

WHY IS THE SUPPORT FOR EXTREME RIGHT HIGHER IN MORE OPEN SOCIETIES?

NEJAT ANBARCI
HASAN KIRMANOĐLU
MEHMET A. ULUBAŐOĐLU

WORKING PAPER NO:1 EU/1/2009

 İSTANBUL BİLGİ UNIVERSITY
European Institute



WHY IS THE SUPPORT FOR EXTREME RIGHT HIGHER IN MORE OPEN SOCIETIES?

Nejat Anbarcı
Hasan Kirmanođlu
Mehmet A. Ulubaşođlu

Working Paper No:1 EU/1/2009

İstanbul Bilgi University, European Institute, Dolapdere Campus,
Kurtuluş Deresi Cad. No: 47, 34440 Dolapdere / İstanbul, Turkey
Phone: +90.(0)212.3115240 • Fax: +90 0212 250 87 48
e-mail: europe@bilgi.edu.tr • <http://eu.bilgi.edu.tr>

WHY IS THE SUPPORT FOR EXTREME RIGHT HIGHER IN MORE OPEN SOCIETIES?[§]

May 2008

Nejat Anbarcı*
Hasan Kirmanođlu**
Mehmet A. Ulubařođlu***

Abstract: We investigate the support for neofascist and populist parties across societies in Europe. Apart from considering the standard socioeconomic variables, such as immigration and unemployment - as well as various supply-side variables -, we also consider ‘societal openness’ (defined on the basis of European Social Survey, 2004), ‘welfare state’ and ‘democracy’. As such, the main contribution of this paper is to establish the “meta” link between the three institutions (1) societal openness, (2) welfare state, and (3) democracy, and find out their impact on the support for extreme right in Europe. We first establish that, in more open societies the direct effect of openness on neofascist votes is negative; however, openness increases the neofascist support indirectly through immigration and unemployment. Moreover, we find that openness has no direct effect on the support for populist parties, but has indirect positive effects through unemployment. We also find that the effect of openness go hand in hand with that of welfare indicator within countries; however, the link between openness and democracy is less unambiguous. Our results are robust with respect to different classifications of extreme right parties and when endogeneity of immigration is controlled for.

[§] We are indebted to Herbert Kitschelt for his extensive comments and suggestions. We also gratefully appreciate the discussions with Cem Karayalçın and Deniz Vardar.

* School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Deakin University, Melbourne, Victoria, 3125, Australia.
e-mail: nejat.anbarcı@deakin.edu.au

** Corresponding author: Department of Economics, Istanbul Bilgi University, Kurtuluř Deresi Cad. No: 47, 34440 Dolapdere / İstanbul, Turkey; e-mail: hkirman@bilgi.edu.tr.

*** School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Deakin University, Melbourne, Victoria, 3125, Australia.
e-mail: maulubas@deakin.edu.au. “Les Français d’abord” (Jean-Marie Le Pen).¹

¹ “The French first.”

1. Introduction

Extreme right parties have recently increased their average vote shares to about 15 per cent in Western Europe. While they have managed to be a part of the coalition governments in Austria, Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland, they also form permanent and sizeable fixtures in Norwegian and French parliaments. Norris (2004, p.2) puts forward a puzzle about the rise of extreme right in Europe: "...[these parties] have arisen in established democracies, affluent post-industrial 'knowledge' societies, and cradle-to-grave welfare with some of the best-educated and most secure populations in the world, all characteristics which should generate social tolerance and liberal attitudes antithetical to xenophobic appeals." This paper tries to put forward a plausible explanation to this puzzle.

In the last two decades, the literature on the rise of extreme right in Europe has sought the explanation in (1) immigration (Anderson 1996, Knigge 1998, Mayer and Perrineau 1989, Golder 2003), (2) unemployment (Knigge 1998, Jackman and Volpert 1996) or its dependence on immigration (Lewis-Beck and Mitchell 1993, Golder 2003), (3) electoral characteristics (Jackman and Volpert 1996, Swank and Betz 1996), and (4) the magnitude of the districts and the allocation of parliamentary seats in upper tiers (Amorim Neto and Cox 1997).

Further, Van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie (2005), among others, point out to the importance of "supply side" variables. These refer to factors that capture the electoral potential of parties, such as the opportunity to assess transparently the opinions represented in the political spectrum, and proportional vs. majoritarian election systems. Moreover, country dummies are found to be very significant in some analyses. These variables capture fixed country-specific effects that may include geographical factors, or institutions if they remain constant in the sample period.

Kitschelt's (1995) extensive and detailed analysis of 1990 World Values Survey, however, points to a more fundamental reason underlying the support for extreme right. He finds that blue-collar workers and small-business owners possess traditionalist values such as support for social order and cultural homogeneity, and that they are over-represented in the extreme right parties' constituencies. Considering that the society comprises other segments that adhere to more socially-tolerant and universal, that is, "open" values, it can be argued that this contrast among the societal groups can give rise to support for extreme right. For instance, contrasting values underlie several disagreements in the society, such as differing stances for immigration, and the segments hurt in the "conflict" may turn to extreme right parties as a reaction. The main importance of Kitschelt's point is to refer to an *initial* source of this support, which can subsequently catalyze other factors. In other words, factors like immigration and unemployment generally constitute the *indirect* (i.e., channel) effects for extreme right support, in addition to a *direct* effect originating from the *Weltanschauung* of the voters.

This paper explores the two playgrounds where the societal separation, and its consequent indirect effects, are manifested: (1) welfare state, and (2) democratic institutions. We argue that the welfare state and democracy may serve as the platforms where the contrasting segments in the society "fight", in the failure of which extreme right may arise. For instance, in terms of welfare state, extreme right support can flourish if the vulnerable native segments in a more open society, which are more welcoming to immigrants, exhibit a tendency to turn to the extreme right parties as immigration and unemployment start threatening their material welfare. The more open the society is at large, the stronger the contrast is, hence the more marginal the low-wage, low-skill people would feel in their own country. Secondly, societal openness can

provide democratic institutions whereby every movement and ideology can form and operate easily in the political sphere. The transparency that such institutions provide would reveal the true stances of parties for problems, including immigration and unemployment, which may trigger more elaborate socioeconomic dynamics *ex post*.

Therefore, the main contribution of this paper is to establish the “meta” link between the three institutions (1) societal openness, (2) welfare state, and (3) democracy, and find out their impact on the support for extreme right in Europe. The framework we establish facilitates the analysis of more fundamental reasons for the extreme right support in Europe by bringing together aspects from the respective three disciplines: (1) sociology, (2) economics, and (3) politics. In doing so, we also explore the relationships through their links with socio-economic variables immigration and unemployment.

At this point, it would be informative to discuss how much European countries differ in the scale of openness.² Figure 1 in Appendix shows that the countries are scattered rather asymmetrically along the openness spectrum.³ The top of the list, indicating the least open countries, is crowded by south European countries, while most Nordic countries exhibit a higher degree of openness. Most of the western-central European countries are in the middle ranks.

Also note that there are inherent difficulties in conducting this type of analysis, such as classification of extreme-right parties as well as endogeneity of immigration. While we mainly focus of neofascist and populist classification of extreme right parties,⁴ we try alternative classifications of parties into extreme right. We also control for endogeneity of immigration by considering social networks, *jus soli* and voting rights for immigrants, and population of the host country as instrumental variables. Our results are robust with respect to different classifications of extreme right parties and when endogeneity of immigration is controlled for.

We establish that in more open societies, the stand-alone direct effect of openness on neofascist votes is, as expected, negative. Seemingly paradoxically, however, in more open societies, immigration and unemployment lead to a higher support for neofascist parties. This accords with the intuition that the vulnerable native segments in a more open society exhibit a higher tendency to turn to the neofascists as immigration and unemployment start threatening their material welfare. Moreover, we find *no* stand-alone effect of openness on populist votes. Openness only operates on populist support through the channel of unemployment, with the channel of immigration being insignificant.

We next provide an extensive analysis of the link between extreme right support and welfare states and democracy. This analysis points out to significant implications about socioeconomic dynamics that may arise in welfare states, in particular, about the conflict between welfare “chauvinism” vs. welfare generosity, as well as their relation to the distribution of power in the political arena. We find that just as in the case of openness, welfare generosity has a negative stand-alone effect on neofascist support, but a positive effect through immigration and unemployment. Thus, from neofascist support point of view, openness and

² Our sample includes 19 countries spanning elections in the period 1970-2000: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom (see also Golder 2003).

³ The scores of openness are scale-invariant, i.e., negative values do not mean that the country is not open.

⁴ Betz (1994), Canovan (1999), Swank and Betz (2003) and Golder (2003) use the same categorizations in distinguishing neofascist parties from populist parties, which we too follow first. We then try two characterizations by Kitschelt (1995) as well.

welfare state have similar effects. However, welfare does not have any effect on populist support. In that regard, our results seem to stand in contrast to the findings of Swank and Betz (2003), who report that “welfare states characterized by universal coverage of populations, a generous social wage and well developed employment policies depress the support for the new far right in times of new risks and insecurities.” It is intuitive to see the relationship between the effect of openness, a fairly time-invariant indicator, go hand in hand with that of a time-variant (and -evolving) welfare indicator within countries.

However, the link between democracy and openness is less unambiguous. We find that, while openness and democracy levels tend to be associated positively, unemployment’s effect on populist support tends to exhibit opposite characteristics at higher levels of openness than it does at higher levels of democracy. That is, when unemployment affects populist support positively at higher levels of openness, it affects the populist support negatively at higher levels of democracy. On the other hand, democracy follows the very same pattern in influencing the neofascist support, as do openness and welfare state.

In Section 2, we provide background information regarding “extreme-right parties and their alternative classifications” as well as “openness.” Section 3 provides our statistical model. In Section 4, we present the results, and in Section 5, we provide a thorough discussion regarding the links among openness, welfare state and democracy. Section 6 concludes.

2. Background: Extreme Right Parties, Their Classifications, and Openness

2.1. Neofascist and Populist Parties as Components of Extreme Right

While it is easier to define a typical neofascist party, as very commonly agreed upon, populism is a notoriously vague term, and that attempts at establishing a general theory about its nature have been problematic (see Canovan 1999). For instance, many populist parties were typically perceived as left-wing in Latin America, while the contemporary European parties are regarded as right-wing, an aspect that contributes to the ambiguity. Another aspect is that, it is not the ideology and the policy content that distinguishes populist parties from others, but their appeal to ‘the people’ against both the structure of established structure of power and the dominant elite ideas and values. As opposed to neofascist parties, populist movements are of the people rather than of the system; the fact that the term “movement” is used very frequently in the context of populist parties points to their attempt to maintain a movement character rather than being organized as an institutionalized party. Their programmatic flexibility is also remarkable. In welfarist, high-tax countries they may embrace an agenda of economic liberalism, elsewhere they may subscribe to a protectionist and statist agenda against the prevailing heavy dose of free market policies.

Populist movements contend that, unlike neofascist parties, they exhibit strong desire to win political influence. One of their central aspects is the constant reference to grass roots and ordinary/little people to whom malevolent elites pose danger. These parties reject any particularistic group claims, resist all forms of compulsory solidarity (such as trade unionism) and refer to the people as a unitary entity: as Canovan (1981, p. 265) points out “the notion that people are one, that divisions among them are not genuine conflicts of interest ... are essential” in populist discourse. Populists, with their strong scepticism of representative democracy and elitist parliamentarism, express a deep desire to expand participatory and

plebiscitary processes such as petition drives, citizen initiatives and referendums. In a sense, they side with a crude majoritarianism that neglects or overrides the rights of minorities.

Heinisch (2003, p. 95) provides further contrasts between populist and neofascist parties. Populist parties, he argues, typically do not subscribe to the openly anti-egalitarian and anti-Western positions of neofascist parties, which are founded on the belief in the natural inequality of humans - be it “biological, genetic ... to justify intellectual and cultural hegemony..” Nor do the populist parties adhere to the authoritarian conception of the state or the law-and-order doctrine that is directed towards all kinds of external and internal threats such as immigrants, criminal elements, as well as their critics and political opponents. Further, unlike neofascist parties, populist parties are not typically hostile to political compromises, nor do they subscribe to an ideological mission as the neofascist parties strongly do.

Table 1 in Appendix presents whether neofascist and/or populist parties ever existed in our sample countries.

2.2. *Alternative Classifications of Extreme Right*

The above points from Canovan (1981, 1999) and Heinisch (2003) underlie the essence of how populist parties are distinguished from neofascist parties. However, as compelling as it is, the distinction between neofascist vs populist parties *for empirical purposes* is inherently difficult to come up with because of the ambiguity as to the definition and discourse of populists. In fact, classifying parties into extreme right vs. non-extreme right, or populist vs non-populist for quantitative analysis is difficult overall. Thus, we employ several classifications to eliminate the risk of spurious findings.

One approach is to treat all extreme right parties in one basket – i.e., combine the neofascist and populist parties into a single group of extreme right - but this may result in loss (or mixing) of information. Nevertheless, in order to explore its implications on openness on a different dimension, we lump neofascist and populist parties into one group in another analysis.

Further, Kitschelt (1995) provides another classification of extreme right parties, not making a distinction between neofascist and populist parties (p. 52). There are a few differences between Kitschelt’s (1995) classification of extreme right and those by others ((1994) – i.e., by Canovan (1999), Swank and Betz (2003) and Golder (2003)).⁵ Our understanding is that Kitschelt tends to see extreme right-parties close to populist parties. Given some obvious differences in classifications of Kitschelt and others, we use Kitschelt’s classification in another analysis. Finally, Kitschelt classifies Spanish Popular Party as extreme right. Whether or not this party can be considered as extreme right, it constitutes an outlier in our sample because of its remarkable vote share around 40%. Thus, in a further analysis, we drop this party from the tally of extreme right and observe the changes in results.

⁵ Kitschelt (1995) classifies the following parties as extreme right whereas others do not (as either neofascist or populist): Democratic Union for the Respect of Work (RAD/UDRT) in Belgium; Rural Party in Finland; National Political Union and its successors in Greece; Independent Movement for National Reconstruction in Portugal; and Popular Party in Spain. For instance, the following parties are considered as extreme right by Golder and others (either neofascist or populist) but not by Kitschelt: New Force in Portugal; Piedmond-Regional Autonomy, Venetian League and Lombard League in Italy; League of Tessins and Vigilance in Switzerland, and “other extreme right” in France. We have taken into account a few cases where parties continue their politics under different names, such as the ones in Britain and Netherlands.

2.3. ESS (2004), Values, and the Openness Index

ESS (2004) identifies nine motivationally distinct values with varying degrees of importance across societies; Figure 2 in the Appendix portrays the categorization of these value sets (the Appendix also provides a detailed description of these basic values and as to how they are measured by the ESS, 2004). The battery of questions from which individuals' values are extracted and the methodology of constructing this battery are based on Schwartz (1992). This survey enables us to compute country scores on a number of basic individual values.⁶

The construction of these two-dimensional openness measures follows the discussion and detailed suggestions of Barnea and Schwartz (1998) and ESS (2004). These values are aggregated into two different dimensions of openness, where the first dimension, OPENDIM1, represents the tension between *Openness to Change* vs. *Conservation*, and the second dimension, OPENDIM2, captures that between *Self Transcendence* vs. *Self Enhancement*.⁷ Figure 3 displays the spectrums on which European countries lie in terms of OPENDIM1 and OPENDIM2, while Figure 4 plots the two different openness dimensions against each other.⁸

The simple correlation between OPENDIM1 and OPENDIM2 is found to be 0.56 and statistically significant. While this is not too high, it is not too low either. This provides us with room to aggregate the two dimensions and come up with a single openness index. The overall index of OPENNESS is the summation of OPENDIM1 and OPENDIM2. It is important to note that using a single index is a better option than using the two dimensions separately in a regression, because in the latter case, common information between the two dimensions is lost (in a regression, other modeled factors are held constant in interpreting an effect). Thus, our focus is on the single-dimensional OPENNESS index.⁹ As it is based on the contrast between universal vs. traditional values, note that this openness measure encompasses more than the usual meaning of “social tolerance and liberal attitudes antithetical to xenophobic appeals” (Norris, 2004, p. 2).

6 Values upon which we will base our openness index have predicted more than 15 different behaviors in 20 countries (e.g., voting, delinquency, cooperation, competition, consumer purchasing, environmental, religious behaviors - Bardi and Schwartz 2003 and Schwartz and Bardi 2001).

7 *Openness to Change* comprises the values of self-direction and stimulation, while *Conservation* comprises tradition, conformity and security. *Self-Transcendence* comprises the values of universalism and benevolence, while *Self-Enhancement* comprises the values of power and achievement. *Openness to Change*, *Conservation*, *Self-Transcendence* and *Self-Enhancement* scores are the averages of their corresponding individual values. Schwartz (1994) argues that basic values are the foundations of individuals' specific political values and ideologies, and may enable them to organize their political evaluations in a relatively consistent and coherent manner. Barnea and Schwartz (1998) contend that the key values that distinguished different segments of voters in the Israeli elections of 1988 were tradition vs. self-direction. In a group of 14 countries, Barnea (2003) finds that in countries where political competition is more concerned with issues of national security vs. equal rights and freedoms for all, security and conformity vs. universalism and self-direction turn out to be the central basic values. In countries where the main concern of political competition is the economic redistribution, “universalism and benevolence” vs. “power and achievement” turn out to be the central basic values.

8 ESS (2004) does not report any value scores for Malta, hence we will not be able to use that country in our analysis.

9 We also thoroughly experimented with two-dimensional openness indices OPENDIM1 and OPENDIM2 in our econometric analysis. Because our results with single-dimensional OPENNESS index turned out to be compelling, needing much exploration, we have opted for dropping the analysis with two-dimensional openness values.

3. The Statistical Model

As mentioned in the Introduction, several variables have been suggested to explain the support for extreme right. These variables involve the demand and supply side factors as well as variables concerning the electoral system. As most of these variables have been shown to be relevant to extreme right support in different contexts we employ several model specifications in our framework, which will also be helpful to explore the implications of openness across a broad spectrum of cases. In building up our framework, the interactions of openness with immigration and unemployment are of particular interest to explore the interplay between socioeconomic dynamics and openness. In broadest terms, we estimate:

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{it} + \beta_2 O_{it} + \beta_3 Z_{it} + \mu_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where i denotes countries and t denotes time, Y is the percentage national vote share for extreme right parties, X is a vector of socio-structural variables as employed by Golder (2003), O is a vector that contains openness and its interactions with immigration and unemployment, Z is a vector of further supply side variables adopted from van der Brug et al (2005), μ denotes country-specific dummies, and ε is the error term.

3.1. The Socio-structural Factors

The vector X includes the percentage of the total labor force that is unemployed at the national level in an election year ($UNEMP$), the percentage of the national population composed of foreign citizens ($IMMIG$), a variable that measures the conditional effect of unemployment and immigration on the electoral success of extreme right parties ($UNEMP \times IMMIG$), log magnitude of the median legislator's district ($LOGMAG$) and the percentage of assembly seats allocated in upper tiers above the district level ($UPPERTIER$). The data source for these variables is Golder (2003).

These factors are based on three types of arguments:

1. The “ideational argument” hypothesizes that higher levels of immigration increase the support for extreme right.
2. The “materialist argument” relates unemployment to the support for extreme right parties through the interaction effect with immigration (i.e., $UNEMP \times IMMIG$). That is, unemployment increases the support for extreme right parties when immigration is high. On the other hand, unemployment does not affect their vote shares when immigration is low.
3. The “instrumental argument” links the motivation of elites and other voters for voting to the support for extreme right. If these groups are instrumentally motivated, then extreme right parties would enjoy a higher support in countries with large district magnitudes and a large number of upper tier seats. This, however, will not be observed if they are expressively motivated, i.e., in the neofascists's case.

3.2. More Supply Side Factors

Although it contains variables like log magnitude and upper tier, Golder's (2003) framework may not cover all potentially important supply side variables to reveal effectively the electoral support of extreme right parties. Kitschelt (1995) and van der Brug et al. (2005) argue

that Golder-type models cover only economic conditions, level of immigration and level of support for the political system, and ignore the electoral potential of parties. Electoral potential is defined to be the maximum number of votes that voters would *consider* casting for a particular party. It points out to the fact that extreme right parties compete with other parties in the political spectrum. A party may have high electoral potential, but may not be automatically successful in elections, as voters, in the final analysis, may vote for another party which they may think would be more successful. But electoral potential of extreme right parties – hence the likelihood of them attracting more votes - would increase at the extent to which voters are able to evaluate their policies, and this potential can be converted into actual votes at the extent to which their evaluation is reflected at the ballot box. Van der Brug et al. (2005) put forward several insightful hypotheses to formulate the political opportunity structure in which extreme right parties can arise.¹⁰ First, the electoral potential for these parties will be high if they are evaluated by their policies, and it will be low when different standards apply. We believe that higher level of democracy would facilitate more mature evaluation of policies due to transparency and the objective assessment opportunity it provides to voters. In fully democratic regimes, parties do not hesitate to express their true views. In less democratic regimes, parties may need to conceal their views, or they, and voters, cannot form fully mature views due to instability of problems. In addition, it is more likely that different standards apply to party evaluation in these regimes. Thus, we control for the level of democracy.¹¹

Second, the higher is proportion of citizens with radical-right tendency in an electorate, the higher is the electoral potential. At the aggregate level, this effect can – reversely – be controlled with voter turnout rate. Higher turnout rates tend to reveal better the centrist votes, which may otherwise go uncast.¹² Third, the extent to which an extreme right party can attain its maximum vote would decrease in the votes of its right-wing competitor. In addition, this extent will increase if the right-wing competitor moves toward the center of the political spectrum. At the national level the distinction between neofascist and populist parties provides an opportunity to control for these two effects. That is, one can consider neofascist and populist parties as different factions of extreme right, with neofascists being at the right-most extreme and populists to the left of them, competing for the overall votes of radical-right citizens, and in addition, with populist parties having a tendency to cover also centrist citizens. Thus, we can control for the populist vote share in explaining the support for neofascist parties, and for the neofascist vote share in explaining the support for populist parties. Fourth, van der Brug et al. (2005) argue, there is an interaction effect between the extent to which the policies of these parties are evaluated and the ideological position of the right-wing competitor. Thus, we control for the interaction effect of democracy and populist vote share in the case of neofascists, and

¹⁰ It should be noted that in their analysis, van der Brug et al. (2005) cover anti-immigrant parties, which they also name “right-wing populist” parties (p. 537). Their analysis is also at the voter level, rather than at the national level. But the political opportunity structure in which extreme right parties can arise can be plausibly captured for our analysis with reasonable approximations. Moreover, van der Brug et al.’s analysis is built upon Kitschelt’s (1995) approach, whose classification we also cover.

¹¹ One can argue that we are already dealing with mature democracies, but this is a different matter for the nature of the argument. As will become clear too, democracies at this level do differ with respect to many issues. We use the democracy data of Freedom House, where it is the average of political rights and civil liberties. A higher level of democracy indicator show higher democratization levels in our sample.

¹² Givens (2002, p. 156), for instance, found that higher rates of non-voting take place in regions of Austria, France and Germany, where the support for the extreme right is higher.

democracy and neofascist vote share in the case of populists. Fifth, and finally, in proportional electoral systems, extreme right parties can mobilize their potential better compared to majoritarian systems. We also control for this effect.

3.3. Estimation

We use the censored tobit estimation technique for the estimation. The reason is the potential sample selection bias that may arise due to exclusion of countries without extreme right parties from the analysis. For instance, Golder (2003) states that extreme right ideologies exist in nearly every country, and their electoral support cannot be observed if they do not organize into political parties. While there are other methods that take into account the potential selection bias, such as Heckman's (1978) two-stage selection model, censored tobit provides us with a chance to compare our results with the previous literature. In addition, many political scientists resort to this technique as the estimation method under similar circumstances (see Jackman and Volpert 1996). Thus, for the analysis, the dependent variable is "constructed" in such a way that countries with extreme right parties have their actual vote shares, and those without them are assigned a zero value. This is a left-censored limited dependent variable, and the regression can be estimated with censored tobit.

Also, immigration may be endogenous to extreme right support. That is, immigration into a country may be affected by the presence and strength of extreme right views in that country and this reverse causation can result in biased and inconsistent coefficient estimate. We adopt Rivers and Vuong's (1988) Two-Stage Conditional Maximum Likelihood (2CML) approach to address this problem. In a maximum likelihood estimation, as is the Tobit model, Rivers and Vuong (1988) suggest that, in the first stage, the suspected endogenous variable be regressed on a set of instruments and, in the second stage, the residuals from the first stage be incorporated into the main equation of interest. We use several intuitively appealing variables to find a good set of instruments for immigration. It turns out that there is evidence for the endogeneity of immigration, and when this endogeneity is taken into account, the empirical results (including some results of Golder 2003) may follow a different course. We discuss our instrumentation strategy in Section 4.5.

Note that the error structure in our estimation, in particular, μ , entails effects that are unchanged, such as a country's geographic location and characteristics (e.g., its distance from the equator, whether it is landlocked or not etc.), or those factors that are at least very stable over the course of the time period considered, such as income and asset inequality. We interpret openness as another 'institution' in this class of factors.¹³

¹³ Also note that, when OPENNESS, as a time-invariant variable, is incorporated into the model, country dummies are dropped from the regression. We test whether or not the omission of the country dummies creates an omitted variables problem. We adopt Ramsey test, where the linear and quadratic fitted values of vote shares from the first stage regressions are included back in the model in a second stage, and the significance of these terms is tested through likelihood ratio test afterwards. The test results support our general modeling procedure for the case of neofascist and populist parties, but provide mixed results for other classifications. Because this test may capture several other effects, such as functional form, as well as may be influenced by outliers and mixing of information across different classes of parties, we do not formally follow up on these tests.

4. Results

Table 2 reports the summary statistics of key variables. Tables 3a through 6b present a sequence of results, constructing our framework. Specifically, we build up our results over the literature, and while incorporating new approaches, check the robustness of results with openness.

4.1. Neofascist Support and Openness

Model 1 (Table 3a) is also estimated by Golder (2003). In this model, unemployment has a negative and strongly significant effect, while LOGMAG's effect is positive and significant. The interactive term $UNEMP \times IMMIG$ is insignificant. When country dummies are removed in Model 2 (which is done to prepare a basis for using OPENNESS), LOGMAG loses its significance, and UPPERTIER becomes significant at 5%.¹⁴ Interestingly, unemployment changes its sign from negative to positive, maintaining its significant effect, albeit at a mild level (10%). In addition, immigration becomes positive and significant at 1%, and $UNEMP \times IMMIG$ is significant, with its sign being not as expected. This points out to an important finding: country dummies are instrumental in revealing the effects of unemployment and LOGMAG on the neofascist support in Model 1.

Model 3 augments Model 2 with OPENNESS. The estimation results show that nearly all variables in these models are estimated to be strongly significant, possessing signs that point to interesting results. In particular, the significance levels of both the socioeconomic and instrumental variables are high, and the signs are as expected (note, for instance, the differing signs of unemployment between Model 1 and Model 3, which is primarily caused by the catalyzing effect of country-specific factors). In addition, just like in Model 1, we estimate the $UNEMP \times IMMIG$ as insignificant as to its effect on neofascist votes. On the other hand, OPENNESS is estimated to have a strongly significant negative effect on the support given to neofascist parties (Model 3). Moreover, the interactions of OPENNESS with immigration and unemployment are estimated to be positive and significant. This is a seemingly counter-intuitive result, but indeed paves the way for a striking set of findings.

Let us elaborate on openness and its interaction terms. Let us take the derivative of the dependent variable with respect to openness:

$$\frac{\partial NEOFASCIST}{\partial OPENNESS} = -4.687 + 1.224 \times IMMIG + 0.244 \times UNEMP$$

This derivative implies that the stand-alone effect of the OPENNESS index on neofascist votes is negative. In other words, when the levels of IMMIG and UNEMP are zero, the more open a country is, the less support neofascist parties receive. Increasing any of the immigration or unemployment variables alleviates the impact of OPENNESS on neofascist votes.

One could also pursue the following direction in interpreting the coefficient of the interaction term:

$$\frac{\partial NEOFASCIST}{\partial IMMIG} = 0.358 + 1.224 \times OPENNESS \quad \frac{\partial NEOFASCIST}{\partial OPENNESS} = 0.244 + 0.2444 \times OPENNESS$$

¹⁴ We check whether the exclusion of Malta in Model 2 due to data unavailability makes any difference to the results, and find that they remain essentially the same.

The derivative taken with respect to IMMIG implies that immigration has a stand-alone positive effect on neofascist votes. It turns out that openness has a magnifying effect on the impact of immigration on neofascist support. Likewise, the stand-alone positive effect of unemployment on neofascist votes seems to be magnified by OPENNESS. In other words, neofascist parties start from a “disadvantaged” position in a more open society, other things being equal. Then they start “recuperating” from this disadvantageous position via immigration and unemployment. All these results point out that there is a ‘conflict’ between openness and immigration and unemployment. That is, openness becomes associated with higher neofascist support. We will explore this below in more detail.

4.2. Populist Support and Openness

Model 4 in Table 3a finds that both immigration and unemployment have insignificant effects on populist votes, while the interactive term $UNEMP \times IMMIG$ is significant at 5%, having a positive sign. This is a support for the materialist argument that unemployment matters when only immigration is high. The catalyzing effect of country dummies is evident with their removal in Model 5, as seen through changing significance of unemployment, LOGMAG and UPPERTIER from Model 4 to Model 5. Moreover, immigration becomes significant with the unexpected negative sign.

In Model 6, we augment the specification with OPENNESS. First, we estimate the stand-alone effect of OPENNESS on populist votes to be insignificant. The interactive term between OPENNESS and immigration is also estimated to be insignificant. However, OPENNESS interacts significantly with unemployment in raising the vote share of populist parties. In other words, the impact of OPENNESS on populist support works only through unemployment (note that it *also* worked through immigration in the neofascists’ case). Also, all other variables (except $UNEMP \times IMMIG$) are estimated to be insignificant. In comparison to Model 4 (where all the instrumental variables are significant), this may indicate that vulnerable segments in the society affected by openness and its interactions, such as minimal job security, are encouraged to vote sincerely for populist parties by a less stringent electoral system.

Let us elaborate further on these results. The first striking fact is that, unlike the case of the neofascist support, openness as a stand-alone virtue is not effective on the vote shares of populists. For openness to have any effect on populist support, it has to go through unemployment. To see how this effect works, take two countries, Country 1 and Country 2, where Country 2 is more open than Country 1. If unemployment is zero, there is identical support for populist parties in both countries. However, when we have a positive level of unemployment, the derivative

$$\frac{\partial POPULIST}{\partial OPENNES} = 1.527 \times UNEMP$$

implies that the more open Country 2, the more it would exhibit more support for populist parties. We will delve into this result further below.

4.3. Other Classifications of Extreme Right and Openness

Models 1-3 in Table 3b replicate the same exercise for neofascist and populist parties above by summing up their vote shares. In Model 1, immigration and UPPERTIER are estimated

to be strongly significant with positive signs. LOGMAG is also estimated with a positive sign, significant at 10%. UNEMP and $UNEMP \times IMMIG$ are estimated to be insignificant. When country dummies are removed in Model 2, among the previously significant variables, only UPPERTIER remains significant at 5%. Interestingly, $UNEMP \times IMMIG$ becomes strongly significant at 1% with a positive sign. This implies that, when the dependent variable is the combined vote shares of neofascist and populist parties, the effect of $UNEMP \times IMMIG$ is correlated with country-specific effects, i.e., possibly the latter causing the former. Adding OPENNESS and its interactions in Model 3, the findings of Model 2 regarding socio-structural variables are repeated: UPPERTIER has a positive and significant sign and $UNEMP \times IMMIG$ is positive and significant at 10%.¹⁵ On the other hand, the sign and significance levels of OPENNESS and its interactions follow a pattern that is a mixture of the neofascists and populists' case in Table 3a. The stand-alone effect is negative and strongly significant as in the case of neofascists. The interaction of immigration is positive but marginally insignificant, pointing out to domination by populists' effects. The interaction with unemployment, however, is positive and significant at 5% as in the case of neofascists.

Kitschelt's (1995) classification results in an interesting set of findings. Using only socio-structural variables, Model 4 finds that the levels of immigration and unemployment have positive and significant effects on extreme right support. Also positive and significant is UPPERTIER. Both LOGMAG and $UNEMP \times IMMIG$ are estimated to be insignificant, however. With the removal of country dummies, in Model 5, only unemployment remains significant, at 1% with a positive sign. In Model 6, important for our purposes, OPENNESS and its interactions carry no significant sign.

Finally, we remove Spain from Kitschelt's classification, as it constitutes an outlier. Using socio-structural variables and controlling (and not controlling) for country-specific effects, Model 7 (Model 8) comes somewhat closest to the results with populists' case in Model 4 (Model 5) in Table 3a, although just a couple of differences are recorded such as the sign of LOGMAG. Relevant to our purposes, Model 9 in Table 3b, using OPENNESS and its interactions, almost reproduces the Model 6 in the populists' case (Table 3a). We find that the stand-alone effect and the interaction with immigration are insignificant, while the interaction with unemployment is positive and significant, as found exactly in the populists' case.

4.4. Electoral Potential of Extreme Right – Further Supply Side Variables

Tables 4a and 4b present findings when further supply side variables are incorporated into the model specifications. We introduce supply side variables one at a time in order to check the robustness of openness and its interactions. In exploring the neofascist support, Models 1-5 in Table 4a introduce democracy, voter turnout rate, populist vote share, democracy and democracy interacted with populist vote share, and proportional vs majoritarian election system variables. Model 6 employs all these supply side variables simultaneously. In all of the models do we find the stand-alone effect of openness negative and strongly significant, while its interaction with immigration is estimated to be positive and strongly significant and that with unemployment is positive and significant. These completely accord with the results when supply side variables are not employed. On the other hand, all socio-structural variables follow the

¹⁵ It is plausible to argue that, as OPENNESS captures at least part of the country-specific effects, the deterioration of the significance of $UNEMP \times IMMIG$ from 1% to 10% is because it is correlated with country-specific effects.

same course when supply variables are not used (Table 3a). The further supply side variables, however, are generally insignificant, except a few individual cases. It may be argued that supply side variables have no effect on neofascist vote share (this, however, will not be the case when the endogeneity of immigration is controlled for).

Models 7-11 present the findings when further supply side variables are used in exploring the populist support, and Model 12 adopt all supply side variables at the same time. The pattern regarding OPENNESS and its interactions across these models is consistent with when supply side variables are not used: the stand-alone effect of openness and its interaction with immigration are insignificant, whereas its interaction with unemployment is positive and significant. Among the supply side variables, the proportional vs majoritarian electoral system variable is positive and significant. This is consistent with van der Brug et al.'s (2005) hypothesis. In addition, the level of democracy possesses a positive sign, being marginally significant. This sign, too, is consistent with van der Brug et al. Socio-structural variables generally follow the course in Table 3a (when country dummies are removed).

In terms of other extreme right classifications (Table 4b),¹⁶ generally the same pattern is observed in openness and its interactions compared to when supply side variables are not used. Notably, when neofascist and populist parties are treated in the same basket, the stand-alone effect of openness is negative and significant and its interaction with unemployment is positive and significant. Using Kitschelt's (1995) classification (without Spain), the results tend to exhibit similar features as in populists' case: in terms of openness, only its interaction with unemployment is significant, and positive. Further, proportional vs majoritarian election systems lead to significantly higher extreme right support, while, as expected, higher voter turnout rates lead to lower extreme right support, possibly due to more centrist votes they tend to reveal.

4.5 Endogeneity of Immigration

The strength of extreme right tendencies may influence immigration into a country. Thus, for an unbiased and consistent estimation immigration should be instrumented. Before proceeding with instrumentation, we first explore the determinants of immigration in Table 5 by employing several variables from Leblang, Fitzgerald and Teets (2007). They argue that social networks attract a great deal of immigration to a country. In our context, lagged immigration can plausibly capture the effect of social networks, because higher levels of lagged immigration should tend to be associated with higher immigration in the current period. We also use other reasons for migration in the exploration, such as jus soli and voting rights for immigrants, log population of the host country, share of government consumption in GDP, and attitude of host country citizens to immigrants. While each of these variables are significantly correlated with immigration with expected signs (except jus soli), their joint adoption for explaining immigration (Model 7) leaves only lagged immigration and log population significant (Model 8).

The next question is, whether lagged immigration and log population would have the desirable characteristics for an instrumental variable. Lagged immigration is expected to be an exogenous instrument because it is not contemporaneously correlated with extreme right support. However, we also need extreme right support not to be serially correlated for the exogeneity of lagged immigration. In this context we do not expect that any random shock to

¹⁶ Naturally we cannot utilize the hypothesis that refers to the vote shares of other extreme right parties here.

occur to extreme-right support, and that this shock to be correlated over time. Log population should also be exogenous to extreme right support. Moreover, these two variables exhibit strong instrument characteristics as seen through the F-statistic higher than 10 in Model 8 (see Staiger and Stock 1997). Hence, they are “valid” instruments. Finally, we do not expect that these variables be directly related to extreme right support in a structural context. In other words, their effects on extreme right should work through other variables, in which case immigration is a very highly likely candidate.¹⁷ Therefore, they are excludable from the model of extreme right.

Table 6a presents findings for a variety of model specifications for neofascist and populist support.^{18, 19} Models 1 through 9, focusing on the neofascist support, find that the stand-alone effect of openness is estimated to be negative and strongly significant, while its interactions with immigration and unemployment are both positive and significant. Thus, our main findings about openness remain extremely robust when endogeneity of immigration is controlled. As per socio-structural variables, immigration, LOGMAG and UPPERTIER follow the same course in Table 4a, all being robustly positive and significant. With regards to further supply side variables, higher levels of democracy, proportional (*vis-à-vis* majoritarian) election systems and higher voter turnout rates (relying on Model 9, which is the most comprehensive) are associated with lower neofascist support, as predicted by van der Brug et al (2005).

Models 10 through 18 focus on the populist support. In all of the models, the interaction of openness with unemployment is estimated to be positive and generally robustly significant. The stand-alone effect of openness and its interaction with immigration are insignificant in almost all cases. Thus, our main results about openness-populist support are also found to be robust to the control of immigration’s endogeneity. As per socio-structural variables, in general we do not find any significant effect on populist support. In terms of the further supply side variables, proportional (*vis-à-vis* majoritarian) electoral systems are associated with higher populist support. Higher levels of democracy may also be associated with higher populist support, but this effect seems statistically weak.

Table 6b presents results with other extreme right classifications. When neofascist and populist vote shares are combined (Models 1-7), the stand-alone effect of openness is estimated to be negative and strongly significant, whereas its interaction with unemployment is found to be positive and strongly significant. The interaction term with immigration is estimated to be insignificant. These results are in line with our previous findings (Tables 3b and 4b). In terms of socio-structural variables, only UPPERTIER has a robust effect, being positive in almost all cases. In addition, higher voter turnout rates and proportional (*vis-à-vis* majoritarian) electoral systems are associated with lower extreme right support.

Using Kitschelt’s classification (with Spain), openness and interactions carry no significant effect (Models 8-14), as found before. Unemployment possesses positive and strongly significant effect on extreme right support, while higher levels of democracy are associated with lower extreme right support. Finally, removing Spanish Populist Party from the list of extreme right parties (Models 15-21), we find that the stand-alone effect of openness is negative, with its

¹⁷ We do not expect, for instance, that countries with higher/lower population should have higher/lower extreme right support. Rather the effect of population on extreme right support should work through channels.

¹⁸ When we control the endogeneity of immigration, we also control for the endogeneity of its interactions with unemployment and openness by interacting the residuals of immigration with unemployment and openness.

¹⁹ All the residual terms in the regressions are *jointly* significant throughout our models, as shown by Likelihood Ratio tests, implying that endogeneity is indeed a problem.

significance depending on the model specification. In the most comprehensive model (Model 21) it is mildly significant. Likewise, in this model the interaction of openness and immigration is found to be negative and mildly significant, but this effect does not seem to be robust. A very robust finding, however, is related to the interaction of openness and unemployment: as before, it is found to be positive and strongly significant. Therefore we tend to see these results similar to the populists' case. Using this classification, immigration may have negative (but weak) effect on extreme right support across Models 15-21. Supply side variables, however, produce robust findings: higher level of democracy, higher voter turnout rate, and proportional (vis-à-vis majoritarian) election systems are associated with lower extreme right support.

5. Discussion: Openness, Welfare State and Democracy

Our (robust) results can be summarized as follows: Openness has a stand-alone negative effect on neofascist support, while it has a positive effect through immigration and unemployment. Openness is positively associated with populist support through unemployment, while it does not have any stand-alone effect, nor any effect through immigration. When neofascist and populist parties are considered together as one group of extreme right, the stand-alone effect is found to be negative and significant, and the effect through unemployment is positive and significant. Moreover, using Kitschelt's classification of extreme right, the results have a tendency to go along with with populists' case (when Spain is removed as an outlier). On the other hand, the evidence regarding socio-structural variables vary across classifications, although electoral potential, i.e., supply side, variables provide some consistent and insightful results. In particular, the level of democracy, voter turnout rate and the proportional (vs majoritarian) electoral system have relatively robust associations with extreme right, depending on the party focus.

We would like take our analysis one step further and explore the deep determinants that underlie our findings. Why do we have a positive effect of openness on extreme right support through immigration and/or unemployment? Why do stand-alone effects differ across neofascist and populist support? Our aim is to provide significant insights to the literature while pinning down the sources of these effects. In particular, we have two important candidates to seek the explanation at: i) welfare states, and ii) the level of democracy.

Our empirical strategy is to replace openness with a welfare state indicator (simply, welfare) in Section 5.1 and with the level of democracy (simply, democracy) in Section 5.2. Just like openness has been interacted with immigration and unemployment, so, too, will be welfare and democracy.

5.1. Openness and Welfare State

Power is mostly held by mainstream parties (i.e., non-neofascist and non-populist) across Europe (see Golder 2003, Figure 1, p. 444). This implies that the mainstream parties determine the course of social support and welfare programs, as well as budgetary procedures. On the other hand, it is relatively well-known that welfare generosity across Europe tends to stimulate support for anti-immigrant parties (see Jesuit and Mahler, 2004, for instance). Kitschelt (1995) also argues that extreme-right parties often embrace "welfare chauvinism" seeking to restrict the social welfare state to non-immigrant population only. Thus, any "perceived" failure of social democrat elites to maintain or restore a sense of security and well-being for the vulnerable

segments in the society would result in more support for extreme right. Indeed, Betz (1994) argues the residual underclass of low-skill people including blue collars, those who are unemployed or have minimal job security are most prone to social risks are more likely to blame ethnic minorities for their hardships, and are more prone to blame governments for failing to bail them out.. Lubbers, Gijberts and Sheepers (2002) find support for this view and report that the unemployed, blue-collar workers, the retired, the less educated are overrepresented in the constituencies of the extreme right in Western Europe (some of these findings are verified by Norris, 2004, too). As also pointed out in Section 2.2, neofascist voters are also more expressive.

We conjecture that the higher is the level of openness, the higher is the general support for immigrants in the society,²⁰ thus, the higher is the consequent concern level by people in the vicinity of extreme right, and therefore, the greater is the shift of votes to extreme right. It is plausible to argue that the worry levels of those who are in the vicinity of extreme right would be escalated due to their predictions that a greater majority of society would welcome immigrants with social support and welfare programs.

Table 7a presents the findings with a focus on neofascist and populist support.²¹ Models 2 through 7 find that the stand-alone effect of welfare on neofascist support is negative and significant, while its interactions with immigration and unemployment are positive and significant. These findings are very robust. Observe that the pattern regarding the directions of these relationships mimics exactly that in the openness case in Table 6a.²² Thus, welfare's affects neofascist support in exactly the same way as openness.

At this point, a statistical note is in order. As we control for country dummies in Table 7a, the precise effect of welfare is one that is free of countries' level effects. This is because country dummies in a model eliminate between-country variation in the data, i.e., different levels of variables across countries, and the model focuses on within-country changes over time. In this sense, our result implies that it is *openness* and *within-country variation in welfare* that operate in the same direction on extreme right support. This is intuitive in order to see the relationship between how the effect of openness, a time-invariant indicator, go hand in hand with that of a time-variant (and –evolving) welfare indicator within countries.

Proceeding with populists' case, Models 9 through 14 do not provide any robust and significant effect regarding the impact of welfare and its interactions on populist support. Thus we find that openness and welfare do not share any feature in the affecting populist support.

Models 1 through 6 in Table 7b focus on when neofascist and populist parties' vote shares are combined. Here, too, welfare has no significant effect on extreme right support. Although insignificant, the signs of the coefficients of welfare and its interactions follow the populists' case in Table 7a. Kitschelt's (1995) classification, however, provides strongly significant and robust results. Very interestingly, the pattern of signs regarding the effect of welfare and its interactions on extreme right support follows that in the neofascists' case. The stand-alone effect of welfare

20 The correlation between OPENNESS and “sentiment for immigrants” is 0.74 and strongly significant. Also recall Model 6 in Table 5. This model suggests that the country with the highest sentiment for immigrants has about 7% higher immigration rate than the country with the lowest sentiment, other things being equal.

21 We control for further supply side variables and the endogeneity of immigration in this analysis.

22 One may want to interpret socio-structural variables. Note that models presented in Table 7a make use of country dummies while those in Table 6a do not. Therefore, for the best interpretation, one can compare the Model 1 in Table 7a with Model 1 in Table 3a. The sign of socio-structural variables in these models are generally consistent, as well as the significance of most variables. However, restricting the attention solely on these models would be a mistake, because the endogeneity of immigration is not controlled in these models.

is negative and significant and the interactions of welfare with immigration and unemployment are positive and significant. Sizes of the effects seem to be greater with this classification, as seen through higher coefficients. Thus, *from welfare point of view*, Kitschelt's original classification tends to capture similar effects that the neofascist classification does. Finally, Kitschelt's classification without Spain follow the same course as in populists and the combined neofascists and populists case, in that it provides no robust significant effect as to welfare and its interaction with unemployment, although there seems to be a weak evidence regarding a positive effect of welfare's interaction with immigration. If taken seriously, this sign is consistent with what is found in the openness case.

In conclusion, welfare generosity has a negative stand-alone effect on neofascist support, but a positive effect through immigration and unemployment. However, welfare does not have any effect on populist support. Given that the mainstream parties, with their majority power in the political arena, represent more open sentiments and embrace generous welfare schemes for everyone (including immigrants) and budgetary discipline, we explain this result with the conjecture that "the blue-collar underclass with minimal job security," "the petit bourgeoisie [i.e.,] small entrepreneurs, shopkeepers, merchants, self-employed artisans, and independent farmers" that are "among those [segments] most vulnerable to new social risks" generally feel "the threat of 'the other': driven by patterns of immigration, asylum seekers and multiculturalism"²³ and turn to neofascist parties (for evidence on the possibility of vote switching, see Norris, 2004, p. 6). Thus, given the strong and robust similarities between the results with openness and welfare, we tend to conclude that in a more open society, the vulnerable segments of the society, who are disturbed by the presence of immigrants (who may possibly be attracting welfare generosity of mainstream parties) and are more prone to blame immigrants for deteriorating conditions, will seek refuge in neofascist parties to express their discontent and their support of cultural protectionism, suggesting strongly a vote shifting behavior as a response to the society being more open.

As will become clear below, our results on the determinants of populist votes also suggest extremely interesting avenues but somewhat different than the neofascist case.

5.2. *Openness and Democracy*

Neofascist and populist parties are not mainstream parties and they face competition from stronger center-right wing parties. Therefore, each voter sincerely supporting these extreme-right parties has to also make sure that their vote will have the maximum possible impact on the election outcome, unless these voters only intend to express their true colors in the elections. It has already been mentioned that while neofascist voters are on the expressive side, populist voters are not; they are much more pragmatic. Given small-magnitude districts and no upper tier seats, their votes may even have zero impact on the election outcome. The above concepts are closely related to representativeness of the electoral system as well as how well democracy is established in a country.

The latter has implications in terms of the democratic institutions allowing explicit representation of populist views in the political spectrum; a more mature democracy can better facilitate distinguishing populist parties from others in terms of their programs and discourses. Although there are significant differences regarding the levels of representativeness of electoral systems among Western European countries, differences among their democracy levels appear

²³ The quoted parts are from Norris (2004, p. 3), which are also used frequently by Betz (1994).

to be smaller. In our sample, countries are clustered around 6, 6.5 or 7 measure of democracy.²⁴ Nevertheless, Freedom House notes that a rating of 6 regarding political rights (which corresponds to the rating 2 in their measure) places a country in a less free position than what a rating of 7 would imply, which is generally due to political discrimination against minorities, violence, political corruption and foreign and military influence on politics. In addition, a score of 6 implies (*vis-à-vis* 7) some deficiencies in some aspects of civil liberties, such as freedom of expression, assembly, association, education and religion. Thus, while a few countries in our sample experienced much lower freedom ratings, such as Portugal having 4 in the 1970s, most others strictly differ between the scores of 6 and 7, providing us with some variation to exploit.

Models 1 through 7 in Table 8a focus on neofascist support. The stand-alone impact of democracy on neofascist support is negative and strongly significant, while higher levels of democracy are associated with higher neofascist votes due to higher levels of immigration and unemployment. Observe that this is exactly the same signs structure we have obtained in the openness (Table 6a) and welfare (Table 7a) cases. This result suggests that, *from neofascist support point of view*, higher openness, higher welfare generosity and higher levels of democracy embed similar effects.

Models 8 through 14 present the results on populist support. The models estimate the stand-alone effect of democracy on populist vote shares to be insignificant. Likewise, its effect through immigration is also insignificant. However, democracy's effect on populist support through unemployment is negative and significant. One would realize that, the pattern of the signs and significance of democracy's effects is exactly in the same way as openness (Table 6a), with one exception, however: the effect through unemployment here is negative, rather than positive. We delve further into this finding.

We find that the simple correlation between openness and democracy is +0.45 and significant. However, simple correlation between OPENNESS*UNEMP and DEMOC*UNEMP is -0.59. This implies that, while openness and democracy levels tend to be associated positively, unemployment's effect on populist support tends to exhibit opposite characteristics at higher levels of openness than it does at higher levels of democracy. That is, when unemployment affects populist support positively at higher levels of openness, it affects the populist support negatively at higher levels of democracy.

The positive openness-populist support relationship due to unemployment can be explained to some extent by the fact that in most developed democracies, the social-democrat parties can fully distinguish themselves from the populist parties, who typically have the reputation of quick and costless yet implausible fixes (that either pay "lip service" or simply are demagogical panaceas) to that rather complicated problem. Further, this intuition can be strongly magnified in more representative democracies. In such electoral systems, populist movements will face a higher chance of not-losing the votes of their supporters to their more centrist alternatives and thus willing to organize as distinct populist parties rather than to hide within ideologically somewhat nearby centrist parties.²⁵ This, therefore, can provide even

²⁴ The data source is www.freedomhouse.org. A higher indicator of democracy shows a higher level of democracy.

²⁵ For instance, French Front National started out as an anti-communist party in 1972 and turned into an anti-globalization party in the 1990s, later being influenced by "new right" etc. As Hainsworth and Mitchell (2000) put it Le Pen's Front National "is caught between its traditional economic liberalism and a dirigist agenda, embracing objectives that are not easily reconciled". Furthermore, it reduces the unemployment problem to the presence of immigrants, through the simplistic slogan "3 millions immigrants=3 millions unemployed people".

clearer ideas to voters in terms of party evaluation.

Specifically, the turning points in the democracy levels²⁶ implies that, when the democracy level is 7 in our sample, unemployment tends to be associated with lower populist support, while the democracy levels are at and below 6.5, unemployment tends to be associated with higher populist support. Supporting our finding is, for instance, Lubbers and Scheepers (2000), who find that Republican Party in Germany was hurt by high unemployment levels in the 1990s. In our sample, Germany has a democracy level of 7 in the 1990s. Note that van der Brug et al. (2005) find this result unexpected! On the other hand, Hainsworth and Mitchell (2000) argue that Front National in France, with a democracy score of 6.5, polled especially well when unemployment levels are high.

As per the results in Table 8b, combining neofascist and populist parties in Models 1 through 5 does not reveal any significant effect of democracy. This may be due to relatively opposing findings in terms of the effects of democracy in the neofascist and populist cases separately. However, Kitschelt's (1995) classification of extreme right, be it with or without Spain, results in the same finding as in populists. The stand-alone effect and the impact through immigration are insignificant, but the effect through unemployment is negative and significant, as it is in the populists's case. Thus, from democracy point of view, Kitschelt's classification tends to capture similar effects that the populist classification does.

Our results imply that the impact of unemployment on populist votes is enhanced upwards by higher levels of democracy. Given a positive correlation between democracy and openness, we conclude that in a more open society, unemployment is associated with a higher populist vote share.

6. Conclusion

Kitschelt's (1995) extensive and detailed analysis of 1990 World Values Survey points to values as a fundamental reason underlying the support for extreme right. It is clear that, when their material welfare is threatened by the economic distress via immigration and unemployment, individuals may no longer maintain their socially tolerant values. As Norris (2004) states, the puzzle is that the societies that have very open features exhibit this trade-off between their interests and values more. Our main contribution lies in the way we answer this puzzle.

To summarize our results, in more open societies, the stand-alone direct effect of openness on neofascist votes is, as expected, negative. Seemingly paradoxically, however, openness increases the neofascist support indirectly through immigration and unemployment. We explain this with a particular socioeconomic dynamics in which vulnerable native segments of a more open society turn to the neofascists as immigration and unemployment start threatening their material welfare. Moreover, we find that openness has no stand-alone direct effect on populist support, but has indirect positive effects through unemployment.

Kitschelt (1995) notes that voters' fears about the social welfare state lead to higher support for extreme right parties. Betz (1994) adds that in that sense the extreme-right parties serve as an outlet for political frustrations among losers in affluent societies. When there is a high level of universal welfare generosity in the presence of heavy and sustained foreign

²⁶ These are found by dividing the coefficients of unemployment by the respective coefficients of democracy*unemployment in Models 8-14 in Table 8a.

migration, nativist and ultra-nationalist ideologies gain momentum. This is due to the fact that these two ideologies (for one reason or another) favor welfare chauvinism, seeking to limit the benefits of the social welfare state to the native-born population. According to this view, the welfare state is supposed to provide social protection to the ones who have been contributing to it, not to the immigrants who are free-riders, or those who are ‘biologically/genetically inferior’ to justify intellectual and cultural hegemony (Heinisch, 2003). That is, when immigration is high, the social protection will be crowded-out by unemployed immigrants, leaving less per capita social protection for the vulnerable native population (i.e., unemployed, blue-collar workers, the retired, the less educated – Lubbers et al. 2002, and Norris 2004) who may lose their jobs as immigrants replace them at low-paying jobs.

Segments that have little to lose from immigration in terms of unemployment and social protection will have little to fear and will probably continue voting for the mainstream parties that are defenders of the universal welfare generosity (see also Jesuit and Mahler 2004). But the segments that may have a lot to lose from immigration in some form may be tempted to vote for certain extreme-right parties who want to stop (and perhaps reverse) immigration, and channel social welfare transfers to the natives only.

Our results on the openness of a society fit this scenario to a great extent. We show that, when openness is higher in a society, the welfare generosity is more likely to be embraced by the median voter and thus by mainstream parties. While we find no link between welfare generosity and populist support, we do find that welfare generosity has a negative stand-alone effect on neofascist support, but a positive effect through immigration and unemployment. Thus, vulnerable native segments will turn to neofascists more when unemployment and immigration become more significant threats (i.e., these segments will expect less welfare chauvinism from the mainstream parties in a more open society and will expect more against unemployment and immigration from neofascist parties). As such, our results in a sense seem to stand in contrast to the findings of Swank and Betz (2003) who report that “welfare states characterized by universal coverage of populations, a generous social wage and well developed employment policies depress the support for the new far right in times of new risks and insecurities.”

REFERENCES

1. Amorim Neto, O., and Cox, G. (1997). Electoral institutions, cleavage structures and the number of parties. *American Journal of Political Science*, 41, 149-174.
2. Anderson, C. (1996). Economics, politics and foreigners: Populist party support in Denmark and Norway. *Electoral Studies*, 15, 497-511.
3. Bardi, A., and Schwartz, S. H. (2003). Values and behavior: Strength and structure of relations. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 29, 1207-1220.
4. Barnea, M. (2003). *Personal values and party orientations in different cultures*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel.
5. Barnea, M., and Schwartz, S. H. (1998). Values and voting. *Political Psychology*, 19, 17-40.
6. Betz, H-G. (1994). *Radical right-wing populism in Western Europe*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
7. Canovan, M. (1981). *Populism*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
8. Canovan, M. (1999). Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy. *Political Studies*, 47, 2-16.
9. Caprara, G. V., Schwartz, S. H., Capanna, C., Vecchione, M., and Barbaranelli, C. (2006). Personality and politics: Values, traits, and political choice. *Political Psychology*, 27, 1-28.
10. Feldman, S. (1988). Structure and consistency in public opinion: The role of core beliefs and values. *American Journal of Political Science*, 32, 416-440.
11. Givens, T. (2002). The role of socio-economic factors in the success of extreme-right parties. In M. Schain, A. Zolberg, and P. Hossay (ed.s), *Shadows over Europe: The development and Impact of the extreme right in Western Europe*. New York: Palgrave.
12. Golder, M. (2003). Explaining variation in the success of extreme right parties in Western Europe. *Comparative Political Studies*, 36, 432-466.
13. Hainsworth, P., and Mitchell, P (2000). France: The Front National from Crossroads to Crossroads. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 53, 443-456.
14. Hausman, J. (1978). Specification Tests in Econometrics. *Econometrica*, 46, 1251-1271.
15. Heinisch, R. (2003). Success in opposition-failure in government: Explaining the performance of right-wing populist parties in public office. *West European Politics*, 26, 91-130.
16. Jackman, R., and Volpert, K. (1996). Conditions favoring parties of the extreme right in Western Europe. *British Journal of Political Science*, 26, 501-521.
17. Jesuit, D., and Mahler, V. (2004). Electoral support for extreme right-wing parties: A subnational analysis of Western European elections in the 1990s, Luxembourg Income Study Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 391, August.
18. Kitschelt, H. (1995). *The radical right in Western Europe: A comparative analysis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
19. Knigge, P. (1998). The ecological correlates of right-wing extremism in Western Europe. *European Journal of Political Research*, 34, 249-279.

20. Knutsen, O. (1995). Party Choice. In J. W. van Deth and E. Scarbrough (eds.), *The impact of values* (pp. 460-491). New Cork: Oxford University Press.
21. Lebland, D., Fitzgerald, J. and Teetst, J. (2007). *Defying the Law of Gravity: The Political Economy of International Migration*, mimeo, University of Colorado, Boulder.
22. Lewis-Beck, M., and Mitchell, G. (1993). French electoral theory: The National Front test. *Electoral Studies*, 12, 112-127.
23. Lubbers, M., and Scheepers, P. (2000). Individual and contextual characteristics of the German extreme right vote in the 1990s. *European Journal of Political Research*, 38, 63-94.
24. Lubbers, M., Gijsberts, M. and Scheepers, P. (2002). Extreme right-wing voting in Western Europe. *European Journal of Political Research*, 41, 345-378.
25. Mayer, N., and Perrineau, P. (1989). *Le Front National à découvert* [The National Front uncovered]. Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques.
26. Miller, W., and Shanks, J. M. (1996). *The new American voter*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
27. Norris, P. (2004). The 'new cleavage' thesis and the social basis of radical right support. Mimeo, Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government. Paper prepared for APSA Panel "The Right in elections" at the annual APSA Meetings, 2004.
28. Rivers, D. And Q. Vuong. (1988). Limited Information Estimators and Exogeneity Testing for Simultaneous Probit Models, *Journal of Econometrics*, 39, 347-366.
29. Rokeach, M. (1973). *The nature of human values*. New York: Free Press.
30. Roland, Gerard (2004). Understanding institutional change: Fast-moving and slow-moving institutions. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 38, 109-31.
31. Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the context and structure of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. In Zanna, M. (ed.), *Advances in experimental psychology*, Vol. 25 (pp. 1-65). New York: Academic Press.
32. Schwartz, S. H. (1994). Are there universal aspects in the structure and contents of human values? *Journal of Social Issues*, 50, 19-45.
33. Schwartz, S. H. and Bardi, A. (2001). Value hierarchies across cultures. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 32, 268-290.
34. Staiger, D. and Stock, J. (1997). Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments. *Econometric*, 65, 557-586.
35. Swank, D., and Betz, H.-G. (2003). Globalization, the welfare state and right-wing populism in Western Europe. *Socio-Economic Review*, 1, 215-245.
36. Swank, D., and Betz, H.-G. (1996). Internationalization and right-wing populism in Western Europe. Paper presented at the Conference on Globalization and Labor Markets, Workshop on Political Economy, University of California, Los Angeles.
37. Zaller, J. (1992). *The nature and origins of mass opinion*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

APPENDIX

The European Social Survey (ESS) uses the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) in order to gauge peoples' basic values. In the PVQ, there are short verbal portraits of different people. To point implicitly to the importance of a single basic value, each portrait includes items that describe a person's goals, aspirations, or wishes. For example: "Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to her/him," and "s/he likes to do things in her/his own original way" refer to a person for whom self-direction values are important. "It is important to her/him to be rich" and "s/he wants to have a lot of money" defines a person who cherishes power values. In so doing, the verbal portraits determine the person's values without explicitly identifying values as the topic of investigation. Respondents, for each portrait, answer the following question: "How much like you is this person?" "Very much like me," "like me," "somewhat like me," "a little like me," "not like me," and "not like me at all." For each portrait, respondents choose their response by checking one of the six boxes labeled with the response alternatives. Respondents' own values are, therefore, inferred from their self-reported similarity to people who are described in terms of particular values. A six-point numerical scale is used in order to quantify the similarity judgments. The PVQ is comprised of 21 items that are combined into ten indices, one for each of the ten basic values. Three items measure universalism, whereas two items are used to gauge each of the remaining nine values. For an item to measure a basic value, aims, goals, wishes, or efforts of the person described express or promote the central goal of the basic value or lead to its attainment. Different items cover different conceptual components of each value.

The ten basic values are:

1. *Self-direction*: Independent thought and action in terms of choosing, exploring and creating. To an individual who strongly possesses this value, it is very important to make his/her own decisions about what he/she does. Such a person likes to do things in his/her own way.
2. *Stimulation*: Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life. Such an individual looks forward to do things in his/her own original way and is open to the consequent surprises. As such, he/she would like to have an exciting life.
3. *Tradition*: To have respect for and acceptance of (as well as commitment for) the customs and ideas that the traditional culture (and/or religion) of the society provide for the individuals. Such an individual tries not to draw attention to him(her)self and avoids doing things in his/her own ways. Instead, he/she would like to follow the customs of his/her society that are handed down to him/her.
4. *Conformity*: To refrain from actions and inclinations that may violate social expectations and norms. Such an individual believes that people should do what they are told and follow rules at all times - even when they are not watched.
5. *Security*: To care about safety and stability in the society (as well as harmony in relationships). It is important that the government ensures its citizens against all types of threats.
6. *Universalism*: It is defined as one's understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people (as well as for nature). Such an individual thinks that every person in the world should be treated equally and believes that everyone should have equal opportunities in life. It also is important to her/him to listen to people who are different from her/him. Even when this person disagrees with them, he/she still wants to understand them.

7. *Benevolence*: To preserve and enhance the welfare of those who are one's family, friends, and acquaintances. Such an individual would like to help people around him/her; such a person would like to care about them. One likes to be loyal to his/her friends and, if possible, likes to devote him(her)self to the people close to him/her.

8. *Power*: To care about social status and prestige - as well as control and dominance over people (and resources). Such a person cares about having a lot of wealth and expensive things that are visible to others. It is very important to such a person to get respect from others and such an individual wants others to do what he/she says.

9. *Achievement*: It is defined as having personal success by demonstrating competence according to commonly agreed-upon standards. Such a person needs to show off his/her abilities and wants others to admire what he/she does. Being successful is very important to such an individual; he/she hopes that the others will recognize his/her achievements.

FIGURES

FIGURE I
Opennes Across Europe




FIGURE II
Structural Relations Among Ten Values (Barnea and Schwartz 1998)




FIGURE III
OPENDIM1 Across Europe




FIGURE IV
OPENDIM2 Across Europe





FIGURE V
OPENDIM1 vs. OPENDIM2



TABLES

Table 1.
Have Extreme Right Parties Ever Existed in Western Europe?

	Neofascist	Populist
Austria	No	Yes
Belgium	No	Yes
Denmark	No	Yes
Finland	No	No
France	Yes	Yes
Germany	Yes	Yes
Greece	Yes	No
Iceland	No	No
Ireland	No	No
Italy	Yes	Yes
Luxembourg	No	No
Netherlands	Yes	No
Norway	No	Yes
Portugal	Yes	No
Spain	Yes	No
Sweden	No	Yes
Switzerland	Yes	Yes
UK	Yes	No

Table 2.
Summary Statistics of Key Data

Variable	Mean	Median	Max	Min	Std. Dev.
Neofascist+ (%)	1.53	0.60	8.7	0.03	2.03
Populist+ (%)	7.68	6.45	26.9	0.2	6.30
Immigration (%)	5.10	2.7	36.6	0.2	6.32
Unemployment (%)	6.09	5.4	22.7	0	4.40
Openness	-0.45	-0.44	0.37	-1.93	0.60

+ Actual votes.

Table 3a.
Neofascist and Populist Parties and OPENNESS

	(1) \pm	(2)	(3)	(4) \pm	(5)	(6)
	Dep. Var.:	Neofascist	Vote Share	Dep. Var.:	Populist	Vote Share
Immigration	0.245 (0.952)	0.170 (2.614) ^{***}	0.358 (4.89) ^{***}	0.870 (1.140)	-0.727 (-2.174) ^{**}	-0.533 (1.60)
Unemployment	-0.197 (-2.642) ^{***}	0.146 (1.724) [*]	0.244 (2.01) ^{**}	-0.859 (-1.363)	-0.870 (-1.938) [*]	0.220 (0.38)
Log Magnitude	1.540 (4.352) ^{***}	0.215 (0.930)	0.396 (2.04) ^{**}	3.694 (2.363) ^{**}	0.788 (0.715)	0.424 (0.38)
Uppertier	-0.082 (-1.459)	0.046 (2.187) ^{**}	0.079 (3.80) ^{***}	1.973 (4.221) ^{***}	0.158 (1.714) [*]	0.136 (1.41)
Immigration*Unemployment	0.005 (0.292)	-0.041 (-2.351) ^{**}	-0.016 (0.87)	0.218 (2.328) ^{**}	0.315 (3.836) ^{***}	0.185 (2.10) ^{**}
OPENNESS			-4.687 (5.03) ^{***}			-2.568 (0.55)
Immigration* OPENNESS			1.224 (5.75) ^{***}			-0.480 (0.56)
Unemployment* OPENNESS			0.244 (1.95) [*]			1.527 (2.20) ^{**}
Constant	-7.11 (3.39) ^{***}	-2.979 (-2.888) ^{***}	-5.428 (4.73) ^{***}	-41.93 (0.407)	-7.235 (-1.531)	-7.386 (1.48)
Country Dummies	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Hausman (Fixed vs Random Eff.)	9.16 (0.10)	-	-	28.72 (0.0)	-	-
Observations	150	150	143	150	150	143

Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.

* significant at 10%;

** significant at 5%;

*** significant at 1%.

For Hausman test, chi-squared test statistics and p-values in parentheses (the null hypothesis assumes no correlation between random effects and error terms). \pm Also reported by Golder (2003).

Table 3b.
Other Classifications of Extreme Right and OPENNESS

	(1) ±	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Dep. Var.: Neofascist and Populist Parties Combined			Dep. Var.: Kitschelt Classification (with Spain)			Dep. Var.: Kitschelt Classification (without Spain)		
Immigration	2.018*** (4.05)	-0.187 (-1.08)	0.035 (0.18)	1.404** (2.46)	0.235 (1.09)	0.101 (0.43)	0.983** (2.18)	-0.380** (-2.05)	-0.290 (-1.49)
Unemployment	-0.220 (-0.92)	-0.230 (-1.00)	0.259 (0.75)	0.622*** (2.67)	1.355*** (5.31)	1.351*** (3.30)	-0.334 (-1.62)	-0.415* (-1.72)	0.149 (0.44)
Log Magnitude	1.998* (1.80)	0.770 (1.24)	0.617 (0.95)	-1.768 (-1.34)	0.801 (0.99)	0.333 (0.40)	-2.117** (-2.03)	0.650 (0.99)	0.163 (0.24)
Uppertier	0.514*** (2.67)	0.138** (2.53)	0.132** (2.24)	0.493** (1.99)	0.109 (1.56)	0.065 (0.88)	0.503*** (2.68)	0.088 (1.54)	0.0531 (0.89)
Immigration*	0.061 (1.30)	0.115*** (2.73)	0.089* (1.72)	0.002 (0.047)	-0.070 (-1.34)	-0.106* (-1.70)	0.100** (2.35)	0.118*** (2.62)	0.048 (0.92)
UNEMPLOYMENT			-7.274*** (-2.69)			4.287 (1.22)			-3.288 (-1.19)
Immigration*			0.844 (1.61)			-0.514 (-0.80)			-0.138 (-0.26)
UNEMPLOYMENT*			0.920** (2.40)			-0.109 (-0.22)			0.851** (2.18)
Constant	-41.36*** (-4.38)	-2.870 (-1.09)	-4.783 (-1.58)	-37.63*** (-3.18)	-8.184** (-2.50)	-3.781 (-1.05)	-34.07*** (-3.76)	0.839 (0.31)	1.585 (0.54)
Country Dummies	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO
Hausman (Fixed vs Random Eff.)									
Observations	150	150	143	150	150	143	150	150	143

See the notes to Table 3a.

Table 4a.
Neofascist and Populist Parties, Supply Side Variables, and OPENNESS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Dep. Var.: Neofascist Parties Vote Shares							Dep. Var.: Populist Parties Vote Shares				
Immigration	0.360** (4.96)	0.310** (3.25)	0.359*** (4.81)	0.366*** (4.93)	0.421*** (4.86)	0.324*** (3.21)	-0.514 (-1.52)	-0.914** (-2.14)	-0.730** (-1.98)	-0.957** (-2.36)	-0.552 (-1.62)	-1.287** (-2.44)
Unemployment	0.239** (1.98)	0.224* (1.80)	0.280** (2.28)	0.260** (2.12)	0.244* (1.94)	0.221* (1.72)	0.331 (0.57)	0.0280 (0.049)	0.162 (0.28)	0.305 (0.52)	0.403 (0.68)	0.231 (0.38)
Log Magnitude	0.452** (2.23)	0.431** (2.16)	0.377* (1.93)	0.465** (2.27)	0.806** (2.56)	0.850** (2.52)	-0.376 (-0.32)	0.692 (0.63)	-0.0537 (-0.046)	-1.365 (-1.07)	-1.516 (-1.10)	-2.549** (-1.69)
Uppertier	0.082*** (3.89)	0.082*** (3.85)	0.086*** (3.94)	0.093*** (4.12)	0.106*** (3.78)	0.117*** (4.01)	0.100 (1.02)	0.160* (1.66)	0.099 (0.99)	0.028 (0.28)	0.068 (0.68)	0.002 (0.022)
Immigration*Unemployment	-0.0162 (-0.88)	-0.0142 (-0.75)	-0.00987 (-0.52)	-0.0124 (-0.65)	-0.0244 (-1.21)	-0.0172 (-0.84)	0.175* (1.97)	0.209** (2.33)	0.190** (2.13)	0.179* (1.97)	0.177* (1.97)	0.204** (2.12)
OPENNESS	-4.270*** (-4.26)	-4.502*** (-4.60)	-4.950*** (-5.17)	-4.463*** (-4.37)	-4.248*** (-4.42)	-3.587*** (-3.06)	-7.071 (-1.32)	-0.431 (-0.089)	-0.188 (-0.037)	-5.863 (-1.03)	-8.597 (-1.57)	-8.412 (-1.29)
Immigration*OPENNESS	1.178*** (5.58)	1.118*** (4.41)	1.349*** (5.54)	1.307*** (5.39)	1.390*** (5.57)	1.175*** (3.77)	-0.061 (-0.068)	-1.429 (-1.35)	-1.145 (-1.15)	-1.374 (-1.28)	-0.613 (-0.72)	-2.102** (-1.67)
Unemployment*OPENNESS	0.227* (1.81)	0.239** (1.90)	0.299** (2.35)	0.262** (2.04)	0.215* (1.66)	0.222* (1.68)	1.789** (2.48)	1.441** (2.12)	1.561** (2.19)	2.244*** (2.78)	2.162*** (2.73)	2.640*** (2.98)
Democracy	8.142 (-0.99)	-	0.640			-0.393		-0.606	9.745*			9.348*
Voter Turnout		-0.026 (-0.83)								(1.67)		(1.57)
Neofascist Vote Share												
Democracy*Neofascist Vote Share												
Populist Vote Share			-0.188** (-2.17)	2.623 (1.20)		2.412 (1.05)						
Democracy*Populist Vote Share				-0.419 (1.27)		-0.383 (1.11)			1.336 (1.38)	-20.99 (-1.18)		-15.73 (-0.90)
Proportional vs Majoritarian					-0.824* (-1.72)	-0.612 (-1.24)					4.693** (2.54)	3.894** (2.13)
Constant	-6.291*** (-4.27)	-3.234 (-1.12)	-5.321*** (-4.62)	-5.857*** (-3.94)	-6.113*** (-4.73)	-2.652 (-0.88)	5.276 (0.67)	11.31 (0.86)	-5.536 (-1.08)	8.551 (0.98)	-7.570 (-1.47)	21.47 (1.30)
Observations	143	142	143	143	143	142	143	142	143	143	143	142

See the notes to Table 3a.

Table 4b.
Other Classifications of Extreme Right, Supply Side Variables, and OPENNESS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Dep. Var.: Neofascist and Populist Parties Combined				Dep. Var.: Kitschelt Classification (With Spain)				Dep. Var.: Kitschelt Classification (Without Spain)			
Immigration	0.036 (0.18)	-0.242 (-0.97)	0.023 (0.12)	-0.233 (-0.93)	0.114 (0.49)	-0.199 (-0.66)	0.100 (0.42)	-0.216 (-0.73)	-0.282 (-1.45)	-0.624** (-2.47)	-0.318 (-1.65)	-0.628** (-2.52)
Unemployment	0.272 (0.79)	0.118 (0.34)	0.353 (1.01)	0.216 (0.60)	1.342*** (3.31)	1.196*** (2.84)	1.387*** (3.32)	1.201*** (2.83)	0.147 (0.43)	-0.0381 (-0.11)	0.292 (0.86)	0.106 (0.30)
Log Magnitude	0.466 (0.70)	0.827 (1.27)	-0.087 (-0.11)	0.092 (0.12)	0.625 (0.74)	0.591 (0.70)	0.070 (0.070)	0.757 (0.74)	0.305 (0.44)	0.424 (0.62)	-1.269 (-1.61)	-0.778 (-0.96)
Uppertier	0.124** (2.08)	0.151** (2.53)	0.106* (1.75)	0.121* (1.96)	0.084 (1.13)	0.091 (1.21)	0.056 (0.73)	0.109 (1.38)	0.063 (1.03)	0.079 (1.30)	0.004 (0.066)	0.042 (0.69)
Immigration*Unemployment	0.088* (1.69)	0.108** (2.03)	0.082 (1.58)	0.100* (1.87)	-0.101 (-1.65)	-0.084 (-1.31)	-0.108* (-1.73)	-0.080 (-1.25)	0.050 (0.95)	0.074 (1.36)	0.040 (0.77)	0.067 (1.25)
OPENNESS	-8.342*** (-2.81)	-5.821** (-2.07)	-8.895*** (-3.06)	-7.950** (-2.44)	6.048 (1.64)	5.748 (1.57)	3.717 (1.00)	7.560* (1.88)	-2.441 (-0.83)	-1.639 (-0.57)	-6.585** (-2.25)	-3.687 (-1.16)
Immigration*OPENNESS	0.957* (1.77)	0.169 (0.26)	0.741 (1.42)	0.196 (0.29)	-0.696 (-1.07)	-1.253 (-1.59)	-0.547 (-0.84)	-1.590** (-1.98)	-0.224 (-0.42)	-0.935 (-1.46)	-0.304 (-0.59)	-1.184* (-1.87)
Unemployment*OPENNESS	0.960** (2.49)	0.863** (2.27)	1.045*** (2.68)	1.000** (2.56)	-0.172 (-0.35)	-0.159 (-0.32)	-0.0724 (-0.15)	-0.205 (-0.42)	0.820** (2.10)	0.786** (2.03)	1.069** (2.76)	0.961** (2.48)
Democracy	1.915 (0.89)			0.942 (0.44)	-3.591 (-1.49)			-4.293* (-1.75)	-1.676 (-0.84)			-2.388 (-1.24)
Voter Turnout		-0.157* (-1.79)		-0.143 (-1.61)		-0.179 (-1.64)		-0.200* (-1.83)		-0.192** (-2.15)		-0.183** (-2.10)
Proportional vs Majoritarian			1.647 (1.61)	1.506 (1.47)			0.619 (0.49)	0.492 (0.39)			3.371*** (3.30)	3.271*** (3.21)
Constant	-2.227 (-0.54)	8.651 (1.08)	-4.761 (-1.59)	8.791 (1.08)	-8.869* (-1.78)	11.25 (1.15)	-3.823 (-1.05)	6.863 (0.69)	-0.825 (-0.20)	17.92** (2.21)	1.657 (0.58)	13.80* (1.70)
Observations	143	142	143	142	143	142	143	142	143	142	143	142

See the notes to Table 3a.

Table 5
Determinants of Immigration

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Dependent Variable: Immigration							
Lagged Immig.	1.070*** (99.7)						1.068*** (48.7)	1.064*** (47.2)
Jus soli		-1.601*** (-4.57)					-0.005 (-0.095)	
Voting right			1.096*** (2.63)				-0.031 (-0.49)	
Log Population				-1.191** (-1.99)			-0.135** (-2.10)	-0.095** (-2.20)
Govt Cons/GDP					-0.187* (-1.68)		0.015 (0.71)	
Sentiment towards Immigrants						0.908*** (3.10)	-0.051 (-1.34)	
Constant	0.0217 (0.26)	5.978*** (9.15)	2.598*** (2.94)	24.31** (2.46)	9.009*** (3.44)	-9.301** (-2.17)	2.790** (2.17)	1.572** (2.33)
Observations	133	144	143	144	144	144	126	127
R-squared	0.99	0.04	0.05	0.07	0.02	0.07	0.99	0.99
F-statistic	9940.5***	20.84***	6.91**	3.97**	2.83*	9.60***	698.86***	1188.6***
Wald test, p-value								0.64

t statistics in parentheses.

*** p<0.01,

** p<0.05,

* p<0.1.

F-statistic tests whether the model is overall significant. Wald test is for testing whether coefficients of jus soli, voting right, government share in GDP and attitude toward immigrants are jointly insignificant in Model 7, hence can be dropped for Model 8.

Table 6a.
Neofascist and Populist Parties and OPENNESS – Endogeneity of Immigration Addressed

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
	Dependent Variable: Neofascist Parties' Vote Share									Dependent Variable: Populist Parties' Vote Share								
Immigration	-0.079 (-0.28)	0.132* (1.69)	0.350*** (4.16)	0.366*** (4.66)	0.301*** (2.78)	0.359*** (4.34)	0.373*** (4.48)	0.452*** (4.98)	0.344*** (3.48)	1.631** (2.08)	-0.722** (-2.04)	-0.388 (-1.11)	-0.343 (-0.98)	-0.728* (-1.73)	-0.550 (-1.48)	-0.606 (-1.59)	-0.407 (-1.14)	-1.003** (-2.08)
Unemployment	-0.302*** (-3.24)	0.087 (0.90)	0.217 (1.65)	0.202 (1.64)	0.205 (1.52)	0.253* (1.97)	0.223* (1.73)	0.198 (1.59)	0.171 (1.37)	-0.311 (-0.44)	-0.876* (-1.88)	0.370 (0.63)	0.536 (0.90)	0.225 (0.38)	0.339 (0.57)	0.569 (0.94)	0.568 (0.94)	0.596 (0.97)
Log Magnitude	0.959** (2.17)	0.228 (0.88)	0.518** (2.59)	0.809*** (3.76)	0.564*** (2.68)	0.508** (2.59)	0.561*** (2.85)	1.288*** (4.01)	1.419*** (4.25)	3.281** (2.27)	0.032 (0.03)	0.119 (0.11)	-0.693 (-0.59)	0.480 (0.43)	-0.326 (-0.28)	-1.715 (-1.29)	-1.898 (-1.39)	-2.881* (-1.90)
Uppertier	-0.332** (-2.34)	0.037 (1.52)	0.089*** (3.89)	0.103*** (4.52)	0.095*** (3.83)	0.101*** (4.21)	0.107*** (4.33)	0.140*** (4.66)	0.163*** (5.14)	1.760*** (3.90)	0.097 (0.99)	0.121 (1.23)	0.0938 (0.94)	0.157 (1.57)	0.0904 (0.89)	0.033 (0.32)	0.0523 (0.51)	0.0120 (0.11)
Immigration*Unemp.	0.0224 (1.14)	-0.031 (-1.49)	-0.004 (-0.17)	-0.006 (-0.28)	-0.002 (-0.11)	-0.001 (-0.065)	-0.006 (-0.27)	-0.0200 (-0.97)	-0.016 (-0.80)	0.088 (0.89)	0.258*** (2.92)	0.127 (1.35)	0.109 (1.16)	0.143 (1.52)	0.121 (1.27)	0.092 (0.97)	0.123 (1.27)	0.102 (1.06)
Residual_Immig.	0.380 (1.33)	-0.631 (-1.17)	-0.266 (-0.62)	-0.382 (-0.94)	-0.173 (-0.38)	0.002 (0.006)	0.105 (0.24)	-0.408 (-1.01)	0.176 (0.41)	3.537* (1.85)	3.749 (1.17)	1.623 (0.52)	1.860 (0.60)	2.598 (0.80)	2.375 (0.70)	2.990 (0.86)	1.860 (0.61)	3.743 (1.06)
Residual_Immig*Unemp	0.0181 (0.24)	0.126 (0.92)	0.193 (1.55)	0.248** (2.07)	0.176 (1.37)	0.109 (0.87)	0.149 (1.17)	0.311** (2.52)	0.190 (1.50)	-0.953** (-2.20)	-0.473 (-0.69)	-0.625 (-0.96)	-0.729 (-1.14)	-0.809 (-1.25)	-0.780 (-1.15)	-1.004 (-1.48)	-0.721 (-1.09)	-1.237* (-1.78)
OPENNESS	-5.969*** (-5.59)	-4.940*** (-4.97)	-5.786*** (-5.12)	-6.169*** (-5.86)	-5.934*** (-5.66)	-4.662*** (-4.62)	-4.112*** (-3.99)											
Immig.* OPENNESS	1.426*** (5.73)	1.321*** (5.93)	1.329*** (4.68)	1.591*** (5.76)	1.602*** (5.61)	1.602*** (5.78)	1.489*** (4.84)											
Unemp.* OPENNESS	0.337** (2.52)	0.344*** (2.71)	0.335** (2.46)	0.369*** (2.82)	0.344*** (2.66)	0.340*** (2.68)	0.318** (2.56)											
Residual_Immig*OPEN	-0.995 (-0.95)	-1.056 (-1.07)	-0.832 (-0.77)	-2.266** (-1.84)	-1.782 (-1.34)	-1.000 (-1.02)	-2.345* (-1.88)											
Democracy	-2.937*** (-3.34)	-0.027 (-0.79)																
Voter Turnout																		
Neofascist Vote Share																		
Democracy*Neofascist																		
Populist Vote Share										1.964								
Democracy*Populist																		
Proportional vs Majorit.																		
Constant	-6.573 (-0.28)	-2.592** (-2.10)	-6.048*** (-4.59)	-10.07*** (-5.23)	-3.822 (-1.22)	-5.954*** (-4.65)	-5.808*** (-4.60)	-10.59*** (-5.36)	-4.677 (-1.48)	-93.31 (-1.11)	-2.066 (-0.42)	-6.270 (-1.21)	5.643 (0.71)	11.36 (0.89)	-4.482 (-0.84)	-87.04** (-2.19)	-6.964 (-1.30)	19.35 (1.21)
Observations	127	127	127	127	126	127	127	127	126	127	127	127	127	126	127	127	127	126
COUNTRY DUMMIES	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO

t statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Residual_Immigration is the residuals from the estimation of immigration on lagged immigration and log population as per Two-Stage Conditional Maximum Likelihood Approach of Rivers and Vuong (1988).

Table 6b.
Other Classifications of Extreme Right and OPENNESS - Endogeneity Addressed

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)
	Dep. Var.: Neofascist + Populist Parties Combined							Dep. Var.: Kitschelt Classification (With Spain)							Dep. Var.: Kitschelt Classification (Without Spain)						
Immigration	1.429** (2.54)	-0.247 (-1.18)	0.082 (0.37)	0.083 (0.37)	-0.190 (-0.70)	0.082 (0.37)	-0.185 (-0.68)	0.887 (1.34)	0.005 (0.02)	-0.006 (-0.022)	0.007 (0.026)	-0.231 (-0.70)	-0.005 (-0.020)	-0.209 (-0.64)	0.571 (1.18)	-0.449** (-2.00)	-0.212 (-0.91)	-0.206 (-0.90)	-0.541* (-1.91)	-0.221 (-0.97)	-0.499* (-1.81)
Unemployment	-0.318 (-1.11)	-0.316 (-1.20)	0.454 (1.17)	0.457 (1.18)	0.339 (0.87)	0.568 (1.46)	0.445 (1.13)	0.301 (1.12)	1.080*** (3.72)	1.327*** (2.91)	1.308*** (2.90)	1.222*** (2.63)	1.376*** (2.72)	1.275*** (2.72)	-0.276 (-1.24)	-0.503* (-1.81)	0.381 (0.98)	0.357 (0.92)	0.219 (0.55)	0.535 (1.39)	0.376 (0.96)
Log Magnitude	4.602*** (3.82)	0.365 (0.81)	0.793 (1.13)	0.771 (1.05)	1.081 (1.52)	0.027 (0.34)	0.401 (0.48)	0.280 (0.19)	0.007 (0.01)	0.009 (0.010)	0.539 (0.62)	0.286 (0.31)	0.341 (0.33)	0.438 (0.41)	0.740 (0.70)	0.211 (0.28)	0.093 (0.13)	0.501 (0.65)	0.466 (1.59)	-1.321 (-0.62)	-0.562 (-0.65)
Upper tier	1.707*** (4.86)	0.104 (0.24)	0.146** (2.24)	0.145** (2.21)	0.172** (2.61)	0.119* (1.82)	0.148** (2.20)	1.403*** (3.41)	0.014 (0.18)	0.021 (0.26)	0.046 (0.57)	0.047 (0.57)	0.010 (0.12)	0.058 (0.69)	1.711*** (5.66)	0.049 (0.75)	0.062 (0.93)	0.081 (1.20)	0.100 (1.45)	0.018 (0.28)	0.069 (1.02)
Immigration*Unemp.	0.054 (1.02)	0.108** (2.06)	0.065 (1.06)	0.064 (1.05)	0.079 (1.28)	0.057 (0.94)	0.0733 (1.20)	0.039 (0.67)	-0.020 (-0.33)	-0.070 (-0.94)	-0.061 (-0.83)	-0.055 (-0.73)	-0.072 (-0.97)	-0.050 (-0.66)	0.070 (1.55)	0.110** (1.99)	0.019 (0.29)	0.027 (0.43)	0.041 (0.63)	0.012 (0.19)	0.041 (0.65)
Residual_Immig.	1.349 (1.54)	0.609 (0.42)	-0.152 (-0.10)	-0.140 (-0.093)	0.469 (0.31)	0.116 (0.78)	0.653 (0.43)	0.0458 (0.044)	-1.676 (-0.94)	-2.289 (-1.24)	-2.589 (-1.42)	-1.826 (-0.96)	-2.201 (-1.18)	-2.052 (-1.09)	1.097 (1.41)	0.521 (0.34)	-0.153 (-0.098)	-0.404 (-0.26)	0.543 (0.34)	0.304 (0.20)	0.614 (0.40)
Resid_Immig.*Unemp	-0.545** (-2.48)	-0.130 (-0.35)	-0.441 (-1.11)	-0.444 (-1.12)	-0.556 (-1.41)	-0.478 (-1.22)	-0.579 (-1.47)	-0.150 (-0.59)	0.907** (2.11)	0.510 (1.08)	0.558 (1.19)	0.412 (0.86)	0.501 (1.06)	0.450 (0.95)	-0.562*** (-2.86)	-0.006 (-0.02)	-0.264 (-0.64)	-0.208 (-0.50)	-0.408 (-0.99)	-0.342 (-0.85)	-0.410 (-1.02)
OPENNESS			-9.623*** (-3.11)	-9.726*** (-2.97)	-7.901** (-2.45)	-11.59*** (-3.50)	-9.517*** (-2.68)					3.834 (0.61)	1.511 (0.95)	5.074 (0.38)			-6.159* (-1.95)	-4.702 (-1.45)	-4.216 (-1.28)	-9.732*** (-2.92)	-6.366* (-1.82)
Immig.* OPENNESS			0.783 (1.40)	0.795 (1.38)	0.080 (0.12)	0.718 (1.30)	0.007 (0.010)					-1.218 (-1.48)	-0.675 (-0.98)	-1.518* (-1.84)			-0.211 (-0.37)	-0.377 (-0.65)	-1.018 (-1.49)	-0.289 (-0.52)	-1.196* (-1.81)
Unemp.* OPENNESS			1.162*** (2.74)	1.164*** (2.74)	1.096** (2.60)	1.296*** (3.02)	1.220*** (2.85)					-0.023 (-0.045)	0.087 (0.17)	0.009 (0.016)			1.179*** (2.73)	1.162*** (2.71)	1.091** (2.53)	1.377*** (3.22)	1.289*** (3.02)
Resid_Immig.*OPEN			-6.351* (-1.95)	-6.344* (-1.95)	-5.725* (-1.76)	-6.821** (-2.12)	-6.343* (-1.95)					-6.489 (-1.62)	-6.435 (-1.57)	-6.778 (-1.64)			-3.917 (-1.15)	-4.099 (-1.21)	-3.381 (-0.99)	-5.085 (-1.55)	-5.099 (-1.55)
Democracy			0.263 (0.095)	0.263 (0.095)	-0.168* (-1.80)	-0.168* (-1.80)	-0.948 (-0.35)					-6.507*** (-2.13)	-0.141 (-1.23)	-6.967** (-2.26)				-4.544* (-1.73)	-2.03** (-2.11)	-0.174* (-1.88)	-5.427** (-2.15)
Voter Turnout																					
Proport. vs Majorit.																					
Constant	-81.83* (-1.72)	-0.551 (-0.189)	-6.483* (-1.86)	-6.141 (-1.23)	7.539 (0.89)	-6.829* (-1.97)	5.378 (0.60)	-51.34 (-0.77)	-3.372 (-0.90)	-3.616 (-0.88)	-12.70** (-2.14)	7.911 (0.78)	-3.828 (-0.93)	-2.418 (-0.22)	-38.78 (-0.76)	3.830 (1.19)	0.333 (0.097)	-6.063 (-1.19)	17.12** (1.98)	-0.257 (-0.076)	6.428 (0.70)
Observations	127	127	127	127	126	127	126	127	127	127	127	126	127	126	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
COUNTRY DUMMIES	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO

See the notes to Table 6a.

Table 7a.
Neofascist and Populist Parties and Welfare State

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
	Dependent Variable: Neofascist Vote Share							Dependent Variable: Populist Vote Share						
Immigration	-0.198 (-0.64)	-0.728** (-2.16)	-0.560** (-2.00)	-0.694** (-2.06)	-0.778** (-2.07)	-0.728** (-2.16)	-0.592* (-1.93)	0.491 (0.40)	2.000 (1.39)	1.155 (0.75)	0.744 (0.51)	1.335 (0.90)	2.000 (1.39)	0.807 (0.50)
Unemployment	-0.787*** (-4.45)	-0.813*** (-4.49)	-0.953*** (-6.39)	-0.829*** (-4.59)	-0.812*** (-4.50)	-0.813*** (-4.49)	-0.945*** (-6.47)	-0.274 (-0.33)	0.343 (0.38)	0.185 (0.21)	0.284 (0.32)	-0.226 (-0.25)	0.343 (0.38)	-0.107 (-0.12)
Log Magnitude	1.475*** (4.86)	0.907** (2.44)	0.977*** (3.21)	0.827** (2.17)	0.936** (2.37)	0.907** (2.44)	1.161*** (3.40)	2.714* (1.77)	2.737* (1.90)	2.268 (1.55)	3.980*** (2.65)	-0.858 (-0.41)	2.737* (1.90)	-0.0651 (-0.023)
Uppertier	-0.143*** (-2.80)	-0.401*** (-3.16)	-0.434*** (-4.18)	-0.415*** (-3.26)	-0.381** (-2.38)	-0.401*** (-3.16)	-0.416*** (-3.40)	1.857*** (4.04)	1.883*** (3.97)	2.001*** (4.23)	1.842*** (3.98)	2.506*** (4.64)	1.883*** (3.97)	2.484*** (4.13)
Immigration*Unemployment	0.038* (1.94)	0.059*** (2.66)	0.066*** (3.59)	0.066*** (2.74)	0.064** (2.48)	0.059*** (2.66)	0.050** (2.24)	0.295*** (2.82)	0.139 (1.16)	0.200 (1.57)	0.113 (0.95)	0.212 (1.63)	0.139 (1.16)	0.187 (1.42)
Welfare	-2.911 (-1.62)	-5.363*** (-3.67)	-5.170*** (-3.16)	-5.153** (-2.57)	-5.331** (-2.61)	-5.363*** (-2.67)	-5.444*** (-3.34)	11.94 (1.27)	16.52 (1.47)	13.60 (1.21)	12.56 (1.13)	12.33 (1.10)	16.52 (1.47)	11.64 (1.04)
Welfare*Immigration	0.339 (1.33)	0.590** (2.23)	0.686*** (3.13)	0.628** (2.35)	0.600** (2.14)	0.590** (2.23)	0.589** (2.52)	0.280 (0.23)	-0.699 (-0.53)	0.000 (0.00)	-0.143 (-0.11)	-0.429 (-0.31)	-0.699 (-0.53)	-0.168 (-0.12)
Welfare*Unemployment	0.430*** (3.41)	0.359** (2.53)	0.507*** (4.40)	0.346** (2.43)	0.352** (2.47)	0.359** (2.53)	0.566*** (4.81)	-1.219 (-1.58)	-1.260 (-1.50)	-1.637* (-1.86)	-1.046 (-1.27)	-1.230 (-1.42)	-1.260 (-1.50)	-1.217 (-1.40)
Democracy		-2.321*** (-4.84)					-2.718*** (-5.00)							15.93 (0.86)
Voter Turnout				0.024 (0.69)			-0.059* (-1.78)				-0.572** (-2.21)			-0.200 (-0.61)
Neofascist Vote Share												-5.995 (-0.63)		9.635 (0.40)
Democracy*Neofascist												1.677 (0.88)		-1.072 (-0.30)
Populist Vote Share						0.425		0.348						
Democracy*Populist														
Proportional vs Majorit.													-10.39*** (-2.67)	-12.30 (-0.52)
Residual_Immigration		1.279 (1.33)	1.287 (1.63)	1.298 (1.34)	1.380 (1.31)	1.279 (1.33)	1.086 (1.28)		7.288* (1.89)	6.955* (1.82)	7.427** (1.99)	5.384 (1.43)	7.288* (1.89)	6.029 (1.59)
Resid_Immig*Unemp		-0.017 (-0.17)	0.074 (0.89)	-0.005 (-0.050)	-0.014 (-0.13)	-0.017 (-0.17)	0.051 (0.56)		-1.436* (-1.98)	-1.577** (-2.19)	-1.082 (-1.54)	-1.877*** (-2.65)	-1.436* (-1.98)	-1.776** (-2.21)
Resid_Immig*Welfare		-1.277 (-0.86)	-1.572 (-1.28)	-1.400 (-0.92)	-1.358 (-0.87)	-1.277 (-0.86)	-1.080 (-0.84)		-1.462 (-0.23)	-0.385 (-0.062)	-3.748 (-0.61)	2.797 (0.45)	-1.462 (-0.23)	1.553 (0.23)
Constant	10.12*** (2.84)	-8.154 (-0.32)	-19.85 (-1.17)	24.80*** (3.27)	-7.555 (-0.37)	7.996** (2.46)	7.062* (1.76)	-115.7*** (-5.04)	-91.65 (-1.40)	-79.58 (-1.28)	-63.36* (-1.76)	-75.29 (-1.29)	-29.90*** (-2.75)	17.79 (0.31)
Observations	133	119	119	118	119	119	118	133	119	119	118	119	119	118
COUNTRY DUMMIES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

See the notes to Table 6a.

Table 7b. Other Classifications of Extreme Right and Welfare State

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	
	Dep. Var.: Neofascist + Populist Parties Combined						Dep. Var.: Kitschelt Classification (With Spain)						Dep. Var.: Kitschelt Classification (Without Spain)						
Immigration	1.364* (1.72)	1.038 (1.14)	1.211 (1.32)	0.962 (1.03)	1.038 (1.14)	1.014 (1.11)	-0.0946 (-0.12)	-0.303 (-0.34)	0.003 (0.003)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.303 (-0.34)	0.090 (0.097)	-0.275 (-0.38)	-0.697 (-0.88)	-0.375 (-0.47)	-0.601 (-0.73)	-0.697 (-0.88)	-0.490 (-0.60)	
Unemployment	0.006 (0.013)	-0.094 (-0.19)	-0.150 (-0.30)	-0.092 (-0.19)	-0.094 (-0.19)	-0.176 (-0.35)	-0.394 (-0.94)	-0.571 (-1.40)	-0.438 (-1.07)	-0.474 (-1.14)	-0.571 (-1.40)	-0.407 (-0.97)	0.172 (0.43)	0.0832 (0.21)	0.189 (0.48)	0.111 (0.28)	0.0832 (0.21)	0.177 (0.44)	
Log Magnitude	1.768 (1.64)	4.542** (3.74)	4.646** (3.83)	4.664** (3.73)	4.542** (3.74)	5.104** (4.08)	-1.270 (-1.15)	0.403 (0.34)	0.515 (0.43)	0.0561 (0.046)	0.403 (0.34)	0.403 (0.33)	-2.354** (-2.55)	0.366 (0.35)	0.481 (0.46)	0.268 (0.25)	0.366 (0.35)	0.736 (0.68)	
Uppertier	0.471** (2.49)	1.672** (4.62)	1.610** (4.44)	1.677** (4.62)	1.672** (4.62)	1.599** (4.43)	0.398* (1.92)	1.153** (3.28)	1.081** (3.09)	1.140** (3.25)	1.153** (3.28)	1.079** (3.07)	0.469** (2.57)	1.611** (5.21)	1.537** (4.99)	1.604** (5.15)	1.611** (5.21)	1.523** (4.92)	
Immigration*Unemp.	0.0840 (1.62)	0.0868 (1.37)	0.0811 (1.29)	0.0787 (1.20)	0.0868 (1.37)	0.0518 (0.79)	0.0274 (0.52)	0.00584 (0.094)	-0.0117 (-0.19)	0.0230 (0.36)	0.00584 (0.094)	-0.00620 (-0.094)	0.124** (2.67)	0.119** (2.14)	0.0999* (1.78)	0.123** (2.17)	0.119** (2.14)	0.0853 (1.46)	
Welfare	1.750 (0.31)	4.293 (0.66)	3.950 (0.61)	4.010 (0.61)	4.293 (0.66)	2.751 (0.42)	-18.89** (-3.35)	-23.50** (-4.09)	-22.05** (-3.85)	-21.58** (-4.09)	-23.50** (-4.09)	-21.51** (-3.66)	0.749 (0.14)	0.700 (0.13)	1.695 (0.32)	1.142 (0.21)	0.700 (0.13)	1.074 (0.19)	
Welfare*Immigration	0.866 (1.17)	0.305 (0.38)	0.226 (0.28)	0.320 (0.40)	0.305 (0.38)	0.248 (0.31)	2.065** (2.66)	2.090** (2.75)	1.890** (2.49)	2.090** (2.58)	2.090** (2.75)	1.861** (2.43)	1.517** (2.21)	1.272* (1.89)	1.072 (1.59)	1.237* (1.81)	1.272* (1.89)	1.091 (1.60)	
Welfare*Unemployment	-0.372 (-0.99)	-0.401 (-0.93)	-0.265 (-0.60)	-0.362 (-0.82)	-0.401 (-0.93)	-0.0722 (-0.16)	1.029** (3.02)	1.178** (3.37)	1.215** (3.50)	1.022** (2.78)	1.178** (3.37)	1.163** (3.09)	-0.681* (-1.71)	-0.671 (-1.50)	-0.592 (-1.33)	-0.712 (-1.56)	-0.671 (-1.50)	-0.493 (-1.05)	
Democracy			-3.927 (-1.63)		-5.585** (-2.06)				-3.941* (-1.98)			-3.795 (-1.60)			-3.691** (-2.04)			-4.913** (-2.25)	
Voter Turnout				-0.0556 (-0.44)		-0.191 (-1.35)				0.170 (1.40)		0.0530 (0.37)				0.0468 (0.44)		-0.106 (-0.84)	
Proportional vs Majorit.					-9.417** (-3.41)						-4.680* (-1.70)						-1.412 (-0.58)	-1.732 (-0.44)	
Residual_Immigration	4.454 (1.61)	4.454 (1.59)	4.403 (1.60)	4.415 (1.59)	4.454 (1.61)	4.314 (1.57)		-3.019 (-1.14)	-2.606 (-0.99)	-2.679 (-1.01)	-3.019 (-1.14)	-2.469 (-0.94)		1.192 (0.50)	1.563 (0.66)	1.298 (0.54)	1.192 (0.50)	1.601 (0.67)	
Resid_Immig*Unemp	-0.183 (-0.59)	-0.183 (-0.59)	-0.107 (-0.34)	-0.202 (-0.64)	-0.183 (-0.59)	-0.128 (-0.41)		-0.506* (-1.78)	-0.377 (-1.30)	-0.439 (-1.52)	-0.506* (-1.78)	-0.361 (-1.24)		-0.475* (-1.86)	-0.354 (-1.36)	-0.456* (-1.75)	-0.475* (-1.86)	-0.349 (-1.33)	
Resid_Immig*Welfare	-5.386 (-1.26)	-5.386 (-1.26)	-5.584 (-1.31)	-5.229 (-1.22)	-5.386 (-1.26)	-5.262 (-1.24)		5.537 (1.38)	4.597 (1.15)	4.779 (1.18)	5.537 (1.38)	4.336 (1.07)		0.0366 (0.010)	-0.842 (-0.23)	-0.198 (-0.054)	0.0366 (0.010)	-0.832 (-0.23)	
Constant	-39.35** (-3.68)	-79.87 (-1.59)	-85.31 (-1.56)	-91.10** (-4.16)	-15.03** (-2.18)	-12.08 (-0.96)	-18.34 (-1.62)	-94.70 (-1.64)	-94.75 (-1.63)	-68.20** (-3.21)	8.158 (1.30)	15.31 (1.26)	-30.87** (-3.10)	-70.65 (-1.44)	-69.47* (-1.70)	-88.44** (-4.73)	0.304 (0.055)	0.304 (0.055)	-1.212 (-0.11)
Observations	133	119	119	118	119	118	133	119	119	118	119	118	133	119	119	118	119	118	
COUNTRY DUMMIES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	

See the notes to Table 6a.

Table 8a.
Neofascist and Populist Parties and Democracy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
	Dependent Variable: Neofascist Vote Share							Dependent Variable: Populist Vote Share						
Immigration	0.738 (0.49)	-3.164** (-2.28)	-3.164** (-2.28)	-3.558*** (-2.65)	-3.015** (-2.14)	-3.164** (-2.28)	-3.601** (-2.60)	12.43 (1.09)	-1.153 (-0.069)	-1.153 (-0.069)	-2.896 (-0.17)	17.00 (0.54)	-1.153 (-0.069)	-3.329 (-0.096)
Unemployment	-1.867** (-2.35)	-3.955*** (-4.82)	-3.955*** (-4.82)	-4.121*** (-5.23)	-4.009*** (-4.87)	-3.955*** (-4.82)	-4.143*** (-5.25)	27.62*** (3.08)	18.93 (1.64)	18.93 (1.64)	18.08 (1.65)	32.82*** (3.14)	18.93 (1.64)	29.49*** (2.77)
Log Magnitude	1.457*** (4.21)	0.982*** (2.95)	0.982*** (2.95)	1.182*** (3.41)	0.919** (2.55)	0.982*** (2.95)	1.156*** (3.04)	3.941*** (2.81)	3.700*** (2.73)	3.700*** (2.73)	4.695*** (3.52)	-2.087 (-1.00)	3.700*** (2.73)	0.032 (0.012)
Uppertier	-0.106* (-1.93)	-0.303*** (-2.78)	-0.303*** (-2.78)	-0.282*** (-2.64)	-0.346** (-2.38)	-0.303*** (-2.78)	-0.301** (-2.08)	1.594*** (3.63)	1.635*** (3.59)	1.635*** (3.59)	1.606*** (3.68)	2.477*** (5.31)	1.635*** (3.59)	2.261*** (4.64)
Immigration*Unemployment	-0.002 (-0.067)	0.004 (0.22)	0.004 (0.22)	-0.007 (-0.43)	-0.001 (-0.067)	0.004 (0.22)	-0.007 (-0.37)	0.178** (2.18)	0.0811 (0.87)	0.0811 (0.87)	0.0659 (0.72)	0.102 (1.26)	0.0811 (0.87)	0.0865 (1.06)
Democracy	-1.487* (-1.92)	-6.841*** (-5.45)	-6.841*** (-5.45)	-7.546*** (-5.90)	-6.912*** (-5.51)	-6.841*** (-5.45)	-7.569*** (-5.94)	40.57** (2.59)	23.08 (1.05)	23.08 (1.05)	20.49 (0.98)	61.74 (1.44)	23.08 (1.05)	31.92 (0.66)
Democracy*Immigration	-0.075 (-0.35)	0.458** (2.31)	0.458** (2.31)	0.501** (2.63)	0.444** (2.23)	0.458** (2.31)	0.507** (2.61)	-1.558 (-0.95)	0.427 (0.18)	0.427 (0.18)	0.559 (0.24)	-2.218 (-0.49)	0.427 (0.18)	0.647 (0.13)
Democracy*Unemployment	0.256** (2.13)	0.568*** (4.59)	0.568*** (4.59)	0.603*** (5.03)	0.577*** (4.65)	0.568*** (4.59)	0.606*** (5.05)	-4.123*** (-3.19)	-2.802* (-1.69)	-2.802* (-1.69)	-2.673* (-1.70)	-4.835*** (-3.21)	-2.802* (-1.69)	-4.350*** (-2.84)
Resid_Immig*Democracy	-2.022 (-1.35)	-2.022 (-1.35)	-2.022 (-1.35)	-1.949 (-1.35)	-2.035 (-1.36)	-2.022 (-1.35)	-1.920 (-1.33)	8.614 (0.70)	8.614 (0.70)	8.614 (0.70)	8.650 (0.72)	7.835 (0.67)	8.614 (0.70)	5.757 (0.49)
Resid_Immig	14.44 (1.37)	14.44 (1.37)	14.44 (1.37)	14.00 (1.38)	14.47 (1.38)	14.44 (1.37)	13.82 (1.37)	-57.73 (-0.67)	-57.73 (-0.67)	-57.73 (-0.67)	-58.53 (-0.69)	-51.23 (-0.62)	-57.73 (-0.67)	-37.08 (-0.45)
Resid_Immig *Unemp	-0.005 (-0.072)	-0.005 (-0.072)	-0.005 (-0.072)	0.012 (0.18)	0.005 (0.066)	-0.005 (-0.072)	0.014 (0.21)	-0.670 (-1.45)	-0.670 (-1.45)	-0.670 (-1.45)	-0.523 (-1.20)	-1.056** (-2.49)	-0.670 (-1.45)	-0.970** (-2.29)
Voter Turnout Rate				-0.062* (-1.92)			-0.064* (-1.88)				-0.592*** (-2.68)			-0.316 (-1.34)
Neofascist Vote Share												24.69 (0.63)		-2.156 (-0.049)
Democracy*Neofascist												-2.941 (-0.50)		0.943 (0.15)
Populist Vote Share					-0.191 (-0.096)		0.587 (0.30)							
Democracy*Populist					0.0352 (0.12)		-0.0881 (-0.30)							
Proportional vs Majorit.						0.185 (0.18)	0.155 (0.15)							
Constant	-5.426 (-0.18)	62.55*** (6.56)	62.55*** (6.56)	52.62*** (2.28)	39.21** (2.38)	47.23*** (5.58)	56.91*** (5.81)	-378.5*** (-2.77)	-258.0* (-1.71)	-258.0* (-1.71)	-161.9 (-0.96)	-498.7* (-1.68)	-188.5 (-1.19)	-225.0 (-0.66)
Observations	143	127	127	126	127	127	126	143	127	127	126	127	127	126
Country Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

See the notes to Table 6a.

Table 8b.
Other Classifications of Extreme Right and Democracy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
	Dep. Var.: Neofascist + Populist Parties Combined														
Immigration	4.002 (0.85)	-2.666 (-0.52)	-4.033 (-0.78)	-2.666 (-0.52)	-4.033 (-0.78)	4.706 (0.90)	5.090 (0.96)	6.476 (1.20)	5.090 (0.96)	6.476 (1.20)	0.485 (0.12)	-3.160 (-0.80)	-4.162 (-1.03)	-3.160 (-0.80)	-4.162 (-1.03)
Unemployment	6.165* (1.97)	-1.860 (-0.50)	-2.282 (-0.62)	-1.860 (-0.50)	-2.282 (-0.62)	12.29*** (3.94)	8.502** (2.46)	9.068** (2.60)	8.502** (2.46)	9.068** (2.60)	11.39*** (4.12)	6.853** (2.04)	6.952** (2.01)	6.853** (2.04)	6.952** (2.01)
Log Magnitude	2.398** (2.20)	4.587*** (3.85)	4.938*** (4.10)	4.587*** (3.85)	4.938*** (4.10)	-0.938 (-0.75)	0.544 (0.40)	0.253 (0.18)	0.544 (0.40)	0.253 (0.18)	-1.260 (-1.31)	0.993 (1.00)	1.211 (1.20)	0.993 (1.00)	1.211 (1.20)
Uppertier	0.594*** (3.09)	1.643*** (4.70)	1.617*** (4.65)	1.643*** (4.70)	1.617*** (4.65)	0.676*** (2.80)	1.304*** (3.29)	1.309*** (3.31)	1.304*** (3.29)	1.309*** (3.31)	0.684*** (3.82)	1.605*** (5.62)	1.582*** (5.52)	1.605*** (5.62)	1.582*** (5.52)
Immigration*Unemp.	0.0903* (1.84)	0.0410 (0.72)	0.0139 (0.24)	0.0410 (0.72)	0.0139 (0.24)	0.0484 (0.94)	0.0720 (1.21)	0.0887 (1.44)	0.0720 (1.21)	0.0887 (1.44)	0.132*** (3.23)	0.0685 (1.49)	0.0557 (1.17)	0.0685 (1.49)	0.0557 (1.17)
Democracy	4.285 (1.38)	-7.813 (-1.50)	-10.12* (-1.87)	-7.813 (-1.50)	-10.12* (-1.87)	9.454** (2.44)	5.418 (1.16)	7.419 (1.46)	5.418 (1.16)	7.419 (1.46)	7.324*** (2.77)	1.896 (0.50)	0.379 (0.092)	1.896 (0.50)	0.379 (0.092)
Democracy*Immigration	-0.288 (-0.43)	0.603 (0.82)	0.764 (1.04)	0.603 (0.82)	0.764 (1.04)	-0.480 (-0.64)	-0.593 (-0.78)	-0.759 (-0.99)	-0.593 (-0.78)	-0.759 (-0.99)	0.0755 (0.13)	0.561 (0.99)	0.685 (1.18)	0.561 (0.99)	0.685 (1.18)
Democracy*Unemp.	-0.969** (-2.04)	0.236 (0.42)	0.324 (0.59)	0.236 (0.42)	0.324 (0.59)	-1.762*** (-3.72)	-1.230** (-2.36)	-1.327** (-2.51)	-1.230** (-2.36)	-1.327** (-2.51)	-1.753*** (-4.21)	-1.044** (-2.08)	-1.045** (-2.02)	-1.044** (-2.08)	-1.045** (-2.02)
Resid_Immigration		-40.06 (-1.10)	-36.74 (-1.02)	-40.06 (-1.10)	-36.74 (-1.02)		-6.112 (-0.15)	-8.138 (-0.20)	-6.112 (-0.15)	-8.138 (-0.20)		-48.61 (-1.59)	-46.26 (-1.50)	-48.61 (-1.59)	-46.26 (-1.50)
Resid_Immig*Unemp.		-0.375 (-1.58)	-0.357 (-1.51)	-0.375 (-1.58)	-0.357 (-1.51)		0.0400 (0.15)	0.0432 (0.16)	0.0400 (0.15)	0.0432 (0.16)		-0.311 (-1.55)	-0.296 (-1.46)	-0.311 (-1.55)	-0.296 (-1.46)
Res_Immig*Democracy		5.873 (1.14)	5.415 (1.05)	5.873 (1.14)	5.415 (1.05)		0.826 (0.14)	1.099 (0.19)	0.826 (0.14)	1.099 (0.19)		7.041 (1.61)	6.712 (1.52)	7.041 (1.61)	6.712 (1.52)
Voter Turnout Rate		-0.195 (-1.52)	-0.195 (-1.52)	-0.195 (-1.52)	-0.195 (-1.52)		0.163 (1.14)	0.163 (1.14)	0.163 (1.14)	0.163 (1.14)		-0.114 (-1.04)	-0.114 (-1.04)	-0.114 (-1.04)	-0.114 (-1.04)
Proportional vs Majorit.				-8.278*** (-3.45)	-8.615*** (-3.60)				-2.326 (-0.84)	-2.045 (-0.74)				-3.069 (-1.54)	-3.274 (-1.63)
Constant	-129.9* (-1.73)	-39.22 (-0.99)	11.44 (0.17)	36.57 (1.02)	66.28 (1.63)	-131.3* (-1.83)	-113.3*** (-3.00)	-129.5* (-1.72)	-49.74 (-1.57)	-75.60* (-1.91)	-104.7** (-2.25)	-98.46*** (-3.37)	-32.96 (-0.64)	-20.52 (-0.79)	-2.097 (-0.065)
Observations	143	127	126	127	126	143	127	126	127	126	143	127	126	127	126
Country Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

See the notes to Table 6a.

İstanbul Bilgi University
European Institute Working Paper Series

1. EU/1/2009 Anbarcı, Nejat, Hasan Kirmanođlu, Mehmet A. Ulubařođlu.
Why is the support for extreme right higher in more open societies?

Orders can be placed:

İstanbul Bilgi University, European Institute, Dolapdere Campus
Kurtuluř Deresi Caddesi No: 47 Dolapdere
34440 İstanbul / Türkiye



İstanbul Bilgi University European Institute

Kurtuluş Deresi Caddesi No: 47 Dolapdere
34440 İstanbul / Türkiye

Phone: +90 212 311 50 00, Fax: +90 212 250 87 48
e-mail: europe@bilgi.edu.tr, <http://eu.bilgi.edu.tr/>



İstanbul Bilgi University, European Institute, Dolapdere Campus,
Kurtuluş Deresi Cad. No: 47, 34440 Dolapdere / İstanbul, Turkey
Phone: +90.(0)212.3115240 • Fax: +90 0212 250 87 48
e-mail: europe@bilgi.edu.tr • <http://eu.bilgi.edu.tr>