekers requires independent financial self-sufficiency to maintain an adequate standard of living. The state should simplify and standardize the process of ensuring recognition of qualifications and university degrees earned in Syria.

**9. Citizenship and Political Participation:** The state should ensure a clear path to long-term residence and citizenship, with openly publicized procedures and requirements.

**10. Protecting unaccompanied and separated children:** Reception standards should address in particular the special educational, medical, psychological, recreational and other special needs of children, in accordance with relevant international human rights law, UNHCR guidelines and Executive Committee Conclusions. A legal representative should be designated for the handling of the social and legal rights of separated children throughout the asylum procedure, and otherwise to ensure that the child's best interests are represented throughout the child's stay in the country.

**11. Addressing the needs of elderly refugees:** The vulnerability inherent in advanced age makes prompt access to medical and health care an essential condition for this group. Also, lack of mobility, a sense of isolation and abandonment, as well as chronic dependency are factors, which the host authorities will need to take into account when designing adequate reception policies for this group.

**12. Supporting female refugees:** At the initial stage of the asylum procedure, female refugees need to be counselled on their rights, including the right to submit an individual application when family members accompany them. As is the case in many countries, female staff using female interpreters should interview women asylum-seekers. To the extent possible, efforts should be made to arrange female staff to carry out the determination of refugee status. Academics should conduct more gender-sensitive research in Turkey to inform policy development. The state should increase the number of women's shelters and provide training to police, DGMM and other government staff on the topic of gender-related violence.

*Further readings:*

1. RECEPTION POLICIES, PRACTICES & RESPONSES: TURKEY COUNTRY REPORT <https://www.respondmigration.com/wp-blog/refugee-reception-policies-practices-responses-turkey-country-report>
2. REFUGEE PROTECTION REGIMES: TURKEY COUNTRY REPORT: <https://www.respondmigration.com/wp-blog/refugee-protection-regimes-turkey-country-report>
3. BORDER MANAGEMENT AND MIGRATION CONTROLS IN TURKEY REPORT <https://www.respondmigration.com/wp-blog/border-management-migration-controls-turkey-report>
4. TURKEY - COUNTRY REPORT: LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK OF MIGRATION GOVERNANCE <https://respondmigration.com/wp-blog/2018/8/1/comparative-report-legal-and-policy-framework-of-migration-governance-pclyw-ydmzj-bzdbn-sc548-ncfcp>
5. INTEGRATION IN TURKEY REPORT (FORTHCOMING) <https://www.respondmigration.com/wp-blog>

**Working Paper Series:** RESPOND's Working Paper Series "Global Migration: Consequences and Responses" series makes RESPOND results freely available to scholars and the general public in order to foster the exchange of ideas and collaboration within and beyond academia. We welcome paper proposals from all researchers working on similar topics. Papers can be accessed at: <https://respondmigration.com/wp-blog>

**RESPOND Blog:** The RESPOND Blog contains posts from the researchers.

The goal of RESPOND is to study responses to mass migration to Europe in 2015 and afterward in order to provide a basis for more effective policy making. The project is an attempt to reckon with the sense of crisis that emerged due to migration movements and to generate recommendations for improving the governance capacity of the EU, member states and neighbors. RESPOND studies the key actors responsible for borders, protection, reception and integration while also addressing the broad issues of Europeanization and externalization. Employing a refugee-centered approach to the study of labor market integration, housing, citizenship and more, policy recommendations resulting from RESPOND will be relevant to refugees, effective and humane. The blog is available at: <http://responders.crs.uu.se/about-respond/>

#### RESPOND Newsletter

Respond Newsletter Series, which features recent stories from our blog, information about RESPOND researchers' activities, and upcoming events is available at: <https://respondmigration.com/newsletters>

## Horizon 2020 Project

### Migration Impact Assessment to Enhance Integration and Local Development in European Rural and Mountain Areas (MATILDE)



*MATILDE has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under Grant Agreement No 870831*

MATILDE develops a transdisciplinary conceptual and methodological framework for a multi-dimensional assessment of economic and social impacts of Third Country Nationals (TCN) at different scales (from EU-aggregate, to local level). It focuses on assessing the impacts of TCNs (inc. economic, families, forced migration and vulnerable groups) on local development and on the redistribution of resources in EU rural and mountain regions. The assessment is based on the hypothesis that TCNs are an important driver of socio-economic development and have a strong effect on the relationships between urban and rural/mountain areas and on a balanced territorial development. MATILDE uses quantitative and qualitative methods and adopts an action-research approach (through the implementation of 13 case studies throughout Europe) that emphasizes the agency of migrants and the site-specific features of the regions involved. Case studies are selected based on the presence of urban poles differently interconnected with rural and mountain areas via flows of people, economic resources and cultural exchange. The action-research approach is built on a multi-stakeholder perspective; the two-level consortium gathers research partners and diverse local partners working in the field of TCNs' integration. MATILDE partners will work together to co-construct the migration impact assessment in rural and mountain areas, engaging local stakeholders and beneficiaries, and to elaborate and share policy recommendations and governance solutions. Overall, the project improves knowledge on the social and economic development potential of TCNs in rural and mountain areas. It helps understanding the mechanisms behind the socio-economic integration of TCNs and it provides policy makers, practitioners and local stakeholders with analytical tools and place-based solutions/policy recommendations to counteract misperceptions and untapped the migration potential in rural and mountain regions.

#### Project Consortium:

1. Accademia Europea di Bolzano (IT)
2. Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg (DE)
3. Uppsala Universitet (SE)
4. Fachhochschule Kärnten, gemeinnützige Privatstiftung (AT)
5. The Glasgow Caledonian University (UK)
6. Bundesanstalt für Agrarwirtschaft und Bergbauernfragen (AT)
7. ITÄ-Suomen Yliopisto (FI)
8. New Bulgarian University (BG)
9. Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi (TR)
10. Høgskolen i Innlandet (NO)
11. Högskolan Dalarna (SE)
12. Universidad de Zaragoza (ES)
13. Hayata Destek Derneği -STL (TR)
14. Nacionalna Katolicheska Federacia Caritas Bulgaria (BG)
15. Okay.zusammen leben/Verein Aktion Mitarbeit (AT)
16. Landstinget Dalarna (SE)

17. Stadt Villach (AT)
18. Siirtolaisuusinstituutti/äitiö (Institute of Migration) (FI)
19. Joensuun seudun monikulttuurisuusyhdistys ry (FI)
20. Citta Metropolitana Di Torino (IT)
21. Caritas Diocese Bozen-Brixen (IT)
22. Convention of Scottish Local Authorities - COSLA (UK)
23. Tür an Tür - Integrationsprojekte gHmbH (DE)
24. Integrerings- og mangfoldsdirektoratet (NO)
25. Departamento de Ciudadanía y Derechos Sociales (ES)

## Immigration to Rural and Mountainous Areas: Opportunities and Challenges -A Brief Literature Review-

**Dr. Fatma Yılmaz-Elmas, İstanbul Bilgi University European Institute Post-Doctoral Researcher**

This paper provides a brief overview of the literature addressing the rural dimension of immigration particularly at the EU level and aims to draw attention to the gap in the literature on this subject compared to its importance.

Against the backdrop of urbanization in global scale, especially forced migration together with the economic one has made the circle for the flows to expand to the remote places, i.e. outside the urban areas. The literature reviews different aspects and impacts of dispersal policies and the presence of immigrants in rural/remote areas. The presence of immigrants in rural and mountainous areas presents several challenges and opportunities for both third country nationals and hosting communities. However, mainly because the specific needs of remote areas are of considerable importance in formulating the policies of migration, studies and literature on this issue deserves more attention.

#### An Understudied Field

There are nascent studies emphasizing the potential of migration to trigger development in medium and long run in remote areas. But it is still an understudied field, especially regarding quantitative analyses addressing the rural dimension of migration at the EU level (Natale et al., 2019). Perlik & Membretti (2018) are among those emphasizing the lack of studies on the impact of migration in mountain areas, in terms of both threats and opportunities for regional development. Either available studies have mainly been conducted as case studies in an urban context (Perlik & Membretti, 2018: 252) or they are generally based on qualitative analyses (Natale et al., 2019: 7). Besides, most of the studies on rural and mountainous places deal mainly with out-migration (rural-to-urban or mountain-to-lowland), and about their impacts on land use and demographic decline. However, Kordel & Weidinger (2018) state that migration processes cannot be understood as unidirectional and more or less permanent movements from place A to place B. Likewise, Milbourne (2007) indicates the need to think



more critically about the broad range of movements and mobilities that are being played out in rural spaces. Accordingly, “rural population change is much more complicated, being composed of movements into, out of, within and through rural places; (...) linear flows between particular locations and more complex spatial patterns of movement; (...) journeys of necessity and choice; economic and lifestyle-based movements; (...) conflicts and complementarities; and uneven power relations and processes of marginalization” (Milbourne, 2007, p. 385).

Natale et al. (2019) highlight at least **four reasons** why migration in rural areas should deserve greater attention from research and policy. The first reason is linked to **residential and territorial aspects**. Migrants may settle in rural areas or peripheral areas of large cities mainly due to the affordability of housing without necessarily working in agriculture. By substituting a shrinking native population in rural areas, they can play a fundamental role in maintaining the socio-economic viability of areas subject to depopulation and ageing. Nevertheless, there are many aspects of demographic impacts of migration in rural areas that are still poorly understood. The second reason relates to the contribution of migrants in the **agricultural labor market**. Due to the industrialization, specialization and intensification of agriculture since the mid-20th century, which was accompanied by the reduction of employment in agriculture and a higher share of temporary and wage labor in respect to family labor, there have been increasing need for employing foreign workers since the 1990s. Third, the specific needs for **integration** posed by the temporary nature of work and by the often-illegal status of migrants employed in agriculture is an important matter to be considered. Migrants in rural areas represent a predominantly vulnerable group, given the fact that illegality, poor working conditions, and the dependency from the role of intermediaries for recruitment are defining characteristics of employment of migrants in agriculture. Considering this, formulation of social inclusion policies is of great importance. Besides, the often-transitory nature of employment in agriculture poses a challenge for integration in the longer term and requires special attention for vulnerable groups. The fourth reason is related to the different attitudes towards immigration that can be encountered across cities, towns, and rural areas. The divide in attitudes is explained by two sets of factors: socio-demographic factors and characteristics of the areas themselves.

### **Socio-economic Impact: Opportunities and Challenges on Remote Areas**

Although large cities and metropolitan areas are almost permanently hubs of immigration, this is a rare case in mountainous or rural areas, especially when considered periods of crisis such as the post-World War II period (Perlik & Membretti, 2018: 252). Nevertheless, recent migrant flows represent a new situation for Europe’s rural and mountainous areas. “Against the backdrop of multilayered crises in Africa and the Middle East, a considerable number of asylum seekers and refugees have been accommodated in the peripheral areas of many European countries according to national

dispersal policies. Asylum seekers and refugees are directed to rural areas to share out the burden, e.g., the costs and pressure on the housing market; or to speed up integration” (Kordel & Weidinger, 2018: xvii-xviii). Concerning the uneven flows to Europe, the programs and project initiatives that recognize international and forced migration as a chance for the revitalization of remote and rural regions are expanding throughout Europe. These programs and projects seem to be supported with a view to harness the potential of migrants and to strengthen, in this way, the rural regions, which lack manpower and experience emigration of young people and ageing (Galera et al., 2018: 8).

Newcomers in rural areas generate visible transformations in their region. They increase diversity, particularly in the light of low population densities and a relatively homogeneous socio-demographic and socio-economic composition in many peripheral areas (Kordel & Weidinger, 2018: xviii). The presence of migrants in rural areas can have positive aspects in this sense. Natale et al. (2019) emphasize that an appropriate level of legal immigration may contribute to deal with the challenges raised by the ageing of population and depopulation dynamics, that result, in some cases, in the lack of labor force to run basic services and economic activities, including farming and forestry. Besides rural economies may benefit from relatively affluent migrants mostly with regard to their expenditures on daily goods, consumer durables and craft services; however important not to neglect the fact that possible increases in purchasing power can also result in rising consumer prices (Kordel & Weidinger, 2018:xviii). The changing demand on rural housing markets is also generally observable, nevertheless largely depends on socio-economic and sociodemographic structures and aspirations of the immigrants (ibid). Findlay et al. (2000), however, state that the effects of rural in-migration on rural labor market have received relatively little attention, compared to the growing volume of literature devoted to the housing impacts.

Migration has been considered as the key process producing change in rural labor markets. Therefore there are good reasons to take a positive approach to studying its contribution to rural regeneration (Findlay et al., 2000). The possibility of migration being a significant job generator in rural areas is an important aspect. Findlay et al. (2000: 336) states that this could be possible through (1) the direct creation of jobs in the businesses established by migrants and (2) the effect of service multipliers, with in-migrants adding to the demand for rural goods and services and thus indirectly boosting job growth in the rural economy. They also note that incomers contribute to the rural labor market because the additional demands they make for goods and services helps to prevent old-established firms from closing.

Perlik & Membretti (2018) specifically put the emphasis on the mountain areas which are structurally disadvantaged in their economic development due to their smaller populations and a lack of urban (i.e. high-performance) economies. Compared to densely

populated lowland areas, they have additional disadvantages due to the lack the multitude of social interactions that are important in regional development. At this point, they go for a study to make the topic of migration overlap with current research on ‘social innovation’. Seeing social innovation as a way to empower marginalized rural areas, they have made considerable contribution to the studies focusing on migration by need and by force to mountain areas. By focusing on the potential benefits to all parties of a better integration of migrants into the host regions, a welcoming culture is regarded as an alternative or a supplementary option to mitigate development gaps in mountain areas. It would then be worthwhile not only analyzing how well-accepted and integrated immigrants can drive the development of new businesses and services but also how hosting refugees could expand the availability of public services in these locations. Perlik & Membretti (2018) point out a possible expansion of the availability of public services in rural locations could benefit also long-term residents as well as new arrivals. It would make it possible to staff even smaller villages with professional staff such as social workers, teachers, and health workers (p. 257).

In terms of rural labor market, however, immigration to rural areas is still dominated by the demand for temporary labor in agriculture. The characteristics of the agricultural labor market entail a high dependency on seasonal and precarious labor. Migrant workers already play a role in the European agricultural sector, especially in Southern countries. Third-country nationals do not necessarily compete with natives in the labor market of the agricultural sector, mainly because migrants working as temporary/seasonal workers are more likely to accept jobs of secondary social status, which locals may tend to avoid. But, they may compete with low skilled EU mobile citizens, as they are more likely to be employed in non-specialized positions (Natale et al., 2019). However, particular attention has been paid by academic studies and international reports to put spotlight the respect of labor rights in the agricultural sector, as labor in agriculture is often precarious and unregistered, and cases of infringements regarding labor rights, exploitation and forced labor have been reported across the EU, including Turkey (for example see Akay Erturk, 2020).

Overall, migration has a potential to trigger development in remote areas, especially the ones having depopulation trend, in the medium and long run. However, for this to happen, Galera et al. (2018) notify that adequate reception and integration policies, tailored to remote areas, are needed. In general, Natale et al., (2019) summarize the specific **challenges** posed by the presence of migrants in rural areas as follows:

Third-country nationals located in rural areas might be in a more vulnerable situation because of remoteness, isolation and limited access to targeted services, such as psychological and social support, language learning, information availability, but also to basic services like health, education, and transport, because of the structural lack of those facilities in some EU rural areas. At the same time, if rural communities are not properly prepared to receive

migrants, and if the local authorities have limited capacity to respond to inflows of migrants, negative attitudes may arise at the local level, especially in those places characterized by a stagnant economy where migrants’ workforce may be perceived as in competition with EU citizens. (p. 54)

Natale et al. (2019: 4) also specifically state three main factors pose particular challenges in terms of agricultural labor force. Accordingly, first the temporary nature and often irregular nature of the work of migrants in agriculture makes it more difficult to quantify needs and target intervention; second, the territorial specificity would require local and regional rather than nation-wide intervention; and third, local authorities may be less equipped to respond to a rapid onset of a large number of immigrants with dedicated integration services.

In their report, analyzing the practices of integration of migrants (including refugees, asylum seekers and status holders) in remote areas with declining populations, Galera et al. (2018) apply the comparative case studies. The comparative case study analysis verifies that remote areas can turn into highly adequate contexts to socio-economic inclusion for asylum seekers, refugees and status holders when **a number of enabling conditions** unfold. These briefly include: (1) integration of asylum seekers, status holders and refugees as a component of local development strategies in remote areas; (2) existence of a critical mass of people with similar values and sensitive to asylum seekers’ integration; and (3) activation of bottom-up local development and social inclusion processes by local actors, including groups of volunteers, third sector organizations and social enterprises (p. 31). In all countries analyzed in case studies, they remark the fact that there is an apparent slow policy shift from a system of assistance towards one of work integration. The case studies, overall, highlight the importance of designing individualized integration paths backed by social inclusion initiatives that are more likely to pave the way for spontaneous collaborations and work relations with local inhabitants.

With respect to **integration**, Perlik & Membretti (2018), among others, underline that in rural areas, it takes much more effort to integrate new people and to address their problems, especially in the case of refugees. For small communities, one might think that they would be happy to attract more people. However, they emphasize that the lacking agglomeration effects work differently: “because of the size of these communities, individuals are much more mutually dependent and cannot avoid each other” (p. 256). They also point out the risk of abused confidence, i.e. images promoted by the media and political parties present newcomers as potential offenders (young men who do not yet know the social practices of the hosting country), disguised terrorists, or people who are as poor as they seem. In this sense, immigrants in rural areas in general, and refugee migrants in particular, often seem to challenge rural identities and places. Especially, for the regions which has not experienced a high level of immigration in the past, Natale et al. (2019) mention, the common challenge is represented by the speed of change in ethnic diversity rather than by a large number of

migrants. “Whether this results in hostile attitudes or a deliberately welcoming culture, often depends on recent (non)experience of foreign immigration or other transformation processes as well as the attitudes of local elites” as Kordel & Weidinger (2018) state. In a different study, Weidinger et al. (2019) reveal the importance of spatial dimensions in asylum seekers’ and refugees’ life-worlds, encompassing the construction of individually important places as well as spatial mobility and accessibility. Intercultural encounters in public space and the resulting experiences of exclusion and inclusion for refugees’ belonging and identity formation matters in this respect.

### The Need for Data

Against this backdrop, the need for data to design policy responses is of importance. Natale et al. (2019: 54) highlights the need for more constant and updated data to better target policy responses. Accordingly, the lack of data on the presence of migrants in urban, intermediate or rural areas can be challenging for policymakers, public authorities and stakeholders who have to structure interventions for the integration of third-country nationals, as difficulties faced by large cities are different from those of remote rural areas. Also, migrants who are passing through rural areas as part of their migratory path have different needs than those migrants who settle there as refugees or than those who arrive in rural areas attracted by job opportunities in agriculture. For all these reasons, the creation of data sorted by territorial typologies is deemed as the first step to take in order to plan interventions according to the local characteristics. Equally important, case studies (Galera et al., 2018) show that a well-designed reception and integration project can have more visible beneficial impacts in remote areas, including the revitalization of abandoned spaces. In fragile areas, the impact of mis- or poor management is notably more severe both for the asylum seekers, who normally lack support structures, and for the hosting communities, which tend to be more homogeneous and hence less migration-friendly. To this respect, Galera et al. (2018) insist on that only strategies aimed at both triggering the long-term socio-economic revitalization of hosting communities and taking stock of the skills (formal and informal) of recipients can enable to go beyond the “economy of asylum seekers’ reception” and activate new development dynamics that are expected to last over time and generate social and territorial innovation. Last but not the least, if necessary to handle the issue in a different perspective; rural or remote areas, as Rodríguez-Pose (2018) calls “the areas left behind” or “places that don’t matter”, those having witnessed long periods of decline, migration and brain drain, have currently been experiencing new migration waves throughout Europe. As their revenge, Rodríguez-Pose claims these places have already used the ballot box as their weapon and give the pave somehow for the ascent of populist vote, as a call for greater attention or even a warning sign of a need to review the system. Considering the recent migrant flows that represent a new situation for Europe’s rural and mountainous areas, this should be taken into consideration and is worth to study on how rural areas, if one can call “places

that don’t matter”, would react to the concentration on urban or a neglect once again in terms of immigration and policy design.

### References

- Akay Erturk, S. (2020, March 6). Syrian refugees and the transformation of Turkey’s rural areas. The Southern Responses to Displacement. <https://southernresponses.org/2020/03/06/syrian-refugees-and-the-transformation-of-turkeys-rural-areas/>
- Findlay, A. M., Short, D., & Stockdale, A. (2000). The labour-market impact of migration to rural areas. *Applied Geography*, 20(4), 333–348. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0143-6228\(00\)00012-6](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0143-6228(00)00012-6)
- Galera, G., Giannetto, L., Membretti, A., & Noya, A. (2018). Integration of Migrants, Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Remote Areas with Declining Populations (OECD Local Economic and Employment Development (LEED) Working Papers No. 2018/03; LEED Working Paper Series, Vol. 2018/03). OECD Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.1787/84043b2a-en>
- Kordel, S., & Weidinger, T. (2018). Current Processes of Immigration to European Peripheries: Status Quo, Implications and Development Strategies. In S. Kordel, T. Weidinger, & I. Jelen (Eds.), *Processes of Immigration in Rural Europe: The Status Quo, Implications and Development Strategies* (pp. xv–xxx). Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Milbourne, P. (2007). Re-populating rural studies: Migrations, movements and mobilities. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 23(3), 381–386. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2007.04.002>
- Natale, F., Kalantaryan, S., Scipioni, M., Alessandrini, A., & Pasa, A. (2019). *Migration in EU Rural Areas* (EUR 29779 EN). Publications Office of the European Union.
- Perlik, M., & Membretti, A. (2018). Migration by Necessity and by Force to Mountain Areas: An Opportunity for Social Innovation. *Mountain Research and Development*, 38(3), 250–264. <https://doi.org/10.1659/MRD-JOURNAL-D-17-00070.1>
- Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2018). The revenge of the places that don’t matter (and what to do about it). *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society*, 11(1), 189–209. <https://doi.org/10.1093/cjres/rsx024>
- Weidinger, T., Kordel, S., & Kieslinger, J. (2019). Unravelling the meaning of place and spatial mobility: Analysing the everyday life-worlds of refugees in host societies by means of mobility mapping. *Journal of Refugee Studies*. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fez004>

## CLASSIFICATION OF MATILDE REGIONS. SPATIAL SPECIFICITIES AND THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS DISTRIBUTION: TURKEY with a focus on Bursa and Karacabey

Prof. Dr. Ayhan Kaya, Tobias Weidinger, Dr. Fatma Yilmaz-Elmas

*This text is a short-version of the original document, which was produced under the MATILDE PROJECT receiving funding from the EU’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under grant agreement No. 870831.*

The MATILDE (Migration Impact Assessment to Enhance Integration and Local Development in European Rural and Mountain Regions) project and vision stem from the potential of rural and mountainous regions. When analyzing the potential of these regions, immigration is one of the fundamental factors that must be considered. The project’s ambition is primarily to stimulate the rethinking of the relationships between rural/mountain and urban dimensions, between local populations and newcomers. In order to assess the impacts of migration on local development and territorial cohesion, MATILDE is carrying out 13 case studies in different regions across Europe. As a preliminary step, the classification of MATILDE regions has been elaborated on the basis of their territorial and socio-economic characteristics as well as considering their socio-demographic profiles. In this context, this country report on Turkey with a focus on Bursa and Karacabey was published as a part of case studies and comprehensive analysis of the social, economic and territorial roles of mountain and rural regions within the European Union.

### COUNTRY REPORT: TURKEY

Since World War II, rural areas in Turkey were characterised by out-migration to cities and abroad due to mechanization in agriculture, neo-liberal agricultural policies and investments in railway connections to urban centres as well as job opportunities there (Adaman & Kaya 2012; Öztürk et al. 2018; cf. Erman 1998; Guresci 2013, Ertürk 2020). In addition, starting from the second half of the 1980s, individuals of Kurdish origin were displaced internally (IDPs) by the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) and sometimes by the paramilitary security forces, and had to leave their villages and towns in the Southeast as a result of the armed conflict (Adaman & Kaya 2012). Simultaneously, a growing number of asylum seekers arrived from non-European countries, especially from Iran and Iraq (Kirişçi and Karaca 2015), which were considered an additional security threat (Kirişçi 2004, 2014). During that time, the UNHCR oversaw Turkey’s asylum policy, provided basic assistance and accommodation and ensured the resettlement of asylum seekers from Turkey. In 1998, the government fostered the reintegration of Kurdish IDPs and refugees with the “Return to Villages and Rehabilitation Project” (RVRP), which was supported by the UNHCR, the European Council and the European Commission (Adaman & Kaya 2012). The implementation, however, was severely hampered by the upsurge in violence between the Turkish army and Kurdish militants since 2004, the continuing presence of around 60,000 village guards, up to a million landmines in the border region to Syria and Iraq and a lacking development in the region (ibid.). In parallel, in the last years and not least fostered by the economic crisis after 2007, re-migration and multi-local living arrangements could be detected among

the aforementioned groups as well as urban middle-classes (e.g. Öztürk et al. 2018). Today, 92.3% of Turkey’s population lives in cities and towns, compared to only 7.7% in villages (Ertürk 2020).

It is important to notice that the Turkish immigration policy in the last 20 years followed the ideal to align Turkey with the EU *acquis* as part of the accession of Turkey to the EU. Turkey also has bilateral agreements and still maintains a rather liberal visa regime in order to attract skilled and highly skilled international individuals (Bertan Tokuzlu 2007; Kaya 2017; Sonmez Efe 2017; Kaya 2019). With regard to Turkey’s current asylum policy, in particular, the UNHCR plays an important and significant role.

In the Turkish context, integration is a contested term, since there is an ongoing debate about the dichotomy of two political and societal discourses with regard to the presence of high numbers of Syrian refugees in the country: integration versus return. It is hard to claim that there are officially formulated comprehensive integration policies aiming at the incorporation of migrants and refugees into the wider societal context of the country since the Turkish state does not formally recognize the fact that the country has turned into a country of immigration. Although the Ministry of Interior has already issued a Migrant Integration Strategy Document, which was shared with the relevant public bodies in 2019, it is not yet publicized due to the negative public perception of the term integration. However, a legal formulation of integration policies was first made in the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) in 2014 drawing on the term “harmonization” (İçduygu 2016). The Law also addressed the foundation of the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) to be responsible for the integration of migrants.

### Labour Migration

The legal background for labour migration is structured by the Law on Residence and Travel of Foreigners in Turkey (Law no. 5683/2012), which regulates that foreigners need a residence and work permit to work and live in the country. Before, it was common among migrants, e.g. from Armenia or Georgia, to illegally use a 90-day tourist visa for entering and working in Turkey and renew the visa by going to the closest border crossing point and re-entering the country after its expiry (Kaya 2017). However, with the new law, a suspension of 90 days was introduced, which led to the fact that many of them overstayed the period of legal stay and continued to work illegally (Rittersberger-Tılıç 2015; Kaya 2017). Likewise, the length of temporary work permits – that start from one year – do not correspond the duration of employment of these international seasonal workers (Sonmez Efe 2017). Following the aim of the Turkish state to attract highly skilled international work force, the Law on International Work Force (Law. No. 6735/2017) eased work permit applications (Rittersberger-Tılıç 2015). With the “Turquoise card for qualified foreigners”, applicants now can apply on their own, if they graduated with internationally accepted studies in the academic field, come to the forefront in a scientific, industrial and technological area that

is considered to be strategic in terms of the country, or those who have made or are anticipated to make significant contribution to the national economy (Kaya 2017). EU citizens, furthermore, got granted certain privileges in the application process.

Today, one-fourth of the employment in Turkey is in agriculture (Beleli 2013), where jobs in small family enterprises and large agricultural production companies are characterised as “3D” (dangerous, demeaning and dirty, Dedeoğlu & Bayraktar 2019). Since the 1990s, landless local farming families were being replaced by internal seasonal workers, in particular women and children originating from the rural areas in southeast and east of Anatolia, including Arabs, Kurds and Roma (Adaman & Kaya 2012; Mura 2016; Dedeoğlu & Bayraktar 2019). In the last years, in addition, international seasonal workers started to arrive in Turkey. Their quantification, however, is difficult due to lacking statistical data and a lacking legal status for seasonal migrant workers as well as undocumented employment (Sonmez Efe 2017). Since 2011, both internal and international seasonal workers are being replaced by Syrian refugees (Sonmez Efe 2017; Dedeoğlu & Bayraktar 2019).

In the mining sector, Chinese individuals predominate in Chinese-led companies in the Zonguldak province in the Black Sea region (Töksöz & Ulutaş 2012), while in the construction sector, subcontracting to small firms that hire immigrants by means of short-term contracts is widespread (Sonmez Efe 2017; Çınar 2019).

The sectors of entertainment and tourism provide further employment opportunities for international migrants. Since the 1990s, destinations of those that often originate from ex-soviet countries are the big cities and the touristic regions alongside the Black and the Mediterranean Sea. Parallel to the increase of tourist flows from these regions, also migrant flows rose, resulting in marriages with Turkish nationals among Russians and more permanent stays among Azerbaijanis including family reunion (Töksöz & Ulutaş 2012; Özgür et al. 2014; Sonmez Efe 2017).

International migrants in live-in housekeeping, babysitting and care have to be considered an urban phenomenon and stem from the insufficiency of institutional care services due to a family-centred welfare regime (Erdoğdu & Töksöz 2013) and an increasing female participation in the labour market. Acquired by means of intermediary firms (ibid.), most of them are female and originate from former Soviet Union, e.g. Georgia (Sadunashvili 2016) or Moldova (Töksöz & Ulutaş 2012). Simultaneously, in science and education, foreign scientists and teachers can be found in universities and foreign-language schools, however, these are normally based in big cities (Kaya 2017).

### Forced Migration

Before 2014, Turkey only granted refugee status to European asylum seekers according to the Refugee Convention ratified in 1951. In the course of the EU accession negotiations, however, the country revised its immigration and asylum policies and adopted the

“Law on Foreigners and International Protection” (LFIP, Law no. 6458/2014).

This law provided the opportunity to confer the refugee status including temporary protection to individuals regardless of their country of origin and offered three categories: (1)refugees, (2)conditional refugees, and (3)individuals under subsidiary protection. The LFIP maintains the previous dispersal policy of assigning each applicant to a specific province, where they are required to register with the Provincial Directorate General of Migration Management and where they have to stay until the end of their international protection (Art. 71). The law does not commit itself to providing shelter to international protection applicants, as they “shall secure their own accommodation by their own means” (Art. 95, cf. Kaya 2020). However, the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) can set up “reception and accommodation centres” for the accommodation, nutrition, healthcare, social and other needs of both international protection applicants and status holders. At present, there are seven centres in operation, located in the cities of Erzurum, Gaziantep, İzmir, Kırklareli, Kayseri, Van and Yozgat.

From 2011 on, as a result of political shifts and regional conflicts, a mass influx of Syrians took place, which was considered only a temporary phenomenon by the Turkish government and was therefore fostered by an open-door policy to increase their power in the region (Sonmez Efe 2017; Yılmaz et al. 2019). As war lasted longer, however, the temporary protection for them was extended in the 2014 regulation. Today, due to its geographical position as a transit country, Turkey is home to the largest number of refugees in the world and houses at least 3.6 million Syrians. Regarding the latter group, many of them live in the metropolitan areas of Istanbul and Izmir (İşeri 2019; Yılmaz et al. 2019). Others instead stayed in the border cities and regions in the Southeast, such as Şanlıurfa, Gaziantep or Hatay, where language barrier is smaller as the region is majorly populated by Arabs or Kurds and where kinship ties can be upheld due to chain migration (Kavak 2016). On site, large-scale camps (not to be mixed with the Reception and Accommodation Centres refugees) provide housing to those under “temporary protection”. The number of camps in ten border cities has remained steady in 26, however only 3.8% or 139,150 individuals of the more than 3.5 million Syrian refugees are accommodated there as of 11 April 2019.

Until 2016, when the Law on Work Permits for Foreigners under Temporary Protection (Law no. 8375/2016) became effective, working was not officially allowed for refugees under temporary protection and took place on an irregular basis (Yılmaz et al. 2019). The new law, then, provided the opportunity for employers to apply for work permits for Syrian refugees who hold temporary identity cards and have resided in Turkey for six months (Dedeoğlu & Bayraktar 2019). However, employers have to prove that there is no Turkish citizen to fill the job and have to ensure that no more than 10% of the employees are Syrians. In companies with less than 10 employees, only one work permit can be granted (ibid.; Saraçoğlu & Bélanger 2019). As a

consequence of the “unreality” and “ineffectiveness” of this regulation given the structural conditions of the Turkish labour market (ibid.), only around 20,000 work permits were granted since then (Yılmaz et al. 2019) (Doğan-Yenisey (2019) argues that the number of work permits granted to Syrians was around 65.000 in 2019). The majority still works in the labour-intensive segments of the informal sector, where the introduction of Syrians led to an increase in labour supply, a downward pressure on the wages as well as deteriorating working conditions and bargaining power of all workers (ibid.; Kavak 2016; for a contrary perspective, see Erzan et al. 2018). Therefore, work of underaged children became widespread to increase the household income (Dedeoğlu & Bayraktar 2019).

In the rural provinces in the South and Southeast, where Syrians first entered Turkey, a huge demand for temporary labour in agriculture exists (Kavak 2016). Thus, Syrian families, i.e. both men, women and their underaged children, started to work as day labourers or became involved in internal seasonal migration, circulating according to the harvest period from one place to another (Yalçın & Yalçın 2019, Kavak 2016; Semerci & Erdoğan 2017; Atasü-Topçuoğlu 2019). Others, instead move to the most important cropping area, i.e. the Çukurova region, for a basis of up to 11 months a year (Semerci & Erdoğan 2017). Work in agriculture is characterised by low wages, which are about half of the official minimum wage (even lower for women and children), and bad working conditions including long working hours or discrimination at the workplace (Kavak 2016; Tören 2018; Atasü-Topçuoğlu 2019; Dedeoğlu & Bayraktar 2019; Kaya 2020).

### Student, Family and Amenity / Lifestyle Migration

Foreign students in Turkish universities are mainly originating from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Nigeria, Pakistan and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, while Erasmus exchange students are mostly Germans or Polish (Kaya 2017). Following the idea of “brain gaining”, in the last couple of years, Turkey also tried to attract students from politically unstable countries such as Yemen or Syria. In addition, LFIP included work permits for international MA and PhD students upon arrival and work permits for BA students after two years stay (ibid.).

In the context of family migration, LFIP regulated that a residence permit with a duration of more than one year is sufficient for family unification. The residence permits of family members, however, are bound to the person who has the residence permit. (Kaya 2017). Apart from the fact that also European spouses of Turkish citizens move to Turkey in the course of family reunion (Kaya 2017), family migration, in the last couple of years, however, is mostly characterised by return migration of first and second generation Turkish emigrants, especially from Germany (“Euro-Turks”, Kaya 2017: 18). These migration flows are either on a cyclical basis, or permanently, e.g. for retirement (Adaman & Kaya 2012; Kaya 2017).

Studies about temporary and permanent lifestyle migration previously dealt with internal migration of urban middle-class professionals to the Aegean and

Mediterranean coast tourist areas and the hinterland. Individuals, for instance, bought and renovated old houses or started to live in gated communities on-site, which are used as a holiday or second home as well as for retirement. Some of them also get involved in tourism (Young 2007; Öztürk et al. 2018). International lifestyle migration was discussed for two groups, i.e. international retirement migrants and Turkish-German second generation. The further group mainly bought properties during the 2001 financial crisis, when the Turkish local currency depreciated (Balkir & Kirkulak 2009) and originates from Germany, the UK, the Netherlands and Nordic countries (Nudrali 2009; Ertuğrul 2016; Kaya 2017).

### BURSA: TERRITORIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REGION

The degree of urbanisation classification of Eurostat is not available for Turkey. As an alternative, rural regions can be identified through their population density. In 2018, 92.3% of Turkey’s population lived in cities and towns, and only 7.7% lived in villages (Ertürk 2020), i.e. in municipalities with less than 2,000 inhabitants. One has to keep in mind, however, that Law No. 6360 of 2012 re-scaled urban areas by absorbing rural ones. Between 2012 and 2019, the number of towns and sub-municipalities dropped from 1,977 to 386, while the number of villages dropped by 47% (34,434 to 18,280, TUIK results of Address Based Population Registration System, 2007-2019; see also Dik 2014). This makes it hard to statistically separate between the current neighbourhoods in cities and the new ones in rural areas, i.e. the previous villages (UKKS 2014).

### Geographical and Territorial Features

| <b>TERRITORIAL INDICATORS</b>  | <b>2018</b>       |
|--|-------------------|
| Share of population living outside urban and intermediate municipalities | No data available |
| Share of population living in mountain areas                             | >50%              |
| Share of territory covered by mountains                                  | >50%              |
| Share of territory covered by agricultural fields                        | 45%               |
| Border region  | No                |

### Territorial Indicators of Bursa, 2018

Source: Eurostat Border typology; Urban-Rural typology; Eurostat Mountain typology; Eurostat Corine Landcover; Eurostat Degree of Urbanization (DEGURBA)

The province of Bursa is located in the Southeast Marmara Region, surrounded by provinces Bilecik and

Adapazarı at its East, Kocaeli, Yalova, İstanbul and Marmara Sea at North, Kütahya at South, and Balıkesir at its West. Although the province stands on the north-western slopes of Mount Uludağ (2,543 m), it is located in a pit area wherein Yenisehir, Bursa and Inegöl plains and, İznik (298 m<sup>2</sup>) and Uluabat (1,134 m<sup>2</sup>) lakes are the primary collapsed areas. In the north, the Marmara Sea forms a 135 km long coastline. Total surface area of the province of Bursa is 11,027 km<sup>2</sup> and 17% of the land is made up of plains. The plateaus also cover 48% of its total land, while mountains cover approximately 35% of the land surface.

In terms of land use, the province covers an area of 1,088,638 hectares. Bursa's lands are covered with 35% mountains and uplands, 48% plateaus and 17% plains (Bursa İli 2018 Yılı Çevre Durum Raporu 2019). 42% of agricultural land is used as farmland, 14% as vegetable plot, 12% as orchard, 2% as vineyard and 12% as olive grove. Compared to 2006, there is a decrease in agricultural land by around 17%, mostly due to a decrease in soil fertility (Bursa İli 2018 Yılı Çevre Durum Raporu 2019). Nevertheless, there has been observed an increase in vegetable, fruit and olive fields where higher value-added products are grown (Özkan & Kadagan 2019). Bursa's proximity to İstanbul makes it an important hub for agricultural production to provide fresh vegetables, olive, tomatoes etc. processed in the factories located in Karacabey in the West of the province, for instance.

## Social Features

### Demography

According to address-based population registration system, the Bursa province has 3,056,120 inhabitants as of 2019 (TUIK 2020b). Population in urban area consists of 54.8% (1,982,898 inhabitants) and population in city area consists of 46.2% (1,412,701 inhabitants) of the total population of the province. Population density is 293.2 persons/km<sup>2</sup>. Total fertility rate for Bursa is 1.74 in 2019 with a decrease compared to the previous year, where it was 1.87. The decrease in fertility rate mostly results from the processes of urbanization and growing economic and financial pressure.

The MATILDE region Bursa is characterized by an impressive population increase of nearly 400,000 persons (2018) compared to 2010, which is in line with the national trend.

2019 figures collected by TUIK (2020a) shows that 0-14 age group population of Bursa is 660,134. Young population (15-24 age group) has the share of 419,397 persons (13.7%) in total population. In the age group 15-64, there are 2,113,125 persons, which corresponds to 69% of the population of the province. This is above the ratio of Turkey in terms of population of the same age group, which is 67.8%. Age 65 and over population is also 282,861 (9.3%) close to that of Turkey (9.1%) in terms of ratio (own calculations). For the province of Bursa, total age dependency ratio is indicated as 44.6 (44.5 in 2018) below the general ratio in Turkey (47.5) whereas elderly dependency ratio (age 65 and over) is 13.39 in 2019 (12.89 in 2018). Elderly dependency ratio (age 65+) is close to that of Turkey (13.4).

Regarding population per gender, the province of Bursa has a balanced demographic structure divided in half by genders, accordingly male population is 1,530,956 whereas female population is 1,525,164 (2019 figures, TUIK 2020b).

Over the last ten years, the migration balance in the MATILDE region Bursa was positive and rose. Most of the provinces whose population growth rates are above the average in Turkey are those with high industrial production capacity and high tourism and agricultural potential. Bursa is one of these provinces due to the aforementioned characteristics. Bursa, therefore, is among the first five provinces receiving migration in Turkey. It is also one of the main destinations for internal migrants because of the vicinity with İstanbul. However, given the net migration figures, Bursa is also among the migrant-sending provinces. Migration balance table below confirms this fact clearly. The positive migration balance is the result of immigration of foreigners due to the fact that migration balance of nationals was very small in all years.

According to the data issued by TUIK (2020a) in 2019, the population of foreign nationals in Bursa is 48,595. From 2017 to 2018, there was a considerable increase (26,198 to 44,798). It is important to note that these figures are issued according to address-based population registration system and do not include the Syrians under temporary protection.

In line with the development on the national level, the total number of migrants (including Syrians under temporary protection) increased significantly in the last years. The share of migrants among total population is slightly higher in Bursa (7.4%) compared to the national average (5.9% in 2018, TUIK 2020a). According to DGMM (2020), the number of Syrians under temporary protection in Bursa is 176,143 by the date of June 5, 2020 (total Syrian population under temporary protection in Turkey is 3,581,636, *ibid.*). Accordingly, the share of Syrians among the total population was 5.4% (own calculations).

As of 2019, the official record covering the population of foreign nationals in Bursa is 48,595 (TUIK 2020a, excluding Syrian population under the temporary protection, foreigners holding visas or residence permits shorter than 3 months with the purpose of training, tourism, scientific research etc.). The main foreign nationals with residence permits in Bursa are Azerbaijanis (7,273), Syrians (6,483), Russians (4,784), Iraqis (2,659), Kazakhs (2,625), Bulgarians (3,130), Greeks (3,099), Germans (2,030), Uzbeks (1,629), Kyrgyzes (1,452) and Kuwaitis (1,263).

### Educational Features

The 2018 literacy rate in Bursa was 97.7% (TUIK 2020a, without foreigners). Population by literacy status (6 years of age and over) in total population is 2,687,754 out of which 2,601,247 is literate. Proportion of literate male (age 6+) consists of 99.2% and the proportion of literate female (age 6+) is 95.7%. According to population by education status (age 15+), high school or vocational school at high school level graduate in total is 591,122 which corresponds to 25.9% of the total


population in Bursa. Thereby, males are overrepresented (30% compared to 21.8%). Due to lack of data on NUTS-2 and NUTS-3 level, no specific characterization for foreigners regarding the educational background can be provided.

### Economic Features

Bursa is the fourth most economically developed province in Turkey. Having vast and fertile plains as well as vast and richly varied forests in the surrounding mountainous region, the geographical location gives the province of Bursa a special feature of a rare agricultural region along with an industrial and trade centre of Turkey. The climate and geographical structure provide Bursa with a fertile environment to produce various **agricultural** products. The province has also become an important agriculture-based industry centre. Almost every sub-sector of the food industry operates in the province. Leading factories operating in the food industry sector as well as the import-export industry in the fields of feed, poultry, livestock and dairy products are centred in the region due to the agricultural sector and animal husbandry. Its **secondary sector** also displays a strong concentration of automotive manufacturing, textile and furniture production, and an increasing service sector that supports production and development activities in the **secondary sector**. In addition to its plains and water resources, the mountainous feature also makes Bursa attractive for winter tourism. A total of 1,625,275 tourists came to Bursa in 2018, 370,387 of whom were foreigners. However, this is still below 1% of the total number of 39,000,488 foreign tourists that have visited Turkey in 2018 (enBursa 2019; Ministry of Culture and Tourism 2019).

According to data indicated by Bursa Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BTSO, 2020), the amount of import in 2018 was 8,518,026 (in thousand \$), while export was worth 15,869,442 (in thousand \$). The Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK, 2020a) issued the 2018 data on GDP per capita in \$ and Turkish Lira (TL) as 11,095 respectively 52,372. In Turkey, the share of the top 10 provinces in the GDP share exceeds 65 percent. In other words, all the remaining 71 provinces can only get 35 percent share. Bursa is among the provinces with the highest GDP share. Considering the total exports made by provinces in the years between 2007-2016, following İstanbul (693,745 million USD), Bursa reached a total export of 99.375 million USD (BEBKA 2018). Entrepreneurship indicators, particularly, the number of big companies established in Bursa, have a considerable share in this table.

*Gross Domestic Product trend in Bursa, 2008-2017*




*Source: Eurostat, Gross domestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 regions*

### Labour Market

However, the data gathered in previous years indicate that the NUTS 2 region TR41, which encompasses Bursa, Eskişehir and Bilecik provinces, has a lower rate of unemployment among both males and females in the 15-24 age group and the above 25 age group compared to the average rate in Turkey. The unemployment figures between 2007 and 2011 indicate that the average rate of unemployment in Turkey was oscillating between around 20% to 25% while it was around 16-9% in the TR41 region (for more information see bebka.org). The main source of the relatively lower levels of unemployment in Bursa and its districts is the diversity of industrial, agricultural and service sectors providing jobs for the locals as well as the foreigners.

One of the main reasons why the unemployment rate remained high and above the average of Turkey until 2010, can be interpreted as unregistered employment. In 2010, the informality rate was 19.4% for men and 41.5% for women in Bursa. Especially, the unregistered employment ratio in the female unpaid family labour in agriculture points directly to unregistered labour and therefore causes high increase in unemployment rate not only for Bursa but also for Turkey in general. By sector, 94% of women in agriculture were unregistered in 2010 for Bursa. By 2013, general informality rate has fallen to 24.5%. In parallel to this trend, the rate of the unregistered employment in Bursa decreased to 24.2% although the informality rate for female employment remained unchanged. This was mainly due to the increase in female employment in industrial sector increased by 10,000 people where the unregistered employment is relatively lower than in the agricultural sector (Toksöz 2016; see also Kılıç 2017).

*Unemployment rate trends in Bursa, 2008-2017 Sources:*



*OECD.stat, Labour indicators, small regions TL3 and large regions TL2; Eurostat, Total unemployment rate; National statistical offices of MATILDE countries; Unemployment rate of TCNs, 2018 (\*available at NUTS2, \*\*available by degree of urbanization).*

Due to lack of data on NUTS-2 and NUTS-3 level, no specific characterization regarding the employment rates of foreigners can be provided. Focussing on Syrians, most of the youngsters, however, are employed

in agriculture, textile and service sector. High rates of youth employment are found in the textile sector, as the Syrians who are settled in Bursa mostly originate from Aleppo with an earlier expertise on textile production. A relevant share of Syrian youngsters under temporary protection is employed in agricultural sector, especially in the western districts of the city. There is also a group of Syrian migrants who are mostly working as seasonal agricultural workers in the fields as well as in the preservation factories such as TAT Konserve, whose employment rate increases during summertime (Dedeoğlu & Bayraktar 2019).

Due to lack of data on NUTS-2 and NUTS-3 level, no specific characterization regarding the unemployment rates of foreigners can be provided. As the Syrians under temporary protection prefer to be employed in informal sectors in order to enjoy the benefits of the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) Program introduced by the EU in 2016 (WFP 2019), there are no reliable data on their unemployment rate.

## REFERENCES

- Adaman, F. & Kaya, A. (2012): Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe. Final Country Report. Turkey. April 2012.
- Atasü-Topçuoğlu, R. (2019): What We Know and Do Not Know about Syrian Women's Labor Force Participation in Turkey: Questioning the Boundaries of Knowledge. In: Yılmaz, G., Karatepe, I. & Tören, T. (Eds.): Integration through Exploitation: Syrians in Turkey (pp. 128-142). Rainer Hampp: Augsburg/München.
- Balkir, C. & Kirkulak, B. (2009): Turkey, the New Destination for International Retirement Migration. In: Fassmann, H., Haller, M. & Lane, D. (Eds.): Migration and Mobility in Europe (pp. 123-143). Edward Elgar: Cheltenham.
- Beleli, Ö. (2013): Seasonal agricultural work and children: problem analysis and policy recommendations. Altan Matbaası: Ankara.
- Bertan Tokuzlu, L. (2007): Migration Law in Turkey. Analytical and Synthetic Notes – Legal Module (= Working Paper CARIM-AS 2007/1). Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration, European University Institute: Florence.
- Bursa Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BTSO, Bursa Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası) (2020): Homepage (in Turkish).
- BEBKA (Bursa Eskişehir Bilecik Kalkınma Ajansı) (2018): Bursa Yatırım Destek ve Tanıtım Stratejisi 2017-2023 2018 Eylem Planı (in Turkish).
- Bursa İli 2018 Yılı Çevre Durum Raporu. (2019). Bursa Çevre ve Şehircilik İl Müdürlüğü.
- Çınar, S. (2019): New Actors and New Conflicts in Construction Labor Market: Syrian Construction Workers from the Perspective of Native Workers in Turkey. In: Yılmaz, G., Karatepe, I. & Tören, T. (Eds.): Integration through Exploitation: Syrians in Turkey (pp. 68-79). Rainer Hampp: Augsburg/München.
- Dedeoğlu, S. & Bayraktar, S. (2019): Refuged into Precarious Jobs: Syrians' Agricultural Work and Labor in Turkey. In: Yılmaz, G., Karatepe, I. & Tören, T. (Eds.): Integration through Exploitation: Syrians in Turkey (pp. 13-27). Rainer Hampp: Augsburg/München.
- Dik, E. (2014): 6360 Sayılı Kanun Bağlamında Koylerin Mahalle Cevrilmesi Sorunu (in Turkish). Mulkiye Dergisi 38(1), 75-102.
- Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) (2020): Temporary Protection.
- Doğan Yenisey, K. (2019): Safeguarding the Rights of Migrant Workers: Another Challenge for Labour Law? In: Casale, G. & Treu, T. (Eds.): Transformations of Work: Challenges for the Institutions and Social Actors (pp. 227-292). Kluwer Law International B.V.: Alphen am Rhein, the Netherlands.
- enBursa (2019): İşte Bursa'nın turizm karnesi (in Turkish), 18 June 2019.
- Erman, T. (1998): Becoming "Urban" or Remaining "Rural": The Views of Turkish Rural-to-Urban-Migrants on the "Integration" Question. International Journal of Middle East Studies 30, 541-561.
- Ertuğrul, G. (2016): British Migrants in the Turkish Countryside: Lifestyle Migration, Loss of Social Status and Finding 'True Life' in Difference. METU Studies in Development 43(2), 475-496.
- Ertürk, S. A. (2020): National and Local Responses to Support Syrian Refugees in Turkey in the times of COVID-19. Southern Responses to Displacement.
- Erzan, R., Aksu, E. & Güray Kırdar, M. (2018): The Impact of Mass Migration of Syrians on the Turkish Labour Market (= Working Paper 1815). Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum: Koç.
- Guresci, E. (2013): Rural Immigration in Turkey and Agricultural Problems. Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 16(4), 63-70.
- İçduygu, A. (2016): Turkey: Labour Market Integration and Social Inclusion of Refugees. Study for the EMPL Committee, European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies. Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy, European Parliament: Brussels.
- İşeri, E. (2019): Syrian Refugees: A Part of the Working Class of Turkey. In: Yılmaz, G., Karatepe, I. & Tören, T. (Eds.): Integration through Exploitation: Syrians in Turkey (pp. 161-179). Rainer Hampp: Augsburg/München.
- Kavak, S. (2016): Syrian refugees in seasonal agricultural work: a case of adverse incorporation in Turkey. New Perspectives on Turkey 54(2016), 33-53.
- Kaya, A. (2017): FEUTURE. The Future of EU-Turkey Relations: Mapping Dynamics and Testing Scenarios. WP6 Migration. Mobility of Skills from EU to Turkey. Istanbul Bilgi University: Istanbul.
- Kaya, A. (2019): Which way to go: Understanding Migration Policies and their influence on EU-Turkey Relations. FEUTURE Extended Voice, Cologne (June 2019).
- Kaya, A. (2020): Reception: Turkey Country Report. Version v.1. (February 12). (= RESPOND Multilevel Governance of Mass Migration in Europe and Beyond Project Report Series 2020/37, February 2020).
- Kılıç, E. (2017): The Outlook of Female Labor in Turkey in the Context of Social Gender Perception from a Global Perspective. In Yenilmez, F. & Kılıç, E. (Eds.): Handbook of Research on Unemployment and Labor Market Sustainability in the Era of Globalization (pp. 114-139). IGI Global: Hershey.
- Kirişçi, K. (2004): Asylum, immigration, irregular migration and internally displacement in Turkey: Institutions and policies. Working Paper. Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration, European University Institute: Florence.
- Kirişçi, K. (2014): Syrian Refugees and Turkey's Challenges: Going Beyond Hospitality. Brookings Institute: Washington D.C.
- Kirişçi, K. & Karaca, S. (2015): Hoşgörü ve Çelişkiler: 1989, 1991 ve 2011'de Türkiye'ye Yönelen Kitleli Mülteci Akınları (Tolerance and Conflicts: Massive Refugee Flows to Turkey, in Turkish). In: Erdoğan, M. & Kaya, A. (Eds.): 14. Yüzyıldan 21. Yüzyıla Türkiye'ye Göçler (Migration to Turkey since the 14th Century) (pp. 295-314). Istanbul Bilgi University Press: Istanbul.
- Ministry of Culture and Tourism (2019): Turizm İstatistikleri. Genel Değerlendirme 2019. (in Turkish) (accessed last, 08.06.2020).
- Mura, E. (2016): Dynamics of Intermediation in the Agricultural Labor Market: Women Workers in Adapazari, Turkey. Middle East Technical University: Ankara.
- Nudralı, Ö. (2009): Sun Seeking Britons In Coastal Turkey: A Case of Study of Lifestyle Migration on the Verge of the EU. VDM: Saarbrücken.
- Özgür, E., Deniz, A., Hasta, D., Yüceşahin, M. & Yavuz, S. (2014): The Immigration of Russians and Azerbaijanis to Turkey: Who are They? Why are They Here? Insight Turkey 16(4), 105-121.
- Özkan, G. & Kadagan, Ö. (2019): Bursa İli Tarımsal Potansiyelinin Geliştirilmesine Yönelik Bir Değerlendirme (in Turkish). Turkish Studies - Economics, Finance, Politics 14(2), 503-522.
- Öztürk, M., Topaloğlu, B., Hilton, A. & Jongerden, J. (2018): Rural-Urban Mobilities in Turkey: Socio-spatial Perspectives on Migration and Return Movements. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 20(5), 513-530.
- Rittersberger-Tılıç, H. (2015): 'Managing' Irregular Labor Migrants in Turkey. The Journal of Migration Studies 1(1), 80-107.
- Sadunashvili, T. (2016): Georgian Migration to Turkey between 1990 and 2012. Master Thesis. Istanbul Bilgi University: Istanbul.
- Saraçoğlu, C. & Bélanger, D. (2019): The Syrian Refugees and Temporary Protection Regime in Turkey: A Spatial Fix for Turkish Capital. In: Yılmaz, G., Karatepe, I. & Tören, T. (Eds.): Integration through Exploitation: Syrians in Turkey (pp. 96-109). Rainer Hampp: Augsburg/München.
- Semerci, P. & Erdoğan, E. (2017): Project of Improving the Living Conditions of Children of (Seasonal Migrant) Agricultural Workers in Adana from the Perspective of Well-Being. Summary of the Research Findings, Policy Areas and Solution Proposals. Istanbul Bilgi University Center for Migration Research: Istanbul.
- Sonmez Efe, S. (2017): Legal Status and Economic Membership of Seasonal Migrant Workers in Turkey. The Journal of Migration Studies 3(2), 66-99.
- Toksöz, G. (2016): Bursa işgücü piyasasının toplumsal cinsiyet eşitliği perspektifinden analizi (in Turkish). International Labour Organization, ILO Office for Turkey: Ankara.
- Töksöz, G. & Ulutaş, C. (2012): Is Migration Feminized? A Gender- and Ethnicity-Based Review of the Literature on Irregular Migration to Turkey. In: Elitok, S. & Straubhaar, T. (Eds.): Turkey, Migration and the EU: Potentials, Challenges and Opportunities (pp. 85-112). Hamburg University Press: Hamburg.
- Tören, T. (2018): Documentation Report: Syrian Refugees in the Turkish Labour Market" (= ICDD Working Papers 22). University of Kassel: Kassel.
- TUIK (Turkish Statistical Institute) (2020a): Homepage. www.tuik.gov.tr (accessed last, 08.06.2020)
- TUIK (Turkish Statistical Institute) (2020b): The Results of Address Based Population Registration System 2019. Press Release No. 33705, 04.02.2020.
- UKKS (Ulusal Kirsal Kalkınma Stratejisi) (2014): Ulusal Kirsal Kalkınma Stratejisi 2014-2020 (in Turkish). Resmi Gazete: Ankara.
- Yılmaz, G., Karatepe, I. & Tören, T. (2019): Introduction: Putting Labor Market Integration in Turkey into its Place – Informality and Refugees. In: Yılmaz, G., Karatepe, I. & Tören, T. (Eds.): Integration through Exploitation: Syrians in Turkey (pp. 1-11). Rainer Hampp: Augsburg/München.
- Young, S. (2007): Hyper-Traditions/Hip Villages: Urbanite villagers of Western Anatolia. Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review 18(2), 29-41.
- WFP (World Food Programme) (2019): The Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN). Helping Refugees in Turkey.

## DAAD FELLOWSHIP

**DAAD**

Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst  
German Academic Exchange Service



As of September 2019, Dr. Deniz Yardımcı is the new DAAD lecturer at the European Institute. Within the framework of the agreement between Istanbul Bilgi University and the German Academic Foreign Exchange Service (DAAD), she will advance the European Institute's relations to German

academic institutions, advise on DAAD scholarship opportunities and pursue original research and will lecture in the International Relations program.

Deniz Güneş Yardımcı is a sociologist, media- and film scholar specialized in Turkish-German relations with a focus on Turkish-German migration history, culture- and identity politics, and the cinematic representation of migration and diasporas. Before joining the European Institute, she worked as a visiting lecturer at the Humboldt University of Berlin and the University of Duisburg-Essen, and will continue to lecture at the international Berlin Perspectives Programme at Humboldt University of Berlin.

Yardımcı received her PhD at the Media Arts Department at Royal Holloway, University of London in 2017, where she studied with a College Reid Scholarship from the Department of Media Arts. Her dissertation takes a comparative approach to the representation of culture and identity of Turkish migrants and the Turkish diaspora in Germany in German, Turkish-German, and Turkish cinema. During her PhD, Yardımcı was a DAAD doctoral fellow at the European Institute for seven months in 2014.

After her double degree study at the Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz in Germany, Yardımcı graduated from the Department of Sociology and the Department of Film/ Department of Mass Communication and received her German Diplom (equivalent to MA) in Sociology in 2009 and her German Magister (equivalent to MA) in Film Studies (with high honours) in 2010. During her studies, she worked as an editorial assistant in the news department of ZDF German Television and as a freelance journalist for Business Week (2006 - 2010).

Between 2003 and 2019, Yardımcı taught various courses in Sociology and Film Studies at the Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz, Royal Holloway, University of London, Humboldt University of Berlin and the University of Duisburg-Essen. Furthermore, she was a research assistant at Regent's Centre for Transnational Studies at Regent's University London and worked as an English Language Tutor for Academic Purposes (EAP) at Royal Holloway, University of London in 2013.

Yardımcı's broader research interests include European Migration and Integration Policies, Turkish-German Migration, Migration and Media/Film, Film Sociology, Transnational Cinema, Social Inequality, Marginal Groups, Postcolonial Theories and Qualitative Research Methods. Currently, she is completing a German as Foreign Language (DAF) teacher qualification at the Goethe Institute and writing her book on the cinematic representation of Turkish-German migration history. Yardımcı's present research focuses on contemporary Turkish-German Hip-Hop culture and the cinematic representation of the Syrian refugee crisis.

## German Studies Unit



Established in 2008 as a part of the European Institute's various research units and in collaboration with the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), the German Studies Unit complements the existing collaboration with the European University of Viadrina in Frankfurt-Oder, Germany.

The GSU is built around the idea of fostering Turkish-German relations within the context of the EU by promoting cultural interactions as well as exchange of knowledge and ideas. The key objective is to address recent social, political and cultural debates in German society and bring together researchers, students, policy-makers, stakeholders and the general public to discuss current trends and challenges in both countries and in Turkish-German relations.

The GSU has expanded its activities and offers a platform for an interdisciplinary exchange of knowledge, expertise and experience also beyond academia. The GSUs activities include:


- Articles and op-ed articles in English, Turkish and German
- Outreach activities in form of conferences, workshops and events
- German Studies Seminar Series
- Yearly German Studies Colloquium for graduate students
- Yearly Study Visits for a group of students to Germany
- Information events on study and research scholarships in Germany

As of January 2020, the GSU has restarted its bi-monthly online publication Germany Brief. The well-established initiative Germany Brief continues to update its readers about recent debates in German society. The latest contributions by Dr. Deniz Güneş Yardımcı, Lalla Amina Drhimeur Melanie Weißenberg, Dr. Constantin Schäfer and Dr. Yaşar Aydın focus on current discussions dealing with the rise of right-wing extremism and migration policy in Germany.




### Germany Brief 9 // January/February 2020

'Göçmen İşçi Çocuklarının Hibrid Sineması Alman Sinemasında Göç Olgusuna Özet Bir Bakış' by Dr. Deniz Güneş Yardımcı



### Germany Brief 10 // January/February 2020 SPECIAL ISSUE 'Almanya, Hanau'da İrkçi Motifli Silahlı Saldırı' by Lalla Amina Drhimeur



### Germany Brief 11 // March/April 2020 'Almanya'da COVID-19 ile ilgili hükümet önlemleri:Hükümet destek kazanırken sağcı popülistler kaybetmeye mi başlıyor?' by Melanie Weissenberg



### Germany Brief 12 // May/June 2020 'Siyaset ve Protesto Arasında:'Almanya İçin Alternatif' (AfD) ve Seçmenleri' by Dr. Constantin Schäfer FOTO 21



### Germany Brief 13 // July/August 2020 'New Trends in Turkey-Germany Migration' by Dr. Yaşar Aydın FOTO 22

In collaboration with the German Academic Exchange Service DAAD, the GSU has organized two DAAD scholarship events informing interested postgraduate students and academics from Turkey on scholarship opportunities for PhD programs and research stays in Germany. Due to the large interest, these scholarship information events will be held regularly.

## CONFERENCES, ROUNDTABLES & WORKSHOPS



### 8 October 2019 Jean Monnet Scholarship Information Event

The European Institute in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized an information event on Jean Monnet Scholarships on October 8, 2019 at santralistanbul campus.

### 13 November 2019 ERC workshop titled "Interdisciplinary Youth Radicalisation"



The first PRIME Youth Workshop titled “Interdisciplinary Workshop on Youth Radicalization” was held at İstanbul Bilgi University santralistanbul campus on 13 November 2019.

Our keynote speaker in the morning, Prof. Jocelyne Cesari made a presentation titled “A Sociological Perspective on Radicalization and Co-radicalization Processes in Europe” and she discussed the relations between deprivation and radicalisation through informing us about the dominant narratives surrounding radicalisation and co-radicalisation. Prof. Cesari’s discussion focused on belief, belonging and boundaries and the significance of politicisation. Our keynote speaker in the afternoon Prof. Emre Erdoğan made a presentation titled “Understanding the New Contagion of Public Protests: The Search for (Procedural) Justice is the Answer”. Prof. Erdoğan’s speech focused on distributive and procedural justice and the value of emotions such as anger, and hope in public protest participation.

For further information, please visit: <https://bpy.bilgi.edu.tr/en/events/interdisciplinary-workshop-youth-radicalization/>

### Interdisciplinary Workshop on Youth Radicalization Workshop Program

**Venue:** İstanbul Bilgi University santralistanbul campus,  
10.00 - 10.30 Opening and Presentation of the ERC Project by Prof. Ayhan Kaya, Dr. Ayşe Tecmen and Dr. Jais Troian  
10.30 - 11.15 Keynote Speech by Prof. Jocelyne Cesari, University of Birmingham

“A Sociological Perspective on Radicalization and Co-radicalization Processes in Europe”

11.15 - 12.30 Discussion and Individual Interventions  
12.30 - 14.00 Lunch  
14.00 - 14.45 Keynote Speech by Prof. Emre Erdoğan, İstanbul Bilgi University

“Understanding the New Contagion of Public Protests: The Search for (Procedural) Justice is the Answer”

14.45 - 16.30 Discussion and Individual Interventions  
16.30 - 17.00 Closing Remarks by Prof. Ayhan Kaya




**27 November 2019**  
**DAAD Event**  
**“Migration with Musical Documentary Films: Deep Encounters and Third Space”**



Group of MA European Studies students with the director Eda Elif Tibet (3rd from left) after the event.

In November 27, 2019, the European Institute organized in collaboration with the German Academic Exchange Service DAAD the event ‘Migration with Musical Documentary Films: Deep Encounters and Third Space’ at the santralistanbul campus at İstanbul Bilgi University.

The well-attended event started with the screening of the 2017 documentary ‘Ballad for Syria’ with the attendance of the director Eda Elif Tibet and was followed by a vivid Q&A session giving all participants the opportunity to discuss the film with the director.



**DAAD Information Event: 19 December 2019**

**8-9 January 2020**  
**ERC Research training for the fieldwork took place on 8-9 January 2020 in İstanbul at santralistanbul.**



Four field researchers (Melanie Weissenberg, Dr. An Van Raemdonck, Merel Zuurbier, Max-Valentin

Robert) joined our team to conduct the field research in Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, and France. The researchers started off with joining the workshop we organized for training them for the field work. Due to the COVID19 pandemic, they have started conducting the interviews both face-to-face and in online settings since late-May 2020. They also provided extensive and valuable information on the cities they are recruiting participants from. We share these narratives on our website.

### Aim of the research training

The aim of this training was to inform the researchers on the importance of ethics, and privacy in conducting field and desk research. At the same time, the training sessions covered proper research techniques particularly in regards to conducting face-to-face interviews. As such, in addition to covering the proper methods of dealing with issues arising from the sensitive nature of the interlocutors, this training provided valuable information on how to reach interlocutors and how to conduct the interviews vis-a-vis the open-ended question set and the quantitative survey. The training also included a session on the importance of going over the information sheets and the consent procedures (ie. the consent form that allows for written or oral consent) with the interlocutor. This was supplemented by a review of anonymization procedures. An important aspect of this training was that the researchers were also informed about the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR 2016/679), which governs the protection of personal data collected in the scope of this project.

For further information, please visit: <https://bpy.bilgi.edu.tr/en/events/research-training-workshop/>

### 9 May Europe Day

European Institute celebrated “9 May Europe Day” with a video filmed by Dr. Özge Onursal and Dr. Mehmet Ali Tuğtan, presenting their FlipEU course, funded by the European Commission Jean Monnet Module.

You can watch the video here: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i3X22C3XyJc>



**DAAD Information Event: 20 May 2019**

**11 June 2020**  
**Webinar on “American Actions in the Light of Global Social Movements”**



The European Institute organized a webinar series in June. The first webinar was titled American Actions in the Light of Global Social Movements and was held on June 11, 2020. Dr. Sinem Adar (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Political-Science and Policy Foundation, Berlin), Assoc. Dr. Erkan Saka (İstanbul Bilgi University,) and Prof. Ayhan Kaya (İstanbul Bilgi University) discussed racism and its effects in thw World. The webinar was moderated by Aslı Aydın-Sancar.

This webinar is available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iDxGbXklStw&feature=youtu.be>

**18 June 2020**  
**Webinar on “Thinking on Migration Films within the Scope of the International Migration Film Festival”**

ANDAAÇ HAZNEDAROĞLU  
YÖNETMEN, ÖGR. GÖR.  
İSTANBUL BİLGİ ÜNİVERSİTESİ  
İLETİŞİM FAKÜLTESİ

DR. ÖGR. ÜYESİ DOĞUŞ ŞİMŞEK  
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON  
SSEES

"ULUSLARARASI GÖÇ FİLM FESTİVALİ KAPSAMINDA  
GÖÇ FİMLERİ ÜZERİNE DÜŞÜNMEK"

18 HAZİRAN 2020  
SAAT: 15.30

Moderatör: Dr. Deniz Güneş Yardımcı  
İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi  
Avrupa Birliği Enstitüsü

DR. ÖGR. ÜYESİ AYÇA TUNÇ COX  
İZMİR YÜKSEK TEKNOLOJİ ENSTİTÜSÜ  
MİMARLIK FAKÜLTESİ

İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi

The second webinar titled Thinking on Migration Films within the Scope of the International Migration Film Festival was held on June 18 with the participation of Director and Instructor Andaç Haznedaroğlu (Istanbul Bilgi University), Dr. Ayça Tunç-Cox (İzmir Institute of Technology) and Dr. Doğu Şimşek (University College London). The webinar was moderated by Dr. Deniz Güneş Yardımcı (Istanbul Bilgi University, DAAD Fellow).

This webinar is available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L7RMekVdgC4&feature=youtu.be>

**24 June 2020**  
**Webinar on “From Global to Local Migration Policies: Issues and Responsibilities**

DR. N. ELA GÖKALP-ARAS  
BAŞ ARAŞTIRMACI  
RESPOND PROJESİ  
İSVEÇ ARAŞTIRMA ENSTİTÜSÜ İSTANBUL  
(SRII)

SONER Ö. BARTHOMA  
İDARİ KOORDİNATÖR  
RESPOND PROJESİ  
UPPSALA ÜNİVERSİTESİ

"KÜRESELDEN YERELE GÖÇ POLİTİKALARI:  
SORUNLAR VE SORUMLULUKLAR"

24 HAZİRAN 2020  
SAAT: 14.00

Moderatör: Dr. Fatma Yılmaz-Elmas  
İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi  
Avrupa Birliği Enstitüsü  
MATİLDE Projesi, Post-Doc Araştırmacı

İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi

The last webinar in June was titled From Global to Local Migration Policies: Issues and Responsibilities on 24 June and was moderated by Dr. Fatma Yılmaz-Elmas (MATİLDE Project Researcher). RESPOND

Project Principal Investigator Dr. N. Ela Gökalp-Aras (Swedish Research Institute Istanbul - SRII) and RESPOND Project Administrative Coordinator Soner Ö. Barthoma (Uppsala University) discussed the migration policies in the light of the latest findings of the RESPOND Project.

This webinar is available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e1dYMIk5IbA&feature=youtu.be>

**8 October 2020**  
**ERC Prime Youth Workshop on Radicalization and Political Extremism**



This conference was moderated by Prof. Constantina Badea of Universite Paris Nanterre.

After Prof. Badea's welcome speech, project's PI Prof. Ayhan Kaya (Istanbul Bilgi University, European Institute) made a presentation on "Nativism, Islamophobia and Islamism in the Age of Populism: Culturalization and Religionization of What is Social, Economic and Political in Europe". Kaya scrutinized social, economic, political and psychological sources of the processes of radicalization among native European

youth and Muslim-origin youth with migration background, who are both inclined to express their discontent through ethnicity, culture, religion, heritage, homogeneity, authenticity, past, gender and patriarchy. In order to explain the relationship between Islamophobia and Islamism emerging in both national and transnational spaces, Kaya also shared the main initial findings from the field research in Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands. These initial findings focused on the rise of the civilizationist discourse, the discontents accompanying socio-economic deprivation as well as the terminological confusions surrounding radicalisation.

In the second presentation of the first session, Dr. Ayşe Tecmen (İstanbul Bilgi University, European Institute) discussed "European Union's Articulation of Radicalisation: Deconstructing the Discursive Formulation of Radicalism through Counter Measures". She discussed radicalization and its prevention as a key pillar of EU's counter-terrorism strategy. Tracing the methods of cooperation and the proliferation of prevention strategies, she analysed the EU's radicalization discourse through a discourse-historical analysis focusing on the interplay between EU strategies and social, and cultural developments. This illustrated that the EU mainly reacts to the internal and

external dynamics influencing the political and public debates. Tecmen noted that In the EU's discourse escalation of radicalization to terrorism remains the central premise but in the mid-2010a "root causes" of radicalisation were introduced to partly address individual socioeconomic and psychological factors provoking radicalization.

In the third presentation of the first session, In her presentation titled "Using Values To Guide Analysis: Initial Observations From Our Research Data", Dr. Aysenur Benevento (İstanbul Bilgi University, European Institute) argued that narrating is purposeful; and that we use it to present ourselves in ways that connect or disconnect with the social and political milieu or to suggest different views of how things should be. Emphasizing the should aspect, she explained why values analysis (Daiute, 2014) was selected to analyze the interview transcripts. Benevento asserted that values analysis is grounded on the idea that values guide individuals' narratives. People interpret, adopt, modify existing values of their cultures in order to be part of or differentiate themselves from other cultures. There is also a broader process for comparing the value enactments across narratives. In the context of the PRIME Youth project, the narratives represented and organized via the four countries and the native/Muslim status will allow the research team to analyze and compare similarities and differences across groups of people.

The second session of the workshop focused on presentations from colleagues in the social-psychology discipline who provided us with insight into various studies on radicalisation.

In the first presentation of the second session, Professor David Bourguignon (Université de Lorraine Metz) presented "From Islamophobia to Communitarianism: The dynamic between French and Muslim identities" on behalf of his co-authors Nada Negraoui (Université de Lorraine Metz) and Layla Azzouzi (Université Catholique of Louvain, Louvain-La-Neuve). He argued that in France, 4 million people are of Arab origin and are Muslim. Although they are French, they face prejudice and discrimination in daily life. Bourguignon asserted that according the Rejection-Identification Model, in the face of discrimination, stigmatized people respond by increasing their identification with their group in order to protect their well-being (Branscombe, Schmitt and Harvey, 1999). Although protective, this strategy is accompanied by hostility towards members of dominant groups. Bourguignon stated that across two studies, they tested the Rejection-Identification Model on a sample of French and Belgian Muslims. Results show that Muslim identification serves as a buffer to cope to Islamophobia and to protect their well-being. Furthermore, no links appear between perceived discrimination and French/Belgian identification and between French/Belgian identification and Muslim Identification. Bourguignon noted that Muslim identification mediated the relationship between perceived discrimination and French/Belgian hostility. Results shed new light on the phenomenon of communitarianism and will be discussed in light of the stigma literature.

Assistant Professor Jocelyn J. Bélanger's (New York University Abu Dhabi) presentation "Ideological Obsession: Sociocognitive Processes and Policy Implications" posited that violent extremism is driven by "ideological obsession" –an ideological commitment fueled by unmet psychological needs and regulated by inhibitory and ego-defensive mechanisms. Drawing from cross-cultural evidence, Bélanger described four processes through which ideological obsession puts individuals on a path toward violence. First, ideological obsession deactivates moral self-regulatory processes, allowing unethical behaviours to be carried out without self-recrimination. Second, ideologically obsessed individuals are easily threatened by information that criticises their ideology, which in turn leads to hatred and violent retaliation. Third, ideological obsession changes people's social interactions by making them gravitate toward like-minded individuals who support ideological-violence. Finally, ideologically obsessed individuals are prone to psychological reactance, making them immune to messages intended to dissuade them from using violence. Bélanger noted that in fact, messages espousing nonviolence have the opposite effect by reinforcing their violence-supporting ideology. He concluded by presenting strategies to prevent radicalisation for individuals in pre-criminal spaces.

In the third presentation of the second session, Dr. Jais Adam-Troian (American University of Sharjah, UAE) made a presentation titled "Using First-Person Plural Pronouns from Search Volume Data to Predict Political Behavior" on behalf of his co-authors Dr. Thomas Arciszewski (Aix Marseille University, Centre PsyClé) and Dr. Eric Bonetto (Aix Marseille University, LPS - Centre PsyClé - INCIAM). He argued that the main factor mobilizing individuals into violent and nonviolent political action remains the extent to which they feel identified with a protesting group (i.e., social identification). Adam-Troian noted that social identification is a key driver of both activism and radicalism and although the link between social identification and political behavior is well-established, current evidence relies mostly on self-report data. To tackle this issue, Adam-Troian et. al. combined real-life protest counts in the US (2017-2020) with online search data (Google Trends) for pronouns indicating a 'group' mindset (first-person plural pronouns; e.g. 'we', 'us'). Time series analyses indicated that weekly fluctuations in searches (N = 164) predict both protest and protester counts over time. Confirmatory mixed-models then showed that a 1% increase in pronoun searches was linked with +13.67% protests and +47.45% protesters the following week. Adam-Troian also argued that these original results have important implications for the ecological study and quantification of political behavioral dynamics in psychology. He noted that future research should aim to replicate and extend these findings to violent political behavior as well as participation in terrorist organizations.





This conference was moderated by Prof. Thomas Faist of Bielefeld University, who is one of the scientific advisors of the PRIME Youth Research Project, in collaboration with Prof. Jörg Hüttermann, a member of the Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence, Bielefeld University.

Prof. Thomas Faist opened the workshop with a warm welcome speech underlining the importance of the PRIME Youth research project in relation to the similarities to the perceived threats of natives in the US coming from the Socialists and Catholics in the late 19th century. After Prof. Faist pointed out such similarities between native and Muslim youth in Europe on the one hand, and between native and Catholic/Socialist migrants in the US on the other hand, the project's PI Prof. Ayhan Kaya (İstanbul Bilgi University, European Institute) first thanked Prof. Faist and Prof. Hüttermann for having organized the workshop, and then he presented the PRIME Youth project called "Nativism, Islamophobia and Islamism in the Age of Populism: Culturalization and Religionization of What is Social, Economic and Political in Europe". Prof. Kaya scrutinized social, economic, political, and psychological sources of radicalization among native European youth and Muslim-origin youth with migration background, who are both inclined to express their discontent through ethnicity, culture, religion, heritage, homogeneity, authenticity, past, gender, and patriarchy. In order to explain the relationship between Islamophobia and Islamism emerging in both national and transnational spaces, Prof. Kaya also shared the main initial findings from the field research in Germany, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. These initial findings focused on the rise of the civilizationist discourse, the discontents accompanying socio-economic deprivation and nostalgic deprivation as well as the terminological confusions surrounding radicalisation. He argued that there is the term "radical" is under attack from several fronts including the central states and the European Union bodies. He stated that the term 'radical' has an historical journey especially since the late 18th century addressing at the democrats, liberals, socialists, and others who took a critical stance against oppressive forces, and it cannot be reduced to jihadist, Salafist, white-supremacists, extremist and/or terrorist groups in the present time.

In the second presentation of the first session, Dr. Ayşe Tecmen (İstanbul Bilgi University, European Institute) discussed "European Union's Articulation of Radicalisation: Deconstructing the Discursive Formulation of Radicalism through Counter Measures". She discussed radicalization and its prevention as a key pillar of EU's counter-terrorism strategy. Tracing the methods of cooperation and the proliferation of prevention strategies, she analysed the EU's radicalization discourse through a discourse-historical analysis focusing on the interplay between EU strategies and social, and cultural developments. This illustrated that the EU mainly reacts to the internal and external dynamics influencing the political and public debates. Dr. Tecmen noted that In the EU's discourse escalation of radicalization to terrorism remains the central premise but in the mid-2010s "root causes" of radicalisation were introduced to partly address individual socioeconomic and psychological factors provoking radicalization.

In the third presentation of the first session titled "Using Values To Guide Analysis: Initial Observations From Our Research Data", Dr. Aysenur Benevento (İstanbul Bilgi University, European Institute) argued that narrating is purposeful; and that we use it to present ourselves in ways that connect or disconnect with the social and political milieu or to suggest different views of how things should be. Emphasizing the should aspect, she explained why values analysis was selected to analyze the interview transcripts. Dr. Benevento asserted that values analysis is grounded on the idea that values guide individuals' narratives. People interpret, adopt, and modify existing values of their cultures to be part of or differentiate themselves from other cultures. There is also a broader process for comparing the value enactments across narratives. In the PRIME Youth project context, the narratives represented and organized via the four countries and the native/Muslim status will allow the research team to analyze and compare similarities and differences across groups of people.

In the second session's first presentation, Lisa Kiefer (Projektleiterin Aktion Gemeinwesen und Beratung e.V.) gave a presentation titled "CleaR - Clearing Procedures Against Radicalization" regarding the utility of the practical aspect of the CleaR project implemented in schools in Germany (see <https://www.clearing-schule.de/>). "CleaR Teaching - dealing with neo-Salafist and right-wing extremist attitudes in the school context" is a project to prevent radicalization and to strengthen democratic attitudes in schools. She noted that teachers see students' concerns and problematic stances they might develop, including cultural suspicion, Islamism, or Islamophobia. She said that assuming the non-linear nature of radicalism, we should be careful not to stereotype people leading to conflict and discrimination. Kiefer also discussed the polarization among the youth and the rise of both Salafist extremism and far-right extremism. She argued that monitored and structured processes introduced at an early age could prevent attacks and conflicts originating from these groups' tensions. Therefore, schools and extracurricular partners can be sensitized to possible indicators of radicalisation.

As the last presenter of the workshop, in his presentation titled "Nativism and Nationalism among "German" Youth", Denis van de Wetering (Bielefeld University, Institute for Interdisciplinary Conflict and Violence Research) discussed his findings from interviews with 18 former right-wing extremist men between 2015 and 2016. In the interviews, former right-wing extremist men addressed that they are repulsed by interactions that enforce the superior/subordinate. They noted that they commit violent acts to establish dominance, which results from the combative negotiation of internal orders among right-wing extremist men. Physical and emotional involvement in fights was essential to establish their significance within the right-wing extreme social order. He further discussed that joint fighting creates mutual trust and collectivity in search of confrontation. In this case, solidarity acts to invalidate social norms against hurting others and legitimizing violence.

The workshop came to an end with a fruitful dialogue and fusion of horizons among the PRIME Youth researchers including the PI, post-doc researchers and field researchers as well as the members of the Istanbul Bilgi University and the Bielefeld University.

7. Ayhan Kaya, Max-Valentin Robert & Ayşe Tecmen (2019) Populism in Turkey and France: nativism, multiculturalism and Euroscepticism, Turkish Studies, DOI: 10.1080/14683849.2019.1637260
8. Ayhan Kaya and Ayşe Tecmen (2019) Europe versus Islam?: Right-Wing Populist Discourse and the Construction of a Civilizational Identity, The Review of Faith & International Affairs, 17:1, 49-64, DOI: 10.1080/15570274.2019.1570759

## PROGRAMMES ON EUROPEAN STUDIES

### BİLGİ MA in European Studies



The MA Program, launched in 2000 and run by the Social Sciences Institute, is designed to provide a thorough knowledge of the European Union, its historic development, its institutions, systems and policies. Turkey's longstanding EU integration process, which started in 1963, continued with the Customs Union (1996) that made Turkey part of the European Single Market. Within the framework of the program, Turkey's EU accession period is analyzed and researched with a focus on recent developments. The Program, concentrating on themes such as enlargement and the societal transformations it brings to the countries involved (peace, stability, democratization, regional cooperation, human rights, rule of law, etc.) and European Neighborhood Policy, also offers a wider perspective of European Studies with emphasis on issues such as migration, environmental issues and intercultural dialogue.

The programs are restructuring and there will be no recruitment to the programs this year.

For further information please visit our new website: <http://eustudies.bilgi.edu.tr/>

### Viadrina Double Degree MA Program



EUROPA-  
 UNIVERSITÄT  
 VIADRINA  
 FRANKFURT  
 (ODER)

As one of the core countries of European integration since the early days of the European Coal

## PUBLICATIONS

1. Chiara De Cesari and Ayhan Kaya, eds. (2019) European Memory in Populism: Representations of Self and Other. London: Routledge.
2. Ayhan Kaya (2019) Populism and Heritage in Europe: Lost in Diversity and Unity. London: Routledge.
3. Ayhan Kaya and Ayşe Tecmen (2019). "Europe versus Islam?: Right-wing Populist Discourse and the Construction of a Civilizational Identity," The Review of Faith & International Affairs, 17:1, 49-64 DOI:10.1080/15570274.2019.1570759 Link:[https://www.academia.edu/38660636/Construction\\_of\\_a\\_Civilizational\\_Identity](https://www.academia.edu/38660636/Construction_of_a_Civilizational_Identity)
4. "Avrupa'da Popülist Sağın Yükselişi: Popülizm Nedir?" Euro Politika Dergi, 2018 March, Link:[https://www.academia.edu/38660472/Avrupada\\_Pop%C3%BClizm\\_Euro\\_Politika\\_Dergisi](https://www.academia.edu/38660472/Avrupada_Pop%C3%BClizm_Euro_Politika_Dergisi)
5. Ayhan Kaya (2019) "Populism as a neo-liberal form of governmentality" in Lia Galani (ed.) Geographical Literacy and European Heritage: A Challenging Convention in the field of Education.
6. Kaya, A. (2018). Right-wing populism and Islamophobia in Europe and their impact on Turkey-EU relations. Turkish Studies, 1-28.

and Steel Community, Germany with its political, social and economic structure deserves special attention in studies regarding the European Union. To this end, the European Institute of Istanbul Bilgi University has developed close relations with many universities and institutes in Germany. The academic cooperation with the European University Viadrina is an exemplary relationship, which started as a two-way exchange of students and academics, leading finally to an enhanced collaboration agreement between the two universities funded by the German Foreign Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). Graduates not only gain an insight into life in two very different European cities, but also prepare themselves for a rapidly changing world of work across the European continent. The program is run by the Social Sciences Institute.

With 30% of foreign students from over 70 countries and an extensive network of partner universities, European University Viadrina is one of the most international universities worldwide. The study courses and university degrees are internationally acknowledged. Its atmosphere is personal and warm, and with excellent student support and guidance European University Viadrina is able to offer outstanding study conditions. Viadrina is located at the German-Polish border, only one hour by train from Germany's capital, Berlin.

The University's proximity to Poland and to Eastern Europe is clearly a distinctive feature of the degree program. Students are able to both learn about the expansion of Europe to the east whilst actively experiencing life on both sides of the German-Polish border. In addition, extensive supervision is offered, along with small seminar groups and outstanding technical facilities. Should Frankfurt be too small, then there is always Berlin, only an hour away by train. The programs are restructuring and there will be no recruitment to the programs this year.

**For further information please visit our new website:**  
<http://eustudies.bilgi.edu.tr/>

### Master in Advanced European and International Studies – MAEIS



Applications for the “Master in Advanced European and International Studies” (MAEIS) at CIFE's Institut européen-European Institute (IE-EI) (Nice/France) in cooperation with Istanbul Bilgi University's European Institute are open. The Master's programme offers the unique opportunity to learn about the challenges and chances of Europe and develop perspectives for its future by learning and living in different European countries over the year. The MAEIS is a one-year-programme that takes place in three different study locations. The programme includes semesters in different countries, complemented by a study trip to the European and international organisations in Strasbourg, Brussels and Geneva.

**For further information please visit:** [www.ie-ei.eu](http://www.ie-ei.eu)  
[http://www.ie-ei.eu/en/3/description\\_21-1](http://www.ie-ei.eu/en/3/description_21-1)

## FROM OUR STUDENTS

### Najib El-Kadi, Double Degree MA in European Studies



I started my Master's Program European Studies at Viadrina in fall 2017. It was not planned to do a semester let alone a whole year abroad at all, before I found the possibility of doing a Double Degree in Istanbul. After a short phase of preparation in which both universities, Viadrina and BİLGİ, proved to coordinate the beginning of a stay abroad with ease, I found myself on board a Turkish Airline flight from Berlin to Istanbul. For someone who has not yet mastered the Turkish language, the first few weeks were quite full of challenges in the daily life. Finding an apartment to live in, organizing a comfortable route to campus in the mornings and registering for the right courses are just a handful of examples that international Students filled their hours with in the first few weeks.

I was lucky to have had the support from previous students that completed their Double Degree in Istanbul. Their insights to the Program and their experience in Istanbul were valuable sources of knowledge that helped to facilitate my whole time in this huge and ever so busy city. Moreover, the people from the international office were always a great support when having to face issues in the daily life of a student.

What I liked most about the Program at BİLGİ was the vast amount of different courses I was able to choose from. When I finally understood the course registering system, I was able to structure my schedule with high flexibility and was able to choose courses from fields like political sciences, sociology, international relations and more.

I personally enjoyed going to Campus three times a week to study and to take classes. The facilities at BİLGİ are of the highest modern standards but what made going to class interesting were the political conversations and discussions during class. These discussions gave me a great overview of the different standpoints in Turkish politics. Still, students were always respectful to one another and teachers almost always provided a focused but independent learning environment for students.

If there is a tip I would need to give to someone planning to go Istanbul, I would highly recommend learning basic Turkish while still at your home country. Language is key in Turkey and opens doors to a network and friendships with Turkish students. The Turkish language classes that are provided at University are not to be recommended if an international Student wants to learn Turkish seriously, but private schools around Taksim area are particularly focused on internationals wanting to learn more than brief small talk. Living in Istanbul for a year has been an interesting and fascinating experience. The whole city is an area of politics. Many conversations with people in the streets, taxi drivers and Turkish friends are ending in a political topic. It became impossible to avoid politics when living in Istanbul. This on the one hand, provides a student with an immense amount of new knowledge but on the other hand can be exhausting to process all the influx. Overall I highly recommend going to Istanbul for any student with an interest in political science or international relations. The practical experiences and the cultural input have added a tremendous amount of knowledge to my personal skill set and I like to personally thank anyone who helped me to successfully master this year in Istanbul.

### INTERN

### Lucie D'Ambra, Katholische Universitaet Eichstaett-Ingolstadt, Intern



My name is Lucie D'Ambra and I am a French student in a Master degree in Political Science in a French-German cursus. I had the opportunity to do an Erasmus while I was studying in Germany. I decided to go to Istanbul, motivated by the different courses I took dealing with contemporary Turkey and the history of the Ottoman Empire.

It was the first time I lived in such a big city. Istanbul is a plural, sprawling city that oscillates

between effervescence and contemplation.

I took courses in International Relations at Istanbul Bilgi University, which offers a calm and pleasant academic setting, rare in a city where everything is fast and crowded. A liberal and tolerant environment that soothes and reassures. I started my Master degree with this Erasmus and the courses were all of very good quality and very enriching in the transmission of key knowledge in the apprehension of modern Turkey, its regional anchorage and its relationship with the EU.

At the end of my Erasmus, I decided to continue my stay in Istanbul with an internship.

I had the chance to do an internship at the European Institute in BİLGİ. The institute deals with European issues, especially on questions of diversity and pluralism. It was my first internship in an academic research centre. I worked on youth radicalisation in Europe, as part of a project carried out in four EU countries and in partnership with Morocco and Turkey. I am very grateful to have been able to participate in such a cross-border project, of such a scale and really grounded in current issues. I have contributed to the theoretical basis of the study, particularly through definitional research. Because of the theme, echoing a media and political discourse in France, this research has allowed me to grasp with greater acuity the issues related to this subject. This internship was very instructive and opened multiple perspectives of understanding and questioning.

My experience at Istanbul Bilgi University, whether as an Erasmus student or as an intern, was decisive in my eight months in Istanbul.

## SHORT NEWS

- Dr. Ayşenur Benevento started to work as a Post-doc researcher for the ERC Project titled “Nativism, Islamophobia and Islamism in the Age of Populism: Culturalisation and Religionisation of what is Social, Economic and Political in Europe” as of January 2020. Benevento has a Ph.D. in Psychology from the Graduate Center, City University of New York. Her research focuses on the interactions children and young people actively develop with their immediate surroundings, different social entities and culture.
- Dr. Fatma Yılmaz Elmas started to work as a Post-doc researcher for the H2020 MATILDE Project titled “Migration Impact Assessment to Enhance Integration and Local Development in European Rural and Mountain Regions” as of June 2020. Yılmaz-Elmas has a Ph.D. in International Relations/ European Studies from Ankara University with a dissertation on the EU migration-foreign policy nexus, for which she conducted research at the University of Pittsburgh's Jean Monnet European

Union Centre of Excellence in 2012. She obtained her B.A. degree in International Relations from Dokuz Eylül University, and her M.A. in European Studies from Ankara University. She also worked as a researcher for over 10 years at an independent think-tank. She is mainly interested in EU external migration policies, readmission, racism and xenophobia, Islamophobia and Turkey-EU relations.

- Dr. Metin Koca started to work as a researcher for the ERC Project titled “Nativism, Islamophobia and Islamism in the Age of Populism: Culturalisation and Religionisation of what is Social, Economic and Political in Europe” as of November 2020. Metin Koca is a post doctoral researcher for the ERC project titled “Nativism, Islamophobia and Islamism in the Age of Populism: Culturalisation and Religionisation of what is Social, Economic and Political in Europe”. Koca received his PhD in Social and Political Sciences from the European University Institute, Italy, in January 2020. He is interested in the study of cultural change and reproduction, as well as the politics of tolerance, recognition and difference. He completed his undergraduate degree at Bilkent University (2012) as the first ranking student in the Faculty of Economics, Administrative and Social Sciences. Later, as a Jean Monnet Scholar in “Justice, Freedom and Security”, he earned a Master’s degree from the London School of Economics and Political Science (2013). Koca conducted part of his PhD research as a visiting scholar in the Department of Sociology at the University of California, Berkeley (2016-2017).

## İSTANBUL BİLGİ UNIVERSITY

‘Non scholae, sed vitae discimus’ (learning not for school but for life) Adopting the principle of ‘Non scholae, sed vitae discimus’ (learning not for school but for life), İstanbul Bilgi University took its place within the Turkish system of higher education as a civil corporation after the application made by the Bilgi Education and Culture Foundation on 7 June 1996 and the subsequent approval by the Turkish Grand National Assembly as per the Law number 4142.

Over time İstanbul Bilgi University has grown to encompass 3 campuses that cover nearly a total of 210,000 m<sup>2</sup>, namely Kuştepe, Dolapdere and santralistanbul, where it continues to serve its students and the academic world in Turkey.

Having broken many new grounds in Turkey within 23 years, İstanbul Bilgi University had a long term partnership between 2006-2019 with Laureate Education, one of the largest international education

networks in the world, with the aim of increasing the quality of education and research and becoming a university that can compete globally. In 2019, Can Holding joined the supporters of Bilgi Culture and Education Foundation.

The university currently has near 20,000 students and 45,000 alumni, approximately 1,500 academicians;

**7** faculties, **3** institutes, **4** schools, **3** vocational schools, and **150+** programs that provide education to its associate, undergraduate and graduate students.

## ACADEMIC PROGRAMMES

### FACULTIES

#### Faculty of Architecture

Architecture  
Industrial Design  
Interior Design

#### Faculty of Business

Business Administration  
Economics  
Economics and Finance  
Economics and Finance (Honors)  
Economics and Management (Honors)  
International Finance  
International Trade and Business Management and Digital Innovation (Honors) \*\* \*\*  
Management Information Systems  
Marketing

#### Faculty of Communication

Advertising  
Arts and Cultural Management  
Communication and Design Management  
Digital Game Design  
Film  
Management of Performing Arts  
New Media and Communication  
Photography and Video\* \*  
Public Relations and Publicity  
Radio, Television and Film  
Television Reporting and Programming  
Visual Communication Design

#### Faculty of Engineering and Natural Sciences

Civil Engineering  
Computer Engineering  
Computer Science\* \*  
Electrical and Electronics Engineering  
Energy Systems Engineering  
Genetics and Bioengineering

Industrial Engineering  
Mathematics  
Mechanical Engineering  
Mechatronics Engineering

#### Faculty of Health Sciences

Child Development  
Health Management \* \*  
Nursing  
Nutrition and Dietetics  
Occupational Therapy \* \*  
Perfusion \* \*  
Physiotherapy and Rehabilitation  
Faculty of Law  
Law

#### Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities

Comparative Literature  
English Language and Literature  
English Language Teacher Education\* \*  
European Union Studies\* \*  
History  
International Relations  
International Relations  
Music  
Political Science (BİLGİ-University of Liverpool / Dual Degree)  
Political Science and Public Administration  
Psychology  
Sociology

### SCHOOLS

#### School of Applied Sciences

Banking and Finance \* \*  
Fashion and Textile Design  
International Retail Management \* \*  
Logistics Management

#### School of Aviation

Aviation Management

#### School of Sports Sciences and Technology

Sports Management

#### School of Tourism and Hospitality

Gastronomy and Culinary Arts  
Tourism and Hotel Management

### VOCATIONAL SCHOOLS

#### School of Advanced Vocational Studies

Accounting and Tax Applications  
Accounting and Tax Applications (Evening Education)  
Aircraft Technology  
Aircraft Technology (Evening Education)  
Architectural Restoration  
Architectural Restoration (Evening Education)  
Banking and Insurance  
Banking and Insurance (Evening Education)  
Business Administration\* \*  
Civil Air Transportation Management  
Civil Air Transportation Management (Evening Education)  
Civil Aviation Cabin Services  
Civil Aviation Cabin Services (Evening Education)

Computer Programming  
Construction Inspection\* \*  
Construction Technology  
Construction Technology (Evening Education)  
Cooking  
Cooking (Evening Education)  
Fashion Design  
Fashion Design (Evening Education)  
Graphic Design  
Graphic Design (Evening Education)  
Information Security Technology  
Interior Space Design  
International Trade  
Logistics\* \* No new students will be accepted.  
Marina and Yacht Management\* \*  
Maritime Transportation and Management  
Maritime Transportation and Management (Evening Education)  
Photography and Videography\* \*  
Printing and Publishing Technologies  
Public Relations and Advertising  
Radio and Television Programming\* \*  
Sports Management\* \*

#### Vocational School of Health Services

Anesthesia  
Anesthesia (Evening Education)  
Audiometry  
Audiometry (Evening Education)  
Child Development  
Child Development (Evening Education)  
Dental Prosthetics Technology  
Dental Prosthetics Technology (Evening Education)  
Dialysis  
Dialysis (Evening Education)  
Electroneurophysiology  
Electroneurophysiology (Evening Education)  
Emergency and Disaster Management  
First and Emergency Aid  
First and Emergency Aid (Evening Education)  
Medical Imaging Techniques  
Medical Imaging Techniques (Evening Education)  
Medical Laboratory Techniques (Evening Education)\* \*  
Medical Laboratory Techniques\* \*  
Occupational Health and Safety  
Occupational Health and Safety (Evening Education)  
Operating Room Services  
Operating Room Services (Evening Education)  
Opticianry  
Opticianry (Evening Education)  
Oral and Dental Health  
Oral and Dental Health (Evening Education)  
Pathology Laboratory Techniques  
Pathology Laboratory Techniques (Evening Education)  
Physiotherapy  
Physiotherapy (Evening Education)  
Radiotherapy (Evening Education)\* \*  
Radiotherapy\* \*  
Social Services

#### Vocational School of Justice

Justice

#### Institute of Graduate Programs\*

Accounting and Auditing  
Architectural Design

Banking and Finance  
Clinical Psychology  
Cultural Management  
Cultural Studies  
Economics  
Electrical-Electronics Engineering  
Entrepreneurship and Innovation in Technology / LITE:  
Learn, Innovation Technology and Entrepreneurship  
European Studies  
Film and Television  
Financial Economics  
History  
History, Theory and Criticism in Architecture  
Human Resource Management  
Information and Technology Law  
International Finance  
International Political Economy  
International Relations  
Law (Business Law/Human Rights Law)  
Marketing  
Marketing / Next Academy  
Marketing Communication  
MBA  
Media and Communication Systems  
Nutrition and Dietetics  
Organizational Psychology  
Philosophy and Social Thought  
Public Relations and Corporate Communication  
Social Projects and NGO Management  
Trauma and Disaster Mental Health  
Turkish-German Business Law (İstanbul Bilgi University-  
Cologne University)

#### **Online Master Programs\***

Banking and Finance Online  
e-MBA English  
e-MBA Turkish  
Human Resources Management Online  
Management Information Systems Online

#### **DOCTORAL PROGRAMS\***

##### **Graduate School of Sciences Programs**

Business Administration  
Communication  
Economics  
Political Science  
Private Law  
Public Law

\*No intake for 2020-2021 Academic Year

\* \* No new students will be accepted to this program

\*\* \*\* The Program will accept students beginning from  
the 2020-2021 academic year.