Nativist and Islamist Radicalism

Anger and Anxiety

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Introduction

This edited volume aims to contribute to the scholarship that has so far studied European youth in ethno-culturally, and religio-politically divided separate clusters, such as "migrant-origin" and "native" youths. In this context, the contributors of this edited volume accord to a single optical lens to analyse the factors and processes behind the radicalisation of both native and self-identified Muslim youths. Accordingly, this introductory chapter lays the groundwork by arguing that European youth respond differently to the challenges posed by contemporary flows of globalisation, such as deindustrialisation, structural exclusion, and socio-economic, political, spatial, and psychological forms of deprivation and humiliation. In responding to existential threats and challenges, social groups exploit what their cultural repertoires offer. In our cases, these cultural repertoires are ethno-national (for native) and religious (for self-identified Muslims) repertoires. The underlying idea here is to challenge the hegemony of culturalist and civilisational discourse prevailing in Europe over the last three decades, and revisit social, economic, political, and psychological drivers of radicalisation – a term that has become overstretched, thus, an empty signifier. Challenging the contemporary ways of using the term radicalism interchangeably with extremism, terrorism, fundamentalism, and violence, we take radicalism as a quest for the democratisation of democracies rather than a pathological issue. We argue that it is the neoliberal forms of governance that often associate radicalism with extremism, terrorism, fundamentalism, and violence.

The edited volume analyses the current political, social, and economic context of the European Union, hit by four fundamental crises – namely, the global financial crisis, the refugee crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine, which have together led to the escalation of fear and prejudice among some segments of the European public *vis-à-vis* others who are ethno-culturally and religiously different. The main question posed in this volume is as follows: How and why do some European citizens generate a radical populist and Islamophobist discourse to express their discontent

regarding the current social, economic and political state of their national and European context, while some members of migrant-origin communities with a Muslim background generate an essentialist and radical form of Islamist discourse in the same societies? In such a manner, the volume is novel as it attempts to analyse two sides of the same coin to understand the sources of discontent of populist young native groups on the one hand, and radical young self-identified Muslims with migration background on the other hand. So far, social scientists have studied these groups separately from more culturalist, civilisational, and religious perspectives. The main strength and novelty of this edited volume is to understand and explain the malaise of both native and immigrant origin youth simultaneously through a scientific method by de-culturalising and de-religionising what is socio-economic, political, and psychological in origin. So far, existing studies have focused on one or the other of these two phenomena, while this volume analyses them together. The volume tries to understand and explain the relationship between nativist-populist radicalism and Islamic radicalism.

At the background of the volume is globalisation, playing a key role in the formation, diversification, and solution of the problems behind radicalisation. Various segments of the European public – be they native populations or Muslim-migrant-origin populations – have been alienated and swept away by the flows of globalisation, which appears in the form of deindustrialisation, mobility, circulation, migration, social-economic inequalities, international trade, tourism, "greedy bankers", and automation. In reaction, many are inclined to adopt two interrelated political discourses, which have become pivotal along with the rise of civilisational rhetoric since the early 1990s: *Islamophobism* and *Islamism*. To put it differently, this neoliberal age appears to have led to the *nativisation of radicalism* among some groups of the disenchanted native populations while also leading to the *Islamisation of Radicalism* among some segments of the disenchanted migrant origin populations. The common denominator of these groups is that they are both downwardly mobile and inclined towards *radicalisation*. Existing studies have so far revealed such findings in a way that clusters these two groups of youngsters in separate ethno-cultural and religious boxes (Mudde, 2007, 2016; Roy, 2015, 2017; Kepel, 2017). Based on the idea of offering *one single scientific optical lens* to closely look at some native and migrant-origin youth at the same time, the novelty of this volume lies in its attempt to *de-culturalise* and *de-religionise* social-economic, political, and psychological phenomena. Be the reaction comes in a populist rhetoric or the Islamist rhetoric, they are both employed by radicalising groups of people who have been alienated and swept away by the current neoliberal forms of governance. It is the processes of radicalisation, which need to be understood better. Hence, this volume analyses the social-economic, political, and psychological processes leading to the nativisation of radicalism among the native European youth on the one hand, and the Islamisation

of radicalism among migrant-origin youth with Muslim background on the other.

It seems that some social groups belonging to the majority societies are more inclined to express their distress resulting from insecurity and social-economic deprivation through the language of Islamophobia, even in cases that are not related to the perceived threat of Islam. Several decades ago, Seymour Martin Lipset (1960) stated that the social-political discontent of people is likely to lead them to anti-Semitism, xenophobia, racism, regionalism, supernationalism, fascism, and anti-cosmopolitanism. Suppose Lipset's timely intervention in the 1950s is transposed to the contemporary age. In that case, one could then argue that Islamophobia has also become one of the paths followed by those in a state of social-economic and political dismay. Islamophobic discourse has resonated greatly in the last decade, and its users have been heard by both local and international communities. However, their distress has not necessarily resulted from a Muslim grievance. The first-generation migrants in Europe used left-wing universalist rhetoric to express their problems, whereas the second generations shifted gradually to the particularist language (Roy, 2007). For any troubling situation in the meantime, Muslims have become popular scapegoats. For over a decade, Muslim-origin migrants and their descendants have been primarily seen by large segments of the European public as a financial burden and virtually never as an opportunity for the member states. They tend to be associated with illegality, crime, violence, drug abuse, radicalism, fundamentalism, conflict, and many other ways, represented negatively (Kaya, 2015, 2014).

In addition to using an Islamophobic discourse by some native groups, the agency of populist political figures is also essential in understanding the growth of the radical right in Europe. Populist leaders tend to use different elements of past, heritage, tradition, culture, religion, gender, myths, and memories accumulated in the repertoire of the nationalist imagination (De Cesari and Kaya, 2020; Kaya, 2020). In this regard, it is imperative to examine the implications of the global financial crisis, refugee crisis, COVID-19 pandemic, and EU accession politics on various groups of the European public, be they native or migrant origin groups who are inclined to politically express themselves, respectively, through Islamophobist or Islamist elements coupled with strong populist rhetoric. It seems that those hit by the socio-economic, political, and psychological detrimental effects of globalisation are expressing their anger and disenchantment through ways that undermine the European motto of "unity in diversity".

On the other side of the coin, the volume explores migrant-origin youngsters with Muslim backgrounds who generate an Islamist discourse of empowerment in times of social, economic, and political turmoil. They incorporate themselves into a counter-hegemonic global political narrative, namely Islamism. Then, it becomes essential to find out about the legitimising sources of this discourse, originating partly from the homeland of

migrant origin-people and other spheres of global and regional political and economic contestation. It is also imperative to study how European states have so far accommodated migrant-origin people with a Muslim background and how their attempts to institutionalise Islam have contributed to the Islamisation of radicalism among Muslim-origin migrant populations and their descendants. In this vein, Martijn de Koning problematises the Dutch integration and minority policies, which define Muslims as a threat to social security. Accordingly, racial securitisation has led to two main avenues of Muslim reaction: one that avoids confrontation with the state and one that actively seeks confrontation. Focusing on the Moroccan-origin youths in France, Mehdi Lahlou analyses how marginalised youths were influenced by the Wahabi strand of Islamism, which had penetrated Moroccan society since the end of the 1970s. Finally, with a broader focus on four European states, Germany, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, Metin Koca argues that the new religiosities in the migrant-origin Muslim communities challenge state-led religious reform and conservation projects, be them coming from their countries of origin or residence. Focusing on the new intercultural policies adopted in Italy, Roberta Ricucci lays down a series of emotional support activities that assist the second generation of Muslims in their personality formation and self-expression.

Hence, the volume mainly analyses the ways in which radicalised groups from both native and migrant-origin populations express their discontent using different cultural repertoires (Tilly, 1977). The main premise of the volume is that these groups, respectively, employ Islamophobist or Islamist discourses to express their social-economic, political, and psychological deprivations in the public sphere, which mainly result from the processes of modernisation and globalisation (Calhoun, 2011). In this volume, two chapters have specific importance in our attempt to stress the commonalities between both groups. In her chapter, Ayşenur Benevento identifies Muslim women and right-wing native women in Belgium and discusses their similar reasonings for participation in and support of the two conventional gendered practices – wearing a veil and being a homemaker. Finding and highlighting similar meaning making processes between both native and migrant-origin populations, who also have very little opportunity to contact one another, is important to challenge the mainstream "civilisational discourse" (Brubaker, 2017) that sets European native and Muslim groups apart in two culturally, religiously, and civilisationally defined distinct boxes (Kaya and Benevento, 2021).

The Front Side of the Coin: Nativist-Populist Radicalism Hauling European Citizens

In 1967, researchers at the London School of Economics, including Ernest Gellner, Isaiah Berlin, Alain Touraine, Peter Worsley, and others organised a conference with a specific focus on populism. Following this pivotal

conference, the proceedings were edited by Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner (1969) in a rather descriptive book covering several contributions on Latin America, the USA, Russia, Eastern Europe, and Africa. One of the crucial outcomes of the book, which is still meaningful, was that "populism worships the people" (Ionescu and Gellner, 1969: 4). Another outcome was that populism was not really a European phenomenon. However, the conference and the edited volume did not bring a consensus beyond this tautology, apart from adequately displaying particularist characteristics of each populist case.

Today, *populism* has become a global phenomenon. However, the state of play in the scientific community is not very different from the one in the late 1960s with regard to the definition of populism. Rather than having a comprehensive definition of the term, scholars have only come up with a list of elements defining different aspects of populism, such as anti-elitism, anti-intellectualism, and anti-establishment positions; anti-globalism and anti-international trade; affinity with religion and past; racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, anti-Islam, anti-immigration; promoting the image of a socially, economically and culturally homogenous organic society; intensive use of conspiracy theories to understand the world we live in; faith in the leader's extraordinariness as well as the belief in their ordinariness that brings the leader closer to the people; statism; nativism; and the sacralisation of "the people" (Ghergina et al., 2013: 3–4). One could argue that the global financial crisis, the refugee crisis, and the pandemic may have played a role in the ascendance of nativist-populist rhetoric. Still, they are, at best, catalysts, not causes. After all, if resentment as a social concept posits that losers in the competition over scarce resources respond in frustration with diffuse emotions of anger, fear, hatred, and anxiety, then there have been several other factors in the last three decades which may have triggered the resentment of the European public, such as de-industrialisation, unemployment, growing ethno-cultural diversity, multiculturalism, terrorist attacks in the aftermath of September 11, humiliation as well as the gender social change and the transformation of the gender order and norms challenging hegemonic masculinity (Berezin, 2009: 43–44; Kaya, 2020).

Many definitions of nativism include differentiation between two groups: natives and immigrants. Migrants have been framed in many European countries as a threat since September 11, even earlier, since they have been perceived as a challenge to the societal, national, economic, and cultural security of the nation. The differentiation between natives and immigrants has become even stronger along with the so-called 2015 refugee crisis. This differentiation is mainly based on their respective temporal relation to the nation, the boundaries of which have been often prescribed. Peter Hervik (2015) defines nativism as favouring established inhabitants over newcomers, eventually leading to the marginalisation of immigrant minorities. Hans-Georg Betz's definition also includes this temporal hierarchy between the two groups. Accordingly, nativism is a political doctrine that prioritises the

interests and the will of the native-born population. The nativist doctrine also dictates that the inhabitants of long standing should reign supreme over those of newcomers (Kešić and Duyvendak, 2019). Mostly, this temporal differentiation between natives and immigrants is coupled with an element of cultural threat by the latter. Betz (2017: 171) posits that nativists regard the nation as grounded in a particular historically evolved culture and system of values that must be preserved and defended at any cost. Both temporal and cultural elements of nativism underline the fear of a loss of identity as a result of being "overrun" by culturally alien foreigners (Betz, 2017: 177). This kind of logic of nativism is represented very well by the polemical thesis of great replacement, which has become prevalent not only in France, but also elsewhere in the West (Camus, 2011). The logic of nativism rests on the demarcation between outsiders and insiders, between foreigners and *the native-born*, acknowledged as bearers of a culturally superior civilisation (Betz, 2017; Kešić and Duyvendak, 2019). In the volume, Ayhan Kaya contributes to these studies by scrutinising heritage populism, utilised by the German nativist party Alternative for Germany (AfD). Based on the testimonies of young AfD supporters, the chapter explains AfD's exploitation of both dissonant and distant past for the masses in an identity crisis.

However, rather than simply recapitulating on the symptoms, one needs to understand the underlying causes of nativism leading to contemporary societal, political, psychological, and ideational divides emerging in Europe where mainstream political parties are becoming less and less credible by their constituencies while previously marginal populist parties, right or left, are becoming more popular. Kaya's chapter questions these causes with a localised focus on the formation of populism in the German state of Saxony, suffering from socio-economic, spatial, and nostalgic deprivation. Analogously, there are three main approaches to analysing typologies of populism in Europe as well as in the other parts of the world: a) anti-globalism approach; b) anti-elitism approach; and c) political style approach.

The first approach explains the populist vote with socio-economic factors. This approach argues that populist sentiments come out as the symptoms of detrimental effects of modernisation and globalisation, which are more likely to imprison working-class groups in states of unemployment, marginalisation, and structural outsiderism through neoliberal and post-industrial sets of policies (Betz, 2015). Accordingly, the *losers of globalisation* respond to their exclusion and marginalisation by rejecting the mainstream political parties and their discourses as well as generating a sense of ethno-nationalist, religious and civilisational discourse against migrants (Fennema, 2004). *The second approach* tends to explain the sources of (especially right-wing) extremism and populism with reference to *ethno-nationalist sentiments rooted in myths about the distant victorious past*. This approach claims that strengthening the nation by emphasising a homogenous ethnicity and returning to traditional values is the only way of coming to terms with the challenges

coming from outside enemies, be it globalisation, Islam, the European Union, or the refugees (Rydgren, 2007; Miller-Idriss, 2009). This approach assumes that it is the elites who created all this "mess" resulting from discourses of diversity, multiculturalism, mobility, free international trade, and Europeanisation. *The third approach* has a different stance concerning the rise of populist movements and political parties. Rather than referring to the political parties and movements as a response to outside factors, this approach underlines the *strategic means* employed by populist leaders and parties to appeal to their constituents (Beauzamy, 2013; Kaya, 2020). The populist leaders often attract their followers by means of appealing to the people versus to the elite, generating some bad manners and a political-incorrectness, presenting themselves as both ordinary and extraordinary persons, constantly relying on a crisis, breakdown, or threat, and trying to explain local and global realities through conspiracies (Moffit, 2016: 29).

All three approaches highlight different aspects of populism, but they all agree that there is growing social-economic inequality and injustice in the contemporary world. OXFAM's findings show that the prosperity of the eighth richest person on earth equals the sum of the prosperity of 3.6 billion people.[1] A growing number of people in Europe criticise the elites, including the scientists, for becoming detached from the realities of everyday life of billions of people and for not leaving their Ivory towers. Nativist-populist rhetoric comes out as a protest and a symptom of these structural inequalities and disparities resulting from social-economic, political and spatial conditions. The scientific translation of radical populist rhetoric in everyday life should be carefully made. Instead of understanding it as an anomaly and disease, scholars should try to understand the messages behind it and the outcries of individuals resorting to it. Populism seems to be one of the radical critics of the neoliberal status quo, which seems to have failed with regards to the redistribution of justice and fairness. Hence, radical populism may be interpreted as an individual tactic to fight back against the meta-narratives (strategies) of globalism and neoliberalism. This is a trend that one could see among many native European citizens. Whereas among some of the subaltern, subjugated "wretched of the earth", to use Franz Fanon (1965)'s words, who are mostly Muslim-origin migrants and their descendants, Islam becomes the alternative rhetoric to be exploited against globalisation and neoliberalism, a point which will be revisited shortly.

Scientific research has already demonstrated that native youths who are labelled as "far-right extremists" are the off-springs of independent farmers and small shopkeepers who primarily reside in politically, geographically remote places (Rodrigues-Pose, 2018). Buffeted by the global political and economic forces that have produced global hegemonic masculinities, they have responded to the erosion of public and domestic patriarchy with a renewal of their sense of masculine entitlement to restore patriarchy in both arenas. That ancient patriarchal power has been stolen from them by

the liberal and Europeanised political elite and staffed by legions of the newly enfranchised minorities, women, immigrants, and refugees who have become visibly more active in contemporary international economic and political life. Downwardly, mobile rural and/or lower-middle-class youth are now squeezed between the jaws of global capitalism and a political elite that is at best indifferent to their predicament and, at worse, facilitates their further demise. "The losers of globalisation" apparently resent global capitalism, Europeanisation, diversity, mobility of labour, cosmopolitanism, and international migration by capitalising on masculinity, imagined patriarchy, heritage, national past, nationalism, nativism and looking backwards nostalgically to a time when they could assume the places in society to which they believed themselves entitled. The exploitation of masculinity, patriarchy, nativism, past, and heritage as a cultural capital against the detrimental effects of globalisation is undertaken by the mediated acts of populist political figures (Kimmel, 2003; Kaya and Kayaoğlu, 2017; Köttig et al., 2017). In this volume, an interdisciplinary understanding of these approaches is deployed to analyse the rationale behind the radicalisation of nativist-populist youth as well as Muslim-origin youth in Europe.

The Back Side of the Coin: Self-Identified Muslim European Youth with Migration Background

It has become common in Europe to label migrants of Muslim origin as persons with a "Muslim identity", the boundaries of which remain unchanged over time (cf., Heitmeyer *et al.,* 1997; Laurence, 2012; Nielsen, 2013). One could trace the genealogy of the ways in which migrants have so far been named by host societies and states. Migrant workers were first simply called "*workers*" in the early days of the migratory process in the 1960s. Then, in the aftermath of the official ban on recruiting migrant labour in 1974, a sharp discursive shift can be observed in their identification by the host societies and states. They have become "foreigners", "Turks", "Algerians", or "Moroccans". In other words, their ethnic labels have become the primary reference for the host societies. *Ethnicisation* of immigrant workers goes in tandem with the process of deindustrialisation in western European countries, where unemployment started to become a common phenomenon for migrant workers, who were mostly left outside the processes of integration to the spheres of education, politics, housing, and labour market (Lipsitz, 1994; Kaya, 2001).

   The latest categorisation made by the majority societies and states in Europe to identify migrant origin groups and their descendants derives from the hegemony of the *civilisational and religious paradigm*, which has become popular since the early 1990s. Since then, migrant groups and their descendants with a Muslim background are unquestionably and homogenously labelled as *Muslims*. There are several reasons for this discursive

shift in identifying Muslim origin migrants and their descendants primarily with their religious identity as Muslims. We limit ourselves here to name just two specific developments to explain the sources of this shift: the dissolution of the Socialist Block and the war in the former Yugoslavia fuelling the discourses of the end of multiculturalism and the rise of the discourse of the clash of civilisations.

It was mainly the processes of securitisation and stigmatisation of migration that have brought about the ascendancy of political discourse renown as *the end of multiculturalism* – a discourse, which has often been revisited over the last three decades since the war in Bosnia in 1992, leading to the birth of the Huntingtonian clash of civilisations paradigm, which assumes that civilisations in general, and Christianity and Islam in particular, cannot coexist (Huntington, 1996). In contradiction to the earlier sociological and philosophical trends defining civilisation on the basis of the material processes of industrialisation, capitalism, colonialism, and urbanisation (Elias, 1998), Huntington's attempt to reduce civilisation to religion and culture apparently attracted a large audience across the world, including the European Union. The discourse of the end of multiculturalism is often built upon the assumption that the nation's homogeneity is at stake. Thus, it has to be restored at the expense of alienating those who are not ethno-culturally and religiously from the prescribed definition of the nation on the basis of linguistic, religious, and cultural tenets. Today, such a culturalist paradigm, coupled with the unfavourable elements of the global financial crisis, the current refugee crisis and the pandemic, is likely to fuel radical right-wing populism, which highly invests in the revitalisation of ethno-cultural and religious boundaries between native majorities and minorities (Mudde, 2014; Kaya, 2020).

Along with the growth of a neoliberal and culturalist paradigm over the last three decades, many western European states are increasingly inclined to accommodate migrants and their descendants originating from Muslim-origin countries through some representative form of Islamic institutions. It is now a common practice to see that modern states, be it imperial states or nation-states, are inclined to generate a similar pattern in accommodating centrifugal religious communities that are becoming more visible in the public space. One could see parallels between the ways in which the Jews in France in the early 19th century and the Muslims in Germany, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands in the early 21st century (Safran, 2004; Koenig, 2005; Berkovitz, 2007; Kaya, 2012). The *Conseil Français du culte musulman* in France (2003), Islam Summit in Germany (2006), *Exécutif des Musulmans de Belgique* (1995) and the long-lasting Pillar system in the Netherlands have so far contributed to the institutionalisation of Islam and the construction of parallel societies in these countries through the creation of religious-based liaison bodies. The formation of such religious institutions has also prevented Muslim-origin individuals from seeking civic opportunities to represent themselves through existing political parties,

labour unions, and civil society organisations where the members of the society are represented on the basis of their civic identities (Ireland, 2000; Koenig, 2005; Fetzer and Soper, 2005).

Attempts to institutionalise Islam in Europe for the sake of creating *liaison* bodies mediating between Muslims and the central and local state actors go along with the labelling of migrant-origin individuals with Muslim backgrounds simply as "Muslims" by an overwhelming majority of private citizens, political actors, media and even by the academia. The labelling of those individuals through a religious identity at both political and societal levels seems to be very reductionist and simplistic since their self-identifications are extremely diverse, oscillating between "Muslim", "secular", "atheist", "agnostic", and other identifications (Kaya and Kentel, 2005). Such forms of labelling imposed on migrant-origin individuals and their descendants seem to overshadow the processes of individualisation and democratisation of Islam among younger generations, who have been raised in the European Union countries interacting with individuals of different denominations (Sunier, 2009; Kaya, 2012). Furthermore, the institutionalisation of Islam is also likely to be contributing to the perception of Islam by radical right-wing populist movements as a threat to their authentic way of life.

Religion and ethnicity offer attractive "solutions" for people entangled in intertwined problems. It is not surprising for the masses, who have a gloomy outlook of the future, who cannot benefit from society, and who are cast aside by global capitalism, to resort to honour, religion, ethnicity, language, tradition, and myths, all of which they believe cannot be pried from their hands, and to define themselves in those terms (Eliade, 1991; Clifford, 1994). However, a detailed analysis must be made to decipher the employment of Islam by young Muslims with migration backgrounds in frequent acts of violence. If the analysis is not made rigorously, it will affirm and thus reproduce the existing "clash of civilisations" thesis. Therefore, it is genuinely important to underline that the Islamic identity used by the youth, who show their resistance to the social-economic, cultural and political regimes of truth through different ways (music, graffiti, dance, looting, and arson) in Europe, is not only essentialist, or radical, but also primarily symbolic and democratic (Vertovec, 1995; Kaya, 2014; Martiniello, 2015; Roy, 2015, 2017; Kepel, 2017). The Islamic reference used in such acts of opposition is expressive primarily of the need to belong to a legitimate counter-hegemonic global discourse, such as that of Islam, and derive a symbolic power from that. It seems that religion is now replacing the left in the absence of a global leftist movement. Michel de Certeau (1984: 183) reminds us of the discursive similarities between religion and the left: religion offers a *different world*, and the left offers a *different future* – both offering solidarity. Moreover, it should be remembered that recent acts of violence, such as in Paris (7 January and 13 November 2015), Nice (14 July 2016), Istanbul (1 January 2017), Berlin (28 February 2017), London (2017), Paris (2018) and rapidly spreading to

other cities and countries, are also an indication of the solidarity among the members of the newly emerging transnational Islam, who are claimed to be engaged in religious fundamentalism.

Gilles Kepel (2008, 2017) and Olivier Roy (2007, 2015) are two leading experts working on the Jihadist groups in the EU. While Kepel mostly concentrates on France, Roy has recently extended his research to other European countries, trying to understand the causes of Islamist radicalism and Jihadism. Kepel addresses the social-economic exclusion and colonial memories of Muslim-origin youngsters as well as the promotion of Salafism by the Gulf countries (mainly Saudi Arabia and Qatar) to explain their affiliation with radical Islam and Jihadism. His main assumption is that Islam is becoming radicalised among young Muslims who are exposed to structural outsiderism in the west. Roy (2015, 2017), on the other hand, argues that the issue is not the radicalisation of Islam but rather "the Islamisation of radicalism". Roy claims that the Jihadists, mostly second-generation immigrants, were caught between the tradition-bound world of their parents and the secularism of their French society. Unable to find a place, they adopted a nihilistic rejection of society, expressing through Islam the absence of a strong Marxist language in the contemporary world (Roy, 2015, 2017).

Yet, what Olivier Roy (2015) has already indicated with regards to the analysis of such forms of radicalism, is very important for us to diagnose what is happening. As one of the leading scholars working on the concept of radicalisation, Olivier Roy scrutinises the relevancy and the excellence of the book with a commentary in Chapter 10. Roy corrects the misdiagnosis, arguing that what is happening is not the radicalisation of Islam, but rather the Islamisation of radicalism in the age of neoliberalism. Combining the analyses of Roy (2015) and de Certeau (1984), it is more likely to understand better what is happening in diasporas: *Islamisation of radicalism* among some young Muslims, mostly converts and second/third generations with a Muslim background, in the absence of a counter-hegemonic global left-wing ideology.

The growing popularity of Islam among younger generations in transnational spaces is partly a consequence of the processes of globalisation. *However, only a small minority of young Muslims become radicalised in the diaspora*. The majority of them generate moderate forms of religious identities in a way that liberates them from the confines of their patriarchal culture. The global circuitry of modern telecommunications also contributes to forming a *digitalised umma* within the Muslim diaspora, which is based on the idea of a more homogeneous *community of sentiments* (Appadurai, 1990), shaped by a constant flow of identical signs and messages travelling across cyberspace. A *digitalised umma* (Muslim community) shaped by electronic capitalism tends to get engaged in various forms of *ijtihad* (an Arabic word, meaning interpretation of the Quran) because each individual dwells in a different social, political or cultural context within the diaspora. Whilst the signs and messages disseminated across the diaspora are rather more homogeneous, their impact

on individual lives differs greatly. The signs and messages form a more heterogeneous and individualised form of the *umma*. This kind of *ijtihad*, built up by the media, has the potential to turn recipients into a virtual *alim* (an Arabic word for intellectual) who can challenge the authority of traditional religious scholars (Mandaville, 2001: 160). As Appadurai (1997: 195) rightly says, "new forms of electronically mediated communication are beginning to create virtual neighbourhoods, no longer bounded by territory, passports, taxes, elections, and other conventional political diacritics." These new *communities of sentiments* are constructed in cyberspace, a space often occupied by modern transnational subjects (Vertovec, 1999).

The reality in Europe today is that young Muslims are becoming politically mobilised to support causes that have less to do with faith and more to do with global communal solidarity with their peers in Gazza, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, or elsewhere, the manifestation of which can be described as an identity based on *vicarious humiliation* (Buruma and Margalit, 2004: 10). Some European Muslims develop empathy for Muslim victims elsewhere in the world and convince themselves that their exclusion and that of their co-religionists have the exact root cause: *The western rejection of Islam*. The rejection of Islam has recently become even more alarming due to the rise of nativist-populist movements in Europe that are often capitalising on the growing institutional visibility of Islam in public space and are not likely to observe the individualisation and democratisation of Islam in everyday life. However, the difficulties of the migration context, to which the migrants with a Muslim background are being exposed, do not only stem from the ways in which they are framed and represented by the political and societal actors of the receiving countries, but also from the state actors of their homeland country. In the chapter written by Metin Koca, the readers have the opportunity of going through a discussion of globalisation mechanics influencing the complex religious making processes of migrant-origin communities in Belgium, Germany, France, and the Netherlands. Mehdi Lahlou, on the other hand, examines a specific population, the Moroccan origin youth, to examine the intertwined relationship between community practices, messages, values, past events, and the global form of *umma,* creating a particularly interesting case in France.

An Interdisciplinary Approach to Radicalism

Radicalism cannot be understood as a stable ideological position. Ideas that are radical at some point could be liberal or even conservative for another. Liberals and democrats of the 19th century were the radicals of their age. It is no longer possible to call them as such. The 1968 generation was also radical in the sense that they challenged the patriarchal socio-political order. The radicals of the 1968 generation were different from the radicals of the 19th century. Similarly, the radicals of the present are also very different

from the former ones. Departing from the theory of social movements, Calhoun (2011) claims that the defence of tradition by nationalist, nativist, populist, or religious groups has also become a radical stance today. He even continues to suggest that this sort of populism and conservatism "has been important to struggles for democracy, for inclusion in the conditions under which workers and small proprietors live" (Calhoun, 2011, p. 250). The present volume contributes to Calhoun's earlier attempts to challenge the current ways of reducing radicalism to different forms of extremism, which neglect socio-economic, philosophical, political, and psychological determinants of radicalism.

Charles Tilly's explanation of collective action is also instrumental for social scientists to understand better the distinctive characteristics of mobilisation at the present time and radical mobilisation in this case. He makes distinctions among three different forms of mobilisation: defensive, offensive, and preparatory. Defensive mobilisation is often bottom-up. A threat from outside, such as globalism, capitalism, or injustice, induces the group members to pool their resources to fight the enemy. Tilly classifies the radical food riots, tax rebellions, invasions of fields, and draft resistance in contemporary Europe as defensive forms of mobilisation. One could also list nativist and Islamist youth mobilisations in the same cluster. Offensive mobilisation is often top-down. This could be a political alliance between bourgeois and artisans to produce the Great Reform Bill of 1832 that introduced radical changes to the electoral system of England and Wales (Tilly, 1977, p. 34). One could also argue that the new political alliances organised by some European right-wing populist parties among various social groups such as working-class groups, precarious groups, women, and LGBTI groups that generate a growing stream of Islamophobic sentiments may also fall into this category (Kaya, 2020). Eventually, the last category of mobilisation, according to Tilly (1977), is preparatory mobilisation, which is also a top-down one. In this kind of mobilisation, the group pools resources in anticipation of future opportunities and threats. For instance, labour unions store some money to cushion hardships that may appear in the future in the form of unemployment, or loss of wages during a strike. This is a kind of proactive mobilisation planned for future threats. Accordingly, one could argue that PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident), established first in Dresden, can be named as preparatory form of mobilisation as they seek to protect the Occident from the Muslim "invasion" (Kaya, 2020). In the book, Ayhan Kaya examines the presence of yet another right-wing populist organisation, AfD, through its supporters in Dresden. His chapter stresses that ideological features shared by the right-wing populist organisations in Dresden are used to justify specific political demands such as the stronger regulation of immigration and the exclusion of Muslims.

There is also a strand of research in psychology that relies on socio-economic characteristics to understand factors that influence the process

of radicalisation. This strand is also covered by the contributors in the volume coming from Psychology (Catarina Kinvall, Tereza Capelos, Poppy Laurens, Constantina Badea, and Ayşenur Benevento). Some scholars acknowledge that pathways into radicalisation are multilevel and involve layers of factors, including intra-individual, community-based, and contextual with global ideological forces such as socio-economic grievance, conflicting identities, injustice, oppression, or socio-economic exclusion, marginalisation, alienation, discrimination, civil war or deep-rooted conflicts, invasion and occupation by foreign military forces, economic underdevelopment, bad governance and corruption penetrating the state at all levels, rapid modernisation, de-industrialisation and technological developments such as the rise of the internet and social media (e.g. Allport, 1954; Tajfel, 1981; Taarnby, 2005; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008; Ferguson and Binks, 2015; Maskaliūnaitė, 2015; Ferguson and McAuley, 2020a; Coolsaet et al., 2019). The chapter authored by Roberta Ricucci contributes to the body of literature by examining the influence of religiosity among migrant-origin individuals from Italy and their values towards secularisation as an indicator of their acculturalisation attitudes as well as leanings towards radicalisation. In addition, while many radicalised individuals share similar experiences, there exist research accounts that show no direct link between becoming ideologically and politically radicalised and engaging in extremist violence (e.g. Della Porta and La Free, 2012; Ferguson and McAuley, 2020b). Such accounts that challenge the previously confirmed constructs urge psychologists to forego positivistic and normative claims. By introducing the term "relational radicalisation", Constantina Badea identifies the interactive arenas from which marginalisation of Muslims emerges and discusses how these mechanisms influence each other and concatenate to constitute radicalisation processes.

The importance of a comprehensive and culturally sensitive approach for the study of radicalisation is also crucial for the implications the research might have in deradicalisation efforts. To date, research-led and government-led initiatives address the challenge of deradicalisation through a combination of education, training, cultural and religious dialogue that helps members of distinct small communities to have financial and educational freedom, build empathy for each other, etc. Research or government-led initiative that is deaf to the socio-cultural norms and the local economic and political realities not only have little chance of being accepted by individuals who already have a high perception of political grievance but also might widen the trust gap between those individuals and authorities. Therefore, a community-based approach might also have a lot to offer to those who plan to move beyond understanding the radicalisation process in a unique context and study patterns of differences and similarities with others who share similar characteristics (Benevento, 2021). In different ways, all the chapters provide implications for locally and culturally sensitive deradicalisation

efforts at the policy level. More specifically, however, Chapter 3, written by Denis van de Wetering and Tobias Hecker and Chapter 7, authored by Martijn de Koning, have specific importance for scholars and policymakers interested in professional deradicalisation work. Based on his 20 years of work, Koning critically examines the purpose and the consequences of counter-radicalisation efforts targeting Dutch Muslim communities. Bringing a clinical psychology perspective to the book, Wetering and Hecker explore the possibilities and limits of the use of clinical interviews based on their interviews with former far-right extremists in Germany. The latter is significant for including interviews with female far-right extremists, a hard-to-access population and, thus, less represented in scholarly writing.

To recapitulate, this edited volume is based on an interdisciplinary perspective bringing scholars and their empirical research together to have a critical stance on the notions of radicalisation and radicalism. Based on the empirical and theoretical works of sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists, and psychologists, this volume demonstrates the socio-economic, political, spatial, and emotional root causes of radicalisation among different young segments of the European population who are exposed to various challenges resulting from detrimental effects of globalisation such as de-industrialisation, socio-economic deprivation, spatial deprivation, nostalgic deprivation, structural outsiderism, alienation, and humiliation.

Scope of the Volume

This collection includes empirical investigations, literature reviews, practitioner testimonies, secondary analyses, and theoretical reflections to evaluate the radicalisation of both native populist youth and Islamist Muslim youth in Europe. The authors are a mixture of senior academics, early-career researchers, and specialists with a history in practice who are located throughout Europe and beyond. The authors' various roles as academics, youth specialists, or practitioners result in a variety of texts, from theory-guided interpretations to chapters written from the research field. We appreciate the contributors who tackled the delicate subject of radicalisation and provided their perspectives on how and why the youth might be radicalising.

While we acknowledge the complex system of radicalisation processes affected by multiple levels of the surrounding factors, from the immediate settings of the individual to broader religious, economic, political, and cultural issues; we found it useful to categorise the chapters in accordance with their core message about the underlying causes of radicalisation. The first section of the volume is entitled "Spatial Deprivation and Geographic Contexts". This section aims to invite the reader to rethink existing conceptualisations and approaches to studying radicalisation and discover the way they are rooted in local and regional factors. In Chapter 1, Roberta Ricucci

demonstrates a shift in tone, identifying the tell-tale indicators of a division between first- and second-generation associationism in the Muslim community in Turin, Italy. Ayhan Kaya brings empirical evidence from Dresden, Germany in Chapter 2 to investigate the popularity of the AfD in eastern Germany. The analysis includes AfD's effective communication strategies that exploit the social-economic problems of the local inhabitants. He further argues that the places that experience geographical and nostalgic deprivation might be at risk of becoming the hub of extremist discourse the most. As such, Chapters 1 and 2 zoom into understudied yet extremely intriguing places – Dresden and Turin – to contextualise the settings in which radicalisation matters. Following Kaya's chapter that identifies the local drivers of the nativist radicalism in Dresden, Wetering, and Hecker on the narratives of 13 former right-wing extremist men in Germany in Chapter 3. Questioning the identity-related challenges to their disengagement, Wetering and Hecker reveal the role of the social environment, which is marked by anger, hatred, aggression, and outbursts of violence.

The second section focuses on mental processes more specifically, drawing on the contributions from the discipline of psychology. This section is akin to Wetering and Hecker's approach in narrowing down on the individuals and questioning what else, alongside the spatial factors, triggers individuals' radicalisation. In Chapter 4, Constantina Badea reviews the psychology literature to investigate the role of intergroup dynamics behind Islamophobia and Islamist "extremisation" in Europe. Badea argues that these dynamics could be reversed by "deconstructing" the perceptions that all Muslims are segregationists and all members of the majority society are Islamophobic. In Chapter 5, Catarina Kinnvall, Tereza Capelos, and Poppy Laurens bring forward the intersectionality of gender, religion, and nationalism as drivers and inhibitors of nativism and extremism. The chapter contributes significantly to our understanding of the everyday tensions between French-Muslim women and the majority society in France. Allured by the women's perspective, Ayşenur Benevento (Chapter 6) also consults women in Belgium to speak of their personal gendered choices. Benevento questions whether those choices could be labelled as radical or not based on their justifications and identities. The chapter provides a case study of both self-identified Muslim women and right-wing native women and recognises the rarely heard voices of the latter group in research.

The third section aims to reassess the received wisdom over Islamist radicalisation critically, given the widespread focus on Islamism(s) in the academic literature and beyond. In Chapter 7, Martijn de Koning focuses on the Dutch state's use of radicalisation as an ideological imperative by "racialising" governance against Muslims. Focusing on the practices and technologies of governing, Koning problematises the mechanisms through which the state defines those who belong to the nation and those who do not. Focusing on the French case, Mehdi Lahlou's Chapter 8 delves into

the history of Moroccan-origin Europeans' radicalisation. Lahlou lays down the political-economic internal and external factors behind youths' religious radicalisation. Metin Koca (Chapter 9) seeks migrant-origin European Muslims' agency in their engagement with various globalisation mechanics. Despite participating in religious activities promoted by their countries of origin, their religious sense-making goes beyond, and sometimes against, these activities. Koca concludes that the process saturates the religious field in Europe to the extent that researchers and policymakers shall identify the radicalisation possibilities outside the scope of violent radicalisation. In his commentary, Olivier Roy analyses the alternative claims on the causes of radicalisation into violent extremism, the motives behind radicalisation, and deradicalisation as a "religious question" in Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority contexts.

Note

1 https://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressreleases/2017-01-16/just-8-men-own-same-wealth-half-world, accessed on 15 September 2022.

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